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Summary
Erving Goffman's idea that persons in interaction can 
be understood if they are thought to have the property of 
"ritualness" is extended. _A theory_of.interaction, that 
interactions are interactive to the degree that persons 
within them have "ritual power", develops itself. Persons 
are then seen as "possessions", and the sociological state, 
"rapture", of an audience when it is deeply moved by a 
fully possessed performer is taken as one pole of a new 
dimension of interaction whose other pole is interaction 
at the point of its ceasing to be interaction. Thus, into 
the social psychology of interaction is introduced an idea 
nowhere else even conjectured, that is, interactional life. 
But this life of everyday life - which 1 call the ritual 
realm - is only there through the appearances of life, 
though these, 1 contend, are not properly understood either 
literally or reductively any more than words are properly 
understood as sounds and letters alone.
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All my life needed was a sense of some place to go. I don’t 
believe that one should devote his life to morbid self 
attention. I believe that someone should become a person 
like other people.
Travis Bickle in Martin Scorsese’s film Taxi Driver
I ’m asking you to please look into your heart and at"least 
give me the chance with this historical deed to gain your 
respect .and_ love... . . - - - - - - - . - - - - - - . ^
John Hinckley, would-be assassin of President Reagan, 
in a letter to the actress who played Bickle’s 
prostitute in Taxi Driver
For after all, there are no half measures. Either it is 
reality or it is fiction. Either one opts completely for 
art or for chance. For construction or for actuality. Why 
is this so? Because in choosing one, you automatically 
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Introduction
This thesis contributes to the sociological study 
of interactions, in the belief that, if these are not 
understood, all other social groupings will be inade­
quately understood. A large part of my argument is also 
directed against the possibility of there being a non- 
sociological psychology that could have relevance to 
dbaple social science categories like "person".
Throughout, I ignore the substantive content of inter­
actions and also, very often, their contexts. My 
exemplar here has been Erving Goffman, whose work persuades 
me that this delimitation of interest may not fatally 
damage an analysis. So, my view of the world is eccen­
tric, and, because of that, clearer than one which would 
attempt what I regard as an impossible comprehensibility. 
The following quotation from Susan Sontag's (1979) book 
On Photography, if the words "photograph" and "photographer" 
are replaced by sociology and sociologist, sums up my 
current views on the activity in which I am engaged:
The contingency of photographs confirms that every­
thing is perishable; the arbitrariness of photo­
graphic evidence indicates that reality is 
fundamentally unclassifiable. Reality is summed 
up in an array of casual fragments - an endlessly 
alluring, poignantly reductive way of dealing with 
the world ... the photographer's insistence that 
everything is real also implies that the real is 
nd enough.
I would add that some part of my motivation in this 
thesis is the hopeless task of making the real "real 
enough". At least I shall answer the questions,
"Real enough for what?" and "What is 'enough*?".
Style of the Thesis
Most of the writing that follows is in essay style, 
and my language at times is allowed to become dramatic.
The essay style is the only appropriate one for my 
dual purpose of developing an argument and mobilising 
some new concepts, and it is, furthermore, inevitable, 
given the lack of pertinent data, which lack has thrown 
me onto my own persuasive resources. Of course, I do 
draw on a considerable amount of self-collected data, 
but this, in my view, is quite insufficient to warrant 
more than guided speculations. In the thesis I use my 
data for illustrative purposes mostly, though prior to 
writing I was to some extent enraptured (this is one of 
my new concepts) by it; also I continually reference - 
but do not write down - my own experience of interactions, 
for not to do so in the case of a thesis like this 
strikes me as purblind.
As for the language, it is sometimes given free 
rein so that it goes "too far". This is in the belief - 
variously set forth by very many writers on methodology 
including White (1978), Roche (1973), Jameson (1972), 
Brown (1977), Churchland (1979), Gergen (1977), Mills
(1940), and Silverman & Torode (1980) - that the matter 
of a verbal analysis is often lodged in its manner or 
style. Accordingly, I assume that new germane matter 
might be generated by "freeing up" the prose here and 
there. The cost of this sort of self indulgence 
unfortunately is that it may at times distract the 
reader from the main themes, but it is also entirely 
possible that one or two of the distractions may 
eventually turn out to bè very promising leads into 
future analyses. The kind of current tradition to 
which I am intellectually affiliated in sociology, 
therefore, would be one that could say through a 
spokesman such as T.R. Young (1980)*
Social science methodology in its quantitative 
mode should recognise the primitive character of 
its operations and not insinuate these as superior 
to folk methods. One should realize that quanti»? 
fication is a process by which the richness of 
everyday life is made progressively more barren 
as it proceeds. One discards information (variety) 
as human behavior is organized into word sets.
Still more information is discarded as one transfers 
data from words sets into number sets - a number 
set is simply not as informative as a word set 
since wDrd sets are not limited by the constraints 
of number sets - ordinality, intervality, and 
rationality. One loses still more information 
as one converts descriptive parameters into summary 
statistics. Quantification, then, is a process 
by which information is systematically discarded.
One must not assume that, since valuable information 
is obtained by such distillation, this knowledge 
surpasses that produced by symbolic interaction 
using words or by behavioral interaction.
If the quality of human life is intimately connected 
to the quality of its symbolic systems (as indeed 
they are), then passion, anger, joy, disgust, hope 
and rage should not be excluded from the pages of 
authentically human endeavor. The languages of 
business, mathematics, computers and science are 
too poor a vehicle upon which to place the fate of 
human society. They are too meagre, too remote, and 
too barren a soil in which to plant ideas.
New Concepts of the Thesis
My main source of conceptual inspiration has been 
Erving Goffman's formulation of persons as ritual beings.
From this I have generated the new concept of "ritual power", 
which I argue for in Part Two. Ritual power is akin to the 
theatrical notion "presence", and I try to show that presence 
is self-possession to a high degree. This leads me to 
propose that persons - insofar as they are ritual beings 
who may gain or lose ritual power through their performances - 
in interactions - may be viewed as "possessions". The 
new concept of "possession" has several advantages over 
that of "role" or "part" or even "self". First of all, it 
implies a coherent and conscious being who is not to be 
best analysed by recourse to his psychology or physiology. 
Secondly, in that possessions disappear if reductively 
analysed, they are specifically ritual phenomena, and, 
therefore, of all the ways there are of speaking about 
persons, this is the one that stays closest to the idea 
(drawnfrom Goffman) that persons are persons because they 
have "ritualness". Possession, I shall be arguing, can 
be seen as wholly ritual entities whose proper world I 
call the "ritual realm". The ritual realm has to be 
understood as that projection from a person's appearances 
of the intelligible form of his possession. In human 
interaction, I suggest, the ritual realm functions very 
much as does perspective in two-dimensional photographs; 
the ritual realm is a moral dimension of conduct simply 
not visible when behaviour is coded literally or analysed 
in the absence of value judgements, for instance in the
work of both microanalysts and ethnomethodologists. Towards 
the end of the thesis, I set out one more new concept ; 
"rapture". This is the corollary to possession in inter­
action. It arises if one person's self-possession is 
particularly fascinating (by being so well acted that the 
ritual realm it appears to originate in is very clear) 
when other persons (in their capacity as audience) will 
feel rapture at their temporary loss of themselves in 
that possession. _ _ _ - - - -
Obviously I shall be introducing all these concepts 
one at a time and with a fair amount of argumentation, but 
it is, I think, at this stage, helpful for the reader to 
see that there are not too many of them - "ritual power", 
"possession", "ritual realm", and "rapture" - and that they 
are closely linked together by their all having grown out 
of Coffman's idea of "ritualness" in interaction.
The main argument of the thesis, then, will be that 
these concepts are positively demanded for a full under­
standing of human interaction.
At no point in the development of this argument 
have I tried to disentangle myself from my assumptions or 
from the social context in which I have written and read 
and researched. I have settled instead for being as 
conscious as I can be, at all times, of what I bring
to the analysis from those selves of mine who are 
strangers to sociology. I shall indicate in the methodology 
chapter that I think that any other course of analytic 
action, given the natures of persons and of language, 
would reduce speech to an endlessly self-complicating 
apology for itself, which I assume is not the best kind 
of speech there can be. A consequence of my ethnocentric- 
ity, therefore, is that I occasionally make my position 
clear by contrasting it to some other current position 
that for the reader may only be a latent, hidden presence 
(off-stage, as it were). The hope is that the position 
made clear can then stand independently.
Plan of the Thesis
What I term the "ritual code" is discovered by the 
activity of researching interactions, and I explain this 
process in the early methodology chapter which precedes 
a definitive statement, made largely in his words, of 
Erving Goffman*s ritual frame, the only such frame in 
sociology.
Having established the potential of Coffman's 
notion of ritualness, I describe two groups of persons, 
punks and nurses, with a view to finding out how they 
make themselves what they are in their interactions. My 
conclusion is that the concept of ritual, power is 
necessary to a proper description of the conduct of 
punks and nurses.
By now, and for the rest of the thesis, off and on, 
the idea of fashion is running through the narrative 
like a leitmotif. In the chapter "Fashionable Ritual"
I even assert that ritual power is gained by fashionable 
conduct, and then, in the first three chapters of Part 
Three, I keep returning to this idea while explaining 
the concept of possession in some of its ramifications. 
Throughout, it is implicit that fashion conduct is 
originality on the. cheap,- that, originality is ritually .
powerful, that what is morally good is fashionable conduct, 
that conduct is modelled after its staged representations, 
and that these latter entertain most when their drama is the 
resolution of conflicting conduct fashions.
In Chapter IX, I change the perspective and look at 
possession from the audience's point of view. Tentatively, 
the hypothesis surfaces that there can be no comprehension 
of anything without some emotional experience like that 
of a theatre audience's when it is being moved or trans­
ported .
Finally the "Summary and Conclusions", though they 
do carefully recapitulate the argument of the thesis, 
actually read like a parallel narrative. The idea here 
is that richer meaning can be created when two slightly 
different ways of saying the same thing are placed side 
by side. This is perfectly in keeping with the notion 
of a ritual realm; the thesis can be interpreted as two 
distinct enactments coming from the same realm, which
is the better charted by stereoscopic verbal vision.
I conclude this introduction with a quotation from 
Feyerabend (in Hollinger, 1980):
Knowledge is not a series of self-consistent 
theories that converges towards an ideal view; it 
is not a gradual approach to the truth. It is 
rather an ever increasing ocean of mutually 
incompatible (and perhaps even incommensurable) 
alternatives, each single theory, each fairy tale, 
each myth that is part of the collection forcing 
the others'into greater articulation, and all of 
them contributing, via this process of competition, 
to the development of our consciousness. Nothing 
is ever settled, no view can ever be omitted from 
a comprehensive account ... Experts and laymen, 
professionals and dilettanti, truth-freaks and 
liars - they are all invited to participate in 
the contest and to make their contributions to the 
enrichment of our culture. The task of the 
scientist ... is no longer to "search for the 
truth," or to "praise God," or to "systematize 
observations," or to "improve predictions." These 
are but side effects of any activity to which his 
attention is mainly directed and which is to make 
the weaker case the stronger (as the sophists said) 
and thus to sustain the motion of the whole.





RITUAL REASONS FOR A RITUAL CODE
This thesis is "interpretive" sociology as Tudor 
(1976) defines this^ and at times I implicitly ask the 
reader to test its assertions against his own experience. 
However, I do not mean to be read in a literary way as, 
for example, Erving Goffman, who writes better than I 
do, has been said to ask readers to so read him (Cioffi, 
1971), because if there is such a response as a literary 
one to this text (or, for that matter, to Goffman*s 
texts) it would come about only after cognitive appreci­
ation, which is a reversed route to that roted by Raymond 
Williams and F.R. Leavis as the one by which literature 
has its effect on readers . Having said this, I must 
admit that I do not see language as being ideally suited 
to cognitive expression, for reasons that Tyler (1978), 
among many others, puts forward. But even when I "swerve" 
(White, 1978), preferring an aphorism to stylistic 
exhaustiveness, I mean to appeal to the mind ahead of 
the senses and the emotions, and only write as I do then 
because then I equate analytic exhaustiveness with styl­
istic brevity. Thus, I try to avoid "prattle", which
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Barthes (1976) defines as: "An unweaned language - 
imperative, automatic, unaffectionate, a minor disaster 
of static." I,am informed here by the following:
The intellect is naive and, too often, vulgar.
(Bateson, 1978)
We are scientific because we lack subtlety.
(Barthes, 1976)
Most human communication is incredibly rich,, 
closer to poetry than mathematics.
(Pittenger et al, 1960)
Understanding a sentence is much more akin to 
understanding a theme in music than one may think.
(Wittgentstein, 1963)
So it is that, no more than I tried to conduct research 
in the manner of a Routine Observational Boob (Douglas, 
1977) or an Ideal Sentential Automaton (Churchland, 1979), 
do I expect the reader to read in like persona.
Any research report is talk about absent others. 
Yerkovich (1976) has shown that such talk in a "folk 
science" mode (Young, 1980) creates people as moral 
characters by concentrating on their sanctionable 
conduct. Abstract evaluative categories develop and - 
in the talk - a small moral community comes into being. 
This is what gossip is, of course, and I suggest here 
that reports should not forget that when they are about 
people they are a strange variant of gossip. Remembering
11
this, a writer at least might refrain from the worst 
excesses of scientising prose; and if the writer, as 
I would, wishes to write as a person rather than as 
Douglas's boob or Churchland's automaton he is likely 
to be drawn to the topic of good and bad conduct, as 
I am.
My choice of moral conduct as an analytic starting 
point, of course ; shows that • a value nf mine iŝ  that 
this is worth studying. A further value I hold is that 
one should value one's values, so I ask the reader to 
just accept this and therefore save me from pulling 
this chapter out of its course by justifying values 
whose justifications would have to be justified and so 
on.
Writing, too, is conduct, but I have avoided 
reflexivity in this text, because even if the text does 
write me (Ricoeur, 1976; Silverman & Torode, 1980; Booth, 
1961) I would rather be a textual fool than the mass 
of my words disappearing into itself that Foucault (1979) 
recommends :
We can say that today's writing has freed itself 
from the dimension of expression. Referring only 
to itself, but without being restricted to the 
confines of its inferiority, writing is identified 
with its own unfolded exteriority. This means that 
it is an interplay of signs arranged less according 
to its signified content than according to the 
very nature of the signifier. Writing unfolds 
like a game that invariably goes beyond its own 
rules and transgresses its limits. In writing, 
the point is not to manifest or exalt the act of 
writing, nor is it to pin a subject within language.
12
it is rather a question of creating a space into 
which the writing subject constantly disappears.
I want now to expand on my bald statement in the 
"Introduction" that I have not tried to "disentangle 
myself from my assumptions," and will do this by 
contrasting my position to the one advocated 
by Glaser & Strauss (1968) in their book. The Discovery 
of Grounded Theory. Glaser & Strauss say that "categories" 
and then theories "emerge" from data, into which the 
researcher puts minimal pre-emptive interpretation. I find 
this nonsensical, because categories can only be named 
in the consciousness of the researcher, which is the 
more encompassing the more subtly interpretive it is.
As Popper (1977) says:
We observe only what our problems, our biological 
situation, our interests, our expectations and 
our action programmes make relevant. Just as 
our observational instruments are based upon 
theories, so are our very sense organs, without 
which we cannot observe. There is no sense organ 
in which anticipating theories are not genetically 
incorporated ... our sense organs are products of 
adaptation - they can be said to be theories, or 
to incorporate theories: theories come before 
observation, and so they cannot be the results 
of repeated observation.
What is more, "after the moment of the observer's birth 
no observation can be undertaken in all innocence. We 
always know something already, and this knowledge is 
intimately involved in what we come to know next"
3(Kaplan, 1964) . So Glaser & Strauss's "mindless"
collection of data and uncritical immersion in it 
repudiates the very means by which there can be any
13
data at all, or any thoughts about it. This is why I 
make a point of saying that when I operate as a researcher 
I operate wide awake and in as thinking a mode as possible, 
never forgetting that there are no pure data "because 
there are only data for some hypothesis or other"
(Kaplan, 1964). In other words, I do my best to develop 
my ideas through whatever encountered material they can 
use, Silverman & Jones (1976) say such a course is 
the only conceivable possibility, since, as there is 
no "neutral" ground, bias (as they call it) is the 
necessary condition for apprehending reality.
Much of my thesis, then, is concerned with the 
morality of conduct (though not with the morality of 
the thesis) and I continually reference what I call the 
"ritual code" . What is this code? First of all it is 
an "occasioned corpus", of which this telling is but 
one small part. Even attempts to explain or describe 
it are merely peculiar ways of exhibiting it, since the 
code cannot be switched off, as it were, during an 
operation calling itself explanation. To clarify my 
distinction here between "telling" and explaining, I 
now give an outline of how telling works in "The Convict 
Code: A Study of a Moral Order as a Persuasive Activity" 
in which Donald Wieder (1969) discovered a convict code 
which is a variant of the ritual code.
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In a halfway house for paroled Californian narcotics 
felons, Wieder found that he could not practise partici­
pant observation because inmates would not let him 
befriend them:
It would be an understatement to say that I was 
dismayed by "getting put in my place" by references 
to the code. For a week or so I thought I could 
learn nothing more about the lives of the residents
It was when he tried to understand his putative failure 
as a researcher that Wieder stumbled across the convict 
code. This code includes maxims such as, "Do not trust 
staff, staff is heat," and these maxims account for the 
mistrust with which Wbder's attempts to participate 
were met :
If you asked a question, as a device to get the 
conversation going, while it was the case that 
you might get a response, the conversation kept 
going only so long as you developed devices to get 
a response out of the resident. If you stopped 
making that kind of effort, the conversation just 
ended. The experience was of not ever getting the 
conversation going. I experienced the conversational 
style as isolating, embarrassing and telling me 
that I was not acceptable - that I did not belong.
The effect was that of being a stranger among a 
lot of persons that were talking together but not 
letting me in.
Hurt by interactions like these, Wieder began to 
formulate the concept of a convict code. He is absolutely 
certain, however, that he needed the code in embryo 
form in order to create the code he eventually told.
For him, the code was an "interpretive device" as it 
was for residents, because it was consequential within 
the halfway house, as "instructive oral traditions"
15
for outsiders could not have been. Used by residents 
to interpret their conduct, the code was "a guide to 
perception" of reportable patterned conduct %
The code then, is a title of a normative order 
in search of its component maxims and behaviors 
which it analyses and explains. The activation 
of the search, which the code title suggests, is 
achieved by an observer who actively interprets 
the indexical particulars (the imbedded "bits and 
pieces" whose sense is determined by their seen 
relevance to some content) of talk and action, and 
in so doing cdnsfitutes the setting as an ordered 
setting for himself that he can live in and with.
... the stable organization of the halfway house 
is the attainment of guided imagination which 
searches for sense through concretely experienced 
scenes.
Wieder was repeatedly offered "moral characterizations 
which made reference to the code," and so this code, 
although only one of many theoretically possible codes, 
acted as "moral persuasion and justification".
Explanation of conduct in terms of the code has to be 
moral justification in order to disambiguate behaviours 
and place them in an ongoing conceptual structure whose 
main clarifying device is to sort conduct into the two 
categories of good and bad, good being that which tells 
the code and bad being that which goes against it,(Wieder's 
participant observation went against it, and so also did 
every attempt of staff to therapize inmates by what 
inmates called "grouping" - the practice of publicly 
looking for motives that were supposed to be hard to 
locate.) The code is a moral one because he who does 
not orient to it with sufficient competence is defined 
as "unserious". Though Wieder does not develop his
16
analysis in this direction, it looks as if the code, 
which uses the categories of good and bad to sort conduct, 
relies on a fundamental definition of a person as a 
being who can choose to be good or bad, since those 
perceived as not being able to so choose cease to be 
treated as full persons. Indeed, in the halfway house, 
the reputational sanction of stripping a person of 
his value and status as a person enforced the code among 
staff» inmates,and researcher alike :
[some staff] were described by the residents as 
stupid, square, fools, naive, and could not be 
respected. Residents coined derogatory nicknames 
for staff members that were particularly trouble­
some to them. They passed these names on to other 
staff members accompanied by demeaning stories 
about the staff member in question's competence. 
Staff employed these names and stories to degrade 
each other. Staff would say of each other things 
like, "John is realty" a square. He thought he could 
get these guys to help him set up a play; you should 
hear what thes residents have to say about him."
Because telling the code is an integral part of the 
conduct it interprets, any sociological description, 
including Wieder's, is only one further instance of 
"the product which results from the uses of practices 
whereby 'telling the code' is achieved."
From this it can be seen that the ritual code of 
human conduct, just like Wieder's convict code, can 
never be completely told, since each telling is a further 
interpretative act informed by all previous tellings 
and informing all future tellings. However, if in the 
telling it is not exhaustively explained or if in the 
telling it seems to resist a convergent analysis that
17
in any case would nail it to nothing more substantial 
than pretensions to conclusiveness, it can at least be 
isolated and illuminated as an interpretive device.
The ritual code like any other code that would be 
told, of course, must be known prior to its exploration. 
That this code does not originate in a particular 
community but comes instead from the work of Erving 
Goffman, who taok ib from Emile -Durkheim, need not 
weaken its meaning and credibility, for as Wieder found, 
a code cannot be told in detail unless first it is 
grasped somehow or other. No code to begin with, no 
code ever after . I grasped the ritual code as I found 
it in Erving Goffman, but there will be many other 
places to find it.
I think it relevant at this point to preface the 
"Ritual Frame of Erving Goffman" (which is the next 
chapter) with some thoughts on Goffman*s own acquisition 
of the code. These I derive from observations I made 
during one week of the spring of 1980 in the Shetland 
village where Goffman, doing his PhD fieldwork, first 
hit on the analytical necessity to view interacting 
persons as ritual beings.
Goffman first introduces his ritual frame in his 
thesis, "Communication Conduct in an Island Community", 
where he uses it to interpret the conduct of crofters 
and gentry in Baltasound, a tiny settlement and port
18
which is the largest of three centres of habitation 
on the island of Unst, the northernmost Shetland island.
It was in and around Baltasound that Goffman studied 
social conduct by "observant participation" (Goffman, 1953) 
for twelve months of the seventeen-month period, December 
1949 to May 1951.
The first thing to be experienced by the visitor 
to the barren island of Unst is the unusual openness to 
surveillance of its scattered dwellings. The houses and 
cottages in this community of some 300 people (now as then) 
are not oriented to a mainstreet proper, and all the 
principal gatthering places - village hall, post office, 
shop, school, hotel, and so on - are a good walk from 
one another. Thus, people in their everyday traffic are 
well spread out too, always seeing and being seen from a 
long way off. Moreover, there are few occasions when 
a person will be seen by someone unknown to him or her, 
for in Baltasound, though there may be occasional strangers, 
no one could long remain one. In this environment, the 
visitor soon begins to feel the need for the "expressive 
responsibility" of Goffman*s thesis, and this certainly 
has to be very great here, for one is always being watched, 
if not by other persons then by sheep, ponies, birds, seals, 
and, from the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, fishing 
vessels. It is only a hunch, of course, but I think 
that Goffman in this space that is exposed to every kind 
of eye, at a period in his life when for the first time 
he was intensely scrutinizing his fellow man, must have
19
over-emphasised the theme of mutual accountability in 
social life.
Because each islander is known to every other 
islander and because islanders work, play, and sleep 
on the same nine miles long by four miles wide "piece 
of rock ... covered by a thin skin of poor soil"
(Goffman, 1953), the place almost defines itself as a 
total institution (Goffman, 1968}. This theme Goffman 
encountered again, but much more thoroughly stated, five 
years after leaving Unst, in his year-long participant 
observation study of Queen Elizabeth's Hospital, 
Washington D.C., but, subtly and unacknowledged, it is 
present in the thesis. Nearly all the interactions that 
Goffman studied must have been between people not only 
well known to one another but also unlikely to ever 
socially escape one another in the future, as in a total 
institution, and so all interactions may have been 
conducted with a greater sense than usual of what they 
might portend. Given, too, the elaborate background 
expectancies possessed by islanders in such situations, 
one can see how conduct could have been often a taxing 
interpersonal problem even in trivial, routine encounters. 
This, then, is the basis of my second hunch, that, on 
the island, interaction is a more serious business than, 
say, in a city neighbourhood.
However, no one who knew Erving Goffman during his 
period of study had any inkling of what he was really
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up to. He used a cover story as a spy might, telling 
islanders that his research interest was "in gaining 
firsthand experience in the economics of island farming" 
(Goffman, 1953) . Thus his participation in social life 
was not a participation as an islander would have 
understood that. It was in fact an extremely scientific 
procedure - in the positivist sense of being emotionally 
detached, with a strong motivation to be objective - 
carried out by one man on his fellow men. (It would 
not be surprising if this experience - of being a 
successful spy - did not activate Goffman's interest 
in spying which came to fruition in the first essay of 
Strategic Interaction) So, on top of the fact that he 
was in a place where everyday encounters were expressively 
delicate and demanding to a high degree, Goffman was a 
person with much to hide, who, as he says, had he been 
discovered to have been taking an interest in interaction, 
would not have survived in the setting, since "residents 
would not readily accept as friend and neighbour someone 
who asked formal questions about interaction or someone 
who showed an unnatural interest in matters of that kind" 
(Goffman, 1953). There must be, then,a strong possibility 
that Goffman, not only with something to hide but also 
with an anxiety to keep himself viable in his research 
site, was abnormally sensitive to the nuances of 
interaction in Baltasound, quite apart from his scientific 
interest. So while inevitably sharpening his perception, 
his own social situation surely led Goffman to overstate 
the treacherousness of interaction, when he calls it,
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for example, a "cold war" (Goffman, 1953), and perhaps 
it is because of this that there is hardly anything in 
the thesis, or indeed ever after, that dwells on people's 
pleasure in sociability, besides a brief mention of 
"euphoric interplay", which, described as well-nigh 
impossible, is never analytically developed.
The crofters Goffman researched are still, almost 
thity years later, a closed culture, distrustful of 
outsiders and keeping themselves to themselves by 
speaking their own half Norse and half Scots dialect.
Goffman certainly was accepted by them, probably because 
his "farming research" cover-story game him pretexts, 
but at all times, as a Canadian, he would have been in 
the position* of having to learn his way in an alien 
culture with little help coming from any spoken words.
This, then, might be a contributory reason for Goffman's 
decision to analytically exclude the "official" substance 
of language in encounters, in his thesis and for the rest 
of his career.
In this context that I have described, Erving Goffman's 
behaviour as a scientist can easily be seen as showing, 
then, a lack of reverence to other people, on two counts. 
Firstly, he spied on aspects of their conduct that he 
knew they themselves believed should not be raised into 
Consciousness, and, secondly, he did not tell them that 
he was doing this. Consequently I argue that Goffman 
arrived at the ritual code by the same route that Wieder
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took to get to the convict code; it was his very awareness 
that he was committing offences by being scientific that 
alerted him to the set of rules that is there to protect 
people's ritual worth. A whole complex of uneasy 
experiences with regard to the respect that is owed to 
people would be - for the young Goffman - explained at 
a stroke by a ritual code which then becomes a means 
perceiving more yet of persons' ritual conduct.
In the next chapter, before developing it a little 
more, I provide a definitive statement of the ritual code 




1 Tudor (1976) writes: "As long as we can agree with the 
analysis, it appears as an unproblematic construction of 
reality shared between ourselves and the researcher. When 
we disagree, then we must ask why. And in so asking we
find that the only possible reply is that, in our experience, 
this particular claim or interpretation does not hold true.
So the very process of writing interpretive sociology 
tacitly demands, of.the reader that he make the test which - 
will, in its limited way, *warrant’ the account. But 
because the process remains an implicit expectation its 
status is disturbingly unclear. Only by rendering test 
criteria open and explicit can we begin to judge the 
characteristics of our knowledge claims." This seems to 
me reasonable, so I have been open and explicit.
2 I do not disagree with Zollschan & Overington's (197 6) 
assertion that the "argumentative form of scientific speech 
must attend to what is the most convincing rhetoric" for
a particular scientific public, but rather suggest that the 
rhetoric in Goffman's case, with, for instance, its very 
frequent use of the first person plural, which enlists the 
reader into the writer’s company so that both seem to share 
the same point of view of the phenomena under analysis, 
finds its plausibility less through reports of highly 
acceptable tests than by highly acceptable reports that 
are their very own tests, which the reader is invited to 
make with the writer as each goes along with the other.
Taylor & Cohen (1980) have remarked that only Goffman 
and Simmel, among sociologists, speak to them as persons, 
and Harre (1979) says exactly the same thing. So Goffman 
does have a recognized ability to take sociology farther 
into the lives of his public than any of his contemporaries, 
by going directly to experiences he and they have in 
common and by writing sociologically about these so well 
that his sociology immediately seems to illuminate and 
charge with relevance hitherto dim and overlooked areas
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of social life. The scientific value of Goffman then is 
established by his ability to write for his fellow scientists 
as persons, which by the circular argument that their 
readership constitutes his authority, must also establish 
that it can be unscientific to write as if the reader is 
tightly straightjacketed by his consciousness of himself 
as a scientist before or in spite of or against himself as 
a person.
Some of this argument and both the quotes from Kaplan 
come from Peter Cumberlidge's ”Thé Derivation of Explanatory 




THE RITUAL FRAME OF ERVING GOFFMAN
Introduction
. The ritual frame of interaction, which I call "The 
Stalking - Ground" ̂ is used constantly by Erving Goffnan throughout: 
his whole oeuvre, but it is only one of several different, 
merged frames with viiich he describes and interprets the rules 
of face-to-face interaction, and nowhere is it set forth in its 
entirety. It is first mentioned in Goffnan’s Ph D thesis on 
page 103, viien Goffnan casually observes that in interaction a 
person may "come to be seen" as a sacred object. On the next 
page, below further exposition of what Goffnan here, for the 
first time, calls a "ritual model", a footnote explains that 
this "general view" is based on a section of Emile Durkheim’s 
The Elementary Foms of the Religious Life (Goffnan,. 1953) • Then, 
three years later, in "The Nature of Deference and Demeanor" 
(Goffman, 1972) (his fullest analysis of the ritual frame) he 
again references the same book by Durkheim, this time specifically 
citing the chapter on the soul, and, at the beginning of his 
paper, he says that he wants "to explore some of the senses in 
vdiich the person in our urban secular world is allotted a kind 
of sacredness that is displayed and confirmed by our symbolic 
acts."
What I produce here, as the substance of this chapter, is 
an extraction from Goffnan’s oeuvre of almost every "ritual"
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statement he has made on the subject of human interplay. This 
is possible because the ritual frame is described as late as 
1976 ("Replies and Responses”) no differently than in 1953 
(the Ph D); a collage of quotations can be organised to display 
a remarkable internal coherence. Althou^ I actively interpret 
the ritual frame - by ordering it in the way I think best 
exhibits it - I keep my linking narrative to a minimum, so that 
vtet hitherto has been scattered and without form becomes 
explicit, as nearly as possible in Goffnan's own words. (But 
one must not imagine that Goffnan would want to define his ritual 
frame or to define it like this.)
I have isolated Goffnan’s ritual frame to show how 
impressive it is (more so, I think, than the celebrated drama­
turgical frame). Also it seems to me to be the most serious part 
of Goffnan’s sociology, as well as the least respected. So I 
risk thoroughly biasing Goffnan's implicit ritual model in order 
to manifest its arresting power and its subtlety. This I think 
is worth doing in its own right, but the frame as I present it is, 
in addition, the background of and starting point for my thesis.
I should justify ny selection and arrangement of quotations, 
so I shall do this by explaining how it came about. I picked 
every seeningly pertinent coirment on ritual life from Goffnan’s 
oeuvre and wrote each one on a separate index card. Then I spent 
a long time arranging and rearranging the order of the cards, until 
they fell into the groups as they are below. The order they come 
in is therefore intuitively arrived at and also is the one that - 
at the time of writing - seems the very best to me for the purpose 
of demonstrating the ritual frame.
27
The Ritual Frame of Erving Goffnan ̂
Ritual and Interaction
These remarks show Goffman's unhappiness with the 
connotations of the word ''ritual" and this signals his new 
uses for ity which are here indicated in their full scope.
The adjectives "ceremonious", "polite", and "expressive" 
less suitably .-describe interactional conduct in which "the actor 
portrays his relation to objects of value in their own right" 
than does "ritual", thou^ this itself has irrelevant connotations 
of "other-worldliness and autcmacity" (RR 266n). Ritual acts are 
those through which a person "shows he is worthy of respect or 
how worthy he feels others are of it," and a ritual order of 
expressions sustains his face, that "sacred thing" (E 19). People 
act not merely by strategically taking into consideration one 
another’s probable responses but also by engaging in mutual 
worship. Conduct, "when the idol we are ritually careful of is 
also ritually careful of us," thou^ partly influenced by thoughts 
of likely responses, is guided by "religious tenets and norms"
(CC 173). "Even more than being a game of infonnational management, 
conversational interaction is a problem in ritual management"
(CC 103). "The ritual frame provides a question that can be 
asked of anything occurring during talk and a way of accounting for 
what does occur" (RR 267).
Rituals
The overly calculating theories of Mead and Weber push 
Goffman to the idea of "considerateness'' which in turn pushes him 
to a view of persons as sacred, SOy little behaviours like 
greetings can be re-interpreted as celebrating big issues y such 
as the nature of humanness. The very morality of interaction can 
now be seen as stemming from the ritualness of human beingSy andy
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furthery a ritual model of interaction can explain interactiony 
especially as the model itself mimics shared conduct ideals.
The ritual model has been "poorly tested", peihaps because 
Mead and Weber tend to inply that when people take each other’s 
actions into consideration they do so instrumentally. But, if 
considerateness rather than calculation is meant by "consideration", 
it can be appreciated that people "taking into consideration" must 
also "give consideration" (CC 103). The object of greatest 
consideration is, of course, a god, before whom rites are performed 
"as frequently and carpulsively as the sacred value of the object 
is greah " yet, in so far as people too are regarded as sacred, 
piety governs conduct (CC 104):
.... in the idol’s inmediate presence we act with ritual 
care, appreciating that pious actions may favourably 
dispose the idol toward us and that impious actions 
may anger the idol and cause it to perform angry actions 
against us.
(CC 104)
Usually, however, only persons of the hipest office are as sacred 
as idols, and behaviour though often cerenonial is not nearly so 
often ceremonious : "An idol is to a person as a rite is to 
etiquette" (CC 104). A pious display, furthermore, may conceal 
other terms of an interaction, for "how a relationship is portrayed 
through ritual can provide an imbalanced, even distorted view of 
the relationship itself" (GA 3).
Acts such as salutations, invitations, compliments, and 
minor services, "through which the individual makes specific 
attestations to recipients concerning how he regards them and how 
he will treat them in the on-coming interaction," are "presentation 
rituals" (IR 71) vjhlle "avoidance rituals" like the use of formal 
address instead of first names, prevent violations of what Simnel
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called the "ideal sphere" of a person (IR 62). These rituals must 
look spontaneous. In total institutions, where they are coerced, 
staff recipients protect themselves from the knowledge that they 
do not win "natural" respect by defining inmates as "not-fully- 
adults" or by rationalizing that it is the office and not the man 
vdio is saluted (A 107). Deference patterns in general are "partly 
a matter of changing fashion" (IR 65) and ritual concerns "are 
patently dependent on cultural definition and can be expected to 
vary quite markedly from society to society" (RR 267 ).
"Ritually neutral" persons, not being able to give or take
offence, are neither sacred nor profane. Thus children, so far
as they are neutral, are not obliged to conduct themselves in a
socially responsible way (CC I86). And, like children, non-persons
(adults in a segmental society) have little sanctity, though this
may not be thou^t deplorable (for example, maids in Dixon^ had
to listen to untactful things that were said in front of them to
convey that maids’ feelings need not be taken into consideration
(CC 227-8)). The moral right to be valued has force to the degree
that claimed social characteristics are real; this countervails
the rule that claims "as to what is" are for other people "what
they ought to see as the ’is’" (PS 24). Should unsuitable
valuations be conveyed, a person "is obliged to try to cope __
by spontaneously treating them as if they had not occurred, or by
integrating them as best he can into the official definition of
the situation, or by merely sustaining tension without departing
physically from the situation" (E 47). This is "the morality of
interaction", which is always open to exploitation by the introduction
of references and acts a victim can manage only with difficulty
(E 47). "A promise to take ritual care of .... face is built into
the very structure of talk" (IR 40), and a person’s orientation to
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face, especially his own, "is the point of leverage that the ritual 
order has in regard to him" (IR 40). Not the individual, then, 
but society, in its social encounters, just to remain what it is, 
needs "self-regulating participants," who are mobilised through 
ritual. To perform their rituals persons need "to be perceptive, 
to have feelings attached to self and a self expressed throu^ 
face, to have pride, honor, and dignity, to have considerateness, 
to have tact and a certain amount of poise. " This extremely - 
prescribed behaviour, which is necessary for the coipetent inter­
acting that keeps society going, is repeatedly referred to as 
"universal human nature" (IR 44).
Within a ritual model of interaction :
1. An act is taken to carry implications regarding 
the character of the actor and his evaluation of 
his listeners, as well as reflecting on the 
relationship between him and them.
2. Potentially offensive acts can be remedied by the 
actor through accounts and apologies, but this 
remedial work must appear to be accepted as 
sufficient by the potentially offended party 
before the work can properly be teiminated.
3. Offended parties are generally obliged to 
induce a remedy if none is forthcoming or 
in some other way show that an unacceptable 
state of affairs has been created, else, in 
addition to what has been conveyed about them, 
they can be seen as submissive regarding others’ 
lapses in maintaining the ritual code.
(RR 269)
In addition, a ritual version of social reality allows
an act to be seen as "a passing exhortative guide to perception"
(GA 3), using those same social appearances an advertiser uses
to dramatise his product. Intention displays, microecological
mappings of social structure, approved typifications, and
gestural externalisations (of what can be taken to be inner
responses)claify otherwise opaque social situations (GA 27).
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"Whether we pose for a picture or execute an actual ritual 
action, what we are presenting is a commercial, an ideal 
representation under the auspices of its characterizing the 
way things really are" (GA 84). In real life, for instance, 
a man lifting a woman’s cigarette proposes to himself, to the 
woman, and to any onlookers that "females are worthy objects, 
physically limited in sane way, and that they should be helped 
out in all their transactions" (GA 84). Similarly, in Dixon, 
salutations "seem to confim and symbolize the right of all 
islanders to have certain kinds of access to all other islanders" 
and "these salutations provide an opportunity of acknowledging 
allegiance to the island and to the commoners, in general, who 
live on it" (CC 183).
Sane Rules of Interplay
Using his ritual conaeptionsj Goffman is able to interpret 
very many interactional regularities y including whole etiquette 
systems and eveny lately (in "Response Cries")y the f077ms of 
solitary but public exclamations.
The principal guide for conduct in interplay is "an image 
of what might and might not give offence to another" (CC 336). A 
person will know "how to behave" by "repeatedly and autonatically 
asking himself the question, ’If I do or do not act in this way, 
will I or others lose face?”' (IR 36). He will not, for example, 
break the "strong taboo" against withdrawing attention, since 
interplay cannot survive the disinterest of its participants (CC 145) 
He will not "improperly" change a topic too abruptly, for that 
would convey too little interest had been taken in the previous
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topic (CC 145). Happening unseen into situations where he might 
overhear remarks to his detriment, he "ought to warn them (the 
overheard) in some way by means of a tactful cue" (CC 94n) lest 
they are allowed to unwittingly give offence. However, self 
profanations, such as those of modesty, do not injure a person 
"qua object of ultimate worth" unless he is forced to treat 
himself this way against his will, when he will be seriously 
threatened. "The licence to accept mistreatment at his own hands 
that he does not have the right to accept from others" ensures
it is not abused (IR 32), thou^, in mental hospitals, "the kind
of infomation that the patient is likely to try to hide" is 
systematically circulated and "used daily to puncture his claims"
(A l48). Sanctions of moral disapproval in conversational 
order, unlike those of other social orders, are expressed 
immediately in ways that do not destroy the order they are designed 
to maintain (CC 34).
Rules are effective (in so far as they are) because 
those to whom they apply believe them to be right 
and come to conceive of themselves both in terms of 
who and what it is that compliance allows them to
be and in terms o f what deviation implies they have
become. The sanctioning systan associated with a 
rule is effective (in so far as it is) because it 
proclaims the individual's success or failure at 
realising what he and others feel he should be, 
and, more abstractly, proclaims the individual's 
conpliance with or deviation from rules in general.
(RP 127)
Thus encounters are much more than arbitrary periods during which 
messages are exchanged. They are "a coming together that ritually 
regularizes the risks and opportunities face-to-face talk provides, 
enforcing the standards of modesty regarding self and 
considerateness for others generally enjoined in the comnunity"
(RR 268). (By identifying the ritual in social situations it
33
becomes possible "to think in terms of general rules for the 
management of conversational interplay" (RR 268).)
Seemingly trivial interchanges like greetings and 
farewells "are expressive of the conceptions people have of one 
another" (and so by being performed in a "snide or fawning fashion" 
can express these quite subtly) (CC 66). The right to enter 
interplay or to bring another into interplay is likewise hedged 
about by ritual concerns, and is only given "to the degree that 
... action cannot be construed as an effort to reduce social 
distance or inproperly acquire strategic information" (CC 159). 
Persons, having once been "introduced", must thereafter engage in 
interplay with each other or else offend, and, similarly, a 
partygoer does not have the ri^t to not be spoken to by other 
partygoers. These arrangements show a ritual respect in the 
former case for the introducer and in the latter for the host 
(CC l60). Talk itself must have a ritual warrant for "silence, after 
all, is very often the deference we owe in a social situation to 
others present " and "without such enjoined modesty, there could be
no public life, but only a babble of childish adults pulling at
one another's sleeves for attention. The mother to whom we would 
be saying 'Look, no hands' could not reply, for she would be saying,
'Look, no hands' to someone else" (RC 813).
Rules of conduct are guides for action reconmended because 
it is suitable and just, not because it is "pleasant, cheap or 
effective" (IR 48). These rules are obligations and expectations 
that ensure the sort of accommodative consideration within 
interplay, where persons are "opened up" to one another, that is 
likely to be absent between its same participants when no longer 
face-to-face (CC 158). Here "territorial preserves" may play a 
dual ritual role, with "ccmings-into-touch" used as a means of
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establishing regard or avoided "as a means of maintaining respect"
(RP 87). Etiquette is the name of the general code governing these 
ceremonial rules and expressions. The forms of etiquette and 
courtesy are "model interchanges" that recognize people as sacred 
objects in an environment of potential offence (CC 191). In a culture 
that values high standards of mutual concern, elaborate politeness, 
then, may as easily evince concealed hostility as imitual regard 
(CC 18In), while courtesies perfoiroed at high cost are gallantries, 
showing à respect for ceranoni^ order over and above personal 
welfare (IR 200). But even the blurting of a response cry like 
"OuchI" is "a claim of sorts upon the attention of everyone in the 
social situation - a claim that our inner concerns be theirs, too"
(RC 8l4), yet at all tiroes the gestures "which carry an actor to 
a recipient must also signify that things will not be carried too 
far" (IR 76).
Manner and Appearance
Goffman is very precise about appropriate levels 
of involvement in interactiony even to specifying how much 
seeming "unthinkingness" there should be on certain occasions. 
He shows how the involvement norms that derive from ritual 
concerns facilitate orderly communication y as do the 
ritually appropriate appearances of decorumy mannery fronty 
demeanour y deference y body gloss y and clothing. His 
concentration on the irnportixnce of appearances inevitably 
leads him to raise the question of how they are trusted.
A person in interplay is ruled by involvement norms of 
two opposing kinds. Inhibitory norms limit the feelings he may 
express and keep him fhcm inappropriately involving himself in 
competing events, while a second set of norms obliges him to be 
"sincere and unaffected in an expressive way" as well as to show 
some real feelings. "These two sets of norms were found to be
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operative wherever, whenever, and with whomsoever spoken 
comnunication occurred on the island" (CC 350).
A social situation therefore can be defined as "that 
entity neatly matching the area within which the individual’s 
regulation of involvement is perceptible" (BP 194). Conduct 
therein obeys the norms of involvement that apply to intensity 
of involvement, distribution of involvement between main and side 
activities, and the tendency of involvement to bring an individual 
into engagements. In a multi-person situation, further rules 
against becoming externally preoccupied or, alternatively, over­
involved with oneself (or with just one other person) oblige 
a person to demonstrate his 'involvement in a situation through 
the modulation of his involvements within the situation" (BP 196); 
however, involvement levels do vary from interplay to interplay, 
as they do between roles in any one interplay (CC 247). Lacking 
its requisite human involvements "the minute social system that 
is brought into being with each encounter will be disorganized, and 
the participants will feel unruled, unreal, and anemic." Indeed̂  
a person habitually "thrown out of step with the sociable moment" 
can become" alienated from things that take much more of his time" 
(IR 135).
Interaction is most successful when persons scale down 
their own expressions and scale up the interest they show in 
those they are with. This suppression of self in favour of 
"other" is "the bridge that people build to one another, allowing 
them to meet for a moment of talk in a comnunion of reciprocally 
sustained involvement. It is this spark, not the more obvious 
kinds of love, that lights up the world" (IR 116-7). Involvement, 
however, ceases to be involvement the moment it is seen as 
premeditated: "The requirement that persons be inpulsively
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involved in interplay in which they participate is borne out by 
a very significant rule, namely that interplay must not be staged 
or worked out beforehand" (CC 249). All persons demand "that 
when an individual speaks, his bodily expression will provide 
easy access to all the information needed in order to determine 
how much self-belief and resolve lie behind his statements. 
Differently put, we demand of an individual that he not be too 
good at acting" (Si 44), i’lt would seem that the unthinking 
impulsive aspect of interaction is not a residual category that 
can be appended as a qualification to a rational model of 
conmunication; the spontaneous unthinking aspect of interaction is 
a crucial elenent of interaction" (CC 242). "Most actions that 
are guided by rules of conduct are performed unthinkingly" (IR 49).
Ritual facilitates comnunication. By conducting themselves 
with ritual care in regard to interruptions, leavetakings, 
inattentions, and the like (signs well designed "for expressing 
the judgements that parti^)ants make of one another") people 
cannot help but act so that messages "flow in an orderly fashion"
(CC 354-5). "The satisfaction of ritual constraints safeguards 
not only feelings but comnunication, too" (RR 267). Participants 
"motivated to preserve everyone ' s face .... end up acting so as 
to preserve an orderly comnunication" (RR 267). Moreover, unlike 
simple gramnars, ritual constraints "open up the possibility of 
corrective action as part of these very constraints" (RR 269).
Thus any rational model of communication reciprocates perfectly 
with the ritual model.
But interaction easily goes awry. If an "untoward event" 
occurs in a public place persons must establish a "viable alignment" 
by choosing from "the corpus of quick displays" that "by and 
large [are] a given of the culture" (RP 225). There is a
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"deterministic" need "to take some kind of stand to the deficiency 
in question" (RP 225). In Dixon, islanders acted under "conditions 
of great expressive responsibility" but everywhere "in our society" 
people are "trained to enploy a somewhat coirmon idiom of posture, 
position, and glances, wordlessly choreographing [themselves] 
relative to others in social situations with the effect that 
interpretability of scenes is possible" (GA 21). TWo aspects of 
this kind of "personal front" are decorum and manner: "Decorous 
behaviour may take the form of showing respect for the region and 
setting one finds oneself in" d̂iile "the part of personal front.... 
called 'manner' will be important in regard to politeness" (and 
politeness of course is only expressed in interaction) (PS 111). 
"Performers can stop giving expressions but cannot stop giving them 
off" (PS 111), and what is given off is demeanour : "That element of 
the individual's ceremonial behaviour, typically conveyed through 
deportment, dress, and bearing, which serves to express to those 
in his immediate presence that he is a person of certain desirable 
or undesirable qualities" (IR 77). Deportment and bearing in their 
turn constitute at least three types of "body gloss": orientation, 
circumspection, and overplay (RP 162-9). When these are used as 
"corrections for infractions" of a "multitude of minor territories 
of the self" they are "the indignity of overacted gesticulation"
(RP 171). However, a gloss such as the "delinquency strut" may 
be adopted to convey both a challenge to authority and the fact 
that the challenge has not been faced up to (IR 252). "The 
gestures which we sometimes call empty are perhaps the fullest things 
of all" (IR 33). "An unguarded glance, a momentary change of 
voice, an ecological position taken or not taken, can drench a 
talk in judgemental significance" (IR 33). In any situation a 
person is obliged "by sustaining a publicly oriented conposition
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of his face" to show that he is "in play", ready for interaction 
(BP 193-4) within vhich he must give frequent "takes" (CC l68) 
since attention signs "are a minor but significant communication 
courtesy" (CC 199). Coiposure is valued for itself because all 
tasks performed in social occasions demand it. (Discomposure 
in a person breaks rules protecting the selves of his coparticipants, 
vho have no choice, if this happens, but to forbear (CC 38).)
"Undirected corniiunication" like demeanour and appearance 
conveys less a specific message than overall conceptions concerning 
the sender and his others, and about these "participants have strong 
feelings" (CC 117). Clothing too is a kind of continous transmission, 
so incorrect attire can affront (CC 120), but since demeanour 
indexes a person's respect for the region of a social occasion and 
its participants (CC 117), it can also be established by acts 
"through which [a person] gives or withholds deference" (IR 8l).
Revealed here is a "fundamental social dialectic." To 
behave properly, people need to know the facts of a situation, but 
must rely on appearances. The less sure they are of the facts the 
more they must look to the very appearances that may have 
encouraged their uncertainty. A "gentleman" will seek to influence 
others' treatment of himself by acting straightforwardly to confim 
the impressions he gives. "Merchants or morality", on the other 
hand, under "the very obligation and profitability of appearing in 
a steady li^t, of being a socialized character," will amorally 
perfom their moral appearances (PS 241-4). So it is that a person 
"may be led to seek the safety of solitude rather than the danger 
of social encounters" (IR 39), or else put his trust in appearances 
that he knows can always be untrustworthy.
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Trusi
Trust is necessary y Goffman has to asserty else society 
would regress into multiplying paranoioy but it is broken for 
convenience and giveny often enoughy on the understanding that it 
will not be taken at face value.
Inasmuch as words are regarded s ls  expressive they are 
taken seriously, and generally the social utility of not becoming 
known as a liar prompts people to say vbat they mean. Because 
"we cannot build another into bur plans unless we can rely on him 
to give his word and keep it" the virtue of honesty that is demanded 
"is made out of organizational necessity" (SI 128,130). In any 
situation, signs of trust must be conveyed since "only v^en these 
signs are received may the individual feel secure enough to give 
himself up to the merely-situated aspects of his involvements"
(BP 197 ). In all relationships "as evidence of trust and mutual 
caimitment" persons are obliged "to exchange an appropriate amount 
of intimate facts about self" (S 108). However, the trust of a 
prepatient passing down his "betrayal funnel" into a mental 
hospital is systematically abused. At each interactional step in 
his betrayal, consideration is shown to him as if he had finally 
reached bottom, but only to win his reciprocated orderly behaviour 
(A 130-1). This kind of cynical consideration is akin to the 
"phantom acceptance" normals give to a stigmatized person, and the 
worst of it is that this is the best the stignatized person can 
hope for, because "the degree to which normals accept the 
stignatized individual" is directly related to "his acting with 
full spontaneity and naturalness as if the conditional acceptance 
of him, which he is careful not to overreach, is full acceptance"
(S 147). But phantom acceptance is a condition of all relationships 
"Any mutual adjustment and mutual approval between two individuals
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can be fundamentally embarrassed if one of the partners accepts in 
full the offer that the other appears to make; every ’positive’ 
relationship is conducted under implied promises of consideration 
and aid such that the relationship would be injured were the 
credits actually drawn on" (S 147). Trust, therefore, is a kind 
of expediency that must not look as knowing as it is.
Place
Ftaoe is a wider term than status^ and Goffnan uses it a loty 
meaning hy it y I thinky the total possible social environment of 
a person. He also seems to de fine place as the amount of ritual 
respect a person should know that he merits. Goffman is often 
at his most eloquent when discussing the fate of people who do 
not keep their place y and he is quite clear that the social 
improprieties of not knowing one 's place arouse deep negative 
emotions that almost seem designed to keep everyone in their 
correct social places.
People are trusted to know their places, and it is his 
particular place that gives a person his particular face. Thus 
"cham and colorful little informalities" belong not so much to 
the self of a hi^-ranking person as to his office, because social 
distance between two people is of different extent "depending from 
vdnose place one starts" (E 114). The situation of western women 
illustrates this. As depicted in advertisements, their place is 
on beds and floors, behind objects, and always below men. They 
are shown snuggling and nuzzling, averting gaze, and staring at 
objects while hanging on to men. Not infrequently they are being 
spoonfed and, much more than men, they smile and clown or stand 
with head or body canted and knees bent. When they are not 
ritualistically touching their own bodies or objects (sometimes 
with their faces) they may be shown (in holiday scenes especially) 
being mock-assaulted by husbands; and in family groups, while their
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sons struggle to emulate father, they passively descend to the 
level of the daughters (GA 28-83). All behaviour confirms or 
dis confirms that a person "knows and keeps his place" (RP 399) 
and strong confirmation comes throu^ displays of proper deference, 
deference being the "symbolic means by which appreciation is 
regularly conveyed to a recipient of this recipient" (IR 56). 
Therefore, interaction between two persons is never so simply 
symmetrical as a Meadian mutual taking into account of other’s 
attitude, for the deference image given is not identical to the 
demeanour image taken, and each person conprises both images 
(IR 84). Rather than strategic calculation, what occurs when 
persons meet is "joint ceremonial labor" with demeanour showing 
interaction status and deference pointing out of the interaction 
to societal status (IR 83). (Deference, of course, is as often 
shown by equal to equal and subordinate to subordinate as by 
subordinate to superordinate (IR 58-6O).) The "status bloodbath" 
of a party, Wiere contamination and sacralization are the order 
of the day, succeeds so long as the requisite spontaneous involve­
ment is not killed by officially irrelevant attributes intruding 
and thereby destroying the identities on which sociability is 
organized. People in gathering can become "uncomfortable" vben 
they have "nothing in conmon" (in this case their statuses are 
so far apart that the attention "status" draws to itself reduces 
official involvements to zero) and can become "bored" when those 
present are "the same old people" (in this case they are too 
similar to enable the worship and sacrilege that would generate 
involvement) (E 71). Parties can be left, but, locked qn a ward 
of a mental hospital, a patient may find that the only way he can 
demonstrate to himself "that he is not to be judged by his current 
setting, nor is subjugated or contaminated by it" is by projecting
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a crazy self (knowing he is not that crazy) (BP 225). For most 
people the rituals of avoidance and presentation "provide a 
continuous symbolic tracing of the extent to which the recipient’s 
ego has not been bounded and barricaded in regard to others"
(IR 71) but in a tough punishment ward the inmate with very little 
more to lose might create his very own self throu^ ritual insub­
ordination, conveyed by a stance that "combines stiffness, dignity, 
and coolness in a particular mixture.... and expresses that one is 
entirely one’s own man." Some patients in these wards "not going 
out of their way to make trouble" manage to convey "unconcern and 
mild contenpt for all levels of the staff, combined with utter 
self-possession" (A 278-9). Such persons, locked in the worst 
of social places, yet succeed in putting a staff person in what 
they see as his place.
Sexual intercourse can be employed by two persons to show 
each other their places for it too is "part of the ceremonial system, 
a reciprocal ritual perfomed to confim symbolically an exclusive 
social relationship" (PS 190n). In these sexual rituals proper 
involvement should be shown since "the engrossing power of such 
encounters can become a crucial test of the relationship" (E 47).
If such involvement is missing, the "subvocal tracking of sexually 
climactic experience" is a "display available to both sexes" whose 
sound "can be strategically employed to delineate an ideal development 
in the marked absence of anything else" (RC 804).
Snotion in encounters may be closely linked to ritual 
concerns. Thus, when a person is cau^t acting improperly or 
catches others doing so, his embai^sment "can be surprisingly 
deep" (BP 248). Any offender against the conversational order 
feels shame (CC 36), and when a face is lost, a witness to the 
event might feel an anguish as deep as the anger that would accompany
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his own loss of face (IR 23). Audiences, too, are always in awe 
of perfomers. Hie more awe they feel the more they would feel 
shame if the performers’ secrets were disclosed (PS 76). Feelings 
are so closely related to ritual concerns that those spontaneously 
expressed, rather than "consciously designed ones," fit best into 
ritual interchanges (IR 23). For this reason, shamelessness is 
a rare state which may only be achieved by unusual persons vdio 
choose to no longer project a self: for example, ri^t at the end 
of their moral careers, some mental patients, having had their old 
selves destroyed, simply do not seek a new one, and, instead, 
unconcerned with their own or others’ sacred worth, "practise 
before all groups the amoral arts of shamelessness" (A 155).
Proprieties
The proprieties are not rules per se but those creative^ 
even apparently rule—breaking forms of conduct that understand 
the rules very well. Proprieties issue exclusively from ritual 
concerns.
It follows that those who "actively dispute the proprieties"
respect a gathering and its encorpassing social situation more than
those who give it no attention (BP 226). Likewise the "unserious
ritual profanation" of joking, which is resorted to when people
used to one kind of relationship are thrown into another, indicates
respect for the left-behind selves that an absence of joking would
not (CC 213). Innuendo, however, is an impropriety that must be
overlooked because it inplies disagreement, whereas the unseriousness
that expresses disagreement signifies underlying agreement.
(Comnunication arrangements such as unserious innuendo give some
idea of the possible conplexities of interaction (CC 89n).)
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Offence may be given by conveying expressive behaviour in a way 
calculated to look calculated (CC 86, 87) but in the dark of a 
film-show expressive offences like weeping are permitted because 
"presumably at these times there is no interaction that can be 
eiribairassed" (CC 288). Joking behaviour, falling short of 
offensiveness, can often be "seriously necessary to keep the 
peace" (CC 2l4n), the joker not being held responsible for his 
words; but, should his attempt at maintaining an unserious 
situational definition fail, he will be; blamed for a breach of 
good taste CCC 79). So, rather than make jokes, a person may direct 
dangerous remarks not to their recipient but to a third party 
(even an animal or an object) or into the air (CC 159), and many 
are the unsuspecting hi^-status persons who in interaction are 
profaned behind their backs :
... .when Mr Allen could come to the pier to check 
up on the rate of work or to talk to the foreman, a 
worker located behind Mr Allen’s back would sometimes 
make profanizing gestures. Dn one occasion, a worker 
took up an enpty bag of lime and whirled it about 
his head, testing the limits to which derogatory action 
could be carried on behind the back of the boss without 
the boss seeing it.
(CC 240)
Nonetheless, there do take place interactions in which a person 
talks about himself and invites others to talk about him in a way 
that sacrifices his self-respect; if others join in and also 
profane themselves, "backstage solidarity" and "team spirit" may 
be built up. Ihis practice of sharing secrets is common in group 
therapy (PS 200), Mostly, though, in everyday life, it is 
necessary to be ready to say pardon at all times, "exorcising 
possible slights" (CC 191), and there is a duty (which engages 
honour) to insist on the right to be given the right place "lest
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the whole pattern of rules deteriorate" (IR 242). Some unruly persons, 
daring from their point of view and foolhardy from the point of 
view of the undaring, will exploit these very considerations in 
order to stage a "character contest" (the moral game of establishing 
strong character at the expense of an opponent’s )(IR 240). Or 
else, "in an unconscious desire to keep amusenent and interest in 
the interplay from lagging" a person might ritually profane himself 
by sacrificing his own dignity (CC 324-6). But, when bending 
the rules of interaction, the greatest care must be taken because, 
sanctions being imnediately applied by the offended, "those who 
break the rules of interaction coiimit their crimes in jail"
(IR 116-7). '*The scene of the crime, the halls of judganent, and 
the place of detention are all housed in the same cubicle ; furthermore, 
the complete cycle of crime, apprehension, trial, punishment, and 
return to society can run its course in two gestures and a glance"
(RP 137). But, in spite of this, persons can create "unauthorized" 
distance between themselves and their allotted place "through 
direct insolence that does not meet with inmediate correction, or 
remarks passed half out of hearing of authority, or gestures 
perfomed behind the back of authority" (A 276). And when a 
person dons a particular style of clothing,such as the black shirts 
in the thirties, he proclaims distance not only fran situational 
life but from civil life (BP 222). Distance may also be expressed 
by "tight" behaviour in "loose" situations and "loose" behaviour 
towards those persons and objects who are owed tight behaviour.
(BP 198-216, 229). Such distancing can strike "at the syntax of 
conduct, deranging the usual agreement between posture and place, 
between expression and position" (RP 424). In fact,"the most 
disruptive thing a person can do is fail to keep a place that others 
feel can’t be changed for him" (RP 449). Many mental patients do.
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just that, and once in hospital duly find themselves "graded 
according to the degree to which they violate ceremonial rules 
of social intercourse" (IR 92). In a mental hospital persons 
may "collapse as units of minimal ceremonial substance and .... 
leam that what had been taken for granted as ultimate entities 
are really held together by rules that can be broken with some 
kind of inpunity" (IR 9.4 ). [Knowledge of this kind is for both 
staff and inmates "undesired". ) So, if a person does'not̂  _
express a definition of himself that his familiars can confirm 
through their regard of him, his effect is:
..... to block and trip up and threaten them in 
almost eveiy movement that they make. Hie selves 
ttiat had been the reciprocals of his are under­
mined. And that v^ch should not have been able 
to change - the character of a loved one lived 
with - appears to be changing fundamentally and for 
the worse before their eyes. In ceasing to know the 
sick person, they can even cease to be sure of their 
way of knowing. A deep bewilderment results. 
Confirmations that everything is predictable and as 
it should be cease to flow fran his presentations.
H e  question as to vhat it is that is going on is not 
readily'"answered at every*turn bat*must be constantly 
ferreted out anew. And life is said to Bebome like 
a bad dream - for there is no place in possible 
realities for vdiat is occurring. 2̂4)
Essential Human Nature
Goffman makes no bones about his feeling that people are 
only their appearances, and that thase are more often boring 
mimeographs than priceless first editions. He has said (in his 
introduction to Interaction Ritual) that his psychology is a 
deliberately minimal one to facilitate his sociology. Hut I 
do not think he means this. Often his sweeping away of psychological 
man is powerfully rhetorical. Ho psychologist that I know of has 
yet noticed that if Goffman is right the discipline of psychology 
is founded on illusions.
If, then, there are no such things as "relationships,
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feelings, attitudes, and the like" and if "various acts and 
postures" do not provide evidence of them, "the position can be 
taken that in the main vdiat exists are doctrines regarding expression, 
gestural equipment for providing displays, and stable motives 
for encouraging certain inputations" (FA 462). Similarly, "natural 
expressions" of gender are portraits that "naturally express" only 
the capacity and inclination a person has to portray a certain 
version of himself.-What is really essential to human nature is 
"the CCTipetency to produce these portraits, and interpret those 
produced by others" (GA 7).
The CCTimonsense assunption that emotional expression 
is a reliable index to the state of mind of the actor 
appears to be partly valid, but perhaps not for the 
reasons commonsense would supply. In this study it 
is assumed that the emotional expression practised 
by the members of a particular group is determined 
by the moral rules recognized in the group regarding 
social interaction. The member must not only leam 
^en and how to express his emotions, but is morally 
obliged to express them in this approved way. Further, 
the member is obliged to obey the rules of expression 
once learned, in a sufficiently automatic and 
unselfconscious way so that observers will in fact 
be partly justified in their assunptions that the 
emotion conveyed to then is a dependable index of 
the actor’s enotional state. It is suggested here 
that emotional expression is a reliable index because 
persons have been taught to act in such a way as to 
confim the fiction that emotional response is an 
unguarded instinctive response to the situation.
(CC 59-60)
Therefore, since "we are socialized to confim our own hypotheses 
about our natures," (GA 2) "universal human nature is not a 
very human thing" (IR 44), and a person is a construct built out 
of externally imposed rules. The particular set of these rules 
that "transforms him into a human being derives from requirements 
established in the ritual organization of social encounters"
(IR 44). So, even in the closest relationship, the "indication 
that each party provides the other that nothing whatsoever could
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break them apart is itself the substance, not the shadow" (FA 463). 
By the same logic, a person among strangers in public places "must 
come to be for himself .... someone vhose appearances are ones 
his others can see as normal. His show of being safely 
disattendable is deeply him; he has no self that is deeper"
[RP 328). It is throu^ deference and demeanour that "the world 
tends to be bathed in better images than anyone deserves," 
because within interactions all persons offer the precise excess 
of deferential indulgence good demeanour consists in declining 
(IR 83). In the fields.of Dixon, too, workers took frequent 
breaks which "seemed to express the fact that they were not 
merely animals engaged in routine labour all day long but were 
persons, capable and desirous of conducting social interaction 
with other persons" (CC 190). Deference cannot be self-served; 
therefore, people who would achieve humanness are tied together.
"If the individual could give himself the deference he desired 
there might be a tendency for society to disintegrate into islands 
inhabited by solitary cultish men, each in continuous worship, 
at his own shrine" (IR 58). In mental hospitals these ideas seem 
to be well understood. For example, assignment to a ward expresses 
a person’s "general level of social functioning". "Given the 
fact that the worst ward levels provide a round of life that 
inpatients with organic brain damage can easily manage, and that 
these quite limited human beings are present to prove it, one can 
appreciate some of the mirroring effects of the hospital" (A 139). 
Here in a hospital a person can leam that by being moved from 
ward to ward his self in a very short space of time can be built 
and lost and built again:
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The setting ... seems to engender a kind of cosmopolitan 
sophistication, a kind of civic apathy. In this unserious 
yet oddly exaggerated moral context, building up a self 
or having it destroyed becomes something of a shameless 
game, and learning to view the process as a game seons 
to make for some demorali zation, the game being such a 
fundamental one. In the hospital, then, the inmate can 
leam that the self is not a fortress, but rather a 
small open city; he can become weary of having to show 
pleasure when held by troops of his own, and weary of 
havingtoahowdispleasure when held by the enemy. Once 
he leams what it is like to be defined by society as 
not having a viable self, this threateneing definition 
- the threat that helps attach people to the self society 
accords, them - is weakened. The patient seems to gain 
a new plateau i/Aien he. leams that he can survive ■ydiilê 
acting in a way that society sees as destructive of 
him.
(A 151)
So the self arises not merely within interaction "but also out of 
the social arrangements that are evolved in an organization for 
its members" (A 138).
"Character", though, is not the same as self. It 
comprises, besides the "primary properties" of ability, "maintenance 
properties" that have a person "standing correct and steady in 
the face of sudden pressures" (IR 214-239). Weak character is 
revealed by incorrect behaviour during the stress of fatefulness 
in "action" (action being problematical and consequential 
activity undergone for its own sake). Possibly because of the 
high costs for individuals and for society of an incessant 
establishing of character among its members, one significant 
expression of character "tends to be taken as an adequate basis 
for judgement". (Various blends of courage-, gameness, integrity, 
and self-discipline will be expressed). Character has a dual 
nature. It refers not only to what is characteristic of a person, 
("essential and unchanging") but also "to attributes that can be 
generated and destroyed throu^ fateful moments" (IR 238).
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Actually it is a "fundamental illusion". Persons ever encounter 
possibilities that seem to encourage them to renew their efforts 
at establishing character, and by so doing only succeed in 
sustaining society’s routines: "We are allowed to think there 
is something to be won in the moments that we face so that society 
can face nonents and defeat them" (IR 239).
What then of self change? In total institutions successive 
abasements, degradations, humiliations, and profanations cause 
"progressive changes ... in the beliefs that he [the inmate] has 
concerning himself and significant others" (A 24). These changes 
constitute a "moral career" that can lead to a fully institutionalised 
self:
It is .... a tribute to the power of social forces that 
the unifom status of mental patient cannot only assure 
an aggregate of persons a common fate and eventually, 
because of this, a comnon character, but that this social 
reworking can be done upon what is perhaps the most 
obstinate diversity of human materials that can be brou^t 
together by society.
CA 121)
But the moment in interactions when a person destroys himself by 
"flooding out" is also socially determined: "The individual’s 
breaking point is that of the group to v^ose affective standards 
he adheres" (IR 103).
Within organizations, social arrangements imply a conception
of a person not only as a member but as a human being and therefore
an organization can be viewed "as a place for generating assumptions
about identity" (A 164, 170). Because the activities prescribed
within an organization prescribe a world, "to dodge a prescription
can be to dodge an identity" (A 170). A person will always hold
himself off "from fully embracing all the self-implications of his
affiliations, allowing some of his disaffection to be seen, even
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while fulfilling his major obligations" (A l6l). Frequently, thou#i, 
it might be something other than disaffection that is shown; in 
interaction a formal role mi^t be put in its place by behaviour 
that inplies a larger or different self:
In performing a role, then, the individual is likely to 
take minor liberties, ducking out for a moment to 
stretch or apologize. These fleeting derelictions 
are but shadows of acts, very easily unseen; certainly 
sociology has managed for long to ignore them. That a 
stage performer must disavail himself of these lapses 
-vtfien presenting a character {except when- they are - - 
scripted) should quicken our interest in them and lead 
one to appreciate more clearly that althou^ the social 
world is built up out of roles sustained by persons, 
these persons have, and are seen to have a ri^t to 
have, a wider being than any current role allows.
These very small acts celebrate very large issues.
(FA 544)
 if an individual is to show that he is a "nice
guy" or, by contrast, one much less nice than a human 
being need be, then it is through his using or not 
using role distance that this is to be done. It is 
right here, in manifestations of role distance, that 
the individual’s personal style is to be found.
(E 134)
But the self that a person "shows throu^" his "official guise" 
is as prescribed by culture as is the official guise (FA 573-4 ). 
Every person falls short of the ideal images provided by his 
culture, and as often as he tries to show, in and around his 
roles, that he anbodies these he is "likely to find himself being 
apologetic or aggressive concerning known about aspects of himself 
he knows are probably seen as undesirable" (S 153). 'TVIore than 
to any family or club, more than to any class or sex, more than to 
any nation, the individual belongs to gatherings, and he had best 
show that he is a member in good standing" (BP 248).
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Social Order
Here are the remarks by which Goffman builds up the 
structure of society from a basically riiMal structure of 
interaction. Society is what we tell one another it is y and 
our acting as if it is as we are told it is makes it so.
Social order is defined as "the consequence of any set 
of moral noims that regulates the way in which persons pursue 
objectives" [BP 81, and "the rules, of conduct which bind the_ _ . _ 
actor and reicpient together are the bindings of society"(IR 90). 
Since acts guided purely by these rules are infrequent and take 
time to conclude themselves, opportunities to affirm moral order 
are sought in other acts that "last but a brief moment" and 
"involve no substantive outlay" and "can be perfomed in every 
social interaction" (IR 91) • Typical small acts are "remedial 
rituals" ("Excuse me" and "Think nothing of it") that are a "cons tant 
feature of public life" and in these rituals is expressed the 
"official moral ideology" of the culture: "We must see that the 
historical centre [moral ideology] and the contemporary periphery 
are linked more closely than any one these days seems to want to 
credit" (RP 222). Everybody feels a need to supply remarks or 
gestures that repair "the discrepancy another might see between 
their practice and their values" (RP 222). A person’s perfomance 
"will tend to incorporate and exenplify the officially accredited 
values of the society" (PS 45). And, because every kind of 
transaction is "opened and closed by ritual", social life is infused 
with a "constant checking back to, and reminder of, a small 
number of central beliefs about the rigits and character of persons" 
(RP 172). In a mental hospital, more than anywhere else, probably 
because of its reflection on his status, the patient will concoct
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a "sad tale" - a lamentation, and also an apologia for his 
presence in the setting - which "brings him into appropriate 
alignment with the basic values of his society" (A 139). The 
condenned man, too, on his way to death will want to demonstrate 
good character by "smoothing" the social situation, comporting 
himeself with good grace in "the final and awful socieilized act"
(IR 232). It is, then, to the "flimsy rules" that manage 
engrossment, not to the unshaking character of the external world, 
that we owe our uhshafcLng sense of realities" (E 72). So compelling 
are these rules that even on occasions of extreme deprivation "it 
is thou^t praiseworthy to joke about the situation and demonstrate 
that one still has a self free for interaction (CC 283).
Rules as strong as these point to a structural explanation 
for even so deconstructing an event as loss of face in enJba^ssment 
displays. A person, placed in a social situation in viiich to be 
the self it demands would destroy the self that brou^t him to 
it, can keep open his options to be both selves at different 
times in the future by ceasing entirely to be a viable self (IR 111) 
(Thus society suffers no loss of roles even thou^ the individual 
has his face temporarily wiped off his existence. )
No escape from society is possible. In the most intimate 
interactions "we will find that the finger tips of society have 
reached bluntly into the contact," for even at the centre of a 
category like "wife" the husband will meet "a full array of socially 
standardized anticipations" so that "it is scandalous to speak of 
marriage as a particularistic relationship" (S 70). Even the formal 
signing of a contract implies a host of non-contractual but societal 
assumptions abou t the signer: that he, for example, thinks contracts 
are legal, has legal competence and good faith, and understands
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unstated limits of trust (A 159). Even those who merely join an 
organization take on a "conception of a person not only as a 
member but as a human being" (A l64), and an organization "involves 
a discipline of being - an obligation to be of a given character 
and to dwell in a given world" (A 171).
Nevertheless, social life has more affinities to worlds 
of make-believe than to facts. The scenes of advertisements, for 
example, though rare in life "may yet be coimonly part of the ideals 
and fantasies of many actual people" (GA 22). Everyday life "often 
seems to be a laminated adumbration" of folk tales, characters in 
novels, advertisements, myths, movie stars and their roles, the Bible, 
and so forth:
Life may not be an imitation of art, but ordinary 
conduct, in a sense, is an imitation of the 
proprieties, a gesture at the exenplary forms, 
and the primal realization of these ideals belongs 
.more to make-believe than reality.
[FA 562)
Persons, telling their tales, since they "do not have a cast of 
trained actors at their disposal or much time to polish a script̂  " 
fail to be as lifelike in interactions as interactions are on 
stage (FA 559). A machine such as television is quite natural to 
people because it does what they do (much worse ) in their own 
interactions: "There is one thing that is similar to the warm 
hours we now spend wrapped in television. It is the time we are 
prepared to spend recounting our own experience or waiting an 
imminent turn to do so. True, we seem to have foregone some of 
this personal activity in favour of the work of professionals.
But what we have given up thereby is not the world but a more 
traditional way of incorporating its incorporation of us" (FA 550)
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The "excitement without cost" that comes of identifying with TV 
characters passing through a play of events that can be fully 
witnessed, now performing dangerous tasks, now engaging in 
character contests, now involved in serious action (IR 262-3), 
is vtot was hitherto sou^t and found in live interactions, that 
is, dramatized life, not the drama of life, thou^ that in its 
turn tends to be lived with an eye to its future dramatic rendering;
They develop â corpus of cautionary tales, games, riddles, 
experiments, newsy stories, and other scenarioswhich 
elegantly confirm a frame-relevant view of the workings of 
the world ... and the human nature that fits with this 
view of viewing does so in part because its possessors 
have learned to conport themselves so as to render this 
analysis true of them. Indeed, in countless ways and 
ceaselessly, social life takes up and freezes into itself 
the understandings we have of it.
(FA 563)
Rather than conclude this chapter with a summary, I have 
created an autonomous and expanded version of what such a summary 
should be and set it apart as a chapter on its own, which now follows.
Notes
1. The following abbreviations are used:
CC Communication Conduct in an Island Community (1953)
PS The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1956)
A Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients 
and Other Inmates (1961)
E Encounters: Two Studies in the Sociology of Interaction (1961)
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s stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (1963)
BP Behaviour in Public Places: Notes on the Social Organization 
of Gatherings (1963)
IR Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behaviour (1967)
SI Strategic Diteraction (1969)
RP Relations in Public: Microstudies of the Public Order (1971)
FA Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (1974) 
GA Gender Advertisements (1976)
RR "Replies and Responses" (1976)
RC "Response Cries" (1978)
The dates are those of first publication, and so do not necessarily 
correspond to the dates in iqy bibliography.
2. Along with works by Szasz, Laing, and others. Asylums, in having 
had an ameliorative influence on the phenomena it reported, has 
to some extent gone out of date.
3. "Dixon" is Goffman’s pseudonym for the settlement where he 




This chapter is a statement of my theoretical starting 
points, almost all of vdiich are taken from Erving Goffman’s ritual 
frame. Throu^ this statement the reader can see imy "world view" 
as this exists at the outset of the thesis. Thus, the sense 
the chapter makes in terms of my whole narrative, is that of 
a background or sociological ambience, which is the context for 
my concerns in ensuing chapters.
General statement : Society has need of moral people who
unthinkingly employ a ritual code to regulate the way they treat 
one another in interactions. People’s estimation of themselves 
as sacred leads to a morality in v^ch even the feigning of 
presentation, avoidance, and remedy rituals is offensive, and, to 
maintain this morality, an obligation lies upon the offended to seek 
the kind of redress that does not further offend. Moral order, then, 
is affirmed or threatened in every social encounter, but all social 
life is conducted with more reference to a very few beliefs - 
dramatized in myth, entertainment, and talk - than to the ritually 
neutral concerns of purely instrumental exchanges.
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Ritual offence: In the coipany of others a person will try hard
not to give offence and if he succeeds will seem like the sort 
of person - a proper person - compliance with ritual rules allows 
him to be, for offenders, even if they have broken a ritual 
rule only once, may be attributed a full-blown deviant self.
Behind one another’s backs, however, people are the less 
ritually careful of one another the more they expect to keep 
their offences, secret. But, face-to-face, it only takes the 
display of a seemingly genuine mutual interest, overriding self 
presentations, to ’li^t up the world’’.
It is the duress of having to seem continually #iat 
cannot be lived continously that gives rise to the ’’merchant of 
morality’’ vdio, especially in his intimate circle, can find himself 
putting more effort into engineering a front than into carrying 
out the acts that would give him the front incidentally. Frontwork, 
however, must not be seen for what it is lest attention be drawn 
to this demeaning faculty - the faking of hmmanness - so. frontworkers 
perform anything but an emotionless calculation. There arises, 
then, a very deep relation between ritual concerns and feelings^ 
so much so that a person may hate those who have defiled a proffered 
self, or, on the other hand, love others who with satisfactory 
accuracy see him as what, at his most optimistic, he can scarcely 
be for himself. But a person’s sacredness is not entirely his 
to give to himself. He must receive it from others by risking it 
in those activities he performs to earn it. (Perhaps a person who 
does not feel, just by virtue of being a person, that he has ultimate 
worth cannot be a person. Such people are rare, for even inprisoned 
criminals, for example, while they may accept that they deserve . 
punishment, have great difficulty in accepting that, as a punishment, 
they should be ’’treated like dirt’’ or that such treatment could be
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meted out by punishers claiming to be human. From this it follows 
that those persons vdio would offend at will, and not suffer from 
any consequences, must be in a position to coerce the offended 
not only into behaving as if they deserve to be offended but 
also into looking as if they accept the offence as just, 
otherwise the response to offence, of counter-offence, would 
threaten the original offender. Staff in total institutions, 
v^o very often fail to elicit "genuine" acceptance of their 
contaminations of inmates, therefore may have to define inmates 
as subhuman, and, by then treating inmates as subhuman, 
inevitably receive further cause to so define them.
Self: A person playing a role actually juggles many subsidiary
roles, and if he does not will be regarded as a machine rather 
than a person, yet thou^ no less prescribed than a relinquished 
official role, his contrapuntal roles may be very distant from 
it, but, if that person does not nevertheless show requisite 
ritual respect for his official role, he will be seen as being 
disruptive of social arrangements, drawing himself closer thereby 
to the legal sanction of confinement under lock and key.
The fragile nature of selves, their easy reconstitutability,
the knowledge that life without a self is not the end of life,
are widely denied beliefs. Those who hold them are ranoved a little
from the rest, for whom they may feel the indulgent pity that is
the reciprocal of pompous alarm. The unpalatable view, indicated
here, of persons as "dramatic effects" rests on the assumption that
if there is an essential human nature it is nothing other than the
competency to perform what is customarily seen as essential human 
2nature.
Interactive man: Only in interaction can a person receive deference
which can never be given in as full measure by himself to himself
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(for a person vAio would take it upon himself to give himself due 
deference is not a proper person and so could not invite deference, 
and, then, not being worthy enough to receive deference neither 
could he, being the same person, give it). Only in interaction 
can "character" be created or destroyed at a stroke, for it must 
always be sought at the expense of soneone else’s and won by a 
superior showing of courage, gameness, integrity and self-discipline 
(the"good loser" is a new character won the moment another is lost- 
in contest). And only in the interactions opened to him by virtue 
of his membership of this or that or^nisation can a person have a 
chance to show that he is the "kind of person" such membership 
defines him as.
A person is the creation of his interactions before he 
is, for exanple, a parent, a Marxist, a boss, a meile, or a Briton, 
and yet all these things that he is not, and the degree to which he 
succeeds or fails at being every one of them, may coipare, when he 
is being sociable with others, to a sort of composite ideal person. 
Conparing unfavourably, the person in question will want to hide 
his discreditable self, and the more successful he is at this the 
more his others’ acceptance of him is not of him. Thus his promissory 
acceptance of their similar phantom nomalcy is not payable in full, 
not only because he himself did not pranise it but also because 
they themselves were not the persons they presented as deeming it. 
Interaction, then, sometimes may be seen as a stalking ground of 
culturally approved ideal persons. Therein people go in fear, 
alternately, of not being taken for the best selves they could be 
and then of being mistaken for those very same selves.
However terrible his circumstances, a person’s first duty 
to those with whom he is face-to-face is to be an inoffensive
61
interactor, which means that he must not fail to interact (though 
some allowances are made in the cases of persons suffering extreme 
physical or emotional pain). It is as thou^ the webs of society are 
too weak to support the dead wei^t of a truly autistic person, 
whose little hole that he makes in social reality is yet seen as 
infinitely deep and beckoningly vertiginous to his closely enmeshed 
familiars. Poised on its brink they maybe feel that, if they too 
fall down the hole, they will take with them all their familiars too, 
who will drag theirs down after them, and so on until nobody is 
left in society to do what George Eliot (1957) in Daniel Deronda 
called "keeping up the forms of life" (Ch IV). The reason for 
keeping up the forms in Daniel Deronda was the beauty, the rarity, 
and"decision of will #iich made itself felt in the graceful movements 
and clear unhesitating tones" of Gwendolen Harleth, who mi^t be 
one exanple out of many millions providing similar reasons for 
honouring the human as a sacred being.
Sources of respect: The ubiquitous rituals, througji viiich people
show respect to one another and also to their relationships, do 
not model relations held across time and space and in and out of 
encounters so much as dramatize approved orientations to approved 
shared values. Persons in interaction, then, demonstrate how they 
relate to moral ideologies that also prescribe the forms of such 
demonstration, and spontaneous and interpretable behaviour must be 
provided to allow others to know #iere a person stands in relationships 
viiose mutual involvement must be of the kind that does not forget to 
appear to forget itself. (In the extreme, lovers should try to also 
forget not to forget to appear to forget, because forgetting this 
could be a falling out. ) Since social life would grind to a standstill 
if every appearance had to be checked out, trust is a societal 
necessity^ that straightway opens the possibility of its betrayal. The
62
more sacred the betrayed person the more serious is the betrayal; 
conversely, lowly persons like children and mental patients can 
expect frequent betrayals. So, viien a Tsar is shot or the wife 
of Chairman Mao put on trial, one might connect such desacralizations 
to conplete reversals in official moral ideology. The extent of 
ritual reversals migjht be then one index of the distance travelled 
between old and new orders. In an order that is unchanging, betrayal 
funnels everywhere can only operate, therefore, by reversing instead 
the character of the betrayed person. Thus the practice of obliging 
a convicted criminal to wear demeaning attire is one method of 
CŒipelling him to demonstrate the fall from civic respectability 
that is presumed to have been devised from within himself and not 
issued to him as a unifom.
Certain notions of human worth can become the point of 
leverage for the turning round of an entire society, for a society that 
condones inhumane treatment of any of its citizens can lose the 
commitment of its humane citizens, and ultimately ccme to suffer from 
their opposition. The central issue for any society, organisation, 
or group may be, then, its tolerable level of inhumanity. At a 
certain point of perceived intolerability, a group, though possibly 
locked together by economic, racial, historical, and other considerations, 
can radically split on this issue, though of course a split group may 
not be dysfunctional for some higher order goal than humane life for 
all. But life in most places is not so thoroughly policed that there 
is not plenty of scope for disrespecting offenders to get off scot 
free as they carry their jokes a little too far, press their 
profanations a little too hard,refuse a courtesy too pointedly, or 
conspicuously fail to exorcise offences b y apologising. Yet these 
petty desacralizations more penetratingly than the most repressive 
regime pierce to the heart of a person’s sense of his ultimate
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worth, and more than grosser, vaster, and more lifelong injustices 
can fill him with a destroying rage against the perpetrator, who 
merely treated his victim as less than his victim’s cultural 
definition of a man.
Ritual model of interaction: Coming together involves people in
a ’’joint ceremonial labor,’’ and this is a lively fraternisation if 
ccnç)ared to the symbolic interactionist model that would have persons 
on first meeting merely working out how to ’’fit their acts to one 
another in orderly joint actions’’ (Blumer,-19/0). Where some - - - - 
symbolic interactionists iirply a scrupulous mutual appraisal which 
when it goes wrong only adversely reflects on a person’s intelligence, 
the ritual model, in contrast, does breathe life into interaction 
and give seme hint that there do exist, everyWiere, singular and 
deep relationships that can only begin in and be sustained by reciprocal 
conduct. More importantly, symbolic interactionism, for example, 
fails to acknowledge that what must be going on at all timeŝ , as 
the necessary and sufficient basis for anything else that mi^t be 
going on, is proper conduct with its constant referencing of relevant 
moral ideologies. Somehow the symbolic interaction is ts have not 
allowed for this fact that interaction can cease or change course 
if offence is given; they have by iirplication swept away the mainstay 
of interaction, ritual concern, into a residual category, as if 
politeness, for example, were mere embellishment of more serious 
’’business’’ (Blumer, 1972), and not the prerequisite, continually, of 
any social conduct whatever. (Thou^ Blumer is ri^t to say that 
the business may have brought the persons together in the first place, 
it cannot follow that business will easily continue however rude 
persons are to one another, for as soon as rudeness emerges it becomes 
the business.) Furthermore, since it is unlikely that the sanctity 
of any two interacting persons can be precisely the same, there
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will be discrepant ritual care of one person by the other. This 
means that the more sanctified person will have, for example, 
greater territorial ri^ts than the other, and will be able to be 
more personal, invading the other’s privacy with greater impunity.
Thus, even if both persons are consciously engaged in mutual 
calculation of other factors in their relationship besides the 
ritual ones - as symbolic interactionism proposes - their very 
calculations are dependent on their relative ritual statuses. -Inter­
action seen in ritual teims, then, is no longer a game in vhich the 
stakes hardly concern the actors; at every instant what is at stake 
before all else is the very self of each actor. As McDemott (1976) 
says, people are always playing out ’’intense identity struggles’’ even 
thou^ they may not think that this is what they are doing.
The ritual model also possesses this advantage, that it 
includes under its rubric both unthinking activity and raw emotion, 
the fomer if too unthinking causing the latter and so revealing the 
transgressed rule so perenptorily as to require instant order-restoring 
redress. Thus eiribarassment, for instance, seemingly disorder at its 
most convulsive, is perfectly acconmodated by the ritual model in whose 
terms the person acting in an embarrassed fashion is not only the 
structural abeyance of two faces that cannot coexist but also an 
experience of intense discomfiture where relief ensures the rapid 
remedial action that keeps interaction in order.
Conclusion : Without doubt, the exemplary forms that guide behaviour
are thenselves vigorous creations of people, and their adoption as 
religious conviction, fashionable conduct, political stance, or 
style of relating may be vigorously prosecuted in the face of 
apparently contrary forms. The forms are given, but they do not 
have to be taken, and they may be changed. However, change is 
inevitably very slow, since the interlocked structures of interaction
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that are social life contain, in every word, gesture, expression and 
glance, a check against any original form that, in causing difficulties 
of ritual interpretation,and for that reason alone, can be offensive. 
Even so sinple an innovation as the divesting of swimriing costumes 
on beaches will arouse violent reactions to the extent that Douglas 
et al (1977), researching a nude beach in California, have been moved 
to coin the category "creative deviance" for bathers, who, in 
challenging old forms, create new ones whose strength, like that of 
their predecessors,‘ will be proportionate " to the ritual inpdrt'arice' of 
the form, itself derived from the dominance of a new sort of ideal 
person. For the nude bathers this ideal person freely accepts and 
glories in his physical self virile the antagonistic ideal person has 
a decent reserve regarding parts of his or her body that connote 
private acts. Interaction, then, viewed ritually, tends to enforce 
its perpetuation along established lines. The costs of transgression 
are various kinds of ostracism. In the stalking ground, the stalking 
horse must be oneself doing the "done" things, even if the ultimate 
intent is to do different things.
Note
The foregoing chapter will have served its purpose if it has oriented 
the reader to the possibility and even desirability of viewing 
persons as ritual beings. In what follows I am less ihterested in 
the rules of interaction (which are the main interest of Erving 
Goffman) than in the ritual meaning of persons conceived as beings 
who cannot be disposed of analytically once an interaction has been 
explained in terms of its organization. Where Goffman has used the 
ritual frame in order to explain interaction per se, I am tending, 




Shott (1979) explores how role attribution can come to 
define and name "raw" emotion states; Kemper (1978) similarly 
shows how power and status differentials in interaction 
activate emotions; and Hochschild (1975) argues that rational 
interaction requires emotional expression. None of these 
writers specula,te about what it is about persons that makes 
them, so vulnerable in social situations to fselings they 
often cannot contain.
Accepting a similar hypothesis, Trilling (1972) suggests 
that the contemporary search for what is authentic in 
persons (triggered by the knowledge that sincerity need 
not be authentic) is responsible for Freud’s heavy em­
phasis on the power of the unconscious - "It was his pur­
pose to keep all things from becoming ’weightless”’ - and 
laing’8 intimation that madness - or total denial of the 
social world - may be the one guarantee of authenticity.
Luhmann (1979) says that society’s rationality depends 
on its ability to reduce complexity with mechanisms like 
law, organization, and language. Trust replaces missing 
information with internal security, and "the rational basis 
of a system of trust lies in the trust placed in the trust 
of other people." Trust is definitely not a reasonable 
assumption on which to decide correctly, because it is 
necessary precisely when decisions are to be made in the 
face of those uncertainties whose very condition is the 
lack of available reasonable assumptions. Distrust burdens 
the distruster with the problem of establishing what he 
can trust in exactly those situations where he needs to 
trust in order to escape such complexity. No complex 
society could be established without trust. However, trust 
of the kind that has the truster stabilizing his feelings 
towards those he trusts is not useful in a highly mobile, 
strongly differentiated social system, when he who has a 
capacity for "far-reaching indifference and readiness to
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substitute" will fare better. Cathectic trust, that would 
make feelings "immune from refutation," must break down, 
and the fear of this causes anxieties that do not trouble 
those who rather than strengthening their internal security 
contrarywise increase "bearable insecurity at the expense 
of security."
Blumer’s (1972) assertion; "People in association do not 
go around with their attention constantly focused on how 
they are being regarded and on how they can influence the 
way in which they are regarded," has hot been substantiated 
in the work of McQuown et al, Birdwhistell, Scheflen, 
McDermott, and many others. For example, the microanalysts 
Pittenger et al (I960) write: "No matter what else human 
beings may be communicating about, or may think they are 
communicating about, they are always communicating about 
themselves, about one another, and about the immediate 




RITUAL POWER: PUNKS AND NURSES
I wish now to introduce the concept of fashion, 
which, despite that it is very flimsy and only fleetingly 
connected to hard data, has inspired sociological passages^ 
that direct attention from what cannot be seen under the 
surface of social forms back to the surface, in a fuller 
consciousness that many surface phenomena are neither 
superficial nor readily accountable in any frame.
Having very briefly summarised a particular tradition 
in the sociology of fashion, 1 shall use the concept in 
order to bias the reader's understanding - in the ensuing 
discussion of punks and nurses - towards those aspects of 
their conduct that are adapted in the pattern of external 
exemplars.
1 have chosen punks and nurses because each group 
lends itself to ritual explication in a way that is 
clarified by that of the other, and because both are 
Weberian ideal types that stand at the opposite extremes 
of tendencies to contaminate and to sacralize that 1
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think most persons display.
Although there is some carryover of fashion ideas 
into Chapter V and beyond, they will not be there further 
elaborated. I stop working the concept almost as soon 
as I pick it up because its main purpose here is to pull 
the psychological rug out from under would-be sociological 
portraits of individuals who may be grouped by the name 
they are called, as are punks and nurses. In keeping 
with this purpose, I shall also write of punks and of 
nurses as though there need be no commonalities between 
members of each group except that they can be called by 
the name of their group.
Of course, punks and nurses only make sense to those 
who share their ritual code, which they both share with 
each other. For example, when I note that a punk does 
not mind being spat on by another punk, I assume that 
my readers, like me, will think that this is not usual. 
Similarly, when I note that a nurse puts on plastic 
gloves before inserting a suppository, I assume that 
readers, as I do, will feel that this is suitably 
decontaminative behaviour. It should not be thought, 
however, that all possible readers will share these 
assumptions, for, as Mary Douglas (1966) suggests,
"our pollution behaviour is the reaction which condemns 
any object or idea likely to confuse or contradict 
cherished classifications" (p. 36). Douglas, in fact, 
is quite insistent that "uncleanness or dirt is that
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which must not be included if a pattern is to be maintained" 
(p. 40). Pullutants, she says, only pollute in so far 
as they can be read as upsetting a given symbolic order.
By implication, therefore, one order is logically on a 
par with any other, and so the idea that spittle or human 
excrement contaminates comes not from the nature of the 
substance but from its ambiguous status in a pollution 
system. The punks, as will be seen, eloquently speak 
for the.power of such a system, since much 6f their conduct 
is deliberately polluting, in the system's terms, with 
the more general aim of polluting the political order 
that upholds the pollution system.
Nurses need no introduction to the modern reader, 
but punks do need introducing because they are a very 
recent youth culture, originating in Great Britain 
towards the end of 1976. At the time of writing, 1981, 
there are still a few punks in all the major cities of 
Great Britain, though the fashion has softened considerably 
since its inception. In what follows, those who have 
only come across punks in the latter part of the last 
five years might think, therefore, that I am exaggerating 
the power of their conduct. Also, it should be born in 
mind that, though I talk of punks' conduct in the present 
tense, much of it is now no longer seen, being out of date.
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The purpose of this chapter is very simple. I 
examine the "ritualness" - as that is understood in 
Erving Goffman's ritual frame - of punks and nurses, to 
see how they increase it for themselves by their inter­
action conduct, especially through their manner of 
handling pollutants. The chapter will conclude that 
ritualness is not a fixed quantity for a person but is 
his degree of "ritual power" as this can be acquired 
bjr his conduct. '
The Concept of Fashion in Sociology
Blumer (1969) says that fashion operates in nearly 
every social world, and "may influence vitally the 
central content of any field." Konig (1973) thinks that 
fashion influences a diverse range of social behaviours, 
from human posture, gait, movement, and expression to 
attitudes, interests, ideas, and occupations. The Langs 
(1961) claim that voice and manners are as susceptible 
to changes in fashion as women's apparelj and Sapir 
(1931) notes the same seeming inutility of fashion 
changes in amusements and furniture that Robinson (1958) 
comes across in cars and buildings. With formidable 
confidence Simmel (1957) asserts that human expression, 
the social forms, and aesthetic judgement too are carried 
on under the rule of fashion, while Sumner (1959) lists 
all human conduct, particularly nominating diseases, 
trading methods, logic, philosophy, and science as 
fashion-governed. Even a contemporary journalist, Tom 
Wolfe (1973), defines certain styles of political
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radicalism as "chic", meaning that they are donned with 
as little or as much thought as fashionable attire.
The social ubiquity of fashion, moreover, has the cautious 
Blumer (1969) not only reflexively commenting that 
"contemporary social science is rife with the play of 
fashion," but also advocating that "fashion should be 
recognised as a central mechanism in forming social 
order in a modern type of world, a mechanism whose 
operation will increaser" However, there seems to be only 
one common denominator of all of these fashion analyses: 
the baffled definition of fashion as a peremptory, 
widespread change in outer forms, whose societal causes 
can only be guessed at.
No studies have connected changes in fashion to 
societal changes, but, on the basis of an impressionistic 
historical survey. Bell (1947) thinks any such corre­
lations are obscure. Robinson (1976) does establish 
that fashions in men's facial hair have no apparent 
relationship to major historical events, though obeying 
a cycle strikingly similar to the one Kroeber (1919) 
detected in a study of women's evening wear over a 75-year 
period, but this cycle does not appear to match any 
known socio-historical cycle. Apropos of the difficul­
ties of finding a "law of fashion", Kroeber (1919) 
writes that "a geologist could as usefully set himself 
the task of explaining the size and shape of each pebble 
in a gravel bed," for in the play of fashion, "we are 
but such stones." Blumer (1968), Konig (1973), and
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Robinson (1958) conclude that fashion is an arbitrary 
law unto itself, but considered in the context of the 
"mores" (also called "custom" and "culture") fashion 
might (1) have an experimental function (Blumer, 1968);
(2) provide a link to the "Zeitgeist" (Meyersohn & Katz, 
1957); (3) be a means of changing culture (Sapir, 1931; 
Sumner, 1959); and (4) create stimulation (Park, 1921).
Tarde (1903) interestingly associates a strong feeling 
for custom with an attachment to nation and a weak 
attachment to nation with a strong feeling for period, 
in which it is fashion that rules. Polhemus (1978), 
idiosyncratically, would designate "custom" clothes 
"anti-fashion", a term he also ascribes to body decor­
ations such as tattooing, scarification, cranial deformation, 
removal of body parts, circumcision, subincision, 
clitorectomy, tooth filing, and ear, nose and lip 
piercing, and in driving a wedge between slowly changing 
forms and rapidly changing forms he seems to want to 
identify anti-fashion with custom, from which Sapir (1931) 
says fashion disengages itself to show a sort of societal 
role distance. The Langs (1961), too, in claiming for 
culture the ability to set limits to fashion, confine 
the concept of fashion to what is changing relatively 
quickly, as if in the hope that what is changing relatively 
slowly will be tractable to the rational explanations 
that fashion confounds.
Tl:o:e is, however, a consensus that fashions are both 
dictatorial - Park calls them a "ceremonial government"
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and Sumner thinks they are "stronger than autocracy" - 
and whimsical, simultaneously defying and enticing easy 
rationalizations . Fashions, it is agreed, are called 
fashions if it is thought or hoped that they will die, 
Those fashions that do die are then exposed as having 
been fashions all along, because it is in the nature of 
a fashion to have not looked like one when holding sway 
(Simmel, 1957). Fashions die suddenly (Robinson, 1958) 
and _the_ new is always driven in by the old (Meyersohn 
& Katz, 1957) . So fashion, then, is always partly out 
of control (Park, 1921), and carries its own death 
sentence; and perhaps that is one reason why the word 
fashionable is derogatory, even though the rejoinder 
unfashionable is also a put-down.
Fads stand to fashions as fashions to customs, and 
even from fashion-apologists like Blumer draw the sort 
of venemous attributions of irrationality that fashion 
fashionably attracts, sometimes being called "crazes", 
as if their failure to fit into neat societal theories 
was their fault.
Simmel originated the trickle-down theory that has 
been taken over by marketing researchers and endorsed by 
Fallers (1967), Barber & Lobel (1952), and Robinson 
(1960, 1963). The theory holds that since the lower 
classes are always emulating higher classes, the higher 
classes to avoid identification with their imitators 
must be forever altering their styles. Blumer (1969)
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has an excellent rebuttal of this. He says that, because 
the central imperative of fashion is to be in fashion, 
it must be the fashionable who are emulated; the rich, 
then, are not copied because they are rich but because 
they have afforded themselves fashionable appearances. 
However, I think Blumer*s impeccable argument that there 
need be no relation between the status of a fashion 
itself and statuses as they exist in that fashion's 
surrounding culture need not reflect the truth.
Blumer (1969) speculates that the societal function 
of fashion might be to free energies from outmoded forms 
in a "collective groping" for future forms, providing, 
through uniformity, a continuity that prevents anarchy, 
while Fallers (1967) says that fashion for the individual 
allows him to share a success that is not his. But 
fashion's adherents, asserts Polhemus (1978), only 
advertise their freedom from existing groups, and Sapir 
(1931) is reduced to claiming for the fashionable, in 
the absence of any other significance, a "symbolic 
significance".
Perhaps, however, there is no simple purpose for 
fashion because all it does is provide dominant conduct 
models for those aspects of behaviour that feel free to 
choose their own forms. Conduct with no social reference 
will have no need for fashion, since such conduct cannot 
convey anything, and conduct that is not free to choose, 
of course, will not be able to change its forms in any
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direction whatsoever. Fashion conduct, then, will not 
be pronounced in repressed societies or in sociales 
where people are relatively uninterested in one another. 
However, contrary to present fashionable views of 
"fashion's slaves", it will be just where there are 
opportunities to change (with no fear of sanctions)^ 
and just when people are very interested in one another, 
that fashion conduct might become all the conduct there
I S  .
A Note on Studying Fashion
Fashion is a field in which there has been very 
little empirical study. Kroeber (1919) and Barber & 
Lobel (1952) have measured the dimensions of women's 
clothes in pictures. Horowitz (1975) has elucidated 
some relationships between designers, communicators, 
and consumers between 1964 and 1967 in Britain.
Mueller (n.d.) has compared the repertoires of symphony 
orchestras. Robinson (1976) measured men's facial hair 
in pictures from the Illustrated London News from 1842 
to 1972.
So far as I know, there is no study of the conduct 
of fashion adherents done by participant observation of 
the type that I practised with punks and with nurses.
The aspect of fashion conduct that has drawn my 
attention bears closely on its morality, in which 
connection Park (1921) has written:
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There is no rebellion against fashion; no rebellion 
against social ritual ... There are breaches of 
etiquette that any ordinary human being would 
rather die than be guilty of.
Bell (1947) too, connects clothing to morals:
So strong is the impulse of sartorial morality 
that it is difficult in praising clothes not to 
use such adjectives as "right", "good", "correct", 
"unimpeachable", or "faultless", which belong 
properly to the discussion of conduct, while in 
discussing moral shortcomings we tend very 
naturally to fall into the language of dress and _ 
speak of a person's behaviour as being shabby, 
shoddy, threadbare, down at heel, botched or 
slipshod.
And Sapir (1931), noting that fashion is related to dress 
by its symbolism, describes art, morals, and thoughts 
as "costuming of the ego". Bearing this in mind, one 
can appreciate that fashion as a concept to be researched 
may be as well explored, at this time, by textual as 
by more obvious fieldwork methods.
It should be clear, as a starting point at any rate, 
that fashions against which "there is no arguing" unless 
one wants to be sanctioned with "ridicule and powerless­
ness" (Sumner, 1959) can thoroughly take over their 
adherents to the point that good behaviour is to be 
fashionable and bad unfashionable, whatever the fashion. 
And if fashion is truly ubiquitous, and if it is as 
autocratic as many sociologists believe, one already 
has to concec^ that to be a good person it is only 
necessary to do what every other up-to-date person 
is doing. I feel safe in saying that, at the time of 
writing, this, in my culture, is an unfashionable
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proposition. It seems to mock a person's pretensions 
to moral seriousness, what I have called his ritual 
self. I found, for example, in the course of my 
research, that punks - supreme "slaves’* to fashion - 
reject such a view by constantly asserting that a punk 
as it were inevitably expresses his "punkness" by his 
appearance. What a punk would never do, say punks, is 
cynically copy other punks in order to suggest that he 
might possess underlying"punkness". I cannot help 
wondering what a state of affairs, in which it was 
fashionable to say that one was only and completely a 
creature of fashion, might be like. Perhaps it would 
presage a sociological era when people would cut them­
selves free from fixed relationships and concentrate 
on playing all their present interactions for the pay-off 
of continually altering identities. In that case, it 
would structurally resemble life in Queen Elizabeth's 
Hospital, Washington D.C., where Erving Goffman, 
pretending to be an assistant to the athletics director, 
observed the conduct that he reported twenty years ago 
in Asylums - with two main differences, that there would 
be no dossier (clinging to each person like a "paper 
shadow") from which antagonistic persons could select 
information with which to puncture claims, and there 
would be no possibility of release into a different 
world.
In the light of the above, and before moving on to 
the specific case of the punks, a second note on fashion's
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unfashionability now seems called for.
A Note on the Unfashionability of Fashion as a Concept
Why should fashion be a far more unfashionable 
concept to take seriously than, for example, dass?
When Guy de Maupassant (1971) writes, "The ladies 
uttered shrieks of joy, and then examined the samples 
with that"seriousness which comes naturally to women 
as soon as they lay their hands on an article of clothing," 
he is surely confident that his male readers, at least, 
will share in his bemused condescension, and many, of 
course, will. Likewise, George Eliot (1958) must have 
expected sardonic appreciation for her observation about 
Dorothea Brooke that "she could not reconcile the anxieties 
of a spiritual life, involving external consequences, 
with a keen interest in guimp and artificial profusions 
of drapery."
Thomas Hardy (1980), more strongly still, in Tess 
of the D'Urbervilles, describes Angel Clare’s two brothers 
in terms that leave no doubt as to his disdain for their 
fashionable conduct:
... non-evangelical, well-educated, hall-marked 
young men, correct to their remotest fibre; such 
unimpeachable models as are turned out yearly by 
the lathe of systematic tuition. They were both 
somewhat short-sighted, and when it was the custom 
to wear a single eyeglass and string they wore a 
single eyeglass and string; when it was the custom 
to wear a double glass they wore a double glass; 
when it was the custom to wear spectacles they 
wore spectacles straightaway, all without reference
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to the particular variety of defect in their own 
vision. When Wordsworth was enthroned, they carried 
pocket copies; and when Shelley was belittled they 
allowed him to grow dusty on their shelves. When 
Careggio’s Holy Families were admired, they admired 
Careggio's Holy Families; when he was decried in 
favour of Velasquez, they sedulously followed suit 
without any personal objection.
The effect of this passage by Hardy, as of the others, 
is to slight fashionable conduct by insinuating that it 
lacks any personal volition beyond that necessary to 
choose ta follow it-. - - '
If it is the case, as I now suggest, that Western 
societies are becoming more fashion conscious in every 
social activity, then it must equally be the case that 
individuality is becoming more a matter of choosing which 
fashion group to belong to than of defying all fashions, 
which as I have quoted Sumner saying, invites ridicule, 
powerlessness, and ostracism. From this perspective, 
there would seem to be every reason to take fashion 
seriously. After all, Angel Clare's brothers were only 
different from Angel Clare and Thomas Hardy in isolating 
more transient customs for emulation, and, between a number 
of customs, who is to choose but by reference to other 
customs? Recently, the social psychologist Gregory Stone 
(1975) has spoken up for the most derided aspect of the 
derided concept of fashion, which is clothing:
... clothing represents our action, past, present 
and future, as it is established by the proposals 
and anticipations that occur in every social 
transaction.
By appearing, the person announces his identity, 
shows his value, expresses his mood or proposes 
his attitude.
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The meaning of appearance, therefore, is the 
establishment of identity, value, mood and attitude 
for the one who appears by the coincident programs 
and reviews awakened by his appearances.
Perhaps this recognition of the crucial importance to 
interactions of actors' attire can give a lead as to 
how to put the volition back into fashionable conduct. 
Received wisdom on the subject has fashion adherents 
cast in the role of passive victims or dupes, who will 
wear or do anything if they think it is the fashion.
Look at it from Stone's point of view, however, and one 
can see how great is the care that people must exercise 
to control their appearances, so as to integrate their 
self-conceptions with those of their others. Social life 
thus demands the existence of a readable sartorial code. 
Given that such codes already do exist, it is simply 
impossible for a person to go codeless, for that too 
would speak volumes of contempt in the sartorial idiom. 
Faced with having to put on an identity in a culture 
where idiosyncratic attire is ungrammatical, a person 
has no choice but to look to prevailing fashions. As 
Simmel (1957) has shown, fashion at once differentiates 
and collects its adherents; so it is the means by which 
the person can lay claim to personness without paying 
the costs of eccentricity. And even within a tightly 
prescribed fashion like punk, there is considerable 
room for variation: individuality may be contrived 
between certain parameters.
One of the techniques for devaluing fashion is to
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define the fashionable into a separate group from the 
rest of humanity ; this comes, I think, of imputing one 
set of motivational relevances to phenomena that are taken 
for granted and another to those which shock. It is 
my view, however, that the pernickety fashion care at 
work in persons picking over a pullover counter in Marks 
and Spencers is no less open to the charge of being over­
concerned with appearances than the care exercised by 
a punk -in a pet shop choosing a dog collar to fasten 
round his neck. The one is just more familiar than the 
ether, but both speak the same language. Punk, by its very 
nature, of course, is not just lowly because it is a 
fashion, for it is a low fashion, even seeming to disobey 
Simmel's trickle-down theory, except if looked at ritually. 
This is because it began among working class youths (the 
only groups it has been emulated by are the ultra-fashion­
conscious beau monde of capital cities, who have improvised 
a sort of haute couture punk). There is no question of 
an Etonian, for instance, ever having stuck a safety 
pin through his cheek: so punk fashion can only be said 
to trickle down if it can be allowed that it possesses 
high ritual power, which would then cause it to be 
followed so that followers could acquire some of that 
power. What Tom Wolfe (1965) said of the mods is as 
true of the punks:
High styles came from low places, from people 
who have no power, who slink away from it, in 
fact, who are marginal, who carve out worlds for 
themselves in the nether depths, in tainted "undergrounds".
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It is the style of life that makes them unique, 
not money, not power, not position, talent, 
intelligence. So like most people who base their 
lives on style, they are rather gloriously unaffected 
cynics about everything else.
(Wolfe, 1968)
If my suspicion, that social life is tending to become 
more and more "fashion life", is correct, one can see 
from commentators like Wolfe how the sixties phrase 
"life-styles" portended this. At no other time in 
European history had it become acceptable to think of 
ways of living as so many styles to be selected from, 
and, indeed, changed at will. But one can anticipate, 
if this sort of orientation were to take hold in 
sociology, a vigorous backlash against it by all those 
who would jump to the conclusion that the "real" facts 
of social situations can never be signalled by "mere" 
appearances. This would be in keeping with a very 
long-standing European intellectual fashion of compul­
sively ignoring surfaces for what is below them, before 
beginning any analysis. Fashions might never be allowed 
to be seen as autonomous movements of change that have 
the power to mass-produce lookalike humans in almost any 
imaginable form. There will be a great deal of effort 
devoted to tying them to persons' psychologies, for 
example, but, as Blumer (1968) has argued, no psychological 
explanation of fashion conduct can say why a psychological 
process gives rise to the conduct that is fashion conduct, 




As in the section on nurses which concludes this 
chapter, I introduce my metaphor of the stalking ground 
very sparingly here, and use the idea of persons as ritual 
beings with circumspectiorL. _ In the whole of this chapter, 
I have remained "close to the data," which, as I have 
indicated in Chapter I, is possible precisely at the 
expense of theoretical expansion. The main purpose of 
this chapter is to justify the concept "ritual power,” 
but it is also inevitable that the chapter will contribute 
to an understanding of nurses and punks as substantive 
topics in their own right.
General Introduction to Punks^
In any sociological study some of the phenomena has 
to be spirited into the account in a state of analytic 
undress before the analyst can quickly garb it in his 
terms so as to eventually prove that it does indeed look 
its best wearing those. Put differently, I cannot talk 
of punks ritually unless I first produce them unritually;
I must speak the language of everyday to begin with, or 
not begin. Thus, I now provide a few remarks about 
punks that suffer from the fate that as much as they 
are effective, they will detract from the value of 
later ritual remarks.
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Either gender can adopt the punk fashion once into 
the teenage years, though attendance at school works 
against a punk's credibility. An upper age limit would 
seem to be the early or middle twenties, but most punks^ 
are in their late teens, as far from educational insti­
tutions as from adult institutions like marriage. Many 
punks are unemployed and express a feeling of being on 
the outside of what they call society: off-the-peg 
occupational identities are either unavailable or 
demeaning.
A punk can only become a punk by wearing the punk 
fashion and the first time he does this is a "coming out" 
(Warren & Ponse, 1977; Becker, 1970; Matza, 1969). Punks 
are highly conscious of their appearance and not only 
carefully fake the details of its ravagement and apparent 
ill-use, but also taboo any but general comments about 
it, preferring to try to fathom whatever it might be 
beneath the appearance that, in their view, causes it. 
This emerges in the process of "fantasy chaining"^ when 
it is frequently asserted that it would be possible to 
be a punk without wearing punk gear. Those who are 
thought of as the real punks, however, are scornful of 
"Friday night" punks who put on the fashion just for an 
evening out and take it off before applying for a job.
Yet even the full-time punks I interviewed confessed to 
wearing non-punk fashions when appearing in courts on 
assault charges, but were apologetic about this in one 
another's presence. A punk who finally discards his
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punk attire is said to "go smooth", and this is not 
regarded as a moral progression but as a backing down, a 
chickening out, a betrayal, and a defeat.
Rather than be "nobodies" with little sacred 
value, punks, relatively unqualified to sanctify them­
selves by the acquisition of wealth, power, status, 
talent, title, or whatever, can go only in the direction 
of profanation if they would come into possession of 
what is ritually beyond their achievable social deserts. 
A punk must profane himself, then, to the point of 
threatening all those who see him and interact with him 
with a contagious contamination. Of this threat, Mary 
Douglas (1966, p. 113) writes:
A polluting person is always in the wrong. He 
has developed some wrong condition or simply 
crossed some line which should not have been 
crossed and this displacement unleashes danger 
for someone ... Pollution can be committed 
intentionally ... The power which presents a 
danger for careless humans is very evidently a 
power inhering in the structure of ideas, a 
power by which structure is expected to protect 
itself .
So the punk attacks the society that he feels has rejected 
him, by putting himself in the wrong, so as to give 
himself an aura of danger. The avoidance by other 
people, then, of his polluting self, is to the punk 
proportional to a greater ritualness he thereby comes 
into. Just as a celebrity walks on hallowed ground 
and may be jokingly referred to as "his highness" (and 
may work in the seclusion of what his aides call the 
"holy of holies") so the punk with every step he takes
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seems to be descending into a realm of evil which is 
known to be that both by his others and by himself, just 
because there is a common pollution code. The punk is 
one with Baudelaire's (1964) dandies:
All partake of the same characteristic of 
opposition and revolt; they are all represent­
atives of what is finest in human pride, of that 
compelling need, alas only too rare today, of 
combating and destroying triviality.
Dandyism is the last spark of heroism amid 
decadence ,.. gloriuus; without heat and full 
of melancholy.
However, though the punk speaks the same ritual idiom 
as his audience, he speaks it better, for if he would 
stay in circulation by living between the limits of 
propriety and legality he must have an enhanced sensitivity 
to both.
I shall now describe how punks desacralize them­
selves, and, since their doing this plays so large a 
part in the creation of their fashion, I shall also be 
giving, by the way, a fairly comprehensive account of 
the punk fashion. This is an ethnocentric account because 
it relies on readers appreciating, without having to be 
told, that acts like vomiting on stage are not "normal". 
What I hope to show through this account are not the 
reasons why punks feel they should have extra ritualness, 
but rather how they go about getting it, and in what it 
consists. (Nonetheless, the ritual code, which they 
share with all those readers this narrative would make 
sense to, is so pervasive that, when I describe how
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ritualness may be lost by their desacralizations, an 
immediate reaction is to take the prevention of that 
loss as a fully sufficient reason for acquiring more 
of what would be lost.)
The Physical Self
Hair: Hair is dyed by both sexes, usually the arti­
ficial colours of peroxide blond, pink, lime green, 
and jet_black. Several colours can be combined on 
one head, and into closely-cropped scalps might be dyed 
patterns such as a spider's web or a question mark.
Male punks* hair can also be completely shaved, or, 
if very closely cut in the neo-Skinhead style, have 
patterns shaved into it (the wavy seam of a tennis ball 
was popular during the Wimbledon summer of 1979). 
Alternatively, hair may be tousled up into unkempt 
spikes and then frozen into place by spray-on starch. 
Improvisations on these themes are not unusual; for 
example, one Bath punk has a mohican cut, with the 
variation that the long central strip of hair is drawn 
up into six-inch long spokes that give him a cockatoo 
look.
Several violations are at work here. Punk hair 
is always visually prominent to a degree not seen in 
Britain since the advent of long hair in the sixties. 
Thus, the treatment of the hair proclaims that it is 
there purely for decorative purposes and that it is raw 
material for often violent chemical experiment (Bath
90
punks, for example, used to splash Woolworths' peroxide 
onto their heads, and when the hair, attacked at its 
roots, began to fall out, they shaved it off completely) . 
The forms of the decoration, moreover, are outlandish. 
Punk hair, then, is always designed to be bizarre and 
outrageous so that it must not only violate modesty 
norms, but also violate norms against violating these.
So by the purchase and application of dye a person 
transforms himself into a double offender, for, not 
showing shame for one offence, he offends again, and 
thus is on the way to his classification as an "animal" 
or a "mindless moron" by those he offends.
Mutilationsx The early punks who set the fashion wore 
several rings in each ear and often had rings or studs 
in their noses too. Safety-pins were the rage in 1977: 
these would be pinned into the face and sometimes a chain 
would connect the safety-pin to an earring. This kind 
of adornment offends, as does the hair, but with 
additional force since it is brought about by painful 
self mutilation. Through his safety-pins, the punk 
says that even if it hurts him, he will hurt you.
Where the flesh of the body shows, tattoos are 
usually in evidence, often of home-made manufacture, 
as if to say that both design and irreversible physical 
change are matters of indifference to a punk. The 
argument once again is very simple. He who does that 
to himself is seen as not caring about himself and so
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disqualifies himself as a proper person twice over, by 
not caring and then by not caring about looking as if 
he does not care.
Another mutilation of the self is the frequently 
seen cutting of the forearms - with razors ot jacknives - 
in herring bone patterns; this combines the flagrancy 
of self-injury with the casual irreversibility of the 
tattooing. - : ' ‘ "
Make-up : The make-up of punk girls is usually a whitening
of natural tones, made more masklike still by the painting 
of lips with "dead" colours like mauve or brown. Heavy 
black lines emphasise the eyes, and early punk girls 
would use, in place of a beauty spot, little swastikas.
Punk girls often have a startling, aggressive femininity 
as if they belong to a tribe living on in the rubble 
after a nuclear holocaust. (Boys rarely wear make-up, 
but when they can, cultivate spots and pimples.) The 
overall impression one gets from some of the punk girls 
is of 1930s Berlin night-life designed by Edgar Allen 
Poe, which is quite antithetical to current "educationalist' 
and liberal dogma about the wholesomeness of healthy 
sex, for instance.
Clothes and Ornaments
Punk clothes are usually old, and are always torn 
carefully. T-shirts especially are ripped, but jackets 
will come in for this treatment too, unless they are
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old leather motorcycle jackets, when slogans, logos, 
and caricatures will be painted on their backs. Boys 
wear "bondage trousers" which are trousers whose legs 
are attached to each other by straps, and some of the 
girls have revived the mini-skirt, which they wear so 
as to expose the tops of stockings, held up by suspender 
belts. The rejection of "liberated" tights in favour 
of soft-porn stockings is then reversed again by the 
wearing of baseball boots on the stockinged feet. At 
concerts some girls are clad in plastic bin-liners and 
very long T-shirts instead of dresses, and a proportion 
of the boys always make sure to wear their "bum-flaps"
(a nappy that hangs over the seat of the trousers) for 
these occasions. In some areas kilts worn over trousers 
are as popular as the bum-flaps, but for footwear, the 
boys usually choose boots of the kind that the skinheads 
wear.
Favourite patterns are leopard spots and tartans, 
which together with the bum-flaps and kilts convey a 
sort of kitsch atavism, a connection to tribal behaviour 
that reaches no further back than to pictures in old 
copies of the National Geographical Magazine that may 
once have been thumbed through at school. So if the 
punk does want to look like a savage, he would prefer 
to be an ignoble one, who is only really at home in 
scenes of urban squalour, or in the comic strip jungle 
of Tarzan.
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Both T-shirts and leather motor-cycle jackets (punks 
will not own or ride motorcylces) are hand-decorated.
Names of favourite punk groups such as the Sex Pistols,
Sham 69, Adam and the Ants, are frequent slogans on 
these, as are the titles of and lines from famous punk 
’•hits".
Both sexes like to fasten round their necks either 
dog collars or the padlocks and chains that are usually 
used to secure bicycles. Here again, as with the safety- 
pins, by singling out not only extremely cheap ornamen­
tation, but ornaments that have a degraded social function, 
the punks score twice: cheap and low at the same time.
Combinations and variations of their clothes and 
ornaments, in addition to styles of hair and body 
decoration, are multifarious, and those elements that 
I have enumerated are neither all-inclusive nor are 
meant to suggest relative frequencies of each, for I 
am concerned here to give a general description of a 
diachronic fashion by a synchronic resume that captures 
what, on the basis of my research into punk taken as a 
whole, seems to be its best representation.
Thus, by deliberately flaunting himself in attire 
that is old, torn, sloganised, and misappropriated, 
the punk breaks the rule that normal appearances should 
not alarm. His tied-together legs, his bum flap, his 
girl friend in baseball boots and fishnet tights, do
94
succeed in appearing to many non-punks as both deliber­
ated and alarming, at any rate until the fashion is 
neutralized by being recognised as a fashion. The effect 
of these clothes, worn with the dyed hair and the safety 
pins, may be imagined when it was seen for the first 
time along the Kings Road in the Autumn of 1976. 
Commentators yet again mistook a fashion for a revolution, 
because it was a fashion that seemed to hate fashion, 
as fashion was then fashionably understood.
Movement
Punks have evolved their own style of dancing 
called the pogo, and it informs many of their non­
dancing movements as well. To perform it, you jump 
up and down on the spot either with both arms held 
stiffly to the sides or, if at concerts, with one arm 
punching a fist into the air at the height of each leap. 
Punks at concerts usually pogo in a mass, crushed against 
the stage, and they are never quite in rhythm with one 
another. If a punk, while pogoing, wishes to show 
appreciation of the singer on stage, he will spit at 
him, timing his release of the gob of spittle to take 
place at his apogee, from where he will help the gob 
on its way with a flick of his head.
This kind of dancing, which minimizes skill, grace
and invention, is performed with a zombie-like facial
expression that further creates the impression of limited
personality. It is a style of dancing with practically
all that one associates with "dance" removed.
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By never dancing in two-sexed pairs, punks convey 
not only their indifference to the execution of dance 
steps but also a refusal of prescribed courtship rituals, 
for which paired dancing is commonly an important 
transition stage. But a punk can succeed in throwing 
himself into the activity of dancing as well as any 
other person; he does this by increasing both his 
tempo and the height to which he leaps. A subtle variant is 
to refuse to leap at all but to root the feet to the 
floor and wrestle the upper torso in imitation of the 
writhings of a man in a straightjacket. This suggests 
even greater energy by its painful inhibition. Such 
disciplined simplifications of movements match the 
moron masks, and go well with the bondage trousers 
that suit a pogoing style and the connotations of 
strapped-in insanity.
I always used to notice that, whenever and wherever 
and for whatever purpose a punk moves, he tends to 
evoke the pogo, his dance of complete self-involvement 
that jumps up and down on any idea that dancing should 
be gracious or should be part of a love relationship.
In dancing his way, punks can powerfully convey 
the contempt they feel for that sort of youthful conduct 
their elders could look at with indulgent approval.
It is as if punks intend to be their own marionettes, 
pulling their own strings.
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Punks generally move about as if recovering from 
accidents that nearly crippled them, and they try to 
make it plain at all times that the accident was that 
of being born amongst non-punks. With every step they 
take, they try to walk away from their environments 
and thus, while trying to upset those who think that 
punks should be grateful for their environments, begin 
to take on the ritual look that can be had by seeming 
to be in touch with non-temporal events. Their physical 
awkwardness can almost suggest a lost utopia where they 
might have felt at ease, but they will try to capitalise 
on this suggestion by a nihilistic dismissal of its 
possibility in reality or in dreams. They want to be 
the twice dispossessed, so that their selves here on 
the streets of the cities, like so many pricks, as it 
were, will puncture and let the air of conviviality out 
of all possible social gatherings, and they are this 
way vengefully, because they see so little conviviality 
in the first place.
Physical Unconcern
1. Losing a fight, to a punk, is no less honourable 
that winning, because he has lost anyway in any wider 
sense, and believing this, the punk raises himself above 
those who would fight him, since the other's victory
or defeat is beneath his contempt.
2. The practice of spitting, which waned early, was
for a time a form of greeting between punks, and as such,
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of course, was an almost exact reversal of conventional 
greeting protocol within which a gob of spit would be 
goodbye rather than hello.
3. Masturbation has won the approval of punks; one 
early fanzine, indeed, was called White Stuff. It is 
easy to see that by celebrating single person sex, the 
punks can show their disrespect for conventional 
couplings, the pleasures or which they will show no 
signs of appreciating. As a corollary to this, the 
punks also affect disinteisst in copulation, tending to 
bracket it with functions like urination.
4. Punks try to ignore the cold, the wet, the wind, 
and other environmental discomforts. Those who bother 
about such things in their view are over-concerned with 
the welfare of selves that they cannot see as being worth 
protecting. Knowing life is uncomfortable, a punk 
attempts to feel more comfortable by doing nothing 
about it.
Self-Stigmatization
Taylor (1976) notes that football supporters on 
the terraces have recently taken to chanting "Hooligans: 
Hooligans!" Similarly, punks give themselves a bad name 
as if to deride those to whom it is bad, and the badness 
is a negative ritualness deriving from the label, which, 
says Rotenberg (1974), sticks from the inside because 
it is both "autosuggestive" and "transformative".
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Punks also refer to themselves as kids, on the 
grounds that adults have no moral integrity, an argu­
ment which they choose not to turn back on their own moral 
manoeuvre of covering themselves in shit in order to 
smell for themselves like roses. Some latter-day 
punks, to dissociate themselves from hangers-on, have 
coined a new lable, "wimp", for punks who, too wet to 
be fully-fledged punks, are not wet enough to be non- 
punks. ' (Only the rock signer, Gary Numan, seems to 
have stuck this to himself so far.) This eager adoption 
of a derogatory label must work in the same way as the 
physical and sartorial self-profanations. I abuse 
myself before you can abuse me, and, what is more, I 
have the courage to abuse myself more thoroughly than 
you would, and therefore, possessing this superior 
courage, I do not deserve to be abused. So my being 
a punk proves that I am not a punk, so long as I am a 
punk.
A self-stigmatizer, then, says that stigmas matter 
less to him than to his audience, and they can only 
matter less to him if he is more worthy to begin with.
In practice, the stigma and the presumed worth must 
arrive simultaneously, but either way, the stigma by 
its being worn with pride, increases ritualness.
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So I have now enumerated how punks desacralize 
their physical selves, their clothes and ornaments, 
they physical movements, their bodily welfare, and their 
generic label. Each single self-profanation is easily 
comprehended only if the punk is seen as profaning 
himself to cause those around him to be "taken aback", 
as they would not be were he not so profaned. I suggest 
now that what the punk is doing, by suffering his own 
ritual degradations with perfect sang-froid, is raising 
himself above those who feel he has lowered himself.
The logic is: I have torn down my respectability and 
am unperturbed, therefore I have more ritualness than 
you, because you do not believe my contaminations could 
not decrease ritualness, and so, when you call me an 
animal. I, knowing I am not that - being just anybody 
who has put on a punk appearance - know I am more than 
you who would be an animal if you degraded yourself as 
I do, and my coolness about your name-calling is what 
provokes it and what proves that you feel my superior 
ritual power.
Since this is the case, it is appropriate now to 
christen the ritualness that punks increase for themselves 
"ritual power". I contend that "ritualness" is not a 
simple"given"for a person because he is a person and 
is not in any simple way connected to formal societal 
statuses but can be profoundly altered in interaction 
by conduct alone. It makes sense to call such an 
interactional property a "power", when it can have the
100
effect punks* ritual power has of completely removing 
them from the normal realm and investing them with 
something that, if it does not command awe in its 
onlookers, commands a sort of respect that behaves like 
respect, even though it longs to be disrespect. Once 
the concept "ritual power" is in use it becomes much 
easier to grasp my argument that ritualness may come 
and go for a person in interactions, and this I believe 
is a-line of thought never pursued by Erving Goffman, 
despite his being the one social scientist to be keenly 
aware of the importance in interaction of ritual 
concerns.
Now I want to answer an obvious question that 
arises at this point; why choose to profane oneself 
by taking on the punk fashion when there are any number 
of different ways of achieving personal degradation. 
After that, I wish to contextualise the punks by 
considering their music and their concerts and then 
their behaviour in public places, before finally 
looking at their ideology, such as it is. Each of 
these latter sections will add to an understanding of 
how punks go about increasing their ritual power once 
they have got themselves up to look like punks.
Why Punk in Particular?
Since there are many other ways of profaning 
oneself than by becoming a punk, how is it that punks 
are a recognisable group whereas, for example, some
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categories of mental patients, such as indecent exposers, 
are not? The only answer I think lies in the fact of 
punk being a fashion. Since fashions, as Simmel (1957) 
said, differentiate their followers at the same time 
that they group them, the follower of a fashion is not 
alone. So fashion legitimates by multiplying its 
instances. This of course provides a deplorably thin 
justification of action for anybody, that it is right 
because others do it_, -but-L think this is a fairly -
universal self-justification. As I have said, it may 
be, too, that a real fashion cannot know itself for 
that until it is over, so punks, for example, are just 
the most recent group in a long line of groups that 
each thought it was the end of the line. This would 
also account for its followers uniformizing themselves: 
they are not, so far as they are concerned, following a 
fashion, but joining a sort of sect.
It should be said here that punks so far have 
successfully brought down on their heads just the kind 
of treatment they want. A review of press reports over 
the last five years reveals an unremitting attitude 
to them as being folk devils (Cohen, 1980), but the 
difference between punks as folk devils and Cohen's 
Teddy Boys as folk devils is that punks have consciously 
sought this attribution. I would expect this to continue 
until the fashion dies, when those who would then be 
folk devils will have to assume another guise whose 
terms again will be set by the wider society. Many
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writers using a subculture perspective, however, often 
imply a model in which a new subculture grows out of 
the old, as if isolated from non-youth ritual idioms, 
but punks themselves are incurious about earlier fashions 
and, being very young, usually have come of age directly 
into their fashion, so there is little sense of their 
having themselves matured through successive fashions 
into the punk fashion. In fact the only fashion punks 
actively decry is the hippy fashion, and it is easy to 
see how the hippy over-sacralization of everything from 
personal relationships to the planet itself presents a 
clear antithesis for the punks to revile. (Punks would 
not pick fights with hippies any more than they would 
fight normals. I think this is because fighting is an 
intimate form of interaction which relies on shared 
ground rules, as these are known by neo-Mods, Skinheads, 
and the like, who have frequent run-ins with punks.)
Thus far, it should be noted, punks have masked 
their self-consciousness very effectively, not that I 
do not think Simon Frith (1978) to be exaggerating when 
he writes: "What's going on here is not the spontaneous 
confirmation of subcultural theory, but the deliberate 
use of subcultural ideology by young sophisticates who've 
read their Stan Cohen and Jock Young and understand 
deviancy theory as a neat form of legitimation." 
Nonetheless, when the leading punk rock group, the 
Sex Pistols, issued an L.P. without songs, comprising 
recordings of interviews given by the group on British
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and American radio and TV, all interpolated with a
voice-over declaring their manager, Malcolm McLaren,
to be an exploiter, the punks took it in good part,
buying it, not as sucker consumers, but as members of
a group in on a "sophisticated" joke against the
commercialization of rock-and-roll. (Naturally that
joke is "contained" (Goffman, 1975) by their buying
the record being seen as a joke, and that containment
is further contained if the dupe knows he is a dupé and
still buys because that is the punk thing to do.) Very
few of the punks I have spoken to, however, had the
formal education to understand the possible significance 
9of McLaren*s alleged activities with the Situationists* 
International of Paris in May 1968, nor could they 
appreciate the Garfinkel-style methods this group emptys 
to "breach" spectacles so as to visibilize their 
"repressive" rules (in the same way that Baader-Meinhoff 
effectively used terrorism in the belief that this would 
expose West Germany as a police state) . But the spirit 
of breaching is readily appreciated and endorsed by punks
The Music and the Concerts
Like the rhythm of most other rock music, punk's 
is a repetitive equal-weighted beat, but punk is harsher, 
denser, and more chaotic in the mix than any rock-and- 
roll that has preceded it. Its lyrics, drawing on a 
nihilistic rhetoric of squalid metropolises, are hardly 
sung ; rather they are scrawled across a surface of 
rough electronic sound as violently as obscene graffiti
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on slum walls. The musicians who have taken up this 
style of playing are the first in Britain for more than 
ten years to graduate , without the aid of talent scouts 
and A and R men, from pubs and clubs to nationwide 
marketing networks. They have been quick to turn their 
disadvantage of musical incompetence into a moral 
superiority, showing it off as evidence of an authentic 
will to express essentially inexpressible boredom and 
frustration. Of course, they are hot the first to be . 
opportunistic about their lack of talent:
Perhaps the whole alienation atmosphere of our 
times - from Dada's rejection of high official 
art, through Surrealism's taboo on reason and 
the formal plot, to existentialist disillusion 
with all idealistic morality - has finally led 
film Undergrounders ... to repudiate their own 
technical tradition as artifical and formalist.
Thus Parker Tyler (1974) on the precursors of Andy 
Warhol's casually careless film constructions.
The exemplary group was the quickly disbanded Sex 
Pistols, who stand to punk as the Rolling Stones and 
Jimi Hendrix did to the heavier hippies. Sometimes 
their songs exactly articulate a bitter, vengeful emotion 
of wantonly despoliated hope:
When there's no future
How can there be sex
We're the flowers in the dustbin
We're the poison in your human machine
We’re the future
Your future.
One cannot do justice to the ecstatic recognition that 
punks show when they hear that song which, despite being
105
banned by the BBC, went to Number One in the British 
charts. The Clash did less well with another seminal 
punk song, "White Riot":
Black men have got a lotta problems. 
But they don't mind throwing a brick. 
But white men have got too much school 
Where they teach you to be thick.
The Buzzcocks also catch a typical punk attitude of 
slovenly dismissal in their song "Sixteen", which ends 
with this appraisal of the then available teenage sound
And I hate modern music 
Disco boogie and pop
They go on and on and on and on and on 
How I wish they would stop.
Sexual love is extolled, typically, as follows, by a 
group called Alternative Television:
I never want to find out who the girls have been servicing
I never want to know who the guys have been doing
It's a mess up 
It's a fuck up
'Cos fucking anybody always knocks me out quite a lot
I never care who I go to bed with
Male or female, there's never any sense in it
It's a bother
It's a cocker
'Cos cocking anybody always bothers me, my love lies
limp, limp, limp.
None of this, of course, is of a different ritual order 
to Elvis Presley, twenty-five years earlier, of whom 
Thom Gunn (1962) wrote then:
Distorting hackneyed words in hackneyed songs 
He turns revolt into a style, prolongs 
The impulse to a habit of the time.
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To make a mark, the groups, who inherited a tradition 
in rock-and-roll of some of the most outrageous stage 
conduct ever seen, found it necessary on stage to shout 
obscenities, to,spit, to vomit, and to urinate. Concert 
hall managers did not understand, and groups were banned 
from venues, this becoming an affidavit of authenticity. 
Those that could get "gigs" then often incited fans 
to smash up halls. One singer (from the group Chelsea)
I personally saw sTibuting repeatedly: "This place is too
clean, let's smash it up." That was as late as 1980 in 
the Locarno Ballroom in Bristol, a hall thronged with 
large anxious-looking men in dinner suits. Being banned 
from stages, like being banned from the airwaves, 
guarantees that no "selling-out" can occur. So the 
groups and the punks can play at feeling as if they are 
really dangerous people, because they are treated as if 
they are, even if at their own prompting, which they give, 
they say, as a result of being born into a society that 
uses them for its dirty jobs, if there are any. Distrust 
of idols who might sell out runs rampant among fans 
whose attitude to the big names of yesteryear is summed 
up by this diatribe of an "angry rock fan" in Hennessy 
(1978):
This is what it was like, right? If you wanted 
to see the Who or Bowie or Dylan you had to queue 
up for days to get a ticket. You'd go to the Isle 
of Wight and there's mud everywhere and no bogs 
and people pissing all over your sleeping bag and 
everyone's starving hungry and getting ripped off 
5Op for a hard-boiled egg. There's empty beer 
cans and garbage, and it's raining and you're so 
far away from the stage you can't even see it, 
let alone guess who's on it. When the groups come
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on, the amps distort the sound and what comes out 
is a mangled version of your favourite number.
Then, afterwards, the stars zap off in their Rolls 
Royces with all their beautiful trendy pals while 
we have to hitch home. And it's us who've paid big 
money for the tickets and bought millions of their 
records and made them the rich, untouchable bastards 
they've become.
Punk singer Jimmy Pursey of Sham 69 puts it more 
succinctly in one of his lyrics:
It's a rip-off for you 
rt's a Rolls Rbyce for them.
The gobbing of singers becomes intelligible, seen in 
this light, as a desacralization that collects the singer 
to the punk group, allowing the group to then share in 
some of the ritual power the singer has by virtue of 
being on stage.
Many punks are sufficiently "into" their music to 
cut their own records in the growing number of small 
hire-by-the-hour recording studios. They then carry 
these about with them like unused passports to stardom. 
The record creates an "I could if I wanted to" possi­
bility for its owner, and this enhances his worth.
However, punks do not listen to their music for its 
music, but for its punk. So long as the music can
create the feeling that something powerful and inchoate
is struggling to express itself, it is heard in much the 
same way that the St Matthew Passion would be heard by 
a member of the Christian faith. As a secular aesthetic 
experience punk, of course, is not to be compared with 
Bach, but to experience punk music as music is for a
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punk a desecration, in the same way that punk music heard 
as music is just that for a musical sensibility.
The dominant punk group was the Sex Pistols, who 
constantly broke taboos, writing lyrics like "the Queen 
ain't no human being," swearing on television^^ and so 
forth. Their bass guitarist, Sid Vicious, was charged 
in New York with stabbing his girl friend to death in 
the Chelsea Hotel, and, released oh bail from Ryker's 
Island after a suicide bid, he died not long after of a 
heroin overdose, and so became a punk martyr. "Sid 
lives", is a repeated logo on T-shirts, motorcycle 
jackets, and walls. If a martyr is someone who dies 
to preserve his believing self, then what Sid Vicious 
believed in, as do his followers today, has to be his 
superior ritual power.
Punks at all their concerts are searched at the 
door for weapons. I have watched several thousand 
individual searches and never once seen any objection. 
Perhaps punks feel complimented by being suspected of 
going armed.
Concert behaviour is standardised. Punks dress 
up in their most punk clothing and adornment, arrive 
early, and, crushed by one another against the front 
of the stage, pogo to every song. At moments of high 
excitement fists punch into the air, and from the edge 
of the pogoing mass some punks ride others pick-a-back
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into the crowd, where they fall off and disappear from 
sight. There are scuffles in bar areas and toilets.
Eyes everywhere are dangerously on the alert for signs 
of disrespect, and many punks are so drunk that they 
give these signs inadvertently. After the performances, 
a few punk girls and boys will hang around, hoping to be 
invited backstage by the group, but most disperse into 
neighbourhoods where police patrols will have been stepped 
up for the occasion. Tunks at concerts, then, strenuously 
affirm their punk commitment, and concerts massively 
confirm that punk is not the fiction of each individual 
punk.
The centrality of music to subcultural life has been 
extensively noted by Fine & Kleinman (1979), who regard 
it as a type of information, by Martin (1979), who thinks 
concerts "liminalise" adolescents, and by Willis (1974), 
who has demonstrated how "bikers" live their musical 
styles. However, I do not choose to call punks a sub­
culture, even though they may often be a "near-group" as 
Yablonsky (1970) defines this or a "contra-culture" in 
the sense that Yinger (1970) gives to that term, because 
punk seems to be mainly alive at the level of iconography 
(Brake, 1973; Taylor & Wall, 1976) rather than in its 
class and economic references. Hall & Jefferson (1973), 
however, would insist that punk must be explained as part 
of an economic system, since, in their view, it must be 
a response of working class youths to external political 
conditions. As should be clear by now, I am arguing that
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there is very little conditioned response about the 
punks' conduct and much more frequently there is, instead, 
their determination to condition other people's - 
including Hall & Jefferson's - responses to them. This 
is not a fashionable view among subculture theorists 
because of their typical reluctance to accept that conduct 
might be principally expressive, and only residually 
practical after the manner Marx defined as real. But 
Rom Harre_ Cl979)_ thinks, for instance, that "in ̂ general, 
for most social forms and at most historical epochs 
the expressive is dominant over the practical," and,
"the system of production is pressed into the service 
of expression, and does not function autonomously. Hence, 
it could not be a cause of expressive social forms and 
practices." So, when Peter Marsh (1977) writes of punk, 
"It's dole-queue rock, and the only way to really make 
sense of it is through some awareness of the kinds of 
lives which the kids who have become punks are leading,"
I would contend, contrarywise, that a good way to make 
sense of the lives of the kids is to look hard at what 
they want to show their onlookers.
Punks in Public Places
Stone (1975) theorises that a person's appearance 
simultaneously conveys identity, value, mood, and attitude 
A punk therefore would instantly be seen in his "identity" 
as a punk, who has punk "values", along with a "mood" 
of deprived nihilism and an "attitude" that society is 
his enemy. "Reviews" (Stone's term) such as these are
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expressed by proprietors of clubs, discos, pubs, and 
cafes, who bar punks from their premises^^. However, 
in streets, squares, parks, bus stations, shops, and 
other urban public places, punks are merely looked at 
with alarmed glances that do not make eye contact 
(though the police are apt to chivy punks along ). A punk 
walking down a street passes through a fine mesh of 
glances coming from every direction, so his appearance, 
then, is like a patch of interference in the midst of 
normal appearances. It is too eye-catching, by design, 
not to be caught by too many eyes. And as if to control 
for being so closely attended to, a punk deadens his 
facial and gestural expressions and affects the same 
clinical stupidity his music celebrates ("moron" and 
"vacant" recur in the songs as terms of praise), often 
walking in the "invisible straight jacket" style of his 
pogo dancing. This further catches eyes.
But to appear to normals as if they do not under­
stand normal appearances, punks must employ conceptions 
of proper ritual demeanour sharper than normal, and 
totally belied, of course, by their own appearances.
The punk girl who plaits a tampax into her bright pink 
hair is carefully profaning herself, so that, going 
beyond the outer limits of propriety, she does not quite 
reach the inner limits of illegality. Therefore, though 
she might be considered to have so far removed herself 
from concepts of female delicacy as to warrant the anti- 
honorific "Slag" (a word I have seen painted on motorcycle
112
jackets of punk girls), the precise distance of the removal 
is calculated and travelled by her alone.
The stalking ground of punk, then, is the territory 
between normal appearances and illegal appearances, 
within which punks profane themselves with an inventive­
ness that is checked only by the requirement that they 
can always be labelled punks by one another and by normals 
In their chosen stalking ground, punks do achieve an 
untouchability equal and opposite to high status persons 
in the same wider culture. The attributions a punk will 
be subject to, moreover, of stupidity, immorality, 
sickness, childishness, laziness, unsavouriness, are 
seized upon, being so wide of the mark (and wide 
because they hit the very stalking horse of punk that 
punks construct), as evidence of the stupidity in normal 
society that was a reason for the taking on of a punk 
appearance in the first place. (This process does not 
unfold in time as stages in moral career, but is better 
seen as a homeostatic system operating at any time.)
Once more, the question arises as to why the conduct 
of punks should standardize itself into a fashion. Again, 
the only answer I can give is that for the punk there 
is safety in numbers, but this "fashioning" of punk 
is precisely what defuses its revolutionary potential, 
for punk, as soon as it is recognised in every instance 
as punk, must become the normal appearance called punk. 
Punks, then, in spitting on society, spit on themselves
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because to be punks they have to betray what they say 
punk stands for. A real punk, one might argue, will 
not look like a punk; he will more closely resemble 
Kim Philby or Richard Nixon. So it is quite in keeping 
with the punk's election of a stalking ground that does 
not reach into illegal areas that he should also want 
to provide himself with the permanent alibi that his 
doings are punk doings and not his own doings. Punk, 
for all its profanations, actually respects many aspects 
of societal order, and the punk must spend his life 
oscillating between the ignominy of not being noticed 
and the recognition of being noticed to be ignominous. 
What is more, the punk's back and forth moral movement 
faithfully mirrors the same movement of a normal from 
being anyone to being someone, but at the other side of 
the line which separates profane from sacred.
The punks I interviewed refused to accept that their 
appearances constituted a first provacative step in 
any interaction, and were inclined to complain of what 
tney described as harassment. I think this was 
because they had arrived at a view of punk not unlike 
the one above, which only makes those who think punk 
is dangerous as dangerous as punks are imagined to be. 
However, now (January 1981) that punk in London is 
showing a greater interest in Nazi costume and fascist 
ideas, commentators will once again take its fashion 
followers seriously, but I do not think they need to, 
since these latter day punks have chosen to give the
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Sieg Heil salute at "Rock against Racism" concerts and 
to wear National Front insignia precisely because they 
have identified these as acts that will be taken seriously, 
and not for the sake of reviving old meanings. (But, 
of course, it could be argued that that would not prevent 
a clever organiser bureaucratizing the fashion and then 
coercing everybody else into following it, as if it were 
not a fashion but were some divinely guided form of 
conduct, which is what I think Hitler did, and is 
certainly what luminaries of the National Front are 
actively trying to do at present.)
The Ideology of Punk
Punk ideology, a name I give its declarative moral 
statements, is found in the songs, in the fanzines, 
and, sloganized, on walls, T-shirts, and jackets. The 
first reports of punk, perhaps because they were written 
by journalists attuned to the political rhetoric of the 
hippies and perhaps, also, because these journalists 
were sensitive to those theories of subculture that 
suggest subcultural members can be grouped in economic 
and political languages (explaining the fact if not the 
form of the subculture), tried to foist an anarchist credo 
on the punks. The punks did actually play with this for 
a while, in as much as it could be used to give expression 
to a style of urban despair; but they were never really 
interested in political theories or in founding an 
enduring "counter culture", since they said they did not 
think there was a tomorrow. Their primary interests were
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never anything but being punk. Thus, at the same time 
as the Sex Pistols sang "Anarchy in the UK" punks painted 
swastikas on their faces, because for a punk, doing is 
being. But a rough ideology true to the phenomena would 
go as follows: the present is intolerable and there is 
no future, so society which believes otherwise is 
insincere, as well as being, in any case, boring and 
suffocatingly conformist, and punks, being the only ones 
who dare see this, are the only realists alive. As I have 
shown, such an idelogy, practised as appearance, is 
self-validating.
It is worth repeating here that the fashion of 
punk is of the same order as the fashion of normalcy, 
and that neither, considered in the terms of either one, 
can be said to be deeper than the other. Also, both 
fashions need the other in order to be discernible at 
all. Perhaps the punks who were mystified as to why they 
should have seemed provocative had reached the point 
reached here, that punk and normal are both as empty 
or as full as each other, but only if punk and normal 
do not think this.
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Some Conclusions
The following points are incidental to the only 
conclusion I need to have made by now, that punks are a 
group of persons who increase their ritual power by adop­
ting a desacralizing fashion, but I list them rather 
than leave them buried as implications within my narra­
tive %
1. ' Thé systematic desecrations practised by punks are 
a measure of the "give" in their society's system of 
proprieties. Where there is no give, there would be
no room for legal impropriety. (A society without give 
would be China during its Cultural Revolution or Cambodia 
under the rule of the Khmer Rouge. A society with a 
great deal of give would be the Haight Ashbury quarter 
of San Francisco in the late 1960s.)
2. That punk can come to be the main interest in life 
of some of its adherents is an indication of the power 
of the ritual code in a culture that tends to conceive 
of itself, officially, as productive, rational, and 
utilitarian.
3. The outrage some punks have been seen to be also 
indicates the power of the ritual code.
4. Punk is only possible insofar as it is contained. 
Were it to take over the other side of its dialectic 
with normalcy, it would be normalcy and therefore.
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according to punk ideology, boring.
5. Affiliation to the punk fashion is a deeper affiliation 
to the prevailing ritual code than affiliation to non­
punk forms.
6. The rhetadc of punk does not fuel the necessary 
organizational engines to change society.
7. Punk, like other visible subcultures, cannot be 
revolutionary just because it is visible. Testing the 
limits of the permissible in the way it does can only 
alter the permissible in permissible ways.
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Nurses
My argument throughout this section is that nurses 
go after ritual power because they are pursued by contam­
inants. Thus, they travel in the opposite direction to 
punks, who pursue the contaminants in order to acquire 
ritual power.
Nurses bear comparison to punks in other ways besides 
their unusual concern for containin.ations and sacralizations 
They also wear a costume that immediately identifies 
them, serving the dual fashion function of simultaneous 
collection and individuation, and, furthermore, though 
they may not see it like this, they can find their lives 
revolving round this costume.
An important apparent difference, that nurses are
governed by the formal organisation they belong to,
obscures the fact that nursing rhetoric claims for its
12members a ’’vocation" . The rhetoric says that nurses 
are called to their work not by money but quite altruis­
tically by the need of the sick for cure and care. A 
nurse is encouraged hereby to believe that she works 
because she is called - as nuns are called to religious 
orders - and if she believes this, as many of them seem 
to, she is just as remote from concerns of career and
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remuneration as any punk.
An analysis of nurses seen in and through the ritual 
frame, like the foregoing analysis of punks, gives far 
less than a total picture but the image it produces 
does, I think, restore importance to activity that is 
often overlooked, and in the only way that makes sense 
of it. Naturally, what I have to say about nurses can 
onTy apply to my first-hand knowledge , but there are 
two reasons why my findings may not be completely bounded 
by the setting I researched. Firstly, many of the nurses 
I worked alongside had experience on other wards, and 
felt that the one where I was working was typical.
Then, the fact that nursing activities are extremely 
standardized argues against the possibility of my having 
happened into an extremely atypical ward.
A punk, of course, must find his stage in the inter­
stices of formal organizations, usually in the streets, 
but a nurse can only work within a hospital^^. Since 
hospitals are institutions that invest themselves with 
ritual authority (Freidson (1970) says "the hospital is 
succeeding the church and the parliament as the archetypal 
institution of Western culture."), nurses enjoy elevated 
status simply by being associated with them. Nurses, 
moreover, are members of a medical profession that a 
polemicist such as Illich (1976) can argue is in the 
business of "appropriating health" by reinterpreting 
human conduct in the rhetoric of sickness and cure, for
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the purpose of colonialising passive citizens. So in 
this way too nurses can share in the overhigh ritual 
status of healers that is acquired, Freidson (1970) 
says, by extending medical jurisdiction "far wider than 
its demonstrable capacity to 'cure'." Thus, although 
my analysis is only meant to show that nurses procure 
ritual power to prevent their contamination, it can be 
seen that they begin with more than they perhaps might 
deserve.■ Instances of their extreme care with regard 
to pollutants, from this perspective that defines the 
medical profession as being ritually self-serving, 
therefore will be more readily understood.
Within the hospital, it is the nurse whom the 
patient meets more than any other staff person, so it 
is mainly in her person that hospitals define themselves 
for patients. However, the nurse does not nurse as a 
typist types or a seamstress sews; somehow all her 
conduct, instrumental, expressive, or even role-distanced, 
must look like nursing conduct. She is not a worker like 
other workers, and this difference is well pointed up 
by the title of Ruth Pomeranz's (1973) book on student 
nurses* The Lady Apprentices. Nurses in hospitals, 
then, are persons such as do not exist anywhere else, 
whose very labour is conduct and whose conduct for that 
reason can be their work, and their conduct must conform 
to prevailing ideals of the nurse^^.
Now I shall simply list the possible profanations
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met by the working nurse - at least in the setting I 
researched - together with details of how these are 
risen above. Then I review some of the nursing litera­
ture in order to broaden the narrative and to show the 
conceptual utility of the ritual frame. A more general 
discussion of ritual and nursing follows that, before 
the brief closing section entitled "Nameless Interaction". 
The purpose throughout, as it was in the punks section 
of this chapter, is to expose the ritual code by exploring 
relevant stalking grounds, staying close to the phenomena 
rather than elaborating theory. Naturally, as I argued 
in Chapter I, describing and theorizing can be inseparable 
modes of apprehending reality, so inevitably the reader 
will keep coming across passages of high generality 
that in the interests of continued "rolling analysis" are 
left where they are as intellectual outcrops and not 
brought together as the foundations for a verbal monu­
ment. So it is my principal intention in this chapter 
to strongly make the point that ritual conduct in the 
sense Goffman gives to it is more than a heuristic 
expedient, and I make this point by concentrating on 
how two apparently dissimilar groups of persons concern 
themselves with ritual power. In Chapter V I shall have 
more to say about ritual power, and in Part Three I 
proceed to a higher level of abstraction, using there 
the very necessity of maintaining narrative coherence 
to verbally create realities that ought to be tested, 
in the way advocated in Chapter I, against the reader's 
experience. (As in the punk section, many of the
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profanations listed below can only make sense to 
members of the wider culture to which both the nurses 
. and punks belong.)
Profanations by Pejapns
1. Nurses work in the same setting as less skilled 
workers like cleaners, domestics, and porters. Continually 
rubbing up against menials, nurses prevent anything 
rubbing off on them by keeping contacts to a minimum.
If unskilled staff are talked to familiarly, it is to 
make the point that the nurse is not the low kind of 
person who would keep her distance from the low. The 
making of this point, of course, increases the distance 
for the parties if they know it to be the point being 
made, as the nurse, at least, always does.
2. High ranking nurses are locked into routines that 
are effortlessly performed by lower ranks, and so the 
routines raise the status of the latter while reducing 
that of the f o r m e r I t  consequently behoves a novice 
to be less skilful than her senior; a show of evidently 
superior skill would be tantamount to insolence. In 
her turn, the senior nurse will try to perform with 
practised dexterity. So both nurses try not to let 
their status differences disappear into identical 
routines - which would be a mutual contamination - and 
work the routines in order that the differences appear
1 to arise out of them.
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3. There were no deaths on the ward I studied, but 
nurses in geriatric wards frequently handle corpses.
Nurses rely heavily on the vocational account of their 
work when discussing death. A nurse in this account is 
the opposite of a person who makes money by washing and 
wrapping dead bodies: she is the nearest possible human 
stand-in for an angel of mercy.
4. Agonised patients doubly insult a nurse because 
they show the medical profession to be ineffective and 
also, by their complete self-involvement, interactionally 
offeid in depriving the nurse of a purchase for recip­
rocal interaction status that can then be used to talk 
the patient out of his conduct of moaning and screaming. 
Nurses duly avoid agonised patients. Paralysed patients 
also offend by not being able to make requisite deference 
signs with their bodies and limbs. This offence is 
usually overglossed by the nurse, in her interactions 
with the paralysed, carrying on a monologue in the first- 
person plural in which the silent partner is spoken
for as if he could not conceivably offend. (Telles 
(1980) observes in this connection that, "the effort 
required on the part of critically ill patients to 
manage their failing and unpredictable bodies leads to 
improper behaviour, such as urinating in bed. Patients 
sometimes apologise for this, and staff typicaLfy react 
with understanding, by indicating that, given the patient's 
conditions, such delicts are excusable." Here one can 
see that patients try hard, and are expected to by the
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nurse, not to be contaminative,)
5. Patients who force nurses to clean up after them 
whether because their wounds have bled or because they 
have lost control of their bowels are never accorded 
full interaction status unless the cleaning is done 
with such bravura that the nurse seems no longer to be 
wiping up blood and shit, but rather bringing off a 
complicated trick. Secure in her role of medical magician 
she can then afford to trade banter with the patient in 
question, the contaminative details having been pushed 
out of a frame that now contains only her cheerful and 
dedicated skill.
6. When nurses received the day's notes in the sister's 
office or the treatment room, the sister would use 
euphemisms for the words arse, genitals, penis, and 
urine, calling these, respectively, "bottie", "bits and 
pieces", "waterworks", and "wee". At first, I thought 
this was because of my presence, but nurses I later 
befriended assured me that the euphemisms were routine. 
Since these euphemisms are somewhat infantile, I suggest 
their purpose may be to unsex aspects of male patients' 
bodies that otherwise could be seen as contaminative.
Profaning Relations to Persons
1. Nurses touch the flesh of opposite-sex strangers 
quite often, for instance when they shave or wash a
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face, or when they bath a patient, or when they dress 
hirv or when they attend to his wounds, drips, or catheter.
In the Urology ward these strangers were old and unattrac­
tive for the most part, and contact with them was 
"selfless" indeed, a phrase that in the ritual idiom 
can only mean not to do with a presumed real self who 
would think well enough of herself to recoil from such 
contact.
Nurses did not surround their touchings of patients' 
sexual organs with the taboos described, in connection 
to vaginal examinations, by Emerson (1963) and by 
Henslin & Biggs (1978), though during these touchings 
breath is bated on both sides. However, nurses are very 
careful not to skimp operations in the taboo areas of 
the body, as carrying these out with unsullied demeanour 
is a test of nursing calibre, which the true nurse 
passes because true nurses are sacred enough not to be 
touched by these sorts of touchings. Nursing logic has 
it, then, that a nurse rises above profanations, because 
she has a calling, but equally well it could be said that 
a nurse nas a calling so that she can rise above profanations
2. Patients are always being lifted: up their beds 
so they can eat, or onto their sides to prevent bedsores, 
or out of bed into chairs and onto commodes, or into and 
out of baths, or they are lifted simply by being supported 
in gentle exercising walks up and down the ward. Since 
many patients are very weak or are paralysed, the work
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is heavy. Young girls find themselves bearing with 
care and respect burdens strong men would find tiring 
and, especially in geriatric wards, much of the daily 
round is an endless humping of ageing flesh. So here, 
in addition to contaminative contact, there is the 
contamination of weight that ever threatens to reduce 
the nurse to the role of labourer. From this role she 
only really escapes by looking like the demure young 
female she usually is.
3. Some contacts between nurses and patients take the 
form of intimate services done by the former for the 
latter. (These will include measuring blood pressures, 
injecting drugs, administering suppositories, taking 
temperatures, and wiping bottoms.) The term intimate, 
used of a relationship, normally, of course, denotes
a pair of persons who love each other, but nurses are 
being intimate with strangers, so against this they 
must arm themselves with brisk, functional behaviour 
designed to look impersonal. The nurse then keeps her 
ritual self's virginity by approximating herself to an 
automaton in contexts of intimacy and may like some 
prostitutes give to patients a look of being withheld.
4. Nurses cede medical authority to housemen and 
consultants. They give her orders, and she must do as 
she is told. This desacralization of her judgement is 
compounded by the unstated requirement that, doing as 
she is told, she must not look as though that is what
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she is doing. Interestingly, both Katz (1969) and 
Mauksch (1972) refer to this physician-nurse relationship 
as a caste relationship closely resembling the nineteenth- 
century relation of Southern whites to blacks, and the 
differentiation is reinforced by the gender division 
of male physician over female nurse. In response, 
nurses try to look as though they have absolute confidence 
in this sytem of their subordination, and this is the 
only possible way they can save themselves from looking 
as if there is another possible system, for expressed 
criticality would imply that they felt demeaned. Theirs 
is the desperate strategy of decreasing the offence that 
is done them by accepting it as if it were a compliment.
5. The nurse works as a waitress when she serves drinks 
and meals to patients and when she afterwards clears 
up the dirty cutlery and crockery. On the Urdogy ward 
patients were required to drink large quantities of 
liquid to irrigate their bladders, so here the nurses 
had the additional and frequent waitress duty of topping 
up patients' measured water jugs. The waitress role 
was often medicalized by the nurses' technique of showing 
a "professional" interest in food and liquid consumed, 
and indeed a nurse was expected to report refusals to 
consume, as on the ward, these were medical events.
But one should not forget that a nurse's waitress 
offices helps her execute her "bedside role", deprived 
of which, Malone et al (1965) found, she feels less of
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nurse than she would like to be. Possibly the bedside 
role is a harkening back to earlier times, if, as Brown 
(1966) suggests, the model of nursing, for most nurses, 
is borrowed from the private sphere. Naturally, as 
Brown points out, the more waitress duties are devolved 
onto aides by nurses seeking to upgrade their professional 
status, the less bedside nursing is possible for nurses.
Here the nurse, as in so many of her instrumental functions, 
IS caught between the virtual self of a profaning 
activity and the ideal self of an aspired-after role.
6. The nurse also waits on the sister who is in charge 
of her ward and, more abstractly, on the ward itself, 
running errands to the "path lab" and the laundry in 
the outer hospital, as well as keeping various supplies 
in good order, none of these activities drawing on 
specifically medical expertise. In recognition of this 
demeaning "waiting", it is the practice to only send 
junior nurses on errands. Selection for such jobs 
is a means also of telling the nurse that the break in 
routine that she is being allowed signifies her inability 
to yet take routine in her stride.
Profaning Substances
One afternoon I was shown round his geriatric ward 
by a Charge Nurse who had joined me while I was drinking 
coffee in the canteen. The smell, of disinfectant and 
shit combined, was one to gag on. At the end of the 
tour, the Charge Nurse asked me this rhetorical question:
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"What other profession handles untreated sewage?" Nurses 
are the only persons in Anglo-American culture under 
an obligation to take care of the excretory functions 
of strangers, yet neither do they usually define themselves 
by this function, and nor are they defined by it. They 
"rise above it" because it really is for them "unmentionable", 
and in any case someone has to do it, and it might be 
that that someone is a better person than one who would, 
for example, rather touch nothing less sterile than the 
keys of a cash register.
Not only raw sewage must be handled but so must dirty
laundry and soiled bandages and dressings, and in Britain,
17delapidated conditions and inadequate equipment can be 
felt to further defile the nurse. The only way she 
can salvage self-respect for working with filth in 
inadequate conditions is to think of herself as being 
the rare person with sufficient inner worth to overcome 
these.
Usually hospital wards are never free of disquiet­
ing sights and smells - that the analyst cannot call 
"bad" without pre-empting his conclusion - yet, as the 
Concourt brothers wrote on 18th December 1860, after a 
visit to M Velpan's ward at the Hôpital de la Charité in 
Paris* "The horror of it all is ... well covered with 
white sheets, cleanliness, neatness, and silence"
(Concourt & Concourt, 1962). The Concourts persisted 
in studying their ward so as to write their realistic
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novel Soeur Philomene, and they were particularly affected 
by the smell: "It is horrible, that hospital smell that
follows you around. I do not know if it is real or 
imaginary, but you constantly feel the need to wash your 
hands" (27 December 1660) and, the day before that diary 
entry, "Melancholy floated within us, a breath of hospital 
air which we had absorbed."
- It is argainst nursing regulations for a nurse to
odorize herself but she reacts to smells by constantly
deodorizing, which in practice involves a slight odorization
2 8with anti-septic aromas . Her most noticeable reaction 
to other unpleasant conditions is one of not appearing 
to notice them, as if they are not only beneath her in 
fact but as if it is also beneath her to act as if they 
are beneath her. Once again it is the contaminants 
that allow the equal and opposite compensation of conduct 
whose ritual power would needs be less without it.
Profaning Labour
There are four ways in which nursing conduct 
considered as labour is a kind of labour usually reserved 
for low status workers:
1. Heavy lifting. This I have already described in 
its connection,to contaminative body contact.
2. Repetitiveness. Bed-making, meal and drink serving, 
the taking of temperatures and blood pressures, bathing 
patients, emptying catheter bags, and so on are performed
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in the same way every day, and comprise much of the day's 
work. In an effort to square this with an image of the 
nurse as a women sensitively oriented to patients whose 
grosser wants are attended by domestics, nursing rhetoric 
is forced to overlay the instrumentality of these tasks 
with the idea that their performance is really a ruse by 
which nurses gain medical information about the unsuspect­
ing patient.
3. Triviality. From my first day on the ward, I was 
well able to carry out very nearly all the tasks of my 
fellow trained nurses, and this was not thought remarkable 
Student and pupil nurses for whom the triviality is 
putatively decontaminated by being defined as a necessary 
part of "training" often see through this definition,
but not to its sacralizing purpose as described here.
4. Long hours. Not only do nurses work long hours but 
they work these hours in shifts that are often "unsocial", 
and they must, of course, work them in the single context 
of a ward, without remission. The only way to work long 
hours as if this working is not a reflection on one's 
status is to do so uncomplainingly. And very few nurses 
complain about the hours. Characteristically, this 
absence of complaint like many other instances of 
nursing reticence, is often cited as signifying no cause 
for it. By my analysis it could better signify so great 
a cause that its expression would hopelessly desacralize 
the nurse. (Not many nurses complain about their low pay
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either. The argument here is that, if nurses were given 
more money, patients would have to go short. So a good 
nurse cannot agitate too much about money. Similarly, if 
a nurse were to work shorter hours, patients again would 
suffer. So the profanation of low income can be overcome 
by pretending it is a sacrifice, and not an injustice, 
for she who sacrifices is the more by the extent of the 
sacrifice.)
General Responses to Profanations in General
I have described how nurses neutralize their profana­
tions not only by silently conducting themselves as if 
they were enhanced by their overcoming of these profanations 
but also by their acting as if nothing difficult had to 
be overcome.
The main weapon a nurse wields against contamination 
is her uncontaminated appearance. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that defects in the highly prescribed costume, 
make-up, and demeanour of a nurse should induce severe 
sanctions from her superiors, as if each nurse - every 
one of them the embodied persona of a "good nurse" - must 
be made proof against filth that would attack nurses in 
general the instant it gained ground on one in particular.
For example, the Senior Nursing Officer of the section 
of the hospital containing the Urology ward where I worked 
was said to "pounce" on nurses - who might be quite 
unknown to her - if she caught them in slip-on instead
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of lace-up shoes. This conduct can be interpreted 
easily if one remembers that laces are traditional, 
look functional, and need tying (so showing that the 
wearer is not lazy). A slip-on shoe is obviously the 
"wrong" image - if my image of a good nurse is the right 
one.
Fine prescription of appearance also fixates on 
ornaments,■ which are forbidden, with the exception of 
wedding rings, presumably because these rings are tie- 
signs (Goffman 1971) before they are jewellery. Sleepers 
may be worn in pierced ears if they are gold, which is 
of course hygienic, though it also may be thought that 
a less precious metal would cheapen the nurse appearance. 
Make-up is absolutely forbidden, as is nail varnish, 
and hair, if long, must be worn up. The same fineness 
of prescription applies to all nurses in Britain and 
the USA, though there are slight regional differences in 
actual uniform.
There is no doubting that failure to conform to the 
regulations of appearance is read as a serious lapse, and 
thus the smoothness of a nurse's outer shell is taken 
as a deep indication of her fitness for the calling.
One crack, furthermore,is sufficient to let in contamina­
tions that would profane the calling as a whole. And 
just in case the off-duty nurse would be tempted to 
desacralize herself, the "International Code of Nursing 
Ethics" tells her that "the nurse in private life adheres
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to standards of personal ethics which reflect credit 
upon the profession." (Extracts from this code are 
given to every nurse on her being employed at the hospital 
where I researched.)
Other Research on Nurses that Bears on Aspects of Ritual 
Conduct______________________________________________ ____
Mauksch (1966) observes that the nurse alone of all 
health-care workers has continuous contact with patients. 
For this reason the demand on her for nurselike comportment 
demure, efficient, cheerful - is heavy, and she does 
not have time to develop a different style of conduct. 
Basing his research on interviews with nurses. Skipper 
(1965) says that, contrary to received opinion, the nurse 
role combines what he calls instrumental and expressive 
functions. In other words, by discerning aspects of her 
conduct as purely expressive. Skipper confirms my view 
of the nurse as one who has to Jook like a nurse before 
she can nurse. Schulman (1958) interestingly calls 
nurses "mother surrogates" but by 1972 (Schulman, 1972) 
he has decided that patients less strongly desire to be 
mothered even if their nurses could reverse their process 
of drift toward increasingly technical equipment.
Schulman's nurses may not be typical, however, in this 
country, where there is not a flow but only a trickle 
of modern machinery into hospital wards.
Glaser and Strauss (1965), in their study of 
Californian hospital wards, note that an important 
nurse function is to preserve the "sentimental order"
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of the ward, and Victoria Wilson (1971), from a feminist 
point of view, bemoans the fact that in the doctor- 
nurse-patient triad it is the nurse who is expected to 
exhibit an impossible mixture of responsibility, initiative, 
and passivity, with the doctor, as Wilson puts it, "on 
top". As far as being cheerful goes, Glaser and Strauss 
(1965) define an unexpected chore nurses might have to 
take on: "If the patient's morale is good ... he becomes
the pacesetter for the morale : of the ward, for it would 
not do for a nurse to be less cheerful than a patient.
Nurses are literally forced to 'one-up' the patient by 
having higher morale" (p 245). So nurses must lead the 
expression of approved attitudes to sickness or else lose 
their medical authority, which often, Freidson (1970) 
says, "teeters between glory and ruin, and is prone to 
claim its glory because of the risk of ruin rather than 
because of its accomplishment" (p 170). Here again, it 
can be seen that nurses are obliged to use forms of 
conduct that are more easily explained by reference to 
their presumed ritual power than to their official 
instrumental tasks.
In the ward, then, patients can come to be seen by 
nurses as audiences for performances. Along these lines 
Wessen (1958) says: "For hospital people, the patients
are not so much a part of their social system, as a 
vital reference group in the midst of which the personnel 
operate, which they serve, and toward which they orient 
many of their actions and attitudes." And Emerson (1963)
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in California describes a phenomenon very similar to one 
I often observed: "Everyone has a special manner of
talking to patients - a polished extroverted, well 
enunciated, friendly impersonality" (p 79). This 
"impersonality", that I have interpreted as a flight 
into ideal role, is called a "coping mechanism" by 
Coombs and Goldman (1973) in their study of an Intensive 
Care Unit; there it takes the forms of humour, escape 
into_ tasks, over-use of technical language, and ration­
alization.
Turning from patients to the doctor and the consultant, 
a nurse finds herself suddenly cast in the role of 
votary that formerly she required the patient to play 
in relation to her. Many consultants are said by the 
nurses (those who talked to me) to think of themselves 
as "gods" and their power is commensurately great even 
over medical students whom Becker et al (1961) report 
as judging consultants by how well they treated students, 
"that is, according to how little they take advantage 
of their opportunity to embarrass or humiliate students"
(p 290). But many consultants, Emerson (l963) says, 
have merely learned "to perform the miracle of walking 
on the waters by stepping on the stones hidden beneath 
the surface" (p 340), and Goldie (1976) has found that 
psychiatrists who, for example, imbue routine activities 
such as diagnosis "with a certain mystery and mystique, 
calling for 'intuition’, 'accumulated experience', and 
'clinical judgement', can by claiming to set such
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activities above the comprehension of the non-medical 
staff ... maintain the subordination of the latter.” 
Mystification is also practised when a patient dies 
unexpectedly, for Sudnow (1967) notes that doctors 
always redefine his medical history so that death can 
become "an outcome of dying." All this is to suggest 
that the analogous ritual power doctors and consultants 
have to nurses that nurses have to patients is, no. more 
than is that of nurses, not effortlessly created as a 
by-product of superior scientific knowledge, but instead 
accomplished by purely ritualizing conduct.
Ritual Power from a Clockwork System
Nurses' decontamination conduct gives new sense to 
Robert Wilson's (1965) assertion that "ill persons 
have to learn how to be patients, for being sick and 
performing adeptly in the role of hospital patient 
are not at all the same thing." Being a patient in 
many cases means being as uncontaminative as possible, 
and this theme, that the patient needs to take care 
with a nurse if he wants her to take care of him, recurs 
in many studies. Thus, Emerson (1963) says that "patients 
should minimize their requests and not treat nurses as 
servants. If the ideal patient does occasionally ask 
for something, it should be done in an 'ask-a-favour 
style'" (p 77), and Tagliacozzo & Mauksch (1972) found 
that most paying patients they interviewed had quickly 
learnt that nurses expect co-operation, respect, and 
consideration. Freidson (1970), who thinks "the community
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is not truly served" when service to citizens is defined 
by a profession, notes that the sick citizen, giving 
himself into the care of medical persons, "is expected 
to take a role which is akin to that of a house pet or 
a child" (p 355). Sudnow (1967), moreover, found that 
"every effort was made" to classify patients so that 
they could be treated in "organisationally routine ways"
(p 172) and Zborowski (1969) established that, though 
expressions of pain vary from culture to culture, these 
are sanctioned if they do not conform to the nurse's 
cultural expectations.
Glaser and Strauss (1964) even link the degree to 
which the patients' deaths grieve nurses to patients' 
social worth in terms of the culturally valued attributes 
of youth, talent, and money and Rosenhan's (1978) experi­
ment of placing nine sane persons in psychiatric hospitals, 
with instructions to act sane, proves the point - that 
patients are only honorary persons - by showing that not 
one was assumed by nurses to be sane - for the reason that 
they were "patients". According to Tagliacozzo (1965), 
furthermore, "good patients" try to "save the bell", 
hiding their real problems "behind a cloak of conformity". 
And the lot of patients contaminating nurses by not 
conforming to the definition of a good patient is personal 
destruction, as Emerson (1963) discovered: "When a patient 
is clamoring to be treated like a person he is bucking 
the system; anyone bucking the system is most likely 
defined as emotionally disturbed and therefore not
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entitled to be treated as a person" (p 83). Telles (1980) 
reports, in this connection: "In ICU, we observe force,
subtle or blunt, used against the patients to maintain 
their well demeanored appearance by eliminating their 
ability to present themselves in other ways. Nurses 
spoonfed them to prevent their spilling of food or drink 
onto their bedclothes. Their hands are tied to prevent 
their movement, bedsheets are tied to rails to prevent 
nudity, and their incontinence is contained by catheters. 
When a patient began shouting at random, the resident 
commented to the nurse that they may "have to kick her 
out in spite of her condition because we can't tolerate 
that kind of noise here.'"
Patients, being the source of so many contaminations, 
prevent nurses relaxing, except when unobserved in what 
Ros^ren & Devault (1963) call "interstitial areas"; 
here "the most blunt questions can be asked without 
prestige and esteem becoming serious considerations."
Coser (1961) suggests that "the determination of who can 
hide from whom may be as essential to the workings of 
a social system as determination of who has power over 
whom." In a ward, patients - even if they sleep or 
refuse eye contact - can hide from no one (it would be 
unthinkable, for instance, for a patient to draw the 
curtains round his bed), while nurses can hide only 
for short periods from their sister, and the sister 
can hide from everybody but not for too long. Unable to 
hide from one another, persons in a ward, therefore, fall
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into stereotypical roles which when played well make 
the place go like "clockwork", which is a word used 
by nurses as superlative praise of a ward's organization. 
Those very few patients who do not know their place in 
a ward are "disturbed", if only because only they seem 
unaware of the kinds of places to which disturbed 
persons are sent. So, in a clockwork system, human 
conduct that is not geared to it cannot be countenanced, 
and those who constitute the main parts of the system - 
the nurses - must be in proper working order. A ladder 
in a stocking, a hint of eye shadow, a single bloodstain 
on a blue cotton dress, an obscene word playing on the 
lips, a slouching walk, a coquettish strut, too loud 
a laugh, all these flaws in the ideal nurse can be seen, 
every one, as the first cracks of ultimate fissures 
through which would pour all the pain, disease, and filth 
of the world. The shell of a nurse needs to be armour 
and a nurse has ritual power to the degree that she and 
others see her armour as being as natural as her skin.
Of course, my argument should be that a nurse is 
nothing but her armour, because nurses play what Elizabeth 
Burns (1972) describes as "total roles". Players of 
total roles, very much less than other role players, 
practise the role distancing that Goffman (1972) has 
argued is a ubiquitous humanizing social strategy. Nurses 
in this respect are identical to Gonos's (1976) go-go 
dancers, and of the context of the ward can be said 
exactly what Gonos says of a go-go dancer's platform:
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... the present frame for go-go dancing is essen­
tially non-dissociative in that no character is 
created for the dancer to step in to. Hence, what 
is perceived as the dancer's "true self" remains 
inextricably linked to the meanings of the activities 
involved in her performance.
(p 201-2)
Of nursing as of go-go dancing, it is true to say that:
... its Cgo-go dancing's] audience is inclined to 
understand the action as self-expressive and further, 
that the social meanings carried on in its performance 
will be attached to the self of the dancer.by the. . . 
audience, and appropriated as part of her self­
conception.
(p 209)
... in the go-go frame, self, role, and gender 
become concurrent determinants, bound up together 
in the action, a particularly insidious identi- 
ficatory formula.
(p 210)
A first possibility is that these women sense no 
distances from their roles as dancers, that is, 
that their activities as dancers near perfectly 
match their ideal images of themselves.
(p 215)
Gonos's dancers, like nurses, are seen to be through and 
through what they appear to be. That is, underneath 
the costume and the conduct of a nurse should be some 
embryonic proto-nurse, and this it is that animates the 
rhetoric of "calling" and "vocation", for only what is 
already there can be summoned. Nursing, then, is not 
any job, but is a way of life, and this way of life 
entails doing the job of living a way of life, a double 
yoke, usually worn with no less apparent insoucience than 
the white paper hats nurses must pin into their hair.
But role-distancing practices do increase up the 
nursing hierarchy; sisters tend to be looked toward as
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persons, to see how they will play their role, and senior 
nursing officers assured me that management was "all 
personalities". Besides the usual reason, of senior 
persons having more personal autonomy, it can be appreci­
ated that the further from a ward a nurse rises, the less 
pressing is her need to self-sacralize, the reason being 
that a senior nurse can acquire ritual power from her 
seniority whereas the ward nurse only ever stands to lose 
heirs. ■ But in Mendiy wards, described to me as those in 
which "the kettle is always on," nurses nevertheless 
sometimes co-operate to get the work done so as to leave 
time for relaxation and sociability. "When the hierarchy 
arrives" (as it was put to me), cups of tea are poured 
down the sink and informality vanishes. What had been 
going on, however, was not role distance as Goffman 
defines it, but a kind of role suspension.
A more transient type of role suspension is laughter, 
when a person becomes a being who appears to be choking 
on an unassimilable concept, but it should not be thought 
that in a "clockwork" ward laughter is not the sound of 
some of its gears meshing. Patients, for example, 
nervously engage one another in jocular talk which, as 
Coser (1965) points out, relates to the anxieties of 
both having to adjust to alien and rigid routines (patients 
are made to get up two or three hours earlier than the 
rest of the population, so as to fit into nurses' shift 
systems) and having to submit to unchallengable authority. 
Emerson (1963) actually says that humour attaches to
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recurrent situations when, in telegraphed form, it is 
used primarily to repair indignities. One such recurrent 
situation in the Urology ward was the emptying of plastic 
catheter bags. The urine contained in these had to be 
measured then and there at the bedside so that a new 
figure could be entered on the patient's fluid chart, 
invariably jokes would cluster around this activity, but 
not quite in the way Coser sees as containing an unresol- 
vable conflict. Structurally/ the humour bracketed the 
bags as being too funny to be taken seriously by nurse 
or patient, yet, since the colour of the urine clearly 
indicated the degree of recovery from an operation, the 
bags were serious indeed. The joking thus served to bring 
their prognostic significance back into the realm of 
routine as well as to trivialise the contaminative 
potential of the urine by ridiculing it. So here joking 
was essentially decontaminative, both of potentially 
threatening significations and of a polluting substance. 
The clockwork needed the laughter as lubrication to 
prevent its jamming.
Of course, no one ever laughs at a nurse, but 
frequently patients are used as butts. For instance, 
messy lockers would occasion huge laughter from the 
nurse opening their doors, at which others would gather 
round the laughing nurse to swell the mirth. Culprits 
usually grinned sheepishly as their pathetic attempts 
at anarchy were mocked out of court. Once again, the 
clockwork performed its waste disposal function -
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grinding contaminations to nothing - so that the nurse 
could look like herself.
Nameless Interaction
Because their shifts do not often coincide for long, 
because they frequently change wards, and because all 
their interactions are always being interrupted by the 
demands of other persons or tasks, nurses do not get to 
know, one another very well; The impersonal cast of ward 
life is further ensured by the taboo on mere sociability 
as a form of nurse interaction. First-names are used 
without warmth, between nurses who have worked together 
for relatively long periods, but otherwise even same-rank 
nurses in the presence of patients or sisters will attract 
one another's attention with the call "NurseI" Sisters 
are always addressed as Sister by all nurses. Patients 
are called "Mr," their names not usually easily associated 
with their faces since patients like nurses are coming 
and going continually. (It is very common for a nurse 
to flick her eyes to a patient's bedhead where his 
name is displayed before she addresses him as if she had 
known his name all along; she can also read his name on 
the plastic bracelet he must wear even in the bath.)
The use of "Mr" as an honorific is so routine that on the 
Urology ward - while I was there - a Brigadier and two 
Reverends were also always called Mr and nurses complain 
good-naturedly about getting patients' names mixed up, 
as if this is inevitable. People in the environment of 
nameless interaction that is a ward, then, are unusually
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sociological beings, easily substituted for one another.
On the ward, nameless men and women confront one 
another as members of very broad categories of human 
classification (this is the point Gonos makes with regard 
to the meeting of go-go dancer and her customer), and 
neither nurse nor patient seems uncomfortable about this.
It is fascinating to quote Simmel (1971) on the subject 
of nameless interaction: The most diverse personalities
can engage in it and all individual differences appear 
to be of no importance." Here Simmel is speaking of 
prostitution, adding that its debasement "lies in the fact 
that the most personal possession of a woman, her area of 
greatest reserve, is considered equivalent to the most 
neutral value of all [money]." So the caring nurse, not 
only by the profanations I have listed but also by 
virtue of the structural impersonality of her situation 
runs a risk there too of debasement, and it is in just 
those activities where this kind of debasement is most 
possible that her conduct is most prescribed. The batting 
of patients, for example, is carried out in a routinized 
sequence (one that is in fact a "practical" in the 
examinations a pupil nurse must pass before becoming a 
qualified State Enrolled Nurse). So in nameless inter­
action there may be found routines prescribed to the degree 
that the interactions are nameless, and these are passages 
of frozen ritual conduct embedded in an improvising stream




I have described some of the ways nurses cope with 
profanations by persons, substances, and labour, and I 
have shown how nurses are driven into a "pure nurse" image 
that fits into the organization of ward life like a 
figure in a clockwork scenario. Throughout, I have argued 
that the nurse becomes as she is in response to a variety 
of contaminants that, if she did not act "nurseness" 
to the hilt, could-so contaminate her as to stop her 
being a proper person of any description. However, her 
working amongst these contaminants in her fresh, clean 
uniform and with a cheerful, brisk demeanour, suggests 
that, even more than her being equal to pollutants, the 
nurse is above them. And it is to the degree that she is 
above these pollutants, which her calling brings her into 
touch with, that, I contend, she has ritual power greater 
than she would have as a non-nurse. Perhaps, in its way, 
this is as great as that of punks, who, as has been 
shown, achieve their ritual power by seeking out pollutants 
just as if it was the ritual power that overcame self- 
desacralisations, whereas, for them as it is for the 
nurses, it is the "overcoming", by simply maintaining 
certain appearances, that brings into being the greater 
than normal ritual power. Thus ritual power can be 
created in interaction by conduct alone, and is by no 
means an invariant quantity of ritualness.
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In the next chapter, I shall consider how conduct 
in general is either fashionable or unfashionable, and 
I shall draw the conclusion that ritual power - as it 




1 Sociologists who have addressed the topic of fashion 
head-on are few and far between, but the following have
had stimulating thoughts on the subject (usually conjectural): 
Roland Barthes, Herbert Blumer, Rene Konig, A L Kroeber,
Robert Park, Edward Sapir, Georg Simmel, William Graham 
Sumner, Gabriel Tarde, W I Thomas, and Thorstein Yeblen.
2 - Robinson (1958) is even moved to' personify fashion' 
as ’’she".
3 Sometimes, in pre-revolutionary France for instance, 
even the wearing of certain materials (such as silk) by 
some categories of persons (peasants) has been forbidden 
by law.
4 Anscombe (1978) assembles a number of song lyrics and 
newspaper items and photographs into a punk manifesto;
Hennessy (1978) reports punk by comparing photographs of 
punks with photographs of "primitive" tribes; and Coon (1977) 
supplies documentary details of many early punk rock 
groups. All these sources give an undisciplined rendition
of the punk phenomena which, longer than most youth fashions, 
still, at the time of writing, 1981, retains its integrity 
enough to prevent itself from being treated with respect 
in the press and on television. Though punk is British 
in origin, there are punks now in New York, Los Angeles,
Berlin, and Paris. Los Angeles punks have only a loose 
orientation to "punkness" while New York punks have ad­
opted the sado-masochistic fetish ornamentation (leather, 
straps, chains, studded belts, and so on) more enthusiastically 
than other punks and therefore are perceived as sexually 
dangerous to boot.
) The data on which this analysis is based is of an im-
impressionistic kind, being acquired through (1) interviews 
with punks and groups of punks, (2) some twelve months of 
weekly or twice weekly "passing encounters" with the six 
members of a loose group of punks in Bath, (3) some twenty
149
attendances at punk rock concerts in the West Country and 
in London (once in the capacity of "Security" working for 
the promoter), (4) a few visits to punk shops in London, 
Bristol, and Birmingham, (5) the scrutiny of any punks I 
happened across at any time, (6) listening to many hours 
of punk music, (7) reading journalistic punk coverage in 
publications ranging from the Sunday Times to the New 
Musical Express. Aside from the concerts, the only large 
gathering of punks that I attended was the funeral of one
_ of the. Bath-group,- who had-been-stabbed to death in - a- back­
street .
6 Statements like "most punks" must be read with extreme 
caution as being conveniences of style to enable an ex­
position that were it so fastidious to hedge every gen­
eralisation with caveats would comprise very little else 
but caveats.
7 Bormann (1972) speaks of fantasy-chaining as follows; 
"People would grow excited, interrupt one another, blush, 
laugh, forget their self-consciousness. The tone of the 
meeting, often tense and quiet prior to the dramatising, 
would become lively, animated, and boisterous, the chaining 
process,, involving both verbal and nonverbal communication, 
indicating participation in the drama."
8 Bell (1947) has these pertinent thoughts about safety- 
pins: "Crude but recognisable safety-pins can be found at 
a very early period of history; at this stage the thing is 
both useful and ornamental, being frequently made of bronze 
or gold. It has subsequently developed in both directions; 
first into the conspicuous broach which commonly has no 
safety guard, secondly into the very practical safety-pin; 
this latter is hidden away from public gaze, and to wear
it upon the person as a fastening to the dress is thought 
very ignominious."
9 McLaren who discovered the Sex Pistols while managing a 
sex shop in the Kings Road of London, now manages a group
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called Bow Wow Wow. Still an innovator, he will not issue 
their music on 45 r p m records, but sells tape cassettes 
with three songs on each side. This way he maintains the 
exclusivity of his product from the "air play" that is 
thought indispensable to making a record a hit. (With the 
Sex Pistols, he used obscenity to ensure their records 
were banned; but without air play, they still made the 
Number One slot.)
10 Bill Grundy, of the BBC programme -"Nationwide", held 
responsible for the swearing of the Sex Pistols during an 
interview, was actually suspended by the BBC for a period 
of three weeks.
11 In fantasy-chaining interviews, punks vyed with one 
another about how many public establishments they were 
banned from. Some Bath punks had tallied these very ex­
actly, which would indicate that their score was at least 
one measure of punkness. A good score was in the region 
of 20-50 for a town whose population is under 100,000.
12 The rhetoric of "vocation" is not unanimously espoused 
by nurses, a proportion of whom are members of unions.
Union members tend to promote themselves as workers like 
any other workers, but they are less numerous than members 
of the Royal College of Nursing, the nurses' main pro­
fessionalising body.
13 This analysis is derived from data collected over a 
three-week period during which I carried out participant 
observation in a male. Urology ward, where I was permitted
to work as a Nursing Auxiliary. Nurses are not often studied 
by sociologists in their place of work; usually they are 
given questionnaires to fill in or are interviewed when off 
the ward. Notable exceptions to this rule, in Britain, are 
some of the accounts in Davis & Horobin's (1977) Medical 
Encounters and, in America, the research by Glaser & Strauss 
and Julius Roth as well as by Coser (1962), Emerson (1963), 
Sudnow (1967), and Telles (1980).
The Urology ward was a long room with twelve beds down
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each side. It had a day-room off to one side at the far 
end, and offices, bathrooms, and so on flanked the narrow 
corridor that led into the ward proper. A ward like this, 
still called a "Nightingale Ward", is aptly described by 
Stelling & Bucher (1972) as a "fishbowl".
14 Obviously, peripatetic nurses like District Nurses are 
not ecologically contained by a hospital organisation, but 
they are as tightly contained by the organisation of health 
and care within which they operate.
15 The Committee on Nursing (1972) summarises very many 
popular conceptions of the nurse, but then goes on to 
minimise the role these play in her life.
16 It might be thought that I am using status as another 
word for the phrase "ritual power". This is true up to a 
point. Status, however, carries too many connotations of 
being fixed and of having been conferred from outside. 
Ritual power, on the other hand, being a form of power, 
is something that can increase or decrease, and, being 
ritual, in its essence is connected to that part of persons 
which resists - but does not forbid - translation into 
formal social terms. Ritual power, unlike status, can be 
won or lost at any time, and must be continually maintained 
through conduct. To explain further: saying a sister is 
superior to a staff nurse because she has a higher rank 
begs the question of wherein lies that superiority, because 
it is far more than a formal convenience of organisation. 
The superiority issues not from appurtenances of rank but 
from what the rank supposes merits rank, and ritual power 
is ritual power so long as persons are supposed to be 
beings who are analytically separable from their multi­
farious appearances. Later on I come close to saying
that all that can be separated is the actual life of a 
person, and, therefore, that it is life that is respected, 
though some lives are treated as more valuable than others.
17 On the Urology ward, tne paint in the bathrooms, toilets.
152
store rooms, and kitchen was flaking off the walls.
Portable commodes were substituted for the wheelchairs 
that cost too much to buy. And so on. These environmental 
shortcomings were all too easily defined by nurses as 
signifying societal indifference to the welfare of the 
sick, and, by extension, to those who nurse the sick.
18 Largey & Watson (1972) make the point that the language 
of odour is often used as a moral calculus. Bad behaviour 
stinks. Ritually lucky people come up-smelling of roses. 
Prom this perspective good nurses will have to smell nice.
19 I am avoiding calling these stylized forms of interaction 
by the name "ritual" as do Sudnow (1967) and Mauksch (1966) 
because in this thesis I want to stress the idea that 
ritual conduct is far from being the enactment of auto­
matic deference routines and more often is behaviour that 
in closely recognizing possibilities of sacralization and 
contamination is especially constructed by persons. But
it is possible that ritualized (in the sense only of 
routinized) conduct will arise where the contact is be­
tween ritual selves who neither of them want to make a 
ritual contact, and here it would be more appropriate 




In this chapter I lead up to the idea that ritual 
power not only can be acquired by systematic orientations 
to societal pollution codes, as I have shown in Chapter 
IV, but, more commonly, derives from (and is) the 
interactional phenomenon "presence" as this is understood 
in the theatre.
Presence is not a mysterious quality that some 
people have more of than others; it is nothing else but 
self-definition by acts, expressions, and words. When 
the definition is sharp and a person is very clear to 
other persons in interaction, I say that he is possessed, 
but actually all persons can be seen to be possessed, 
though most of them, neither sharp nor clear, are 
blurred copies of vital societal images. Possession 
is a difficult notion because Anglo-American culture 
wants to believe that someone, a person perhaps, is 
possessed, whereas here I am pushing towards the idea 
that a person is his possession - or collection of 
possessions - through and through, and nothing else.
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My reorientation to human beings thus requires that 
they be seen as mediums of flesh caught up in acts 
perceived to be of ritual beings. The perceived person 
is like an envoy, from a ritual realm, using the only 
means at his disposal - a body, a voice, a dramaturgical 
talent, and so on - to open this realm, or even close 
it, to others. A person, I shall argue in later chapters, 
is there when you look at him because he is a fine actor 
of this societal notion "person", through whom nothing 
except what is shown can be seen, just because it is 
through the behavioural straws in his ritual wind that 
you come to see, with his help or despite his hindrance, 
the particular straw man that is his person. A person, 
therefore, is not a projection of some lantern-slide 
of self so much as his audience's projection, the other 
way round, into him, who dwells, in fact, anywhere 
but "within" his behavioural manifestations and whose 
only significant relationship to his body and his mind 
is that he, the possession, must always be a function 
of his dramaturgical ability in interaction, though this 
too in part will be a function of the precise form of 
his possession. I leap ahead of myself here, for these 
are some of my final conclusions.
The first section of this chapter enlarges on my
analytic decision to regard conduct as subject to changes
in fashion. It is the case, I shall propose, that proper
conduct is fashionable conduct. But, since fashions
conceal their "fashionableness" from their followers,
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persons have difficulty in seeing that they sail before 
some other wind than that of their own autonomous will, 
however they may sail and wherever to. This idea that 
"good" behaviour (which will be conduct of acceptable 
ritual power) is fashionable conduct, dispels what 
Goffman has called "The Doctrine of Natural Expression" 
and acts as a wedge to open the theoretical door that 
is thrown wide in Part Three. (There, the fully inter­
active interaction is defined eventually as a maelstrom 
of interchangeable possessions, whose only law is its 
own revolution.)
However, before I move on to presence and then from 
presence to possession, I need to establish that conduct 
is not only fashionable but - because it must be form - 
is also always aesthetic. Geertz's (1975) analysis of 
Balinese social life is useful here, partly through 
Geertz's own revealed ethnocentricity. After showing 
how aesthetic Balinese life is not logically different to 
Anglo-American life, I then meet the objections of 
"authentic man" by arguing, with reference to Antonin 
Artaud's (1958) manifesto for theatrical cruelty (or 
truth to life), that a man who would tear his conduct 
off his body can only perform the conduct of a man doing 
just that. My argument here is a little like Berkeihy' s 
when he criticises John Locke's view that objects 
"cause" perceptions of themselves. Berkeley asked how 
it could be seen that what give rise to perceptions are 
objects if only the perceptions of the objects can be
156
seen, and he concluded that objects must be "constructions". 
(I go further in the case of people, and say that they 
construct themselves.) Recently Locke has been 
reinstated because his illogical epistemology honours 
everyday language practice, but in this thesis I am 
trying to dishonour language practices that would locate 
the "true" person in his innards (where, I say, he can 
never be seen to be except as an introjection from outer 
manifestations) for I feel that the inner view of man 
dishonours him, and so I enact my "ritual reasons" as 
described in Chapter I .
It emerges here that selves may be possessions 
of self by self, and possessions that are done well 
become interactionally "present", I now hypothesize, 
because he who would be "himself" is the conscious 
pilot of his vessel rather than a vessel trying to become 
conscious. Stages, I then note, are the places where 
dramatic enactments are clearest and where, for that 
reason, I suggest, conduct fashions may be explored, 
and in safety, moreover. So it is fitting to now enquire 
how actors, the practical scientists of conduct, go 
about their work. It would seem that they are neither 
purely technical nor purely expressive: between these 
two limits they obey rules for conduct whose full 
formulation would be impossibly cumbersome and whose 
partial formulation, if followed faithfully, would 
result in eccentric performance. Also, actors do the
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best they can to keep "theatricality" out of their 
conduct, and theatricality is nothing other than old- 
fashioned acting. (That there are conduct fashions 
on the stage of course supports my view that everyday 
conduct is fashion-governed.)
Now, since the stage is the one place where the 
ritual code operates to the exclusion of everything 
else', it becômès' hallowed - for being that place where 
specifically human and somehow valuable conduct is 
enacted. It is also a fact that while most people are 
oriented to dramatized ritual conduct, the profession 
of actor is still regarded as fairly lightweight. Putting 
these two facts together produces the conclusion that 
status life is not a true match of ritual life, and 
this is born out by the use of phrases like "you look 
the part" as compliments (it only helps to look the 
part). Goffman, I conclude, who sees ritualness as 
relatively fixed and as positively related to status, 
misses the important interactional variable of ritual 
power, which is a variable because not only is it 
altered by pollution conduct, as I showed in Chapter IV, 
but also is altered by fluctuations in dramatic 
competence. (So, though Goffman thinks that performers' 
secrets are "petty", I have arrived at an opposite 
opinion.)
Finally, I suggest that it is not enough to be
fashionable if you want to be social. Some originality
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of conduct is necessary and this necessarily brings on 
new fashions that may well first surface on stages. It 
is so because life that only replicates what has gone 
before, inventing nothing new, is not perceived as fully 
alive or human.
Conduct as Fashionable Conduct Modelled by Actors
I have described punks as young persons who adopt 
a fashion in music and clothes that, only appearing to 
emanate from a deeper profaning self, still gives them 
an inverted ritual power greater than the power they 
would have if they did not follow their fashion. I have 
also described how nurses systematically regulate their 
conduct in order to control the contaminations in whose 
midst they work, and how this must take the form of 
self-sacralization when the contaminants will not go 
away. In so doing, I have asked the reader who might 
grant that costume is always dictated by fashion (nurses' 
costume would be a very slow-moving fashion compared 
with the fast-moving punk fashion) and who would also 
grant that costume and interaction are inseparable, 
to see forms of conduct as being fashionable or unfash­
ionable, which is to say, fashion-governed. It would 
follow that the rules of conduct, insofar as conduct 
should be fashionable conduct, operate only within their 
own sphere and cannot be related to anything but their 
own evolution, however zig-zag that might be and in 
whatever direction. (But I am not answering very
important questions that are begged here, such as how
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a fashion of conduct might be related to other human 
activity - if there is any such - or how changing 
events in the human universe might have effects on 
conduct fashions.)
I look at examples of conduct from this one angle 
and in this one light, preferring to paint a partial 
picture that makes sense than to botch an exhaustive 
portrait. I do this to see what this allows me to see, 
which otherwise would remain hidden. My procedure is 
not dissimilar, then, to that of someone testing a 
theory, the theory in this case being Coffman's ritual 
f rame.
Where punks and nurses are obvious choices of
fashion-controlled persons who actively exemplify the
ritual code, actors are, as obviously, I feel, a good
choice of persons who have a highly developed competence
to appear like persons, because they can play many
persons convincingly and are not confined to the playing
of a single role like "punk" or "nurse". Thus, towards
the end of the chapter I draw on the data source of
complete tape transcripts of a three-week rehearsal
period in a leading British provincial theatre^ and
in Part Three I repeatedly refer to observations of
my own made during a nine-week period of intensive
participant observation in a repertory company. In
addition I constantly use the insights of stage performers
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and their commentators to help propel my argument. Why 
I do this will emerge as the narrative proceeds, but one 
of the most important reasons for my singling out actors 
as persons of interest to anyone who would study inter­
action is that a great number of people spend great 
amounts of time watching them. Althiede & Snow (1979) 
quote the figure of six hours each day for the time each 
American TV is switched on and, seven years ago, Williams 
(1974a) quoted three hours per day for British TVs. 
Williams (1974b) has this to say:
It seems probable that in societies like Britain 
and the United States more drama is watched in a 
week or weekend, by the majority of viewers, than 
would have been watched in a year or in some cases 
a lifetime in any previous historical period. It 
is not uncommon for the majority of viewers to see, 
regularly, as much as two or three hours of drama, 
of various kinds, every day. The implications of 
this have scarcely begun to be considered. It 
is clearly one of the unique characteristics of 
advanced industrial societies that drama as an 
experience is now an intrinsic part of everyday 
life, at a quantitative level which is so very 
much greater than any precedent as to seem a 
fundamental qualitative change. Whatever the 
social and cultural reasons may finally be, it is 
clear that watching dramatic simulation of a wide 
range of experiences is now an essential part of 
our modern cultural pattern.
Not only have dramatic enactments become a staple social
2diet of Anglo-Americans , but understandings of social
reality may be being subtly restated in a logic that
borrows from (dramatic) entertainment formats, so that
the infusion of dramatization into society is at two
levels, the immediate one of visible presentations and
the hidden one of issue-dramatization. Both Williams
and Althiede & Snow advance this view that the criterion
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for all TV representations of all human social realities 
is becoming entertainment. (Entertainment they both 
define as mundane behaviour with the mundanities removed 
and so structured as to encourage vicarious involvement.) 
Althiede & Snow,at some length and with convincing 
thoroughness, also argue that there has grown up a 
"media logic" that is now learnt from "entertainment-TV" 
and applied to all social phenomena (from sport to 
religion). Big institutions, say Althiede & Snow, are 
definitely beginning to shape their forms to fit this 
logic. I invoke these points here only to emphasise 
that people may be judging conduct by television's 
standards, and thus I think my choice of actors as 
persons worth studying by the observer of ritual conduct 
is justified, since these are the people who, for vast 
numbers of TV viewers, embody the forms of intelligible 
conduct, not only in their micro-behaviour but in their 
narratives. Actors, furthermore, suffer a process of 
natural selection. Only those recognised to be performing 
conduct as it "should" be performed can stay alive 
professionaly; those who act badly - or too imaginatively 
for the average viewer - will not be seen. Televised 
actors, then, model the latest fashions of conduct which 
far less competently are variously adopted by their 
viewers, the whole symbiosis operating under a contrary 
rhetoric that persons are really, for example the social 
flowerings of their chromosones and genes.
So, if present-day conduct may be disposed to be
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fashionable in its ritual forms and fashion is visible 
form, what of the forms? I now put forward the view that, 
since the logic of form for form's sake is aesthetic, 
conduct is considered good when it looks right, not if 
it is right by standards that are outside fashion. Thus, 
if conduct is fully aestheticized, it must be fashionable 
ritual. To explain this notion of aesthetic conduct 
more fully I examine the Balinese through Geert»'s (1975) 
account of their social life, because perhaps more than 
any other society the Balinese "stand on ceremony". I 
come to the conclusion that the Balinese are their forms, 
as must be all other social persons, and that the 
aesthetic nature of conduct may be hidden from most 
understandings of conduct just because most conduct does 
work aesthetically.
The Balinese^
Geertz (1975) characterises Balinese social life 
as one whose "obsessing ideal" is with conventions and 
proprieties that are exaggeratedly ceremonious conduct 
designed to prohibit spontaneity, emotionality, and 
individuality. Manners are a matter of "deep spiritual 
concern" and interaction is informed by a "playful 
theatricality" which is, however, grave in its performance. 
"Balinese social relations are at once a solemn game 
and studied drama." The formally ceremonial ritual life 
of the Balinese is as relaxed as civil life is formally 
ritualistic, and the two forms of conduct commingle: 
"Etiquette is a kind of dance, dance a kind of ritual,
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and worship a form of etiquette." The courtesies of the 
Balinese, says Geertz, express sensibility rather than 
rectitude ; people please one another "to please as 
beauty pleases, not as virtue pleases."
In this life of aesthetic conduct, the most intensely 
emphasised "affective regulator" is what the Balinese call 
"lek", a kind of stage fright. Lek is the worry that 
aesthetic illusions will collapse and that the part each 
person is playing will be suddenly exposed as a part 
being played by an entity who, having no part or form 
itself, will grotesquely mar the composition of Balinese 
society. Geertz also says that lek is the anxiety 
that the forms of conduct will no longer hold at bay 
those behaviours in which "the immediacy of the moment 
is felt with excruciating intensity," and, as if at the 
dictate of lek, social life in Bali is free of quarrels 
and open confrontations, and conflictual issues are 
blunted or dropped. Possibly this provides a reason 
why unaccomplished and frustrated tasks are abandoned, 
sometimes never to be resumed, and why the formal ritual 
that functions to summon down Balinese gods consists 
mostly in "getting ready and cleaning up". The Balinese, 
in all these ways, show one another - and this is Geertz's 
ethnocentric view - far too much respect. (It is 
interesting to compare the non-events of Balinese 
rituals to another "solemn game and studied drama", the 
English sport of cricket, which, in my view, quite
appropriately has given its name to a moral code.)
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All I want to suggest here is that Balinese conduct, 
as Geertz interprets it, has much more in common with 
Anglo-American conduct than at first appears to be the 
case. The Balinese are no different from other people,
I am saying, in always trying to be for one another the 
best selves that they can be considered to be. It is 
just that their stalking ground, in proportion to its 
unusual freedom from direct threats to ideal impersonations, 
is as a whole vulnerable (and this is why iek is so 
pervasive). One false move in Bali and, for those 
witnessing it, the entire Balinese society is likely 
to disintegrate, leaving those Balinese people where 
people without society are always to be found, scrambling 
desperately to start a new one. But gaffes and embarras­
sing acts similarly anomize Anglo-American culture, 
because of the basic human predicament that, when persons 
are face-to-face, whatever they do must confirm, threaten, 
or create a form of conduct that fits into a moral 
ideology, even if what they do is nothing (an act which 
suggests an evaluation of social life and of other persons 
as valueless) . Conduct, then, is inevitably aesthetically 
judged, even when it is considered ugly, and so far as 
it is effective in aesthetic terms it is seen as separate 
from and different in nature to some unseeable being who 
might be said to perform it, but whom, I argue, is not 
visible except through his performances.
But it could be objected here that aesthetic conduct
in the Balinese style, with its attendant and constant
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risk of rupture, does not allow of the easy innovation 
one associates with An^-American behaviour. To answer 
this it is only necessary to account for the "ease" 
of such innovations. Riezler (1943), in this connection, 
observes that friendship cannot be friendly without the 
constant exercise of tact, and he says that tact is the 
diligent indulgence one person gives to the nascent 
Meadian "me" of another's "I". No indulgence, no tact, 
and, therefore, no innovation. The mosaic of "mes" that 
form a society are preserved by tact so that their "Is" 
do not suffer shame, and in Bali, where the "me" predom­
inates over the "I", tact seems to be built into the 
social system as a whole, whereas, in Anglo-American 
culture, tact is in part exercised at the discretion 
of individuals (so that it is possible to describe a 
person as tactless). Innovation, then, must rely on 
tactful forbearance, as well as on the willingness to 
risk being untactful, so that in the realm of aesthetic 
conduct the ritual self is as much in play as in more 
obvious fields of honour. This is the crucial point, 
that the growths of personality tact protects must be 
items of conduct, and just those items most ritually alive 
to persons. Societal tact in Bali (plus a seeming 
societal dislike of changing the prevailing fashion 
conduct) conceals its constant employment (tact, 
reflexively tactful, is not tactful if it can be seen 
for what it is) and thus it is that where the Balinese 
"really are" is in their non-abrasive social interlockings.
Similarly, for Anglo-Americans, the parts of the self
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that have most social life are just those that are most 
exposed to others. So the ritual self is as it were 
triangulated into a formal biographical definition from 
a host of small behaviours that can only be assessed 
by their comparison, in terms of form, with other 
behaviours, that is to say, aesthetically. In Part 
Three, I shall show that the most real person is he who 
has more concentrated and organized surfaces, not he who 
would disown his conduct as though, by doing so, he 
would release into the presence of other people a being 
who is essentially "him" and who, moreover, could somehow 
be seen by other people through some other medium than 
his appearance in gesture, expression, costume, words, 
and movement. Such "conduct-less" conduct might well 
be called de-aestheticized conduct, whose possibility I 
want now to explore. If it is impossible, then the 
necessity for conduct to be aesthetic conduct - fashionable 
ritual - is further established.
De-Aestheticized Conduct
In the theatre, the aspiration to rip conduct to 
shreds so as to release the person before he has a 
chance to play himself, has been best expressed by 
Antonin Artaud (1958) in The Theatre and Its Double, 
where he writes: "If there is still one hellish, truly
accursed thing in our time it is our artistic dallying 
with forms, instead of being like victims burnt at the 
stake, signalling through the flames" (p 13). He compares 
his ideal theatre to a crisis like the plague: "It
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invites the mind to share a delirium which exalts its 
energies; and we can see ... that from the human point 
of view, the action of theater, like that of plague, is 
beneficial, for, impelling men to see themselves as 
they are, it causes the mask to fall, reveals the lie, 
the slackness, baseness, and hypocrisy of our world ..." 
(p 31). By definition, this kind of theatre must destroy 
whatever social institution could incubate it, but 
theatrical followers of the Theatre of Cruelty, which 
began with Artaud, have shrunk from Artaud's conclusion 
that theatre should be, as Derrida (1978) says: "Life
itself, in the extent to which life is unrepresentable"
(p 234). Derrida describes Artaud's stalking ground 
thus :
A closed space, that is to say a space produced 
from within itself and no longer organized from 
the vantage of an other absent site, an illocality, 
an alibi or invisible utopia. The end of represen­
tation, but also invisible representation; the 
end of interpreation but also an original inter­
pretation that no master-speech, no project of 
mastery will have permeated and levelled in 
advance. A visible representation certainly, 
directed against the speech which eludes sight ... 
but whose visibility does not consist of a spectacle 
mounted by the discourse of a master. Represen­
tation, then, as the autorepresentation of pure 
visibility and even pure sensibility.
This pursuit of the nascent is also carried on by Derrida
in his writing, except that unlike Artuad he does not
have a vision of what his words would look like if they
overcame thdr verbality. However, once such a project
is undertaken, forms of conduct cease to be anything
but successive betrayals of what is dumbly implied to be
their actual life, and the result in language can be,
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as Jameson (1972) observes of Derrida, a "philosophic 
language that feels its way gropingly along the walls 
of its own conceptual prison, describing it from the 
inside as though it were only one of the possible worlds 
of which the others are nonetheless inconceivable” (p 186). 
But Artaud and Derrida who would strip conduct of itself 
must forever fail at the instant of revelation, when what 
would be revealed reveals only that it was already 
revealed, and both Artaud and Derrida, to a marked degree, 
are in the predicament of Hamlet, as Rosenberg (1970) 
states it : "Hamlet is obsessed by the sense of being
an actor, that is to say, of falsifying himself through 
what he does and says. His self-consciousness exceeds 
his role and blocks his performance of it." But where 
Hamlet searches for a better performance of a richer 
aprt, Artaud would attack the part itself, only, of course, 
in my view, to find himself playing the part of a man 
attacking himself. In his fury to murder his falsifying 
outer selves, I feel, Artaud fails to give expression 
to Artaud; he becomes instead a particularly understandable 
human passion, which victimizes him. Raging against what 
to him was aesthetic conduct of an insipid and mediocre 
kind, nonetheless, in his writings, Artaud conducted 
himself with admirable aesthetic verve, and there, rather 
than in the mental asylum of Rodez where he was confined 
for much of the latter part of his life, did he, I feel, 
release his realest self.
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So conduct can only be sloughed off by conduct, 
and a person has to suffer his characterization by others 
out of the behaviours he, like Artaud, might want to fling 
in their horrified faces. But, if he is not like Artaud, 
how is he to take his place as an acceptable member of 
society? Actors, here, I think, can show how "acting" 
is made to disappear from view and how conduct can be 
passed off as inevitably expressive. I now discuss 
how I think actors bring this about, and finally I come 
to the idea of presence.
Life in Everyday Life
An actor, while being someone he is not, can perform 
so well that his audience will forget he is an actor and
engross themselves in the part he plays. I argue in
this thesis that persons who would look most like persons 
in interaction similarly act, and that the kind of part 
played is of less relevance to its being taken seriously 
than the competence in playing it. It is of course 
evident in contemporary Anglo-American culture that 
persons are asked to only play one part, their own.
(Perhaps a societal reason for this is to prevent confusion,
just as a reason for styles of conduct being uniformized 
into fashions may be to decrease ambiguities.) Persons, 
then, possess themselves with recognizable social identities, 
though most of them are taught to regard their own and 
others* identities as modelled after inner propensities.
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The possession of self by self is very well described 
by George Eliot (1957) in Middlemarch:
Every nerve and muscle in Rosamond was adjusted 
to the consciousness that she was being looked 
at. She was by nature an actress of parts that 
entered into her physique: she even acted her own 
character, and so well, that she did not know it 
to be precisely her own.
This is a little like the admired social faculty for 
self-possession. A contention that I shall later amplify_ w ... .. .. - w - - - - - - - - - - “ - - ..
will be that highly self-possessed individuals, like 
Rosamond in the above quotation, are seen to be that 
because of their particularized definition, which gives 
them more ritual power than less self-possessed persons. 
Most actors, and many other people besides, call this 
quality of particularized self-possession "presence", 
which I think is the equivalent of ritual power, lending 
a high interactional status to he or she who has it, 
regardless of all other statuses. (Chaikin (1972) says 
that actors have presence where ordinary persons do not 
because they are especially sensitive to their immediate 
situations.)
Possession of this sort seems to be what the actors 
I studied were striving to engineer for themselves on 
stage. It is often as if actors want to be taken over 
by their parts and yet remain fully alert. Playing the 
part is then rather like manoeuvring a strange being from 
the inside. (Taking over a part, on the other hand, by 
imagining oneself to be the part and then trying to 
change, from inside out, does not seem to work so well.)
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This is the moment, I think, to be more specific about 
actors and their techniques. Drawing from my own partici­
pant observations and from the transcripts I mentioned, 
it is possible for me to tentatively develop some data- 
based generalizations.
Actors seem to operate between pure technicality 
and mindless emotionality according to rules they hesitate 
to put into words. It is as though verbal reification 
of techniques is seen as containing the possibility of 
ossifying performances that will go out of date. Further­
more, the fact that in the theatre certain stage conduct 
is criticized for being "theatrical" suggests that 
professional stage acting is fashion-governed.
Certainly actors are reluctant to become conscious 
of how they act, and John Gielgud (Funke & Booth, 1961) 
is typical in defining the process not only as "secret" 
but also as one that would not work for the actor whom 
it preoccupied. The fear seems to be of getting caught 
in verbalizations (of artistic techniques) that would 
be bound thereafter to crank out the same kind of perform­
ance in every play, always stuck in an old fashion of 
acting. Thus the theatre director of the transcripts 
would object to theatrical or "bogus" acting, contrast­
ing this to acting that was "truthful" and "absolutely 
right and natural," and there are no signs that the 
actors did not know exactly what theatrical meant. But 
there are actors who rely on or think that they rely on
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technique alone. Helen Hayes (Funke & Booth, 1961) 
describes these as "mechanical marvels", implying that, 
unless the marvellous eclipses the mechanical, audiences 
will not be tricked into seeing a "real" stage character. 
In other words, technique and technique alone is a hard 
route; some guidance from unformulated understandings 
is more likely to take the actor to the audience as a 
person. (And in the same way that the technical body 
can obstruct the body of a real person, so words too 
can be a barrier to their meaning. The director of the 
transcripts is always against this verbalising of lines; 
high praise from him for an actor whose speech is effect­
ive would be "every word was a though" and "you were 
really thinking every word.")
It seems probable, from what the microanalysts, 
on the behavioural side, have discovered and from what 
textualists, on the verbal side, have found in words 
alone, that any rote technique for speech making would 
be impossibly cumbersome to articulate. An actor, then, 
needs to keep his very complex and far-reaching under­
standings of his acting methods subverbal so as not to 
come under the biasing influence just a few of these would 
exert if they were preferred to a verbal level. Notably, 
the director of the transcripts, as well as the director 
of the company I researched, refrain from telling actors 
in detail how to make moves and intonations: overall 
"blocking" parameters are laid down within which it seems
to be the actor's responsibility to find the "right" move
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or tone or expression. (When, however, an actor does 
not fulfil this responsibility, he calls down on himself - 
in the transcripts - this comment: "You make me feel 
like a puppeteer this morning, which is not what I see 
my function as being really.")
But human meaning is not only lost by mechanical 
enactments; it also departs when high emotion is 
represented in a one-to-one match, so to speak. The 
director says: "Bits which work least well are roar
and rant, sound and fury, because then it is just 
meaningless and any direction in a sense disappears," 
and, "if you blow your rag, then actually we don't have 
anywhere to go." So the reverse of over-technicality 
is not right either. Removal of the control of the 
character removes the character too; something needs 
to be left to be shown to be gripped by emotion, or the 
emotion, gripping nothing, is nobody's and therefore 
dramatically meaningless.
Thus, from two directions, what a person might be 
on stage is hinted at here. He is not a machine and he 
is not undisciplined expression. Between these two 
extremes he steers himself by reference to rules he 
dare not formulate for fear of always thereafter being 
no more than the repetitious product of these formulations, 
an old-fashioned theatrical. The same, I suggest, may 
be true for persons in everyday life, simply because 
they must recognise life-like conduct on stage in the
174
same way that they recognise it off stage. Persons, 
then, control themselves the better to be themselves 
and try not to think too much about their doing so or 
about how they do it lest they seize up like a motorist 
who cannot see the road he is driving because he will 
not take his eyes out of the engine. But that there 
is an engine which has to be driven on a road is the 
point.
Williams (1974a) says:
The drama of any period, including our own, is 
an intricate set of practices of which some are 
incorporated - the known rhythms and movements 
of a residual but still active system - and some 
are exploratory - the difficult rhythms and 
movements of an emergent representation, 
rearrangement, new identification.
So the stalking ground of a theatrical stage is one place 
where, perhaps more than anywhere else, new fashions of 
conduct, if enacted through new fashions of its staging, 
can emerge in legible form. Stages and not everyday 
situations are reserved for conduct that is understood 
to be more selfconscious than usual, and they are where 
experiments are performed with the ritual code, which 
there operates to the exclusion of almost everything else 
Possibly this accounts for the hallowed nature stages 
are attributed in the literature of the theatre. Funke 
& Booth (1961) talk, for example, of "temples", while 
Segal (1978) says a stage is a "consecrated place", and
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refers to the playing out of a drama in front of an 
audience as a "communion". There seems to be no escaping 
the fact that just where ritual conduct is fashionable 
it is an aesthetic performance or, as I shall show in 
Part Three, a controlled possession.
Conclusion
That people do go to theatres or watch drama on 
television and will accord respect to performers along 
a scale of lifelikeness, does suggest that, in Anglo- 
American culture, lifelike conduct in its most pure 
and heightened forms is dramatized conduct, that is, 
the ritually live conduct of knowing possession. However, 
the actor cannot be the ideal type of a person simply 
because, although more than any other person he is able 
to be effectively possessed, he has no societal role but 
that of "actor" by which to be possessed off-stage. Off­
stage, his trained talent is of little benefit to him 
just because it is known to be trained in a culture 
which wants to believe that natural possession is a 
form of expressed innerness and that ritual power can 
be any person's if he is given a high enough status.
Later I shall expand on this theme but for now I would 
point out that it can be said of a high status person,
"He looks the part", and, that it is not said too often 
of these persons, argues that the particular kind of 
ritual power I am busy defining here is not obviously 
connected to societal position.
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Goffman has frequently said that what is essentially 
human is the competence persons have to look human in 
approved fashion, but he has never gone on to consider 
competence as a variable capacity or to consider what 
this implies for interactions. (His work on "faulty 
persons" (Goffman, 1953) and on stigmatized persons 
(Goffman, 1968) does not touch on the issue of competence 
in this sense, for these persons, because of a fault 
or a stigma, are placed in a position of being deemed 
incompetent, even though they may have no less competence 
than normals.) My suggestion in this chapter is that 
power of a ritual kind accrues to competence in inter­
action, and, conversely, that incompetence decreases 
worth, and my criticism of Goffman is that, by sometimes 
not incorporating his ritual in his dramaturgical frame, 
he has unfortunately diminished the role of awe in 
interactions. And when he says, "The audience sense 
secret mysteries and powers behind the performance, and 
the performer senses that his chief secrets are petty ones" 
(Goffman, 1971, p 76), he surely slights the degree of 
transportation a person can feel in the presence of 
good acting or even in the presence of those persons 
who are described as "larger than life." Goffman's 
reduction of the theatre to a trick played by "mechanical 
marvels" directed by puppeteers, and his consequent 
draining from the dramaturgical frame of as-yet ill- 
defined sociological notions like "being moved" or 
"purged", though it frees his readers from the doctrine 
of natural expression, still discounts the everyday
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knowledge that some people and not others can "get through" 
to other people. (This was an inevitable result of a 
necessary analytic division of dramaturgical from ritual 
frame, and the fact that some elements of interaction 
were lost thereby is, of course, as nothing to the gains 
made by Goffman's sociology, but what was lost is enough,
I feel, to make it worth my while trying to effect some 
recoveries.)
Cless (1979) quotes Herbert Blau as saying that the 
supreme ability of an actor is "to bring out of nowhere 
an action that is incredibly strange and perfectly right, 
so that one feels, after it is performed, that he has 
witnessed an enchantment, and can only ask in admiration, 
'Where did that come from, it was so true?'" This is the 
recognition that if a person is to invest himself with 
ritual power he must behave in an original way that 
connects appearance to meaning so that there could be 
no other appearance for no other meaning. And, if it 
were not possible for persons to endlessly create new 
forms of conduct, social life would quickly assume a 
stilted, mechanical 'aspect in which it would become hard 
to imagine that persons are really alive. The living 
dead, of course, are everywhere, but most people do not 
feel they could be befriended. Spontaneity, originality, 
alertness to the situation, the ability to unambiguously 
enact apposite meaning, these are the marks of life, 
and it is impossible to imagine any interaction that 
lacked at least a modicum of such life being properly
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termed a human interaction. Goffman, I feel - fortunately 
for me else I would not know what to write about - has 
never turned into this side road, the role of life in 
everyday life. In Part Three, I clarify and sort out 
the ideas from this chapter relating to that theme. In 
the "Summary and Conclusions" I finally get to the point 
of suggesting that the side road is a freeway.
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Notes
1 These transcripts were very kindly made available to me 
by Professor Iain Mangham.
2 I repeatedly use the category "Anglo-American", and 
always do so only negatively to indicate in the loosest 
possible way the group within which I should be considered 
to be ethnocentric. It is not a term I like using but all 
tha possible alternatives seem even worse. \
3 It does not actually influence my argument either way if 
G-eertz’s Balinese are merely his projections of them (and
I do not think they are that). The Balinese here serve as 
"ideal types" and have equal relevance to my argument whether 
they are as Geertz describes them or whether they are purely 
the construct of a respected anthropologist.
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Part Three: Possession and Rapture
CHAPTER VI
POSSESSION
_ Thischapter provides a_more solid foundation for the 
idea of possession than the few remarks on the subject in 
the previous chapter, and so the reader may feel he is mark­
ing time, and, indeed, until Chapter IX, there will be no 
significant theoretical expansion on any of the points so 
far raised, though all these will be dealt with at greater 
length. Possession, I have said, is not possession unless 
it is controlled. However, I defer any discussion of the 
control of possession until the next chapter, so as not to 
complicate the simple assertion I put forward here, that the 
idea of possession in interaction is a ritual idea following 
naturally upon Goffman's appreciation of persons as ritual 
beings. Some of the consequences of this view are examined 
now, and others later on.
To begin with, I adapt David Cole's (1975) thoughts 
about the "illud tempus" to show that his is a useful rhetoric 
for actors in particular and persons in general, and then I go 
on to note how some theatrical gurus already behave as though 
there is no doubt for them that there is an illud tempus.
This leads me to suggest that the life which the "theatre of
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possession" wishes to impart to audiences is the life of 
interaction when interaction becomes fully interactive, and 
I reflect that this life is infused as if from an illud 
tempus, or ritual realm, by cues that imply the realm as a 
more probable origin of the person than any other. (It goes 
without saying that the ritual realm is only "there"in as much 
as it is effectively evoked by conduct.) So what I am pro­
posing is a sort of dominant "frame" for interactions, outside 
which, I contend, they scarcely merit being termed interaction. 
"Camp", as I interpret this, vouches for my ritual ideas, for 
I see camp conduct to be the response of actors to their pre­
dicament, as ritual specialists, of not being able to stop 
becoming over-charged with meaning: actors burlesque the
human to "earth" their ritual power. A new concept, "narrat- 
ibility", emerges now. Persons must have narratibility or 
feel worthless. This is because life is essentially ritual 
life that, in its turn, is effective dramatic life which - 
when its episodes are strung together into a biography - is 
not dramatic unless it is in its overall pattern intelligible 
or, as I have called it, "narratible", and narratible, moreover,
as the person's life and not the life of some other person or
ritual force that was more important to him than himself, 
whoever he was in that case. So people often try to make 
sense for themselves (in Chapter IX I show how they make ritual
sense for others too) by pulling out of the thickly woven mat­
erial of their lives long strands of narrative they claim as 
being their lives entire, and, I conclude, they do this because 
they are ritual beings who, to be those, need to be possessed
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by themselves. Finally, I introduce Chapter VII, by letting 
into my discussion the deferred idea that possession must be 
controlled. I give the example of tact as the control exerted 
by a better self (who protects others) to be a better self (who 
does not untactfully show himself as that), and also the example 
of the psychopath to convince the reader that, if a person will 
not control himself at all, nonetheless society will sea his _ 
uncontrol as a species of conduct highly controlled by a path­
ological condition. So, having shown that "possession", as I 
receive it, is a viable concept and that it admirably suits a 
ritual theory of persons, I arrive at a position from which I 
can explore, in the next chapter, some of the ways possession 
is controlled so as to be itself.
In some cultures the "shaman" has inspired awe by jour­
neying on behalf of his audience to a realm David Cole (1975) 
calls the "illud tempus", and the "hungan" in some Haitian 
cultures returns from that realm as one of its personages for 
an audience. The illud tempus is a spirits' stalking ground 
where the dead, too, commingle, and it is more powerful by far
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than quotidian reality. (Freud called it the unconscious.)
Not anybody might visit it and those who do are endowed with
a special status, neither wholly symbolic nor wholly poli­
tical but always imbued with magical power. In Anglo- 
American culture, says Cole, it is the actor who more than 
anyone else combines the roles of shaman and hungan. If 
he performs well on stage he is "seized by the revelation 
of fate" (Frobenius) just like a "primitive ritualist" from 
the remote past of the human race. Frobenius (quoted in 
Huizinga, 1976) adds:
The reality of the natural rhythm of genesis and
extinction has seized hold of his consciousness,
and this, inevitably and by reflex action, leads 
him to represent his emotion in an act.
In cultures of excessive liminality (Victor Turner's word 
for social forms that are ambiguous, dissolving, and 
nascent), a true actor, who would travel to and from the 
illud tempus, might find himself, in the absence of either 
appropriate institutions or adequate conduct fashions, 
enacting the seizures of an epileptic, as did Dostoyevsky, 
suggests Shusterman (quoted in Turner, 1975) so as to per­
form a true act in a social life he did not believe in.
In Anglo-American culture, the temper tantrum might be an 
equivalent demonstration by a person that he is other than 
the self that had a temper to lose, having become the temper^ 
someone seized, who, unlike those who cannot lose their tem­
pers, can be seized from beyond himself by forces that use 
him to loudhail and semaphore to the world that they wish to
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enter their audience. Here Sartre (1963) gives a reason for 
the conduct of anger - and one that I think implies an under­
standing, like mine, that social life is constantly in need 
of dramatic simplifications that will reinvest it with ritu- 
ality-when he says: "Anger is merely a blind and magical
attempt to simplify situations that are too complex." And in 
Anglo-American cultures, as in the primitive cultures Coles 
alludes to, the idea that an excellent performance, not just 
on stage but also in music and literature, has been "inspired" 
needs no explanation, and inspired performances are recognised 
as far more valuable than those that are uninspired, so much 
so that the word uninspired is used of performances barely 
registering as performances.
My purpose here is neither to establish the possibility 
of an illud tempus nor to analyse it, but to indicate that 
persons do behave as if it is there. We do not need to 
believe that an excellent performance is a kind of seizure 
by persons or forces unknown, merely to note that that is how 
one is often viewed, being evaluated along a scale that runs 
from non-seizure to total possession, at whose limit epilep­
tic performances, for instance, can be frightening to the 
degree that possession seems total, when the convulsing 
person seems to have gone away completely and to have been 
replaced by bizarre conduct whose gestures cannot be inter­
preted. Thus Otto (1965) obviously feels confident that he 
will be understood when he says that madness touches he who 
wears the mask of Dionysus:
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The whole splendour of that which has been submerged 
draws imperatively near at the same time that it is 
lost in eternity. The wearer of the mask is seized 
by the sublimity and dignity of those who are no more. 
He is himself and yet someone else.
So the idea that persons are possessed by their everyday
roles might be closer to everyday understanding than that,
for example, persons take roles (Turner, 1962) that leave
their players essentially unchanged.
Now Artaud did not doubt that the lifeless decadence
of the theatre of his day came of its breaking away from
"gravity, from effects that are immediate and painful - in
a word, from danger," and he associated this lack of raw
experience in the theatre with the alienation of populations
in general. He thought that theatre would never again
become "a means of true illusion" until it offered audiences
"the truthful precipitates of dreams." The appeal would be
to the public's taste for crime, eroticism, and savagery
(this taste, of course, is met now by the gutter press and
by television, with its concentration on violent action even
in news reportage). Very recently Cless (1979) reports
alienation of the type Artaud reacted against as still being
normal in contemporary American theatre:
While the rehearsal and development of the play should 
be a thorough meeting of the actor as a person with his 
character and the script to enable rich full communica­
tion of the play with other actors and the audience, 
rehearsal is most often either the technical labor of 
assembling the parts of the play through mesmerization 
and stylization, or at an even more estranged, but 
deceptively subjective level, the effacement and denial 
of person through character presentation (i.e. a way of 
hiding from the audience is to fake subjectivity).
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Cless goes on to accuse theatre in America of reifying 
experience, prohibiting occasions of transcendence and 
"spiritual communion". Whether or not this is univer­
sally the case and whether or not a wholly alienated actor 
nevertheless could fully "move" an audience, Cless is still 
an example of someone like Artaud who believes in a kind of 
possession that is truer to life than merely technical 
enactment. Indeed, possessed by this idea, the theatrical 
guru, Lee Strasberg, influenced a generation of leading 
American actors, notably Brando and Dean. Possession, 
then, makes sense to a number of people whose vocation is 
to make characters palpably sensible to audiences, and it 
seems that theatrical experts in social life know very well 
that enactments can reach a much more humanly involving 
level than the cognitive. These enactments "come to life" 
on stage when the human part of human beings somehow inten­
sifies itself, as it was the purpose to so intensify it, to 
the point of its destruction, of Antonin Artaud and the 
regret that this is not done of Downing Cless.
In everyday life, it must be allowed, persons are said 
to become "enthusiastic" or to get "carried away" or to "fly 
into a temper" or to be "inspired". So it is that, even 
informally and without the framing protection of staging 
devices, persons are seen to bring into their interactions 
energies that in some degree take them over, and, when 
"infectiously", others too. Moreover, the person consis­
tently failing to be taken over, to be seized, to be
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possessed, is dismissed as "unprepossessing", someone rather 
less than a full human being. There does exist, then, a 
way of discussing persons in interaction that uses terms 
from theatrical experience which have less reference to role 
playing (and to performing in the sense of making the moves 
of a formal game) than to possession by spirits and to per­
forming in the sense of being an intermediary in an essen­
tially supernatural ritual. (And it is precisely the 
failure of populations to accept this in practical terms 
that fires Artaud and more recently both the Pole Grotowski 
and the English director Peter Brook with the missionary 
zeal to create theatrical events that would make partici­
pants into genuine communicants.) An article of experient­
ial ly-grounded faith for these missionaries is that persons 
are larger, stronger, more mysterious, and less controllable 
than they might feel they are if they do not get the chance 
to witness actors living intensely in a dramatic realm, 
where the possibility to be good and the possibility to be 
evil coexist in close proximity to the consequences of choos­
ing to be either. This realm is understood to be a true 
stalking ground of the soul. So Cole's illud tempus is the 
place where people, in disengaging from temporal roles, 
experience with unusual concentration what it is to be a person 
And wherever people are, in whatever interaction, they must, 
however incompetently and unwittingly, come in and out of the 
illud tempus as they conduct themselves, or else seem to be
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possessed by nothing more transcendent than the idea 
that social life is a series of quick calculations 
unproblematically acted upon with no emotional sense of 
being alive in the present.
Thus, when a woman wears diamonds round her neck, 
in her ears, and as a tiara on her head, she tries for 
a resplendence that must seem to come from some other 
place than the jewel box on her dressing-room table and, 
before that, from the shop window in the high street, 
and this other place is a ritual realm such as might take 
away the breath of one so socially accomplished as George 
Eliot's Gwendolen Harleth: "It was a new kind of stage- 
experience to her to be close to genuine grand ladies with 
genuine brilliants and complexions, and they impressed her 
vaguely as coming out of some unknown drama, in which their 
parts perhaps got more tragic as they went on" (Eliot,
1957, p421). This same "unknown drama" or ritual realm is 
perceived by the narrator of Proust's A la recherche du temps 
perdu when, nearing death, he attends a society gathering 
where there are women he had once admired: "There was no
limit to their efforts to fight against age; they held 
the mirror of their faces towards beauty, vanishing like a 
setting sun whose last rays they passionately long to return." 
Here, the narrator evokes a neo-platonic stalking ground 
in which the capture of and possession by the ideal form 
of beauty itself is the serious sociable game that is nearly 
over for the players. But the punk girl with a dog-collar
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round her neck, as much as the bejewelled society belle or 
the nurse with her white paper hat, seeks, too, to bring 
into her interactions ritual power from realms that only 
exist because she originates them through appearances. By 
the same argument, every person in his or her every inter­
action to some degree brings himself or herself from a world 
he or she creates, from which he or she is the only envoy, 
appearing to be that, I am saying, by being possessed. Two 
illustrations (from the repertory company) of the ease with 
which realms can be created follow here. In the first 
instance, a perfectly English actress creates the "wild west" 
by her posture and costume combined, and, in the second, the 
realm of Waiting for Godot is brought effortlessly into an 
office by the "acting" of just one line:
Candy Starr has put on her hooker’s gear for the first 
time. She comes out of the ladies' dressing room and 
stands in the kitchen doorway with one hand on her hip. 
Immediately the men in the kitchen see her, they start 
cheering and whistling. "Now, now, boys, one at a 
time," she drawls, smiling and making as if to chew 
gum.
Pozzo has shaved his head, since the stage directions 
require him to be bald. The administrator looks up 
from his desk and is visibly taken aback by Pozzo 
minus his thick brown hair. Pozzo draws himself up 
and puffs out his chest and places an imaginary 
monocle in his eye. "This office is a tip," he says, 
in his Pozzo voice. "Well sir, it's not me but the 
other fellow who's left it in this terrible state," 
says the administrator in an Irish accent.
Now sociability seen in this rhetoric must be a special
problem for professional actors who know only too well one
another's unknown realms and who, moreover, are blessed with
rare vocational capacities to detect dramaturgical insincerity
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What do they do when they get together for socialibility?
I used to accompany the actors I was researching to the club 
where they met after giving their evening performances, so I 
was able to see at close range the practice of "camp". Camp 
behaviour is a self-mocking burlesque of the professional 
theatrical manner. An actor being camp presents a grotesque 
of the worst possible professional self that could be attri­
buted to him by those who are watching. Thus, by "camping 
it up" actors can vie with one another to be ridiculous beings, 
there for amusement only. Interaction, then, is made unser- 
ious by persons making themselves unserious; what could have 
been a deadly stalking ground becomes a coconut-shy with each 
thrower of a ball taking his turn as a coconut. Camp is also, 
interestingly, a common interactional style among overt 
homosexuals (Newton, 1979, provides a very detailed ethnography 
of this) who like actors are very familiar with one another's 
secret selves, yet prefer to enjoy sociability than turn it 
into a continuous encounter group. So camp is a broad protect­
ive parody of the self, deliberately contrived to seem to be 
coming from the vanity and technical virtuosity of its performer 
rather than from any type of illud tempus. The fact that camp 
is quite demanding of its performers of course further argues 
the omni-presence of an illud tempus; it requires much effort 
and skill to evoke laughter by the camp conduct that works 
inasmuch as it turns the person before one's very eyes into 
merely that being who is before one's very eyes. And that
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camp is a behavioural lingua franca of theatrical people
can only, therefore, bespeak their deep sense that persons
are sacred. The following fieldwork note of an episode
shows how "B", the director and lead player of One Flew Over
the Cuckoo's Nest, keeps out of a difficult ritual realm by
a timely resort to camp - when he heads off Martini's
request to look at interpretation - and then how camp can
restore good humour by earthing an interactional "atmosphere"
before it can build up too much charge. (In this and other
fieldwork illustrations I refer to actors by the names of the
characters they play.)
They now do the scene in which Bromden has to deliver 
his "That ain't McMurphy" speech. B, at the end, 
asks, "OK, OK, do you want to run this scene?" Martini 
says, "I don't like this." B ripostes in an affected 
voice, "Don't you like it darling?" and so avoids 
finding out what is making Martini unhappy. They 
start again. Big Nurse has a very powerful line early 
on. She has to say to McMurphy, "Isn't it past your 
bedtime?" This line, given disingenuously calm 
elocution, can be a sarcastic taunt that reminds 
McMurphy of Big Nurse's institutional power. For 
some reason Big Nurse cannot get the line right. She 
keeps saying, "Isn't it time..." She tries it and 
fluffs it three times. B grits his teeth and says in 
an undertone, "Record's stuck." Eventually they take 
a break and, on their way out to the kitchen, Cheswick 
and Martini dance across the set together. B catches 
sight of this and calls out, "You two - it'll end in 
tears." Laughter all round.
Theatre will decline, says Artaud, when it presumes 
that conduct can be fully accounted in other than ritual 
terms :
Psychology, which works relentlessly to reduce the 
unknown to the known, to the quotidian and the 
ordinary, is the cause of the theater's abasement 
and its fearful loss of energy.
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I myself think that psychologizing is not the enemy of 
ritual life so much as is the assumption that what is known 
exceeds the unknown, an assumption not held in the social 
sciences when these were the product of a materialist- 
positivist drive that expressed a sense of enormous ritual 
confidence that the known should imperialise the unknown, 
now alas tending to divide and subdivide into a prolifera­
tion of internecine texts that, for fear of committing 
inadvertent heresies, dare not turn their backs on the 
literature to face the phenomena at the frontiers. Whether 
or not there is more to social life than is thought to be 
known about it is, however, not at issue here, since the 
point I make is that this can be thought and is definitely 
thought in the theatre world, where the language of appre­
ciation - "being moved" and so on - suggests a widespread 
acceptance that a great performance is virtually quite 
beyond, say, the conduct of a subject watched by a psycholo­
gist in a laboratory. In this text I only say that this 
is a thinkable position, though, as I explained in Chapter 
I, that I say it involves my saying it ought to be thought 
(but not saying it could say that it ought not to be thought, 
which I regard as a less scientific stance). The belief 
that there are supernatural possibilities in human inter­
action (which may be attenuated to the belief that there 
might be many as-yet unknown factors in play therein) entails 
another, that a person's life should make sense as a drama or 
a narrative history does (which may be attenuated to a
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formulation like "be satisfactorily analysed"). When this
second belief is shaken, a person is as disoriented as when
he is desacralized. Thus, Joan Didion (1979):
It was a time of my life when I was frequently "named".
I was named godmother to children. I was named lec­
turer and panelist, colloquist and conferee. I was 
even named, in 1968, a Los Angeles Times "Woman of the 
Year" along with Mrs Ronald Reagan, the Olympic swimmer 
Debbie Meyer, and ten other Californian women who seemed 
to keep in touch and do good work. I did no good works 
but I tried to keep in touch. I was responsible. I 
recognised my name when I saw it....This was an adequate 
enough performance as improvisations go. The only pro­
blem was that my entire education, everything I had ever 
been told, or had told myself, insisted that the produc­
tion was never meant to be improvised. I was supposed 
to have a script, and had mislaid it. I was supposed 
to hear cues, and no longer did. I was meant to know 
the plot, but all I knew was what I saw: flash pic­
tures in variable sequence, images with no "meaning" 
beyond their temporary arrangement, not a movie but a 
cutting-room experience. In what could possibly be 
the middle of my life I wanted still to believe in the 
narrative and the narrative's intelligibility.
What has happened here is that narratibility has vanished 
and with it the sense of intelligibility without which 
dramatic enactments are seen to lose their ritual power.
Having lost ritual power, Joan Didion feels "absurd".
Yet this "cutting-room experience" of life is the pro­
fessional fate of an actor whose "working" reality must 
always be radically shifting as he goes from drama to drama. 
Particularly striking, to their observer, is how actors make 
use of their current dramatic worlds during their everyday 
conduct, which they will richly season with borrowed lines, 
adopted accents, remembered gestures, as though relishing 
the fact of living in discontinuous realities. At first
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this might seem puzzling, but it is explained, I think, in 
terms of the actor’s self as an actor. The more he is a 
performer, of whatever bits and pieces, the more he is an 
actor. So his discontinuities actually affirm his career 
continuity. Similarly, though she does not say it, Joan 
Didion's career continuity of professional writer is affirmed 
by her conduct of writing about her sense of personal dis­
continuity. She invents a narrative to her life by narra­
ting the lack of one and so testifies to the social compul­
sion to make sense in those terms.
Narratibility of self creates for a person a sense 
that he and not some other agent is the hero of his life. 
Whatever this "hero" is, he it is, of all a person’s selves, 
who, in possessing the person, most personifies him, and for 
whom the person feels a very deep affinity that in unalien­
ated periods can approach complete identification. However, 
inability to narrate self, for example, by being at the 
mercy of unpredictable and powerful persons, who are able to 
command any performance they like, can make a person feel 
that he is the satellite of an agent more important to him 
in the end then he is. The hero stops being oneself and 
becomes someone else in the face of unnarratibility. For 
children this someone else is the parent; for a soldier, 
the general; for a madman, perhaps the psychiatrist; and 
for Freud, the unconscious. The narratives these people 
would tell would only be their own incidentally, and their 
ritual worth would only be a function of their hero’s, and
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so one strategy for restoring or increasing ritual worth 
might be the self-construction of an autonomous narrative, 
as Charles Dickens realised at the beginning of his auto­
biographical novel David Copperfield when he wrote: "Whether 
I shall turn out to be the hero of my own life, or whether 
that station will be held by anybody else, these pages must 
show.” Paradoxically, then, disorientation and confusion 
and loss of ritual self (the varieties of "rapture" that 
I analyse in Chapter IX) can be the prelude to new 
performances or possessions that are richer than the old, 
and this is what I shall argue at length in Chapter IX.
So far I have spoken of possession quite loosely, in 
order to introduce the concept in general terms before 
going t>n to refine it, and I have not paused to consider 
how a person might control his possession or how possession 
might be seen to be what it is, but it is the case that 
possession must always be controlled, for, even in the extreme 
instance of epileptic seizure, the convulsions are shaped 
by the contingent facts of human physiology.
The exercise of tact is an example of an ever present 
control of possession in interactions. Tactful persons, 
when they save faces that are in danger of being lost, must 
become possessed by their "better selves" at the same time 
as they control this possession in order not to untactfully 
show their tact. In some social situations, moreover, not 
only is the better self required to control its possession 
(by possessing its control of tact) but the whole self might 
need to be in such a relation to control. Thus Genet (1967)
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observes that "in prison you cannot afford to be casual," 
and Allerton (Allerton and Parker, 1964) relates that a 
prisoner's first appearance on his wing in the period call­
ed Free Association is known as "going on stage". Genet 
and Allerton are writing of prison life where convicts are 
the only resources for the ritual survival of one another, 
and obviously in these conditions it will be necessary to 
always be so socially legible that neither threats nor 
promises are offered unless they are to be "honoured".
But prison life is perhaps only an intensification of 
everyday life, in which, if a person should do something 
his others regard as uncharacteristic or unusual, he is 
likely to be faced with some such question as: "Whatever 
possessed you?"
To conclude, the case of the psychopath might be 
cited to show how the control of possession is not only an 
inevitable condition of possession but is also positively 
demanded by society which, not given it, casuistically 
confers it. Thus, when a person's control of possession 
is persistently weak and seen to be so, he is said to be 
a "moral imbecile" or a "psychopath" (Eysenck, 1971, p54). 
In this extreme example of a person who, as it is said, 
(regardless of the damage this causes himself as well as 
others) finds it impossible to substitute deferred for 
immediate satisfactions the clinical psychologist such as 
Eysenck encounters the phenomenon of uncontrolled conduct 
in its rawest state. Accordingly, the psychopath is
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clinically defined as one who has "emotional poverty", who 
is "undependable" and "irresponsible", who, unable to plan 
ahead, yet "over-reacts" to stimuli, and who, furthermore, is 
not perturbed in the least by his "social maladjustment".
This person, the psychopath, because he cannot be proven to 
be brain-diseased or neurotic or psychotic or defective in 
intelligence, and, despite that he can "verbalise all the 
social and moral rules", while not being able to "obey them 
in the way that others do" is nonetheless very definitely not 
deemed a case of uncontrolled possession. He is, by nominalist 
magic, for Eysenck and his colleagues at any rate, ipso facto 
a psychopath, which word explains everything: the less control
he has the more will he be this clinically-defined possession, 
"psychopath". Thus, a person approaching the societal limit 
of uncontrolled conduct can be seen as an example of a very 
precise type who the more confirms himself as that the more he 
is in reality no type whatsoever. In Anglo-American society, 
therefore, even completely uncontrolled possession, by being 
regarded as "psychopathic" can be and is recovered to the rubric 
of "control", and this fact must argue a general reluctance to 
see conduct as dispossessed by virtue of being uncontrolled.
The message is ; you will be a person, even if we have to write 
textbooks demonstrating the internal coherence of miscellany.
Now that I have established possession and its control 
as terms in my discourse, I can move on, in the next chapter, 
to tighter, more controlled definition of possession, preoisely 
by explaining some of the means by which it is controlled.
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It should be remembered that I am using the concept of 
possession not only because it is current in everyday lang­
uage and in the theatre but also because it offers the analyist 
of interaction a series of "ritual" connotations (around per­
sons' performances in everyday life) that formulae such as 
"role-playing" singularly lack. However, I am not defining 
possession in so many words because I think that would premat­
urely pre-empt any explorations of its possible uses. Here I 
take as my counsellor Lev Vygotsky (1962): "The dictionary 
meaning of a word is no more than a stone in the edifice of 
sense, no more than a potentiality that finds diversified 
realisation in speech." And Popper (1973) too would endorse 
my procedure: "The precision of a language depends. . . upon 
the fact that it takes care not to burden its terms with the 




In this chapter I show how possession becomes itself 
through some of the varieties of its control. I begin by 
restating the case that all conduct is performance, then 
I consider natural conduct as being the performance 
"that dare not speak its name." This leads me to briefly 
note that the morality of performance resides less in the 
"contents" of a performance than in its competence, natural 
conduct being conduct that must not betray its competent 
performance. (The contents of performance, I speculate, may 
be nothing other than workings-out of competence problems.) 
Two forms of control have now been discussed, the control of 
having to look as though control is not required and the 
control brought to bear by a moral demand that in performance 
control be as much as a person can exercise. Now I look at 
how performances are controlled from outside by different 
sorts of framing devices, and then the temporal frame of 
"rehearsal" is considered on its own. From here it is an 
obvious step to the subject of professional actors and how 
they actually work. I conclude that actors are societally 
controlled because their possessions are too good. After 
this, I look at David Cole's concept of "rounding", 
applying it to those possessions whose control is greatest.
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I finish the chapter by arguing that live control - liter­
ally "live" in the entertainment world and figuratively 
"original" in everyday life - is a sign that possession is 
being actively controlled and therefore is a live possession 
and as such truly human.
Conduct as Performance
Although I have established that conduct may be read­
ily viewed as possession, I have yet to fully substantiate 
my claim that all behaviour is oerformance, not only from 
the point of view of a person's audience but also from his 
point of view, when, I shall suaaest, he unknowingly or, in 
some cases, very knowinglv is a person for other people.
It is worth labourina this point, because, once it is 
aranted, it is that much harder to view persons as beina 
somehow behind and somehow biaaer and stronger than their 
appearances. Such a view is part of the Ando-American
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heritage and thus not easy to forget, but it can easily 
distract the reader from the imaae of a person that I 
am promulgating, as beina a possession, not to be 
understood as having been "caused" from within, or even 
by an interaction between outside and inside. The 
possession as it ooes alona creates itself anew, draw- 
ina into itself its own consciousness that is not borrow­
ed from an already existing consciousness but is created 
by itself over against the Physiology it possesses. This 
is the meaning of possession, coniured out of conduct in 
every kind of interaction, even, as I shall show, with 
itself (Chapter IX). So such a being is much more than a 
congeries of Coffman's "dramatic effects" (his definition 
of selves in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life) for 
Coffman's being creates no ritual realm, because Coffman 
does not allow that it can accrue ritual power by the 
exercise of dramatic competence. Yet a person is still no 
more than his performances, as <^offman declares - so far 
as he is social - even when nearly all of these may relv 
on indulaent audiences who are content to give him the 
benefit of the doubt at all times, simply assumina he is 
"really" the person he mav be only ever sporadically hint­
ing at in his conduct.
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Charles Darwin (1904) thought that "the far greater 
number of the movements of expression, and all the most 
important ones, are ... innate or inherited ... and 
cannot be said to depend on the will of the individual"
(p. 375). People, he said, are born with their codes, and 
these have evolved in the species from three vocabularies: 
the habitual expressions- of - gratification, these gratifia- . _ 
cation expressions reversed, and the reactions like blush­
ing that seem to be involuntary. The overall code is 
effortlessly understood, while being very hard to describe 
(this, as Hymes (1975), following Labov, has pointed out, 
is a common problem of many human behaviours; it is easier 
to repeat conduct than interpret it, and easier to interpret 
than to report it) . Darwin often understood as saying 
that, since persons inherit a lexicon of facial and 
gestural expression, they are not free to improvise new vari­
ations on atavistic themes. But his own argument, that the 
code has evolved, implies that it is still evolving, and 
is therefore still changing. Darwin's interest, I think, 
was with the repertoire of signals rather than the use to 
which they may be put socially, and he must be right in 
thinking that no person could reinvent the whole code any 
more than he could devise a new verbal language that had no 
old elements. As such, however, he is really more concerned 
with the parameters for conduct, and the histories of these, 
than with conduct styles and their meanings for persons. So 
Darwin, who, more than any other writer on expressive
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behaviour, is considered a proponent of the "instrinsic"
view (Davis 19 75), that outer forms are given by inner
I Icauses, is not logically presenting a position that would
exclude the possibility that conduct can be original and 
at the same time meaningful.
Recently Hymes (1975) has made distinctions - between
behaviour, conduct, and performance which depend on how
much deliberated expression goes into one or other. 
Behaviour, such as lying down because one wants to go to 
sleep, is "behaviour" plain and simple. Conduct is the 
body "under the aegis of social norms", and the behaviour 
or conduct of one who "assumes responsibility for presen­
tation" is performance. This taxonomy of conduct has 
the double attraction of releasing little involuntary 
behaviours like coughing or scratching from the duty of 
being significant expression for others, and then of re­
investing conscious action with a consciousness that is in 
danger of being forgotten when performance is called behav­
iour. But it might be expected that in most social inter­
actions all three modes will coexist with just one empha­
sized at any given moment, and the nearer one gets to seeing 
behaviour as performed the more will it be necessary to 
consider that the expressive idiom is controllable. So 
what Hymes does is grade conduct from relatively uncon­
trolled to highly controlled, or, in my terms, from un­
possessed to totally possessed.
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It is interesting to note here-what the costs might be 
for being uncontrolled when one should be controlled or 
possessed. Ernest Becker (1962) indicts depressives, for 
instance, for not "putting forth a convincing self" that 
would oblige others to show deference, since "power over 
others consists in presenting an infallible self and in 
commanding dextrous performance of deference." Depressives, 
then, and other mentally ill persons, for whatever reason, 
may abandon the control of their social conduct; and so 
one would anticipate that this could bring in its train 
multiple interactional sanctions that, to be coped with, 
would require an increased level of the control whose lack 
invited the sanctions in the first place. It is not hard 
to see, then, how persons in this predicament might seek to 
regain control in interaction by refusing to play a reciprocal 
self to those of others. So loss of control may have far- 
reaching effects, and similarly its maintenance may be all 
that allows a person to remain the person he could be.
Yukio Mishima (1979) states this latter position from the 
completely different perspective of the samurai warrior's 
ethical code, when he writes of the seventeenth century 
samurai, Jocho Yamamoto:
Belief is resolution. Resolution must be tested daily 
over many years. Apparently, Jocho makes a distinc­
tion between major beliefs and minor beliefs. In 
other words, one must nurture major beliefs in one's 
daily life so that at the moment of decision to act 
they may be carried out effortlessly, spontaneously.
Minor beliefs are the philosophy that governs the 
trivia of day-to-day existence. Prosper Merime ....
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Once remarked that "in fiction there must be a theor­
etical basis to the most minute details. Even a 
single glove must have its theory." This is true not 
only of novelists. While we live and enioy life, we 
must always approach even the smallest matters theor­
etically, exercisina our judgement and makina decisions. 
Otherwise, the framework of our life collapses, and 
sometimes even our greatest beliefs are violated.
This is a call for the "areat expressive responsibility" of 
Goffman's Shetland islanders, one which is re-echoed in yet 
another realm by Stanislavsky with his idea of the "subtext" 
that works as a clear but hidden theory informing every 
element of stage conduct.
I have now shown how conduct is able to be far more 
voluntary than some of Darwin's readers have led themselves 
to suppose, and also how some passaaes of conduct can be 
regarded as performance, and I have found another way of 
approaching my central proposition that a person becomes 
himself in his clearest definition only when his performance 
is highly deliberate. Deliberation, or control, is the other 
side of the coin of an (inconceivable) amuk possession. First 
of all, a person must be taken over by himself, but at the 
same time he will only carry himself across to others if his 
possession is in his full control, and what does the controll­
ing is the possession, who is, therefore, the person.
Now the microanalysts Birdvhistell and Scheflen, who have 
spent the major part of long and distinguished scientific 
careers analysina filmed interactions, ao much further than 
Hymes, Neither have any doubt that behaviour at all times 
is not wholly interpretable in terms of its reciprocation with 
other behaviours in whatever social system it is observed in.
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This behaviour includes coughing, scratching, and lying 
down to sleep. The extreme alertness and rapidity of 
synchronic integration - as displayed in Birdwhistéll*s 
and Scheflen's films - is ample evidence to support an 
assertion that all behaviour is performance. There is 
simply no doubt that the communication system of an 
interaction is of great cybernetic subtlety. But most of 
the conduct is nearly always out of its interactants' 
awareness; the control is unknowing control. Control by 
enacted subtext or by theory, then, must be categorized as 
conscious control, whose possibility is of course vouch­
safed by the existence of huge control to build on. Pure 
uncontrol, in this light, is controlled behaviour informed 
by "incoherent" theory and the microanalysts doubt its 
possibility. Thus Scheflen's (1973) film of a schizophrenic 
girl and McDermott's (1977) film of "disorderly" school 
children do not show an absence of organised self presen­
tation but rather the presence of disorganisation in terms 
of the rules of the given interactional system. The so- 
called disorganised conduct is in fact very finely dovetailed 
into reciprocal interactional conduct, so my notion of the 
control of possession should be amended to mean "consistent" 
and "appropriate" control of possession which is, of course, 
fashionable control.
Notwithstanding findings such as I have cited, many 
people strongly resist the idea that the behaviour which
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would be most true to the behaving person is the most per­
formed, for Anglo-American culture generally condemns per­
formers on the grounds that they disguise their real selves, 
and the idea that honesty and tact depend heavily on the 
skill to perform is likewise anathema in some quarters.
This nexus of attitudes, hostile to performers, I associate 
with the doctrine of natural expression that Goffman so 
effectively exposes in Gender Advertisements. The self, 
according to this doctrine, cannot help but express itself 
how it must, according to its nature, and if there is any­
thing that can be done about it then this should not be done, 
for the purpose of expression is to convey a "real" self that 
would be violated in performative "translation". This ultra- 
psychological or biological view of persons, of course, 
is diametrically opposed to the radically sociological view 
set forth here, that if there is a real self it is conjured 
into existence by the competence of its performance.
My own view is that those who would be more controlled 
in their conduct will tend to weigh their actions with 
significations that go beyond them, which means that the 
performer takes his social life more seriously than the 
more serious psychological person who has no time for theat­
ricality. The performer, therefore, must be a more comp­
letely socialised person than he who refuses consciousness 
of his performances, and the nature of this socialization 
is always, as it was in the cases of Yamamoto and Mishima,that 
it strives to design life to be worthy of its designer.
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an endless cycle of creation by self to create self that, 
in the Samurai's case, and in Mishima's too, comes to 
perfection in ritual death.
Possession for Yamamoto meant possession by the 
samurai spirit, and this was not only easily prevented by 
any lapse of conduct but was only possible if the performance 
was severely correct, whatever the inner emotional state.
For the English gentleman, too, there is an analogous 
possession, by the spirit of the "gentleman", whose claying 
of honourable games is more important than his other conduct, 
and for whom the softening of his stiff upper lip would be 
a moral detumescence. In both these cases and in all other 
cases where the stress is on expressive responsibility, the 
kind of the possession is totally dependent on the manner of 
this possession. But there are persons who stubbornly refuse 
to give their performances of themselves a central place in 
their own worlds. Mystics and other inner-oriented individ­
uals - at least the sincere ones - would be of this type.
Of them it might be said that they are looking for sources 
of possession by some other means than by becoming possessed, 
from which it inevitably follows that, in bumbling, abstracted 
fashion (dependent for its continuity on the tact of those who 
must experience it) they seem to be possessed by a role such 
as the "searcher", who in this world is not of it. An extrem­
ely sociological beina like Yukio Mishima, on the other hand, 




Andre Gide (196 7) describes a friend:
He expresses himself so well that one is suspicious; 
his voice takes on just the inflection he wants; his 
gestures are never involuntary; it took me some time,
I confess, to admit that it could all be genuine.
Here Gide registers a common suspicion of a naturalness that 
looks too performed, but I think this suspicion actually 
lends force to my proposition that effective dramatization 
in interaction is the same as ritualization by possession. 
This is because possession, to look like what it is, must 
give itself away as a state whose control reauires constant 
vigilance, for the possession that seems to be in full 
possession of itself is rather too easily only seen as poss­
ession by a self who would act self-possession. (When one 
can see the vigilance like an aura, around the possession, 
one gets a sense of the vertiginous drop that is possible 
into uncontrolled behaviour. Janis Joplin and Maria Callas 
never failed to electrify audiences perhaps just because 
they walked their respective high wires with ever such a 
slight suggestion of imbalance.) So being natural - or 
being socially literate to a hiah degree - is, as Evreinoff 
(n.d.) recognized, "a science necessitating long years of 
training, experience, and education ..." Elizabeth Burns 
(1972) is also quite clear that naturalness is not natural: 
"Natural behaviour in any period is judged not by any 
criterion of spontaneity but by its conformity to norms 
that have been learned" (p.162). So this natural conduct
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is actually performed in accordance with complex rules, and 
the very difficulty of this performance is acknowledged by 
the belief that if the conduct is flawless it must excite 
suspicion.
Naturalness, however, is not identical to other forms 
of, controlled possession. It is that kind of self possession 
in which the_ self_, that in possessing is possessed, is _ _ _
nonetheless thoroughly in thrall to the rules of its social 
context. This, then, is the one creative form of conduct 
in interaction that seeks to create nothing new: the
natural person in being possessed by his ideal of natural­
ness is only natural to the degree that he competently 
controls his conduct to conform to the received rules for 
naturalness. Yet, even for the extraordinarily socialized 
and constructed person who is natural, it is the precision 
of control in the possession that permits that precision of his 
definition. It is very difficult to be natural, then, and that 
this is so must be why the term is singular praise for an 
individual's conduct, which is not made any easier to perform 
by the cultural myth that natural means unforced, free and 
easy, and spontaneous. (The tense would-be performer of 
naturalness - because of this myth - must find also that 
his very tension is dissuasive of his ability to be natural.)
As I remarked in Chapter V, Goffman has repeatedly said 
that what is essentially human may only be the competence to 
look human. For the purposes of his analyses he has regarded
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such competence, or acting ability, as an evenly distribut­
ed capacity throughout interactions. But, of course, 
abilities vary, and, in Anglo-American culture, those who 
become possessed in an especially controlled and creative 
way stand out from the crowd. This is true in the acting 
profession, where the laurels go to the virtuosi, as well 
as in everyday life, where the personable person is valued 
more highly the person who "does not know how to behave."
But it is possible to leam how to behave, and, though 
there is a reluctance to concede that worthy humanness can 
be inculcated into persons by training alone, institutions 
like boys' preparatory and public schools, girls' finishing 
schools. Borstals, and mental hospitals, for instance, are 
all built on an accepted premiss that behaviour can be trained 
to look bred or well-bred. However, the very unwillingness 
to admit that persons can be coached to look human may issue 
from an excessive deference to ritual worth, with the 
deference being given here specifically to what is taken to 
be the part of humanness that fees cannot buy. In practice 
too, ritual worth is often rescued for the trainees by the 
adoption of the notion that only suitable persons will 
benefit from training. Thus U.S. Marine neophytes have the 
Marine ideology drilled into them by ritual insults (Flynn, 
1977) but only because "really" they were Marines since their 
conception. Any training then, is likely to be premissed 
on the assumption that persons can be remade, the faces of 
the remade persons being saved by a complementary assumption
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that all along they^were, "underneath", what they end up 
as. In this way Anglo-American culture seals naturalness 
from charges of unnaturalness even as it goes to work at 
manufacturing natural soldiers, natural nurses, or, even 
more radically, b o m  gentlemen.
So if naturalness is a performance of not-performing, 
which as Elizabeth Burns says would be "devalued" (Burns 1972) 
were its "composition" detected, as it always is by the 
microanalysts, what do interactants feel about it? When the 
tone of an interaction is "natural", the interactants them­
selves may feel, I think, that what they are not doing is 
performing. So in a "natural interaction" persons are a 
part of social life, not apart from it. They will be involved 
with one another so harmoniously that they may not know them­
selves to be physically separated. They may "lose them­
selves" so completely in these interactions as afterwards to 
be able to say that they forgot themselves. But in unnat­
ural interactions they will feel awkward, out of place, 
uncomfortable, strained, bored, put upon, and always acutely 
aware of their own presence, which awareness is precisely 
what can disable a natural interaction, coming as it does 
from elements in the interaction which would not have been 
perceived if it had succeeded in becoming natural. In 
unnatural interactions, then, people know perfectly well 
that their attempted naturalness is totally performed. Burns 
(1972) describes the elements that bring on unnaturalness as 
those which are "entirely unprecedented and fraught with
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consequentiality." In this connection she advances a most 
persuasive reason for the fashioning of conduct that I dis­
cussed in Chapter V: conduct has to become patterned in
order to relieve interactants of the task of continuously 
interpreting the "unprecedented" into the "acceptable". So 
it might be concluded that, when patterns coincide or are 
mutually understood, naturalness is a possibility, but that, 
if they jar against one another, unnaturalness is almost 
inevitable. Thus from another direction yet there emerges 
once again the notion that naturalness has nothing to do 
with the nature of specific units of behaviour as such, and 
everything to do with its interpretation as natural.
Now follow three examples of natural conduct, taken from the 
repertory company. The first two show how "perfectly 
natural" behaviour of the actors is both verv complex and 
specific to their culture. The last example shows how 
easily an outsider can misunderstand what is natural to 
other people:
The first time the DSM produces the cleaning mat­
erials for "Work Time", Martini and Billy begin 
to act the fool with the Jay Cloths. Martini 
holds his cloth over his middle and mimes the 
pelvic grinding of a striooer. With a voiceless 
cry he flicks the cloth away and up, and this sets 
Billy off waving two cloths above his head like a 
cheerleader at an American football match. Big 
Nurse laughs at these antics. Now that he has 
her attention. Martini advances on Big Nurse with 
his cloth draped over his upraised right hand.
Like a conjuror he casts a spell over the cloth 
before smatching it off his hand which holds a 
cigarette packet. Martini, Billy, and Big Nurse 
seem very relaxed together. All this took place 
in the five or six seconds that elapsed while B 
checked the loose head of a broom.
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In the studio all the cast are spaced out in a 
circle and B is giving them some elaborate timing 
schedules. Harding pulls a cigarette out of his 
pack and then sees that Big Nurse wants one too.
He puts his cigarette in his mouth and pulls out 
a second one which he throws to Big Nurse who 
catches it without withdrawing her attention from 
B. Candy notices a^d makes a gesture with her 
hand to her mouth. Harding throws her a cigarette 
right across the room. Others too now look 
briefly to Harding, who ends up feeding the whole 
company cigarettes. At no point, however, is B 
interrupted in his instruction-giving.
Two social workers arrive in the office with three 
youths whom they are hoping to place with the 
company for a number of hours of "Community Service", 
It is striking how automatically the actors 
identify with the youths and take up a critical 
attitude to the social workers. In response to 
being asked what jobs there are for the youths to 
carry out, the administrator says, "Well, to begin 
with, there's selling the programmes...." The 
female social worker jumps at this. "Ian, you'd 
like to sell programmes, wouldn't you?" she asks 
one of the youths. He looks noncommital but the 
social worker turns from hî i back to the administra­
tor as though a knotty problem had been elegantly 
solved. After the social workers have gone, much 
disgust is expressed about the way the youths had 
been treated. The business of telling someone to do 
something with only the merest pretence at involving 
them in a democratic decision is singled out for 
loud censure. What seemed to have been most annoy­
ing was the social worker's assumption that she 
was in harmony with the actors.
No one is more of a specialist in the job of seeming 
for other people to be a natural person than an actor. So 
I close this section with a note from my observations of 
actresses in their after-hours club. The first thing the 
outsider notices is the insistent "unnaturalness" of their 
behaviour. Why is this? I think that, as in the case of 
camp conduct, this apparent unnaturalness protects these 
actresses from their trained perceptiveness. Actresses'
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voices are often coated with a sugary, husky, theatricality 
in which vowels are drawn out and all the tones are given 
a mock melodiousness that would ape elocution enunciation 
were it not done with a winning smile. The word "Darling" 
is a universal term of address that might be intimately 
whispered or shrieked the length of a crowded, drunken 
room, and it is used as much as is the word "Sir" in milit­
ary organizations. These and all sorts of other behaviours 
which together exaggerate and mock with a flagrant falsity 
of manner can be seen as deliberate self-parodies not 
unlike "camp", offered up for the fun of sociability to 
those who know very well from which realm comes the actress 
and how perfect (or not so perfect) can be her control of 
possession. Here is a social use of an almost "naturalized" 
type of unnaturalness, resorted to, as it were, to avoid the 
embarrassment of natural conduct between professionals who 
know conduct cannot be natural.
Morality of Performance
Natural behaviour is always good behaviour and all 
performances necessarily create moral situations. "What is 
expected is the intelligible representation of moral situations 
which are usually private," says Barthes (1973) but only of 
theatre and wrestling matches, whereas I consider this to 
be also true of many everyday interactions. (Nevertheless, 
it is on the stage that performances may most easily be 
experimented with, because there, having been stripped of 
what Goffman calls the "dull footage", they have no practical
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consequences and are al&o easy to aestheticize, which is, 
perhaps, one reason why they are there.) A good perform­
ance, says Barthes, involves an "emptying out of inferiority 
to the benefit of exterior signs," which implies the respons­
ibility to an audience that Bauman (1975) notes: "Fundament­
ally, performance as a mode of spoken verbal communication con­
sists in the assumption of responsibility to an audience for 
a display of communication competence" (p 293). The performer, 
then, not only creates a realm in which good and bad can be 
seen clearly but he is also good or bad as a performer. These 
two things are connected but for the moment I wish to concen­
trate on good or bad performing.
Abrahams (1974) constructs a typology of ghetto per­
formances in everyday life, and it includes styles such as 
"talking smart" (serious conflict talk), "putting down" 
(aggressive talk), "putting on" (manipulative talk), "playing", 
"sounding", and "talking shit" (non-serious contest talk).
Those performers who excel in these modes, who "walk their 
walk" and"talk their talk", enjoy the highest social status 
or "rep". Here the "good" of performance is lodged less in 
its content (so far as that can be separated) than in its 
competence. "Talking shit" and talking that talk" build up 
a street image, and in the street "one must dramatize con­
stantly." The reward of hiah rep is to have many friends, 
upon whom one can call for goods and services. In the 
British West Indies, too, Abrahams (1970) observed that all 
public activities were regarded as performances and
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"evaluated as performances of varying appropriatenes and 
effectiveness." Again, the highly competent performer 
is the moral exemplar of his community. Similarly, it 
could be argued, accomplished playwrights and novelists in 
Anglo-American middle-class culture are accorded the respect 
due to morally worthy persons because they have the capacity 
to seriously entertain, the entertainment being the more 
serious the more it opens up questions of right and wrong, 
approaching at the far end of a seriousness spectrum the 
genre of tragedy, in which men and gods (or godlike forces 
such as desitny) come into direct interaction. Respect is 
earned, then, by performance.
In an interview, Lynn Fontanne (Funke and Booth, 1961) 
explicitly says that there is no qualitative difference 
between performance in everyday life and performance on stage: 
"Sociability is composed of the very essence of what you 
give to the theatre, what you give to a part. For instance, 
this interview is going to take it out of me for tonight." 
Bearing this in mind, one can now see that the strong rule 
among actors that it is wrong not to give your all to an 
audience might also be a rule of everyday life, where, when 
another person withholds his self in interaction, this can be 
taken as a snub, an offence, a sliahting of ritual worth. It 
is good, then, to perform well (and performance raises quest­
ions of what is good and bad). So the morality of inter­
action holds that persons should give themselves to one another 
to the best of their abilities. Poor performers mean poor
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people. From'my fieldnotes I extract the following para­
graph which makes this point:
Giving his notes about the previous night's performance,
B admonishes Billy for having insufficient strength, and 
Billy just nods. Then B says that Nurse Flynn was read­
ing the report on McMurphy as if to morons, and that 
this was embarrassingly bad. Finally he accuses him­
self of leaving Harding "drowning in the shallows" 
because he mixed up some lines and gave Harding ambig­
uous cues. At no point during these criticisms, or 
_ _ during any others that_are_ given in all three productions, 
is there every any suggestion that poor or inadequate 
performances must not be improved so far as is humanly 
possible.
Yet, even if they are not representing conduct that goes 
against prevailing moral ideologies, do good performances 
inevitably mean good people? Genuine performance, I think I 
have established, is often seen as being far more than the 
behavioural manifestations of a "mechanical marvel". But 
there are persons who, apart from life, never become a part 
of it. Robert Service (1980) wrote: "The world has been a
stage for me, and I have played the parts my imagination con­
ceived. Rarely have I confronted reality: it seems as if I
have never lived at all, just dreamed and played at living."
And Marianne Faithful (in an interview with Mick Brown, 
Penthouse, Vol 14 No 12) tells an interviewer: "I would have
loved to have been a great actress but I realise that I act 
all the time anyway. I even act with people I know very well." 
The difficulty for these two people is that they cannot get 
themselves possessed by people with whom they can identify.
(I say much more on this subject in Chapter IX.) From this 
it follows that the actor who never loses consciousness of
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himself acting will never, if this consciousness shows, seem 
to be alive, and, since he will always appear to be role- 
playing, he will be perceived as failing to be his "genuine" 
self, and therefore amoral, and if the consciousness does 
not show he will be amoral to himself alone, to whom, of 
course, the consciousness does show. So the morality of 
performance is that it should not only be the best that a 
person can put on but that it also should seem to be "owned 
by" or to be the "personal possession" of the performing 
person. Moral realms are opened up in performance, and I 
suggest now that, since morality is about "how to behave" 
these realms are constituted by the dramatic renderings of 
competence problems, or the performance morality at a meta 
level.
The Framing of Performance
I have shown that conduct is performance and that the 
possessions by which people perform themselves - opening 
up thereby ritual realms which in turn have interest inasmuch 
as they deal with questions of performance - are controlled 
into being what they are, in the case of natural conduct, by 
having to appear as needing no undue control, and, in the 
general case of deliberate performance, by the moral rule 
that a performer ideally should give his all. Now I shall 
change the perspective, to note and comment on some of the 
"frames" that are put upon possession.
The framing devices of performances in theatres are easy
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to list: raised staging, unobstructed visibility, favour­
able lighting, curtain or black-out "brackets" (Coffman 1975), 
acting conduct of an aestheticized kind, separation from 
auditorium. These are found everywhere in social life. The 
pulpit, the lecturer's podium, the judge's bench, and so on, 
all borrow from the staging norms of the theatre so as to set 
off and exalt the leading performer even before he opens his 
mouth. But framing devices may also be found in less staged 
social situations, and it could be said that their design is a 
limit on the performative conduct. Bauman and Sherzer (1974) 
insist, in this vein, that everyday performances are highly 
dependent on their situations and Abrahams (1972) says that 
"the energies of the performer must be matched in great part 
by the responsive energies of the audience." In other words, 
the audience is a further framing device; an attentive aud­
ience obviously would encourage performances that would be 
discouraged by groans and yawns (in Chapter VIII, I say more 
on this topic). Bauman (1975) actually adopts Coffman's 
concept of frame and his review of folklore literature turns 
up a wide variety of metacommunicative keyings that serve 
to separate performances from non-performances. These include 
special codes, special openings and closings, special lang­
uage, special style devices, special prosodic patterns, and 
special vocalizations. Carey (19 76) has further found that 
a very large number of modulations take place in their para- 
linguistic channels when Presidential candidates make tele­
vision broadcasts, and these changes consistently occur when
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candidates go from "Off-Mike/Off-Camera" to "On-Mike/On- 
Camera" and vice versa. It seems safe to say, then, that 
frames for performance are multiply-cued in interactions, 
and that a performance cannot happen unless it is framed, 
for without a frame it will be regarded as uncontrolled 
behaviour, though he who performs may actually frame him­
self, by voice alteration and so on, as he goes along. The 
more formal the performance the stronger the taboo against 
breaking into it from outside the frame. In a theatre, for 
example, a person persisting in talking across the show will 
be asked to leave and, if that fails, will be bodily removed. 
But right down at the level of ordinary conversation, he who 
interrupts without "good" reason is considered rude, and 
poor performers, unless their ritual worth is bolstered by 
externally applied statuses, need not expect to be heard out 
every time they begin a peroration. (Poor stage actors, too, 
perforce watch another show besides their own, of the audience 
filtering away through the exits as the play goes on.) Rules 
against interruption and non-attention are very well explained 
by Erving Goffman, yet it might add to an understanding of 
the sense a person has of more than interactionally utilitar­
ian forces upholding such rules to see that performance, even 
of the lowly type called for in "making conversation", is not 
only communication of lexical items, voice qualities, gestures, 
expressions, posture, costume, physical character, and so on, 
but, more than that, the creation of a world in which the 
audience might lose itself as it never could in interaction
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viewed only as a communication system. So it may be that 
attention in interaction honours framed worlds rather than 
persons, though it will have to be to their envoys that 
appreciation is shown. The following two examples from the 
theatre, I think, show how it might be the "realm" and not
the person that is deferred to;
While rehearsals were in progress, visitors such as _ 
poster designers and lighting technicians would lower 
their voices or stop talking altogether when they 
entered the auditorium, even though they never looked 
directly at the stage.
If people wished to speak to the director when he was
in the stage area, they would wait at the edge of the
area for him to walk to them, whereas, away from the 
stage, it would nearly always be the other way round, 
the "supplicant" approaching the director.
The framing of performance is one of the most obvious 
features operating to control possession. That it is found 
at every level of conduct argues that orderly performances 
are protected from disorderly interruptions, but only in such 
a way that what is framed does not itself look like supra- 
interruption, on the order of, say, sudden epileptic seizure, 
whose very unframed suddenness might be a part of what 
affrights its audience. The shock of unframed performance 
is reported by Sudnow (1967) who, during a period of 
hospital research, saw 200 deaths, only one of which was not 
a "hospital death". This exception was a shooting in the 
Casualty Department. Sudnow says that, after the shooting, 
nurses, well used to unconscious, dying, and dead persons, 
stood stunned and apparently helpless around the shot 
victim, and this could only be because the victim was
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improperly framed and therefore uncontrolled.
Not all frames are immediately apparent around the 
performance. The frame of rehearsal is one that is less 
obviously a frame than, for example, a raised stage, but 
it does serve as a buffer between the performers in a 
relatively uncontrolled state and the same performers after being 
controlled by their rehearsal.
Rehearsal for Possession
I shall now discuss some of the characteristics of 
theatrical rehearsal, which is the period between no­
possession and full-enough possession, into which unknown 
oersons must venture with special care, since here they 
are in the presence of selves in disarray, which must be 
looked at without too much judgement, or too little apprec­
iation, or too much interest, and with the riaht amount 
of respect, as it is outside rehearsals but at a lesser 
pitch.
Many actors are unhappy being watched while rehearsing 
and those powerful enough within the profession usually 
refuse outsiders permission to sit on rehearsals. Zalk (1972) 
calls rehearsal an "intensely private phenomenon," and 
perhaps this is because the process by which an actor makes 
contact with a character who is not there depends upon such 
delicate adjustments to normal interactional attention 
structures that these latter risk being upset completely 
by stranae pairs of eyes. The complicated work of feeling
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a way into a part involves the actor ini exposing his actor's 
mind as he experiments with gestures and inflexions, so it 
is not surprising that he hesitates to welcome witnesses to 
this exposure, the very one his whole professional life is 
about not showing to audiences. Preparation, then, apart 
from the hard physical labour required, is a testing time for 
an actor's self. Furthermore, if Evreinoff is right in 
asserting that "the main thing for us is not to be ourselves. 
This is the theatrical imperative of our souls", it can be 
appreciated how worrying the period of preparation can be for 
an actor who, for long working hours, is hovering between 
several selves, not really able to be any one of them. Prep­
aration in the theatre is not taken lightly. The constant 
call for longer rehearsals and more thorough training shows 
that possession is not thought, by those that know it profess­
ionally, to happen at a throw of a switch. The control of 
possession,then, begins long before it can occur, and perhaps 
this is why most persons only ever learn to be one self, 
because they lack the time and application to multiply their 
selves.
Rehearsals in the theatre nearly always follow the same 
schedule. After an initial directorial introduction to the 
playworld, the blocking is gradually gone through, before 
the speech is internalised by the actors. Then scenes are 
repeated and repeated until acceptable performance standards 
are reached. Finally, run-throughs of separate acts and then
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of the whole play smooth out discontinuities, so that, in 
miniature,the rehearsal period resembles a socialization 
process, but into a playworld, within which the actors 
must come to feel at ease before they can perform. Even 
through a "run", just as in the course of a professional 
career, the feeling of coming to be "at ease" may go on 
increasing, and this feeling actually assists in the 
elaboration of conduct that in its turn assists the poss­
ession the coming into which brought on the feeling of 
ease in the first place. Thus;
Rutley's fellow catatonic, who told me after the first 
night that he "did not know what he was doing half the 
time," has now taken to writing in the ward book during 
those periods when he is stood by the Nurses* Station.
He writes abusive comments about Big Nurse, totally in 
character, and tells me, after one week of this, that 
he now finds it impossible not to write in the book.
During the second week of the run, Bromden starts act­
ing in just his bare feet. B asks him how he feels about 
this. Bromden replies that he does not understand how 
he ever felt right wearing shoes and socks "in the ward."
McMurphy has added a new refinement to the exercises 
sequence at the beginning of the first Group Therapy 
session. He looks around, open-mouthed, at his fellow 
patients, incredulous at their pathetic movements, and 
he slowly mimics them as if he cannot believe in what 
they are doing. Then he finds himself facing the orderly 
Warren, at whom he now directs a big insincere smile. 
Warren frowns, so McMurphy begins to do a sort of twist 
dance step with his face slackened off into an expressive 
parody of "being sent". I ask B about this later on, 
and he says he just found himself doing it one night.
From the kind of high-speed socialization a rehearsal 
is, I think two themes common to all socialization processes 
can now be abstracted; that new roles are difficult to learn.
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and that, nonetheless, new roles can be leamt. The control 
of possession, then, is usually guaranteed for a given person 
by lengthy procedures of increasing familiarisation with a 
new self. It is inevitable, in a society where the division of 
labour is very fine, that all kinds of training periods will 
be allotted to neophytes everywhere. In this way, the dram­
atic abilities of persons are implicitly recognized, and 
those persons who make their various grades are allowed to 
feel that they are different people on graduation.
Looking the part and being the sort of person who ought 
to play the part can be convergent demands on a person, so 
that, as I showed in Chaper IV, a nurse who disobeys any of 
the HiinQte presriptions that govern both her dress and her 
demeanour will not be allowed on a ward, and one, who, as it 
is said, "naturally" obeys the rules of conduct, gives all the 
evidence that ever can be obtained that through and through 
she is a nurse, until at the maximum of "naturalness" she 
will be referred to (as I have already noted of such persons) 
as a "bom nurse".
Thus formal possession of self in both small and 
large society is treated as hard to control, but as con­
trollable, and the process of this control is rehearsal.
Following on from these ideas about the rehearsal 
frame, now come some rather more different observations 
about the working life of professional actors. These lead 
to a general suggestion about controlled stage performances
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and everyday life performances, that both should control 
any signs of their being controlled.
The Everyday Life of Actors
It might be thought that actors, who must show to 
audiences persons who can be effortlessly interpreted, 
would study people who are not actors. This is recommended 
in a few drama schools but the norm of the group I researched 
was that such study is voyeuristic. In fact, the director 
of One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest, which is set in a lunatic 
asylum, explained to me that the cast would not be visiting a 
mental hospital because the patients "have enough on as it is".
On the basis of my limited data, I can say that a signif­
icant number of actors (at least) learn most from fashionable 
and successful actors, in particular the ones with whom they 
have a chance to work. As I said in Chapter V, a natural 
selection is going on here. Actors who do well with the 
public are emulated. So the public sees not so much studies 
from life as copies of vogue styles, and this of course is 
true of any artistic field in which the dominant fashion, just 
because it is a fashion, is the only fashion, until replaced 
because it has begun to look like only a fashion.
Modelling themselves on successes, to whom do actors 
turn for evaluation of their efforts? Directors much less 
than instructors in drama schools offer skilled criticism, 
and this is taken very seriously; the remarks influential
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directors have made about an actor are quoted in almost 
reverential tones. Criticism through reviews, though, is 
perfunctory, dealing out shorthand praise or dgffrmation, 
and laudatory mentions make only temporary impact. So 
actors are without the kind of intelligent and loving 
mirror that would guide them to better acting, for the 
applause of audiences is the crudest and least particular 
response by which to measure dramatic effectiveness. In 
this respect, actors share the fate of other members of 
the wider culture, that tact allows them their faults.
So it is necessary for the actor who would improve 
(and he will not survive in the profession unless he does) 
to become ever more discerning of himself. This sets him 
apart from non-actors, as does the further requirement, 
should he wish to be a serious performer, that he explore 
his emotions and sensations as near their limit as he dare, 
sometimes a requirement incompatible with one no less 
stringent that he take the utmost care of his artistic 
instrument, his body.
In general, stage actors work in comfortless rooms for 
long concentrated hours in the company of other actors. They 
lead careers that have neither security nor continuity, 
and if they are successful they work in the unsocial evening 
hours. They are only ever as good as their last performances, 
and must compete in a labour market where the majority at any 
one time are out of work. Their main employers are the 
repertory companies, and (in Great Britain) these are a
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reservoir of talent for the TV companies, yet are not 
financially reimbursed. The actor's threadbare existence 
in repertory, then, usually can only be exchanged for the 
joyless, factory-produced acting of TV, or the occasional 
short period of the shooting of a film. (And, as the years 
of his career go by, the actor will find it harder to re­
join everyday life.) These are the conditions that prevail 
behind every performance an audience warms to, and, such is 
the actor's art, these conditions are rarely guessed from 
the performances.
So, just as the idea of possession can be hidden behind 
cultured myths of naturalness, so are actors' possessions, 
those of a race apart from everyday life, controlled, like 
all possessions, I suggest, so as to look before they look 
like anything else, as if they are not controlled. Any 
possession, then, just like the natural possession should 
look like an expression whose form is given, even as it is 
given this form.
Now I come to perhaps the most important kind of control 
in interaction, the one that actually determines the form 
of the possession, and I discuss this with reference to 
David Cole's (1975) concept of "rounding" (the bringing of 
maximum ritual presence into an interaction).
Rounding and Control
A controlled person is not a person in interactional 
abeyance as it were - an absence of a person - but a person
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whose manner of control precisely shows his matter. This 
can be illustrated by imagining a person as tightly controlled 
as he can be. Even he conveys a person, generally in Anglo- 
American culture described as straightlaced or uptight. Among 
friends this "cold fish" is likely to receive gentle encour­
agement to let go a bit or to let his hair down, with 
assurances that "we don't need to stand on ceremony." If 
he fails to do so, or to not seem as if he wants to do so, he 
will not long have fellow interactants calling themselves 
his friends. This clearly shows that to all intents and 
purposes the person controlled is actually a function of the 
control a person has. Unyielding control goes with a
thoroughly rigid person and is control in the sense of
strength, not of flexibility and subiety.
John Gielgud [Funke and Booth, 1961] says that in a
perfect performance a person is conscious both of the person 
he would be possessed by and of how he should control this 
possession: "The mind is clearly divided between the imag­
inative impulse and the deliberate execution of the part, 
with nothing allowed to distract one from these two processes, 
which should be complementary - the one feeding and sustaining 
the other." So it can be understood how uncontrolled people 
in having an insufficient faculty of control also lose 
commensurate personness up to the point where a completely 
uncontrolled person is not a person. Having no self-control 
is not different to having no self to control. The possession 
of control, then, is always the control of possession.
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Possession at its height consequently requires the most 
expert control. Cole [1975) says that when these heights 
are reached performers "round" on audiences, that is, 
having shamanistically gone to the illud tempus, they come 
back as hungans. The truest of all theatrical events are 
constituted by roundings. Cole believes, and theSe are 
those encounters between performers, for audiences, when, 
as Sidney Poitier says (Funke and Booth, 1961,) "There is 
not a theatre and there is not a stage," and then the 
realm the actor comes from is there for the audience to 
enter. An example of rounding, taken from my own field­
work, follows:
This afternoon, during repeated run throughs of the 
group therapy scenes, B, playing the recalcitrant 
McMurphy, did not seem very involved in the proceed­
ings. One result of this was that a note of frust­
ration entered into Big Nurse's coaching of her pat­
ients, so that her bland patter began to sound quite 
oppressive. While she was coming to the conclusion 
of one speech B pulled a pack of cards from his 
pocket, and I do not think anyone who glimpsed this 
was sure that he was fully inside the play. Big 
Nurse paused. B was holding the cards in both hands, 
bending them back ready for a zip shuffle. He looked 
UP at Big Nurse, at this moment either as the direc­
tor of the play - and as such unimpressed by Big Nurse's 
playing - or as McMurphy showing Big Nurse that he had 
no respect at all for her psychiatric theories. There 
was a confused silence. It occurred to me that B 
had used the cast's uncertainty as to whether or not 
he was in character to create the very feelina of 
uncertainty that should be in the air at just this 
moment on stage. And as this occurred to me I real­
ised that the very same thought would also be occurr­
ing to the others. But before I had a chance to relax, 
and before the actors could release the tension that 
had just crept into their playing, the cards in McMurphy's 
hands suddenly all flipped into the air and cascaded 
to the floor. Big Nurse suppressed her reaction of 
flinching and Cheswick, on B's left, pulled away from
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him with a start and then froze, in character for 
the first time that afternoon. B got up and walked 
towards Big Nurse with a faint smile on his lips.
It was still possible to see him both as McMurphy and 
as the director, in the latter case compelling the 
cast to register that he had jolted them all up to a 
more intense level of acting. At this point, however, 
the distinction vanished, because if B was the director 
the director was also McMurphy at all times. Big 
Nurse was obviously unsure of what B would do, as she 
and everybody else knew that he was quite capable of 
hitting her hard. Her professional training won out 
and she stood her ground, but in such a way that it 
was obvious she was thinking that if she did not block 
McMurphy, here and how, she would go down herself. B 
had clearly summoned a deep response from Big Nurse 
who had incorporated her response directly into the 
character she was playing, thereby intensifying it so 
that it now seemed to have its own life, one that was 
stronger than that of the actress supporting it. For 
a few seconds, then, everybody in the room was lifted 
out of the rehearsal studio and transported to Ken 
Kesey's ward, and in the process the tiredness of the 
day seemed to be completely dispelled.
It is probably true to say, then, that rounding is only poss­
ible for persons who have the dramaturgical talent to so 
revise their appearance as to fit perfectly into an intell­
igible ritual realm.
All art of course rounds on persons who lose themselves 
in it Cl enlarge on this in Chapter IX) and in everyday life 
people continually achieve art-like status for one another, 
becoming worlds effortlessly entered, and sometimes mutually, 
as happens for Rosamond and Lydgate in George Eliot's (1958) 
Middlemarch;
Lydgate was quick in anticipating her. He reached the 
whip before she did, and turned to present it to her.
She bowed and looked at him: he of course was looking
at her and their eyes met with that peculiar meeting 
which is never arrived at by effort, but seems like a 
sudden divine clearance of haze. I think Lydgate turned
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a little paler than usual, but Rosamond blushed deeply 
and felt a certain astonishment. After that, she was 
really anxious to go, and did not know what sort of 
stupidity her uncle was talking of when she went to 
shake hands with him.
Such mutual roundings are like sudden glimpses into unsus­
pected vastnesses, and it follows from this that the person 
who makes a strong impression on others does not do that so 
much as create a larger world for them to enter. Thus a 
woman who looks as if she comes from a world no more myst­
erious than a television soap-opera will not round on 
people with such power as, say, Jane Austen, when she seems 
in her ritual realm to make behaviour explain itself in ways 
that set the reader free from stupidity and confusion, as, 
it eventually turns out, Rosamond Vincey could not for Lyd­
gate.
Among actors on stage rounding can call forth other 
roundings, as happened in the fieldwork example above, and 
such roundings are totally involving for audiences. Poss­
ession at this level of near-perfect execution seems on the 
verge of getting out of hand as it escalates in these inter­
actions, and the actors' ritual power may become awe-inspir­
ing at the limit. Then the watched physical protagonists, 
having refined their conduct into a series of iconic images, 
can seem to be encountering each other as if they only 
stand in for absent giants, so that a couple's argument, 
for example, might look like a fundamental quarrel between 
men aind women, which is how such arguments often seem in 
the novels of D. H. Lawrence.
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So when - safely outside its frame - people watch 
conduct in stalking grounds charged with danger, they enter 
into other people who seem capable of stalking one another 
to the death. What is happening here for audiences may be 
very similar to what happens for a writer of fiction:
Writing becomes a search for a poly-personalitv, a 
means of living several destinies, of penetrating 
into others, of communicating with them. The writer 
becomes conscipus of the world he brings to life, he : 
is its consciousness and he thus escapes from the 
ordinary limits of the self, something which intox­
icates his spirit while enriching and sharpening it 
at the same time. (Serge, 1972)
Some actors, however, may never round,
and different plays will afford different opportunities for
performers to round. In everyday life, too, there are those
who never succeed in "rising to the occasion" and also those
for whom there are very few occasion to rise to. But I am
proposing that human attention will not be able to help
itself gravitating to such people as Barthes' (19 73) wrestlers,
because, as he says, "they are, for a few moments, the key
which opens Nature, the pure gesture which separates Good
from Evil, and unveils the form of a justice which is at last
intelligible." Persons who have the very high degree of
control that permits this kind of "rounding possession",
moreover, may be said to triumph in their interaction, and
for them there is no sense whatsoever of their havina gone
through an ordeal. But, at the opposite extreme from
rounding occasions, there will be those which severely test
self possession, when a person only just manages to convey
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himself as a minimally intelligible ritual being, and 
these are often interviews or any sort of trial. The 
interactional scale suggested here, of ordeal to triumph, 
was one I saw operating very clearly in the theatre.
Not only two consecutive nights, but two consecutive acts 
or even two consecutive scenes could be the one ordeal and 
the next triumph. I think in everyday life, too, persons 
are now barely surviving their exposure to others and the 
next minute coming through encounters, as they say "with 
flying colours". Control of possession then needs to be 
very fine, and the minutest adjustments can make the ritual 
difference between an almost dispossessed ordeal and the 
triumph of rounding. With this in mind I want to now 
consider the topic of "live" control and originality, which 
will conclude this brief review of some of the ways control 
is applied, and some of the results of it being so applied.
Live Control
With the safety-net of editing techniques and re-run 
capabilities removed, the live performer, who cannot lose his 
mistakes, can only lose his performance, but may thereby 
win an involvement by virtue of this alone. So, although 
a taste for live performance in preference to recorded 
performance may reflect the high value placed on immediacy 
and sincerity, perhaps, also, audiences of live shows want 
proof that the playworld in which they are asked to lose 
themselves is also worthy of its performers' engrossment.
Only the live performer, therefore, so long as he maintains
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his control, gives continuous evidence that what possesses 
him can be possessive.
Distaste for the bogus, the theatrical, the over­
rehearsed, the obviously-scripted performance may be the 
emotion of a presentiment that such performance gives no 
world to enter through the mechanical movements of a man­
ipulator unless it be a world he does not believe in, or 
come from, or care about, or want to be involved in himself. 
If muzak is music without music, then this deadhanded con­
trol of routinized possession is the muzak of social life, 
instantly recognisable in the tired patter of salesmen, 
politicians, disc jockeys, and hacks of every denomination. 
Audiences both of professional shows and of less professional 
everyday life performers may put up with dead conduct but 
will know live persons when they see them. From this there 
follows an absolute dictate in social life, that there ever 
be new forms of conduct, just because the old ones, having 
been seen before, are not responses to the present. And a 
person who becomes entirely predictable ceases to qualify as 
a person, just as, for example, a novelist who starts to 
repeat himself is said to have lost his inspiration or to 
have been deserted by his muse. To go further, any science 
of persons that would aim at exhaustive explanations of 
conduct under the auspices of determinism might from the fore­
going point of view open itself to the charge that in focuss­
ing on what can be reduced to the predictable it misses the 
point that what is most characteristic of persons is their
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capacity to transcend themselves. Simmel (1971) elaborates 
this dialectic in his essay "The Transcendent Character of 
Life", where he says he had made the "attempt" to conceive 
of life as:
... something which constantly reaches beyond limits 
towards its beyond and which finds its essence in 
this reaching beyond. [This essay] is an attempt to 
define life in general by way of this transcendence, 
where by the closure of its individuality form is 
maintained, but only in order to be broken through 
by the continuous process. Life finds its essence, 
its process, in being more-life and more-than-life.
Its positive is as such already its comparative.
I am well aware of the logical difficulties involved 
in the conceptual expression of this way of viewing 
life. I have tried to formulate it, in full presence 
of the logical danger, because perchance the level is 
here attained in which logical difficulties by them­
selves are insufficient to impel silence - because it 
is here that the metaphysical root of logic itself 
draws nourishment.
My own rhetoric of possession can be reduced to a single axiom
that is in harmony with the above passage. It would go: "I
perform, therefore I am more than what I perform." Always, I
am suggesting, the possession, in so far as it is controlled
in an appropriate manner, opens a realm which is other than
the "figure" cueing it into being and which, in the case of
rounding at least, must be beyond any current conceptions of
what a person should be. This is a realm that Erving Goffman
(1975, p 523) has only approached:
A puppeteer works his strings a yard away from the doll 
he brings to life. A ventriloquist works his puppet 
close by so that it can be manipulated from behind and 
appear to be the actual emitter of sound. A chess 
player is within easy reach of his pieces, his men, his 
figures. A stage performer works closer still, since 
he manipulates his own limbs and his own lips - as, to 
a degree, we also do in quoting someone during ordinary 
talk. Where we work in everyday life when speaking 
for ourselves remains to be considered.
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Throughout this thesis I have been engaged in considering 
"where we work when speaking for ourselves", and I have said 
that the "place" is a ritual realm whence possessions seem 
to originate. I have also put forward the idea that a person 
is a possession, and definitely not a performance played by 
any other agent than the substance of this performance. His 
person, the possession, takes its consciousness, then, from 
human raw material, and outside the possession's consciousness 
there is no other consciousness, unless it be that of a new and 
different possession which, as they all do, comes into being 
by sweeping through all those human appearances the possession 
can be constituted by, and gathering these to itself, so to 
speak, in order to transform conduct so that, just as a two- 
dimensional picture may yield the third dimension of perspective, 
there may be yielded a ritual realm. My rhetoric of possession 
thus dispenses with "inner men". What then of the stream of 
thought that a person keeps to himself? This I term a private 
possession, whose particular nature is that it feeds on its own 
consciousness of being unseen: the more conduct gives nothing
of a private possession away the more that appearance of giving 
nothing away is the possession unto its private self. But if 
the private possession would communicate itself, then it must 
make public sense, and, more than that, be interesting, if it 
would be attended to, and if a possession does not make sense, 
despite that it wishes to, it will be taken as some symptom of 
some "madness", the label a possession has when it seems def­
icient in inner reason. (Obviously, a whole social psychology
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could be developed out of the idea of possession and its 
reciprocal "rapture" (which is explained in the chapter after 
next), and this really ought to be combined with a history of 
self conception, but in this thesis I have only had time to 




Possession has now been defined from several different 
directions, but before I fit the second half of my theory 
of interaction, "rapture", to this the first, it remains_ _ _ 
for me to add some explanations of assertions left dangling 
in the previous three chapters. Therefore my treatment of 
rapture is postponed to the next chapter.
First of all I shall return to the seminal idea of 
ritual presence and this time devise a scale that would 
measure it from "parroting" at the zero end to "loving" at 
the fully possessed end, and I do this by referring back to 
the acting experiences of stage actors. Then I amplify my 
ideas on the consecrated nature of stage space, which I 
term "ritual space", and this properly follows from presence 
since I say that ritual space, and even territory, is as 
it is so far as it is the site of ritual life.
In previous chapters I have tended to slight the 
role of the audience in possessions, almost implying that 
a person who would be possessed must, as it were, pull him­
self up by the bootstraps of his own self consciousness.
But of course interaction is not interaction if it is not 
interactive, and so I note that audiences which are specially 
attentive will enable performers to enrich their actions 
while (but I do go into this) disinterested audiences may
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diminish or kill possessions.
Presence, then, is not confined to the possessed 
person, because it can diffuse itself into spacial areas 
as well as nourish itself on attention. Now I go on to say 
that occasions themselves, those, that is, which frame ritual 
life, also become imbued with presence, and these framing 
occasions are "the rituals of ritual life," such as church 
services and court hearings. The rituals of ritual life 
are deferred to in their own right, regardless of their 
content, and this content may be full ritual life or the 
opposite when the framing ritual of the ritual life can 
aptly be described as an "empty ritual". People too, I 
conclude, can be emptied of their ritual life, so to speak, 
if - particularly when they are professional actors - they 
are considered to have only "framed" it. Thus, on stage, 
actors overmaster the audience but off-stage, having shed 
their stage possessions, they walk relatively small in con­
temporary status life. In this sense, they are the dis­
possessed, but, I argue, so is anyone who will not act. 
Possession, I imply, is the sign of the human, and all 
humans are possessed.
Presence
In Anglo-American culture only a few actors are 
revered as artists; most enjoy no higher status than that 
of skilled craftsmen, and their performances are not ex­
pected every time to create rapture in an audience, but 
something less religiously toned, appreciation. In the same 
way, very few people in everyday life awaken one another
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to the miracle of existence, but, nonetheless, they are 
not gladly received if they breathe death into their inter­
actions by behaving in ways that demand no more appreciation 
than the voice of the speaking clock. Thus, at the begin­
ning of Under Western Eyes, Joseph Conrad's narrator, a 
teacher of languages, is rueful when he reflects that his 
lifelong professional orientation to words has made him 
view humankind as "not much more wonderful than parrots", 
and the impression of parroting lines on stage would seem 
to be at an opposite pole to the one of acting well. Conduct, 
as I have shown in earlier chapters, should be seen to 
issue from the inside of a person and not look like a 
superimposed irrelevance. This, I have argued, is difficult 
to bring off, precisely because "possession by" is 
necessarily an "imposition on". But, if imposition were 
all that possession seemed to be, human parrots would not 
be as chilling as are for example The Mummy and the Old 
Man of Strindberg's The Ghost Sonata. In these cases the 
"possession by" a low form of life causes horrifying 
diminution just because the possession as imposition is 
nonetheless regarded as essentially the being who is so 
possessed. And human parrots are seen as being worse than 
parrots because they represent the substitution of the human 
by some lesser life, as does an actor who "sells himself".
To reverse the human entropy that leads to the human parrot, 
Grotowski (1976) advises an actor to free his body "from
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every resistance to any psychic impulse", when "he does 
not sell his body but sacrifices it" and "repeats the 
atonement", coming "close to holiness".
So it is bad acting that has given acting a bad name, 
for acting is the absolute requisite for being human at all, 
and through it only the consummate stage actor can distil 
what for John Gielgud (Funke and Booth, 1961) is "the essence 
of important moments". Acting which is good, moreover, 
creates the ritual presence that is emphatically human.
For the same reason that good acting reaches back to 
commanding ritual realms, truth itself has greater ritual
presence than propaganda, hypocrisy, circumlocution, 
so on, whose words in not being meant seem to come from a 
source that in not meaning what it says does not want to 
say what it means or be what it is, and that, therefore, 
is nothing but its own negation. A ritually present person, 
then, is difficult to overlook when all about him are 
hedging their selves. So, in a culture where the hedging 
of selves is a structural necessity (Luhmann, 1979), 
institutions like theatres, which house and frame perfor­
mances of ritual presence, might serve as a compensatory 
device, reminding people both that selves do not always 
have to be hedged and that an unhedged self is an awesome 
entity. Conversely, where social selves are meant to be 
as nearly holy selves as possible, as in England when 
Oliver Cromwell was Lord Protector, theatres are closed for
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trivialising life, and, when holiness is owned by
institutionalized religions, the professional actor might
expect a lean period, as Benedetti (1976) notes:
The Council of Laodicea (343-381AD) required all 
clergy present at a festivity to leave the room 
before actors were allowed to enter. This 
ecclesiastical antipathy toward actors lasted for 
over seventeen hundred years; even as late as the 
fourteenth century Thomas a Becket, who had been 
friendly toward minstrels while he was Chancellor 
of the Realm, banned them from hi& palace once he 
became Archbishop of Canterbury. Moliere was denied 
Christian burial in the seventeenth century, and 
the church ban against actors in France was not 
lifted until the Revolution.
But ritual presence like any other form of conduct can
become stereotyped muzak. To prevent this, an actor, says
Grotowski (1976), "must be able to construct his own
psychoanalytic language of sounds and gestures in the same
way that a great poet creates his own language of words".
The demands that Grotowski recommends an actor to make on
himself, so as to always be ritually present, are morally
stringent :
One must give onself totally, in one's deepest 
intimacy, with confidence, as when one gives one­
self in love. Here lies the key. Self-penetration, 
trance, excess; the formal discipline itself - all 
this can be realised, provided one has given oneself 
fully, humbly and without defence.
Abrahams (1972) also calls the act of creative performance
- but this time in everyday life - "an act of love", the
stress being on a giving of self (sharing of possession)
which can only be called giving if there is no thought of
return. But "giving" is not quite right; rather, energetic
competence is fed into interaction so that a world is
generated that leads out of the interaction into exactly
the same interaction but now charged with ritual presence.
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Presence, then, is that type of ritual power which seems 
to overflow itself.
Ritual Space
Cole (1975), I think, captures the idea of spilled 
ritual presence when he describes stage space as "the 
extent of an uneasiness". Thus the space "claimed by any 
group of people for a particular activity" (Scheflen 1976) 
may have a different quality to that of a mere "orientational 
field" as Scheflen designates it.
Scheflen (1972) has observed how a person crossing the 
territories of a strange group lowers his head, curls his 
shoulders, unprotrudes his chest, holds his hands close to 
or in front of his body, and keeps his eyes to himself.
But Scheflen has not considered that this "behaviour of 
territorial passage" might have less to do with the act of 
stepping onto a piece of geography that is formally owned 
by strangers than with the showing of deference to unknown 
persons whose ritual power must be respected. The use of 
the word territory for ritual space does not help, I think, 
my appreciation here that some people's territories are 
more sacrosanct than others. "Ritual space", however, 
suggests that space owes its power of commanding deference 
to the ritual power of the persons using it. So it is 
easy to see that God's space, a church, is more inviolable 
than a punk's space, the street corner, though both are 
equally territories.
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Ritual space, I am arguing, originates in persons who 
do not so much stake it out as hallow it in direct propor­
tion to their ritual power, which is very great in the case 
of actors performing. (As if in accord with this idea 
Segal (1978) calls the theatre stage space "consecrated".)
So the other-wordliness of possession, that creates ritual 
space, need not be territory, though territory must be an 
other-worldy piece of the world. In ritual spaces, ordinary 
conduct may be profane, but, in strange territory, the ritual 
behaviour as Scheflen describes it - making it look extra­
ordinary - should also be seen as ordinary awe. Two 
examples of "ordinary awe" follow here. In the first 
McMurphy solves his problem of having to cross stage space 
where he should not be and in the second Harding, stuck for 
a line, gets a prompt that respects the vocal space 
of the stage. Neither of these examples shows deference 
to territory as such, but instead deference to a ritual 
realm that just happens to be territory:
There is not much room in the studio, so McMurphy has 
a problem when he leaves stage right because he has no 
way back to stage left that does not traverse stage 
space. At his exit he walks off stage directly into 
a wall, then collapses himself into himself, and turns 
and quickly burrows - with eyes fixed on his destina­
tion - to his next entry position.
When Harding cannot remember a line, he freezes his 
posture and at the same time, without looking at her, 
calls out to the DSM "Line!" or "Yeah!" The DSM 
softly cues him and he resumes his speech as if he 
has not stopped.
The next two examples show how stage space is routinely 
respected :
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The director wanted to show a friend of his the ward 
book (in which Billy writes his reports of other 
patients' conversations) that is kept near the nurses' 
station in the Cuckoo's Nest set. Both B and his 
friend set off towards the stage from the wings, but 
at the edge of the area the friend stops. B walks 
on and picks up the book from its lectern and brings 
it back to his friend, taking it for granted that his 
friend would not want to trespass on stage space.
During an afternoon rehearsal in the studio, someone 
knocks at the door and when he has opened it a few 
inches puts his head round it and says, "Phone for 
B." B is across the room where lié has been watching 
Big Nurse rehearse a scene with Warren and Bromden.
B now walks all the way round the perimeter of the 
stage space to get to the door, even though Big Nurse 
and Warren are not in action at that moment. On his 
roundabout way to the door, B spots a cigarette end 
in the stage space and straightaway he picks up 
Bromden's broom and sweeps the cigarette end into the 
audience area. Then he very carefully puts the broom 
back as he found it before continuing on his way to 
the door.
Earlier I advanced the view that possessed persons who 
are fully in control create worlds for their audiences to 
enter. It is compatible with this to suggest that ritual 
space, which acquires its holy nature from ritually power­
ful persons, should be deferred to in so far as it seems to 
be the site of other worlds. Certainly this is the case 
with battlefields, cemeteries, and, of course, churches and 
cathedrals. Museums and art galleries are also the sites 
of other worlds and it may be, then,that they are places of 
hushed and rapt congregation not because art and archaeology 
are now lay religions but because, like the churches of 
religion, they are the places where other worlds begin.
As Hall (1966) showed, people carry about with them 
units of space into which intrusion that is not at their
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bidding is profoundly offensive. My argument shows that 
this "contour", as Goffman (1972) describes it, is ritual 
space. Thus people, who, according to their others, over­
estimate their ritual space, are said to be "distant" or 
"unapproachable", while "familiar" people underestimate the 
ritual space of their fellows. Both these descriptions 
draw on spatial understandings, so too does "being made to 
feel small" which would be to have one's ritual space com­
pressed, while he who incorrectly thinks of himself as 
celebrated will be said to be "puffed up with his own 
importance." Ritual power, already there in a contour 
around a person, will enter, if it is strong enough, spaces 
and even objects too, and by a circuitous route it is even 
conceivable that from ritual spaces persons might draw a 
ritual power they had not had before, as when a priest for 
the first time takes up his station before assembled wor­
shippers .
So spilled presence can be treated as having entered 
non-human ground and thence, sometimes, humans once again. 
The Audience
Presence, then, may be spilled and absorbed into 
spaces from which it might be reabsorbed by other perform­
ers than those who originally spilled it. But also, in 
ever greater quantities, presence can be rebounded back 
to himself by a performer off the audience.
The unity of an audience is itself in the first place 
brought about by the presence of a common danger - excess 
ritual power which, during the threatrical event, for
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example, looms larger for each and every member of the 
audience than any of their differences. Cole goes so 
far as to say that audiences react to "rounding" like a 
crowd on which someone has pulled a gun, and Andre Breton 
said that the most perfect surrealist act was to fire a 
gun at random into a crowd. (Was Breton not expressing 
here the traditional artistic ambition to win urgent and 
concentrated attention, and does not this surely rank 
with the actor's imperative to be the focus of a communion?)
A possibility Cole does not go on to discuss is that 
audiences too can perform, even rounding on a performer.
The mob that hacks down its leader could be said to have 
rounded on him, and, at least during the sixties, there 
was scarcely a rock concert that did not see sections of
the audience trying to storm the stage. The mob, of course,
has reversed the poles of danger and safety, but more
commonly, in a real theatrical event, the danger will pass
between performers and audience, never settling on either 
for long. So amidst one watchful agglomeration of con­
sciousness whose supra-awareness is as fraught a medium as 
there is, great performers walk an electric stalking ground 
in which their every move and word is naked and in which 
they have to make a kind of bodily confession before an 
omnipotent judge, and be acquitted honourably if they want 
to hear applause.
It seems only commonsense that the more watchful, 
apprehensive, expectant, keyed-up, and eager the audience
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is the more will the performer before it be able to feel con­
fident that his slightest move or intonation will be richly 
interpreted. In this situation he will be able to so 
minimise his actions as to make for himself behavioural 
room for more of the same, which will inevitably further 
enrich his performance, or, if he keeps his action l)ârê, it 
will look barer still and so in that way seem a stronger 
performance than it was. An enriched performance cannot 
but further excite an already attentive audience, so, it 
can be said, the audience fuels a performer's ritual power 
to the degree that he can awaken them to it. I now give 
some examples of this from the repertory company, and, 
though they rather assume the point they try to make, I 
think they give a good idea of this interactional feedback 
process as it may occur in the theatre:
The matinee audience fills about half the 350 seats 
and comprises mostly schoolchildren and old-age pen­
sioners. Julia Price advances to the front of the 
stage during her soliloquy and there is no atmosphere 
at all. Backstage, after the interval curtain, I 
meet her drinking tea. "It's awful," she says, "I 
feel as though there's nobody out there."
B has instructed the cast to use the technical run- 
through as an opportunity to rehearse. Half the time 
he is behind a desk rigged up in the middle of the 
auditorium. When he has an important line, he waits 
till his cue, then races down the aisle, giving the 
line maximum volume and expression and arriving on 
his mark, after vaulting up on to the stage, just as 
he hits the last word. Every time he does this, the 
rest of the cast seem to follow his example of throwing 
themselves further than necessary into their parts.
The sundry people milling about, fiddling with lights
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and wires and so on, cannot help responding to B's way 
of playing his part, and the cast react positively to 
this intriguement that normally is absent from techni­
cal run-throughs.
Friday night and a full house for Cuckoo's Nest. From 
the wings, even, you can feel that the pressure coming 
from the auditorium is heavier and keener than usual. 
The chances of an actor being "seen through" are higher 
than normal tonight, and the actors respond with 
additional firmness and precision in their playing.
The extra effort that is being put out on stage does
not seem to tire the actors at all, but to come about
as an almost unmediated response to ah unusually 
powerful audience interest.
In everyday interaction, too, it is commonplace that 
interest can be generated or that interactants can get ex­
cited (in Chapter VII, I touched on this briefly when I
looked at "the framing of performance"). I am suggesting
that this is not only because of a possession coming into 
focus but also because this is facilitated by ritual feed­
back. It might be concluded here, then, that ritual power 
is by no means always locked up in the performer. But it 
can be locked up in what I next consider: "The Rituals of 
Ritual Life."
Rituals of Ritual Life.
Goffman describes how conversation can be a play of 
and a play with disparate frames, the references for talk 
being carved out of worlds not there but for the carving, 
and he creates images of selves seeming to be regressing 
backwards from themselves like reflections trapped between 
parallel mirrors, the speakers not merely functioning as 
performers and persons but as a quartet of strategists, 
principals, animators, and figures, severally substitutable.
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He articulates a theory of interaction that can accommodate 
what in 1953 he noted was "the conversational thing about 
conversation," meaning its "rapid and continued give-and- 
take" (pll9) with constant shifts in subject, tone, purpose, 
and direction. Unlike any other sociologist, he has brought 
about a body of words that with an unusually high degree of 
precision seems in its structuring to reveal hitherto unac­
knowledged patterns and possibilities of conversation. But 
though he has used the idea of performance for the show a 
person can put on, he has not specifically opened his theories 
to what I take to be the force of performance.
The playworld, or even the world framed by a competent 
performer in interaction, can be overmastering. Thus, in 
the intervals of shows that I watched from backstage, I 
would see actors indulge in just the sorts of choppy inter­
changes that Goffman analyses, yet all the while they would 
be pervaded by their playworld as if the characters they 
would soon be resuming were hovering over them. This of 
course is the most-impressionistic type of data, but I do 
think that, for instance, the phenomena of "carry over" is 
not difficult to grasp of interactions, one to the next, in 
everyday life. By this I mean the impression among inter­
actants that a world left by one or more of them has not 
left them. People perhaps do not always snap easily and 
instantly from frame to frame, from reference to reference, 
always taking all of their attention with them each time. 
Something lags, some part of past engrossment is not given
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up, part of the mind is trailing. And, when the frame has 
been brimfull of ritual presence, it might be expected that 
this will not vanish with a vanishing frame. This is true 
for performer and audience alike. So I now propose that the 
shape of interaction chains may come from the ebb and flow of 
ritual power as much as from the preordained rules of gather­
ings, which themselves, I suggest, may exist just to generate 
or preserve ritual power in certain forms.
In the theatre, the arrangements by which audiences are 
allowed to watch ritual lives are standardized and formalized. 
Theatrical performances, occasions of ritual, become rituals, 
because the form of the occasion gathers to itself the defer­
ential respect that is owed primarily to the performers.
This can be seen in four of the many rules that I saw followed 
by audience after audience throughout a whole Spring Season, 
and which, also, I have rarely seen broken elsewhere. That 
these rules seem almost too obvious to set down further shows 
how well-established they are:
1 When the lights start to dim, people hush their 
voices, and by the time the lights are out no one 
is talking.
2 There is no talking or moving about during perfor­
mances, whatever their quality or power to absorb.
3 When the final curtain falls - every time - people 
applaud, clapping their hands together in front of 
their chests, with no exceptions.
4 Audiences as a body do not rise to leave until they 
have finished applauding, which is not until the last 
curtain call has been taken and the lights have 
started going up.
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Most scenes of heightened ritual life seem to undergo this 
sort of transformation into ritual events in their own 
right. Trials, funerals, marriages, post-mortems, inter­
views, lectures, of themselves, like theatres, do come to 
hold a ritual power borrowed and accreted from the social 
interactions they are wont to frame.
Rules of rituals appear to be more strongly enforced 
than rules of interaction, and the more ritualised a ritual 
is the less the characteristics of its performers come into 
play. Thus, a mini-ritual like a greeting does not vary 
greatly whoever the pairs of greeters are, yet, since the 
greeting is an exchange between persons representing proper 
personness to each other, a failure to greet is "inexcusable" 
because persons in general are then disparaged. A maxi­
ritual likewise celebrates institutionalised relationships, 
so that threats to the ritual are threats to the institution 
in proportion to the formality of the ritual. In this con­
nection, the phrase "empty ritual" can be understood as des­
cribing ritual no longer felt to be fully celebrating real 
states of affairs, and so rituals, I am suggesting, when they 
are full, are full of ritual presence.
Since ritual life inevitably drifts to the fashionable 
forms that are rituals of life, it will be appreciated that 
proper forms of conduct will lag behind experienced ritual 
presences, and that new kinds of disciplined ritual presence 
at first will seem formless and opposed to old forms, when 
perhaps only social analysts - such as Marsh et al (1978), who
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found order in football terrace hooliganism - will be disposed 
to see new forms of ritual life at the very beginning of their 
becoming outmoded rituals.
The Dispossessed
I want to say now that, just as the frames of ritual 
performance become ritualized, so do persons - because they 
are ritual frames - whether on-form or pathetic, awake or 
asleep, alive or dead. Status itself may be the frame of a 
ritual life that may or may not live up to this status-frame 
which either way will be deferred to as if it truly frames 
commensurate ritual power. But something happens to pro­
fessional actors which goes against this generalization.
Even though on-stage they can exert enormous ritual power, 
off-stage their prestige is not nearly so high. Why is this? 
Why is the professional actor usually regarded as a lightweight 
person, who the better he is the more will seem to belong in 
theatres which are not regarded with as much seriousness as 
are, for example, factories or offices? Is it because the 
more he is a medium for other selves, the less of a self will 
he seem to have among those whose selves refer only in a 
limited way for a limited distance back to their seeming 
mirror images? Is it because the actor seems too alive, 
having too much of too many potentials to be any one of them, 
like a visitor from a kaleidoscope of dreams? Is it his 
very capacity for possession that dispossesses the actor of any 
mundane self heavier than that of "actor"?
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Before suggesting an answer, I offer three examples of
actors being treated as lightweights;
Some members of the company meet with a representative 
from Equity, the actors' union. Equity have contri­
buted considerable funds to the company but neverthe­
less, full of after-performance euphoria, none of the 
actors is concerned to be diplomatic. When every­
body has become silent, the representative finds a 
way of reproaching them for what he takes to be their 
lack of seriousness. He mentions the fact that he 
had noticed that one of the non-speaking "loonies" 
in the Cuckoo show had not been an Equity member. 
Failing to get any response at all to this, he now 
unveils the news that Equity has done a deal that works 
retrospectively so that several of the company will 
soon be coming into unexpected monies. "Let's have 
a party!" they all exclaim, and the Equity representa­
tive throws me a look which says "Actors!" as if it 
would be too much to expect them to be serious about 
anything.
Two city councillors from an area where housing has 
been condemned to make room for a motorway-spur are 
meeting the company to discuss the possibility of 
the company helping a campaign against the motorway.
A Saturday afternoon "fair" is being organized to 
publicise the anti-motorway cause and also to raise 
cash for a fighting fund. Would the theatre company 
like to contribute some amusement that, by the way, 
would also publicise the company's present production? 
It is all getting bogged down in details when B 
suggests, "Why don't we simply arrive in our lunatic 
costumes and loon about among the crowds?" Both 
the councillors say "No" simultaneously. Picking 
up on their consternation, B says, "We could carry 
pickaxes and shovels so that people would think we 
were on the other side." The councillors laugh in 
such a way as to indicate that they want B to see 
that they are tactfully regarding his suggestion as 
not being made seriously. B smiles broadly at 
Martini who begins to mime pickaxing a hole in the 
parquet floor, his eyes widening in horror at what­
ever it is his imaginary pickaxe is revealing. The 
elderly councillor clears his throat and starts again.
A delegate from the local Arts Council has called at 
the office to explain the "position". It takes him 
half an hour to settle the blame on the company for 
not filling in an application form when the company 
first needed subsidies. "But you yourself knew we 
needed money then. What difference does a form make?"
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the delegate is asked. He sighs and scratches his 
forehead before replying, "If there's no form, the 
committee can't be expected to know you need money." 
The response he gets to this is, "Why didn't you fill 
in a form for us,, or tell the committee yourself?"
The delegate now smiles as if this is some sort of 
very clever trick question. "I'm not the applicant," 
he says. Eyebrows are raised and heads are shaken 
and one of the girls giggles. The delegate rises 
to leave, saying, "You do have to fill in a form," 
as though he cannot believe there exist people naive 
enough to think otherwise.
I think that actors, dispossessed of the characters 
they play on stage from the moment that they walk into the 
wings, are further dispossessed of seriousness off-stage 
as if to counter their potential for ritual power in inter­
action. My examples, I think, do show how the officials 
interacting with the actors I studied seem nervous of 
powers they have to mock if they cannot take them for what 
they are. Many times I saw this kind of interaction, and 
nearly always the actors played themselves unseriously, thus 
abetting their dispossession, as if, knowing they could 





If we wish the spectator to experience a 
maximum emotional upsurge, to send him into 
ecstasy, we must offer him a suitable 
"formula" which will eventually excite the 
desirable emotions in him.
The simplest method is to present on the 
screen a human being in a state of ecstasy, 
that is, a character who is gripped by some 
emotion, who is "beside himself".*
Rapture is to possession as deference is to demeanour, 
not the obverse side from possession of the coin "human 
interaction" and not the impress of possession's face on the 
soft substance of appreciation, but rather the sociological 
state of a subject when he feels himself to be in an object 
ritual realm that he cannot see as not being his own.
This chapter, then, is about possession from the point 
of view of the audience, and so does not "advance" my ideas on 
possession so much as go forth to meet these sideways on, so 
to speak.
Summary
I argue that, given clear enough ritual interpretability, 
rapture may become the sociological descriptor of one or more 
persons in an interaction, and, further, that rapturous 
interactions are not only of importance sociologically but
Eisenstein, Sergei (1968) "Introduction" (to screenplay 
of) The Battleship Potemkin London Lorrimer Publishing
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also, because of their nature, are neglected in sociology.
I go on to say that the possibility of rapture in interactions 
can transform these, so that beyond merely making sense to 
one another, people can become "interesting" as performed 
beings, and then enrapturing; and rapture can culminate in 
catharsis, the experience of having seen things afresh from 
a privileged point of view. Rapture I here define as a 
temporary dissolution of the self, but I propose - in an 
argument which rebuts some of Richard Bennett's recent ideas 
- that a sign of strong ritual being is the capacity to lose 
the self so as to create a richer self. Interaction, it follows 
from this, is fully interactive when persons within it lose 
themselves over and over again, in every conceivable form.
So a person begins to be definable as the very interactional 
ability to wipe himself from view and change himself totally, 
at will. Those people who are able to become strange to 
themselves can even interact, in a fully sociological sense, 
with themselves, I suggest, and this is socially functional 
when auto-rapture is its negative, shame. But, usually, 
interaction is for each interactant an alternation of 
possession and rapture, especially heightened in a love 
relationship (for the lovers their most important relationship). 
The conclusion I finally come to is that life without rapture 
is hardly sociological, since it would mainly consist in 
mutual cognitive appraisals which do not logically require the 
empathetic identification of self with other that allows 
persons to feel that through and through they are social beings.
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Interpretability
The necessary condition for rapture is that the person 
who, as it were, becomes the condition of rapture, should so 
well understand the possession which enraptures him as to 
be able to share it, when the fact that he, the enraptured 
person, is one body and the other, the possessed person, is 
a separate body, is an irrelevance that gives a misleading 
picture of the rapture-possession relation. Understanding is 
in its turn impossible if the possession does not have 
interpretability, and this, in its turn, depends on a common 
language between the persons locked together, the one 
enraptured and the other possessed. These summary points need 
to be amplified.
No matter how great the fidelity of acting on stage to
behaviour in life and no matter how skilfully essential
elements of the latter are separated from inessential and
turned inside out to expose their latent meaning, staged
conduct will not be understood by an audience unused to
seeing the conduct of everyday life in the same terms. The
successful stage illusion, says Burns (1972), depends on a
"working consensus" between performers and audience and not
on the relationship between staged and unstaged conduct. It
is not so much that people only see what they want to see,
or that they are only capable of seeing things in certain
ways, or even that they can only see what they are used to
seeing, but rather that they speak a given language and will
not fully understand conduct in a different language.^ This
constraint has never prevented great artists from reaching
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the public with no loss of power, but it is an art, and not 
a science or a technique, to perform precisely for the moment 
- in a highly intelligible yet concentrated way - something 
that because it is true of one moment is true of other moments. 
However, in any culture, not much conduct of any form is of 
this artistic order, though all conduct must aspire to the 
condition of art, in which originality of expression is the 
only way to express what seems original and, therefore, 
ritually alive.
Perhaps, then, the sense of exposure that actors 
customarily feel before a performance (reported by Little & 
Cantor, 1970, p 88) comes less from the prospect of being 
seen by a large number of people than from the certainty of 
being interpreted by them. After all, every one of millions 
of commuters each day is seen by thousands of others, and 
none of these, in streets and stations and so on, will feel 
nearly so exposed as he would were he on a stage, when an 
audience would be making up its mind about him as if he were 
their problem to be solved, either by his competent 
performance of himself or, if he could not act, by them 
despite his ineptitude.
Audiences too used to unexposed performances will sink 
into a sluggish appreciation of what it is to be alive, and 
they can be roused from this, thinks Grotowski (1976), only 
by being attacked: "We are talking about profanation. What,
in fact, is this but a kind of tactlessness based on the brutal 
confrontation between our declarations and our daily actions?" 
Profaning the audience is here seen as a stimulus from the 
stage intended to spark off the feeling of danger that alone 
augurs ritual presence.
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Grotowski's idea of using "tactless" over-exposure to
break up moribund and habitual forms of conduct of course
relies on no less well understood forms of ritual conduct.
It might even be that the varieties of the ritual code are
not so hard to translate one ot another as are verbal
languages, for instance. The fact that Peter Brook’s company
in Africa (Heilpern, 1977) succeeded in performing ritually
alive plays for audiences who were culturally very remote
suggests, indeed, that the closer one approaches a pure ritual
code the more universal it is. This does not mean that
there really is a human lingua franca but that ritual acts,
which need to be original, are equally original to all
audiences, though only those audiences who speak the performer’s
own behavioural language will easily distinguish the genuinely
original from what is unoriginal. (This explains why foreigners,
at first, are interesting and strange; they seem original.)
I now give a very simple example, from my fieldnotes, of
interpretable stage conduct, and analyse it to show how
intricate is its apparently obvious meaning. This I think
shows how much there very often may be even in enactments
that demand little decoding effort if the code is known, and
this in turn must show how little may be understood of
enactments in unfamiliar codes:
There is a piece of stage business in the first 
act that always gets a good response. McMurphy, 
against Warren's orders, has just untied the belt 
that had been restraining Bromden, when Big Nurse 
comes into the ward, freezing the inmates with 
her clipped enquiry about what is going on.
McMurphy turns wonderingly from Bromden to Big 
Nurse, whom he has not yet met, and she walks 
across the stage towards him. His face, but not 
hers, takes on a pleasant, friendly aspect.
"I’ll have that, Mr McMurphy, please," says Big 
Nurse, in a sort of singsong voice as if talking 
to a naughty child. She holds out her hand for
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the belt that McMurphy is holding in his left 
hand. He makes a long explanatory reply that 
involves him turning back and forth between 
Bromden and Big Nurse, and this distracts the 
audience from the belt and from the fact that 
Big Nurse is still holding out her hand for 
it. McMurphy then steers his remarks into the 
comment that it’s ’’mighty nice’’ to make Big 
Nurse’s acquaintance, and on that he shakes 
her by her outstretched hand. Of course, she 
pulls it away fast, and this always makes the 
audience chuckle. McMurphy then turns the 
audience response into laughter as he 
elaborately hands over the belt, acting as he 
does so as if he had quite forgotten that that 
was what Big Nurse had originally asked him for _ _ 
and as if he had also quite innocently 
misinterpreted her outstretched hand. The 
audience, every time, at once understand how 
remiss the mental patient McMurphy has been to 
shake hands with a nurse and that he has done 
this in a way that cannot be sanctioned 
legitimately and how his apologies are completely 
insincere, and it is essential that they do 
clearly understand because this and other 
dramatic enactments of the first act are all 
that build, for the audience, McMurphy’s habitual 
conduct style or character. But, even though a 
lot of meaning is being enacted in a very short 
space of time, there never seems to be any 
problem of interpretation.
Obviously, interpretability on its own is not enough to 
guarantee that the interpretable will be interpreted. Some 
possessions are more popular than others and audiences vary 
as to what they choose to become enraptured by. This touches 
on the subject of culture, high and low, and of taste, ’’good’’ 
and ’’bad’’, but here I cannot go further into the social 
processes that set up situations in which one person can say 
of a possession that has enraptured another person, ’’I don’t 
know what you see in it.’’ (Raymond Williams, F R Leavis, and 
Richard Hoggart pursue these problems that also engaged 
Arnold and Ruskin.)
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So rapture will not be brought on by a performance 
unless the performance has interpretability, and performances 
faithful to the forms of everyday life may not have this, 
and imperfectly enacted possessions will not have enough of 
this, while possessions relying on unknown behavioural codes 
may distort it, and, for audience reasons entirely, some 
possessions, however ritually powerful, may be reacted to as 
if they have no interpretability.
But interpretable possessions are the human totem poles
around which the dances of social life go on, as I now
indicate.
The Importance of Rapturous Interactions
Aesthetic contemplation, which is possible for 
any object and only especially easy for the 
beautiful, most thoroughly closes the gap between 
the self and the object. It allows as easy,
effortless and harmonious formation of the image
of the object as if this image were determined 
only by the nature of the self. Hence the 
sense of liberation which accompanies an 
aesthetic mood; it is characterized by 
emancipation from the stuffy dull pressures of 
life, and the expansion of the self with joy 
and freedom into the objects whose reality would 
otherwise isolate it.
This is how Simmel (1971) describes a merging of the self 
with an object that engrosses it, but this process is not so 
intense or affective as the merging - one self into another 
self - which yields the "rapture" that I claim is created 
when ritually powerful possession is effortlessly understood. 
However, in the same way that a person cannot give himself 
due deference (for by being someone who would give it to 
himself he would cease to merit it, and, not being able to 
merit it, could not then give it either), so a person cannot
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enrapture himself with his possession of himself, for his 
being enraptured would require that he be lost in the 
possessing self to the exclusion of the control constantly 
needed to maintain the possession. Thus, persons need other 
persons if they wish to be "taken out of themselves" into 
ritual realms that are even more releasing than the objects 
of aesthetic contemplation. The possession-rapture relation 
may be then the most social of social relations.
Rapture at possession - getting lost in what Burns (1972) 
calls a "mythical cohesion" - necessarily collapses social 
distances, and thus threatens social structures (this, 
incidentally, provides a structural reason for the framing of 
performances). A person who regularly collapses social 
distance by creating rapture is said to be charismatic in 
Weber's sense of the word, his personal gifts, Weber 
pronounces, being seen to be supernatural in origin. And 
because social distance disappears in rapture, the "charismatic 
structure" (Weber, 1974) "in contrast to any kind of bureaucratic 
organisation of offices . . . .  knows nothing of a form of an 
ordered procedure of appointment or dismissal." This is 
inevitable because "charisma knows only inner determination" 
and "its attitude is revolutionary and transvalues everything." 
Not only that, but charismatic persons, says Weber, "the 
master as well as his disciples and followers, must stand 
outside the ties of this world, outside of routine occupations, 
as well as outside the routine obligations of family life."
So organizations and movements and even societies may revolve 
around states of rapture.
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Within interaction, the rapture of one person at the 
possession of another is a mutual over-involvement of the 
kind that Goffman (1963) has said embarrasses the social
3occasion in which it occurs. So I suggest here that the 
neglect within sociology, of the kinds of interaction in which 
this sort of highly alive mutual symbiosis takes place, may 
be a result of its not being seen in society, for, knowing 
its embarrassing potential for social occasions, it hides 
away or changes its appearance as soon as it feels scrutinized. 
This is why it is so difficult to study this phenomenon, and 
why it is necessary to settle in its stead for the stylized 
variants to be found in theatres. Despite its secretive 
existence, it is still, however, a sociological phenomenon, 
because it is between persons, and, since it can be the most 
important relation persons can have with one another, it must 
have wide social repercussions.
So rapturous interactions are socially important not 
only in that they empower, through charismatic persons, 
charismatic organizations (from a world outside Weber's bureaucr­
atic world it could be argued that bureaucracies too are 
charismatic, since they work best only when bureaucrats believe 
in without reserve, or are enraptured by, the magic of pure 
rationality) but also because for the persons of society, 
considered one at a time, their most crucial social relations 
are likely to be just those in which they have the greatest 
number of their m:3t rapturous interactions. For individuals
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and for society as a whole, then, rapture is the key to 
life, and sometimes there arise political persons who 
understand this with absolute clarity. Such persons seek 
to make whole populations fall in love with them, so as to 
coalesce public and private lives into a millenial dream, 
and where this love is not forthcoming they perforce must 
coerce its simulation - I touch on this in the ’’Summary and Con­
clusions - with terror, and it has to be terror just because 
it bad needed to be love, the exorbitant responses to love 
requiring an equally exorbitant coercion if they are not 
felt. I am thinking of Hitler and the Third Reich. The 
well-known fact that for a period of his early life Hitler 
himself was wholly enraptured by Wagner’s music gives away 
the origins of his societal understandings, and, in my 
"Summary and Conclusions", when discussing the role of the 
film Taxi Driver in the life of President Reagan's would-be 
assassin, I shall be coming to a conclusion that the price 
of a Wagner is a Hitler, a person for whom no other possessions 
than Wagner's could so enrapture him. (Wagner, of course, 
knew exactly what he was doing to other people, because he
4was already doing it to Ludwig II of Bavaria.)
But few people are as spellbinding as Wagner and most 
of us have all our work cut out just to make sense - a minimum 
interpretability - in the hope that our sense might be 
interesting. Rapture may be the key to life but without sense 
being made between people at all social times no occasions for 
rapture will arise. How then does sense imperceptibly become 
interesting, or begin to acquire enough ritual power to carry
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other persons away from themselves in the direction of rapture? 
The next section of this chapter essays some provisional 
thoughts on this question.
Making Sense and Being Interesting
It is a sociological truism that when one person is in 
the presence of another it will not be possible for either 
person not to interpret the other's conduct. Persons are 
always in the predicament of actors, being seen to be convey­
ing a certain self, and, I have said, through that self 
conveying a larger scenario or ritual realm that the self 
seems to come from. A heightened consciousness of this, 
which is socially condemned as "self-consciousness", may 
bring on a state of behavioural revolt. By looking at such 
revolts, as I now shall do, one can begin to detect what it 
means to be "interesting".
The revolt may occur when an actor or an actress starts 
to feel that other people are too glib in their interpretations 
and are far too ready to believe in these. Such is the dawn 
of a Hamlet-style consciousness: "Hamlet is obsessed by the 
idea of being an actor, that is to say, of falsifying himself 
through what he does and says. His self-consciousness exceeds 
his role and blocks his performance of it" (Rosenberg, 1970). 
This shows that, whatever the self privately thinks (over 
against what its public thinks it thinks) its social existence 
is still at the behest of others, who have no option but to 
take the expressions of its consciousness as the performances
they necessarily must be. A further example of a person who
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revolts against slick and slickly interpreted outer forms of
conduct is the actress Elisabeth Vogler in Ingmar Bergman's
(1972) film Persona. She is a great actress who decides
she will act no more, on stage or in life, and at first it
seems that she is perfectly understood by her doctor, who
addresses this speech to her:
I do understand, you know. The hopeless dream 
of being. Not doing, just being. Aware and 
watchful every seconds And at the same time 
_ _ tbe abyss between what you are for others and _ _
what you are for yourself. The feeling of 
dizziness and the continual burning need to be 
unmasked. At last to be seen through, reduced, 
perhaps extinguished. Every tone of voice a 
lie, an act of treason. Every gesture false. 
Every smile a grimace. The role of wife, the 
role of friend, the roles of mother and mistress, 
which is worst? Which has tortured you most? 
Playing the actress with the interesting face? 
Keeping all the pieces together with an iron 
hand and getting them to fit? Where did it 
break? Where did you fail? Was it the role 
of mother that finally did it? It certainly 
wasn't your role as Electra. That gave you a 
rest. She actually got you to hold out for a 
while more. She was an excuse for the more 
perfunctory performances you gave in your other 
roles, your "real-life roles". But when 
Electra was over, you had nothing left to hide 
behind, nothing left to keep you going. No 
excuses. And so you were left with your demand 
for truth and your disgust. Kill yourself?
No - too nasty, not to be done. But you could 
be immobile. You can keep quiet. Then at 
least you're not lying. You can cut yourself 
off, close yourself in. Then you don't have 
to play a part, put on a face, make false 
gestures. Or so you think. But reality plays 
tricks on you. Your hiding place isn't
watertight enough. Life starts leaking in 
everywhere. And you're forced to react. No one 
asks whether it's genuine or not, whether you're 
true or false. It's only in the theatre that's 
an important question.
This speech not only shows how Elisabeth Vogler's autistic mode 
of conduct can still trigger a massive interpretation from her
doctor (.that the actress had a demand for truth perhaps even
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born of ber gift for total deception) but also that there is 
no eye-tight skin for the human being. Like it or not, 
reactions will be elicited, and they will be interpreted, 
and, worse than that Cor better, if you are a merchant of 
morality), provided they make some sense (or a sense), this 
will be taken as their complete sense. For it is only in 
the theatre, as the doctor observes, that audiences, behaving 
there like the working paranoids they must not appear to be 
in everyday life, search for the possible misrepresentations 
of conduct, since dramatic staged conduct can only be 
constructed out of these (if everything on stage at the end 
of a play is the same as it was at the beginning then there
5will have been no play). So it might be that in everyday 
life you are only what you seem to be at a cursory glance, just 
as Elisabeth Vogler, even when she severely inhibits her 
conduct by retreating into mutism, is yet seen to be a woman 
disgusted with pretence, when in fact she may have any number 
of different reasons as well as this one, or instead of it, 
for her social withdrawal. (The words "retreat" and 
"withdrawal" are fascinating evidence that, when a person 
in Anglo-American culture refuses to give a readable ritual 
realm, it is assumed that the person has "gone back" into 
some realm which is secret and guarded. The fact that the 
person is right there - in close-up too in Bergman's film - 
in no wise allays suspicions that "really" the person is just 
about anywhere else but there. Actually the person may just 
be blank, or following some train of thought that he or she 
finds senseless. But that psychologists, for example, will 
construct inner psychodramas from the minute "betrayals" of 
mad people clearly shows that, even in the face of the most
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deliberate acts of realm refusal, there is a cultural 
determination to create realms out of cues, and this 
determination is no less strong than the incapacity to accept 
that realms may not be there, or may be different to the one 
as it is read.)
So, though people, as I have proposed, might be looking 
to lose themselves in other people, they only want to do so 
up to the point that already makes sense to them. Normally 
then, persons empathise just enough to satisfy themselves that 
other persons can be made to function in a scenario 
recognisable to them. But in this case why are Hamlet and 
Elisabeth Vogler "interesting", and why are there, for that 
matter, people in everyday life, and characters in playworlds 
too, who are only looked away from with a sense of loss? The 
revolt is the clue. Those persons who refuse their others 
the perfunctory sociability that would "arouse no comment" 
open up a crack in the psychosocial mosaic. The detaching 
fragment seems to be turning on its own axis in such a way 
that its very composition is in question. Therefore it 
questions the surrounding fragments. Those next to a loosened 
social piece are immediately loosened themselves, and some of 
their own self-possession is lost to the social object that 
seems more lost, but lost only because it wants to find 
itself, with interest, where it goes looking. Interest here, 
then, is that part of a person's possession which gives itself 
into another's, as if to bring this back to itself. And, if 
it fails to do so, the other remains interesting. So an 
interesting person is a human kaleidoscope devised to always 
produce a portrait that while being faithful is obviously not
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the whole story and which, if it were the image in the 
mirror of the viewer, would do him ritual credit. (But 
there may be many real people who could be interesting yet 
are not because they do not want to be or because they are 
speaking the wrong language to the wrong audience.) Sense, 
then, that just fails to make complete sense, is the snare 
laid by the stalked interesting person. Catch him and you 
catch yourself. Lose him and you must go and find yourself 
in him again.
Perhaps it is even true that every person "can’t help" 
being interesting, but that society only works insofar as it 
makes people do their best to be as uninteresting as possible, 
to be, in other words, mere embodiments of current conduct 
fashions, limiting the originality of their variations on 
these to the bare minimum necessary to evince others' reaction 
to them as live or ritual persons. And perhaps people will 
sacrifice their personness willingly because it is ritually 
dangerous to be interesting, for interesting people threaten 
to collapse society's formal status differences which "must be" 
but "cannot be" exact equivalents of ritual differences.
That may be why many interesting people settle for being 
entertainers: being merely entertaining is a safe way of
being dangerous. A dangerous way of being safe, on the other 
hand, would be to take yourself seriously in everyday life.
I now illustrate these last aphorisms with a pair of contrasting 
fieldnotes. The first, about a punk who plays safe by 
remaining in character as a punk, shows how this is not 
necessarily his safest course of action, and the second, about 
an actor who performs murder on stage, suggests that this 
person is socially viable perhaps only because he confines
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his most theatrical conduct to stages:
N got into trouble last night. After drinking 
beer all evening, he followed a courting couple 
through the centre of Bath. When the couple 
entered a telephone kiosk together and started 
kissing each other, N responded like a true punk 
by opening the kiosk door and yelling at the 
couple: "You dirty fuckers!" Then he slammed the
door on them as hard as he could. A small pane 
of glass at the bottom of the door fell out and 
broke in two on the pavement and at exactly the 
same instant a hand clamped itself on N's 
shoulder. N turned round to confront the 
policeman who had been following him following 
the couple. The policeman arrested N, took him 
to the Police Station, and charged him with some 
offence or other. N was kept in custody until 
bailed from the Magistrates’ Court the following 
morning.
Night after night, watching McMurphy grab Big 
Nurse by the throat and then hammer her head 
against the wall of the Nurses’ Station, I am 
struck by how murderous B looks when he is doing 
this. The expression on his face seems then the 
perfect completion of another expression he often 
has off-stage, of glazed restraint. Perhaps this 
kind of tolerated head banging has become 
indispensable for his general sense of himself. 
It’s not easy to imagine what he would do or be 
if he wasn’t allowed to act, but I don’t feel 
it would necessarily not be frightening for 
society.
The interesting in social life, then, is that which makes 
a sense more absorbing than is usual, and whose regard involves 
a loss of self to the degree that the lost self is absorbed.
So interest is a form of rapture - much more frequently 
encountered than rapture - which, I now add, must stand most 
chance of being experienced in the rituals of ritual life when 
these are "full" as in theatres.
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Interest shown also revises the interested person, for 
after being interested he returns to himself changed from 
the person he was before becoming interested, but rapture 
that can come to a climax in catharsis can completely change 
tbe enraptured person, as I now elaborate.
Sociable Catharsis and Cathartic Sociability
I have said that persons are apt to be perfunctory in 
their interpretations of one another, but this, I now submit, 
may be partly a result of the press and rush of modern social 
arrangements. No one has enough time for anyone else. The 
ritual deprivation stemming from this endless social super­
ficiality - which exists even between those lovers who keep 
glancing at their watches - may build up to a well-nigh 
insatiable demand for processed, condensed, dramatic life.
In Anglo-American culture, it does seem that there must be 
stages and screens on which lives are distilled and served up 
with a narrative clarity that makes normal life look as if its 
medium is mud, and the human images on these stages and 
screens are there to receive the viewer's identification to 
such a degree that he will get rid of his limiting self the 
more so as he is "moved".
It is often wondered why entertainment thrives in hard 
times, and surprise is expressed that people who should be 
facing up to adverse realities choose escape. By my 
reasoning, the escape is a functional reassurance that the 
escaper is not really as imprisoned by his social circumstance 
as he had thought. Entertainment lets people be the people
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life prevents them from becoming, and they need to be these
people very much indeed, for if they cannot become them they
stop being people altogether. (Conversely, when life is too
pleasant, persons may seek out entertainment that blackens
their horizons, going to see Citizen Kane or King Lear. In
this way they escape the delusion that, for example, human
beings are happy creatures.) So the stage and the screen
are where society short-circuits itself. The dullage of
everyday life is simply cut out, both as content and
consequence. (Of course, what is shown must look like the
dullage, but unlike everyday dullage it should be dense with 
.6meaning.)
Aristotle (1975) thought that all healthy societies 
should include the dramatic performances of tragedy. Within 
tragedy there should be, he says, "incidents arousing pity and 
fear," the pity at seeing a person receiving "undeserved 
misfortune" and the fear from his being "a man like ourselves." 
The social purpose of drama, Aristotle thought, is to draw 
its audience into it by empathetic identification so that the
7emotions they will feel by imitation will "purge" them 
"cathartically". It is as though, for Aristotle, the dramatic 
short-circuit is an electro-convulsive therapy for audiences, 
jolting them into seeing sense where, before, their social 
life had been slowly turning into a long sad vista of entropie 
repetitions.
In my rhetoric catharsis is simply the outcome of rapture 
at possession, and maybe it is most necessary for those most 
"out of" life, as Freud found, for he took this concept to the
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gcentre of his therapeutic practice.
It even seems that possessions in general may often be 
the outcome of cathartic rapture, and it is possible that 
rapture in this way has an important function for possession, 
not just between people but as a routine imaginative require­
ment. Thus the renowned bio-chemist Jacques Monod (1974) 
thinks his understanding of a protein molecule is arrived at 
in this fashion:
I have . . . found myself, after lengthy 
concentration on the imagined experience to 
the exclusion of everything else, identifying 
with a molecule of protein. However, it is 
not at that moment that the significance of 
the simulated experiences becomes clear, but 
only when it has been enunciated symbolically. 
Indeed, the nonvisual images with which 
simulation works should be regarded not as 
symbols, but, if I may so phrase it, as the 
subjective and abstract "reality" offered 
directly to imaginary experience.
Here Monod says that his merging with a form, not even human, 
enables his later representation of it through a symbolic 
performance, which - if this makes him understand the molecule 
anew - is then cathartic. The same process is described by 
the French literary critic Maurice Nadeau (1972), attributing 
it to Flaubert (the quoted phrases in the following are taken 
by Nadeau from Flaubert’s correspondence):
For Flaubert, to write was to allow himself 
to be invested by "the objective" until he 
merged into it, and then, by "atrocious labour" 
and "fanatical and devoted perseverance" to 
"operate" on the compound formed by the 
interiorized "thing" or the exteriorized self 
and make it yield up the word which gives it 
its existence. In this way, "style is the
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very life-blood of thought" though the 
"marvellous chemistry" by which words explode 
into another world, another nature, "remains 
completely incomprehensible."
Flaubert merges with the world he perceives and "explodes"
out of it (catharsis) as words that are "another world" or
"another nature", or, in my terms, a ritual realm. (This
ritual realm of course is not Schütz's paramount reality,
but is paramount to those lost in it,who, for example,
reading a book, may reach a point of not being able to see
that it is mere words. The words conceal their verbality
then as successfully as successful ritual people conceal
their biological humanness.) Nadeau goes on to say that
for Flaubert "as for Mallarmé, language 'nothings'
(neantise) the thing it designates, and must be 'nothinged'
in its turn for the thing to emerge in its primal freshness
together with the unique expression which reveals it." So
one might say that to speak at all is to catharsize oneself,
coming to be the exact possession of what had been enrapturing
Not all catharses are like Madame Bovary, and against that
many individuals, with no forms or words for anything,
perhaps eschewing these in favour of "authenticity", are the
positively or negatively enraptured abeyances of themselves,
never, as it is said, "coming into their own," as little
definable as babies who in place of sentences and paragraphs
gcan only cry "Wow" or "Too much".
Ritual realms, it must not be forgotten, are not really 
there, and only arise in words and performances, but words 
and performances are really there for people, where reality is 
not, because they are ritual realms generated by articulated
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incorporations of otherness into self. This is not a 
question of one frame being preferred over another (Goffman, 
1975), but of a frame itself preferring more than others to 
be preferred. So Flaubert, the artist-masturbator, an 
alchemist of meaning, distils an aphrodisiac that is itself 
for itself, or as Flaubert put it, "Madame Bovary, c'est moi." 
People do this sort of thing, I have suggested, because they 
want to be people, i.e. always more interestingly defined.
They are scientists through and through: they want to be the 
knowable unknown of themselves and more than that to be 
carried away by themselves so as to know more of more 
unknowability, and so on.
So I conclude here that phenomena make sense sometimes 
to the point of becoming interesting, and that the interest 
they command can turn into rapture which can dissolve an 
enraptured self prior to its new resolution, and that this 
may be a general feature of creative intellection.
The point has been reached now where rapture, because of 
its far-reaching effect of identity destruction, does not look 
innocuous any more, as does some such condition as "taking 
the role of the other." An enraptured person, far from 
taking the role of the other, a phrase which implies and 
which I think is meant to imply that there is not only a 
degree of choice in the "taking" but only a small amount of 
the self engaged in doing this taking, actually becomes wholly 
the other, submitting to the other in an absolute manner. So 
the possessed other of an enraptured person is his master.
Is the self-destruction of rapture better avoided? I 
now try to answer "No" to this question, largely by arguing 
against Sennett (1977), who would answer "Yes". But first I
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shall go into the interaction phenomenon of "atmosphere", 
to emphasise a point to be made more strongly later that 
human interaction in an "atmospheric" or quasi-rapturous 
(positive or negative) state is so because it is on the verge 
of possessions it fears and desires. This will support my 
view that rapture - as Sennett fears it is not - is inherently 
unstable and ever likely to give way to possession.
An "atmosphere" may be defined as the behavioural 
state for interactants in which the dominant orientations 
are to unacted performances that are nonetheless indicated 
by the present conduct. A cheerful atmosphere is one in 
which participants might seem to be restraining themselves 
from breaking into song and dance, while an unpleasant 
atmosphere is one in which open expressions of dislike and 
acts of hostility are "just below the surface". "Air" can 
be "cleared" of threatening antipathies by addressing them 
directly; serious differences that still cannot be settled 
then may be settled interactionally with the formula of 
"agreeing to differ," which will be a mutual tolerance of 
irreconcilable opinions in which expressed "undercurrents" 
of dislike are outlawed by common consent.
Sometimes, however, atmospheres can be so thick that 
"you could cut them with a knife". (In atmospheres like
these an interactant may not even dare to open his mouth 
lest "one wrong word" result in his having "his head bitten 
off".) Most marriages produce thick atmospheric conditions
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at times, in which one or other or both of the partners may 
be reduced to complaining, "Everything I do seems to be 
wrong." This "getting on each other's nerves" can be cleared 
not only by verbal agreements but also by the interactional 
quantum leap to a "row", during which performances can include 
physical assault, shouting, screaming, violent language, 
weeping, and the smashing of treasured objects. Rows that 
do not end in injuries or in one or other partner "walking 
out", and often those that do, eventually lead to reconciliations, 
when the whole process is set in motion again. What is 
happening here, I suggest, is that persons who are too familiar 
with each other's possessions suffer thwarted rapture which 
builds up an atmosphere only cleared if the possessions are 
changed, as in rows, when two furious persons wholly engross 
each other in the mode I have called enrapturing, though 
negatively, with each side shaming the other, until catharsis 
of some sort ensues ("making it up in bed," etc when the 
rowing couple, two demons, are sent packing like actors after 
their too-exhausting show is over.) But of course atmospheres 
exist in most interactions and it may even be possible to say 
that if an interaction has no atmosphere then it is not an 
interaction. And it seems as if it is of the nature of 
atmospheres, the thicker they get, to precipitate from 




In his important work, The Fall of Public Man, Richard 
Sennett (1977) continually worries about the social situation 
in which "one person must become master of, and distant from, 
the feeling to which another will submit." But I think that, 
correct though he is to isolate the activity of submission, 
he misplaces his reservations in the actual process of 
interaction rather than in the purposes and abilities of 
possessing persons. After all, it is exhilarating and 
enlarging to submit to Johan Sebastian Bach when it is not 
nearly so improving to go along with Barbra Streisand and is 
perverting to sink oneself Into the person of a Charles Manson. 
Christopher Ricks (1974) in his book about John Keats,
Keats and Embarrassment, makes my point when he shows that 
Keats' ability to empathize, rated by Ricks as outstanding, 
derived from the very instability of his own identity, whose 
instability, Ricks argues, is the necessary condition for 
empathy. There is no contradiction here. Strong identity 
is not fixed identity, but is one that is extraordinarily 
sensitive and accommodative to its human surround, and the 
more sensitive it is through its instability the more it will 
know the difference between Bach and Radio One. Rapture is 
not, however, involuntary (as Sennett assumes it always must 
be) but, when it is volunteered, of course it is submission 
(as Sennett regrets very deeply), of a nature, I must say, 
that simply cannot be maintained (whatever Sennett fears) 
when what it would submit to shows itself as ugly according to 
an aesthetic scale developed through earlier submissions. The 
idea being advanced here, that to be fixed and unyielding is to
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be weak of identity, is actually quite an old one, even though 
it still runs contrary to many modern behavioural myths. 
Strindberg (1964) in 1888 put it as follows:
The word "character" has, over the years, 
frequently changed its meaning. Originally 
it meant the dominant feature in a person's 
psyche, and was synonymous with temperament.
Then it became the middle-class euphemism 
for automaton; so that an individual who had 
stopped developing, or who had moulded himself 
to a fixed role in life - in other words, 
stopped growing - came to be called à ^'character" 
^ whereas the man who goes on developing, the 
skilful navigator of life's river, who does not 
sail with a fixed sheet but rides before the 
wind to luff again, was stigmatised as 
"characterless" (in, of course, a derogatory 
sense) because he was so difficult to catch, 
classify and keep tabs on.
I do not think, however, that Sennett need be accused 
of having a middle-class prejudice against protean man, but 
it does seem that the cynicism with which performers sometimes 
view their performances makes him very suspicious of rapture. 
Thus, as if to seal his argument, he quotes Liszt on 
Paganini: "He who created so much enthusiasm could make no 
friends among his fellow men. . . . Paganini's god was never 
any other than his own gloomy, sad 'I'." But this situation 
only comes about for Paganini because he would not or could 
not find any possession beyond his own in which to enrapture 
himself, and the fault for this surely lies elsewhere than in 
his own musical virtuosity in front of audiences.
It seems to me, then, that what most troubles Sennett is 
that possession - which I am saying the performer can hardly 
ever experience as his audience does - carries audiences away
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to nowhere but where they came from and this very often 
through a possession the performer turns on like a mechanical 
projector. But Sennett seems to have quite forgotten his 
earlier book, The Uses of Disorder (1970), in which he makes 
this excellent observation:
The fact that a man can care about something 
outside himself is a sign that he has a 
distinctive self of his own.
Men who cannot become enraptured at least to this degree of 
'taring" are, Sennett says in The Uses of Disorder, "indifferent 
to the effects of their acts, especially in moments of strain, 
because they have not developed a sense of themselves that 
would give them the strength to have a sense of others." And 
Sennett's ideas are the same as mine when, in the earlier book, 
he says that caring is a prerequisite for being somebody - 
because caring, a form of empathy, is mild rapture - but when he 
proposes, in The Fall of Public Man, that you cannot have a 
self if you allow it to feel rapture I think he assumes that 
rapture must preclude possession. Sennett's horror of an 
encounter group society, in which human forms would degenerate 
into a psychosocial ooze, is one I share, but this kind of 
society is surely not prevented by a taboo on rapture, and may 
not be prevented, either, by a taboo on becoming enraptured by 
poor people ( F R Leavis would strongly disagree) because any 
state of rapture is the beginning of a voyage out of the self 
and, in any case, cannot survive either its disillusion with 
any given possession or the disintegration of that possession.
My argument is that Sennett's two extremes - on the one
hand the personalisation of self by unique conduct and on the
other hand the elaborate control of the ungiving self - are
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not polar opposites. The opposite of originality is not 
controlled unoriginality, for originality, I have shown, 
depends on control much more than does unoriginality. (I 
have in fact claimed that originality has no polar opposite, 
only its rapturous appreciation, the state Sennett equates 
with passive unoriginality.) Presence of rapture, I 
therefore contend, in no wise irretrievably dissolves the 
self and may even be a condition for the self’s growth 
(though absence of rapture need not prevent wholly original 
possessions ).
Now follow two fieldnote passages about occasions that 
illustrate this idea. In the first a punk becomes more of 
a punk by having been enraptured by a punk performer, and in 
the second nurses work in a more nurse-like fashion after 
helplessly watching others being more nurse-like than themselves
Jimmy Pursey, of the only currently viable punk 
group. Sham 69, has been on stage an hour at the 
Bath Pavilion. He finishes a song, and then, in 
the silence, points at the handcuffs he has 
clipped into the belt loops of his jeans. Out 
of breath from singing and dancing around, he now 
almost gasps into the microphone (setting off some 
painful feedback): "The next one’s for anyone who's 
ever worn a pair of these." This excites the 
punks like nothing else, and as the guitars 
practically knock down the back wall with their 
opening chords the punks pogo faster than ever. 
They're completely out of time with the beat, 
punching fists into the air and leaping up and 
down out of phase with one another. Over their 
bobbing heads in the spotlight beam the air 
clouds with the steam of their sweat, and Jimmy 
Pursey, on stage alone in the beam, writhes like a 
skewered dervish. Then he freezes and the noise 
stops dead and he yells into the microphone: "I 
never had fuck all I" And before one has time to 
respond to this in one's mind the music hits one 
again like a hammer blow between the eyes. The 
punks are beside themselves, all of them thoroughly 
enraptured, and in their midst I spot one of the
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Bath punks who for the first time in twelve 
months looks as if he's enjoying himself.
After the concert, on my way to a restaurant,
I see him standing alone, very posed, right on 
the edge of a kerb next to fast traffic in a 
one-way street. The passing headlights splash 
him with violent light and shadow so that his 
face is like a flickering, heatless flame, 
hardly a part of his general appearance which 
is that of a teenage tramp who has been dragged 
backwards through barbed-wire dripping with 
day-glo dyes. I am convinced that he is 
absolutely conscious of his stance, and that he 
relishes the image he makes. His being as he 
is at this moment can only be as a result of 
his earlier total identification with Jimmy 
Pursey on stage.
Bedmaking is done in pairs clockwise round the 
ward. With some nurses, it's very easy to 
match my movements with pillow, sheet, blanket, 
and bedspread to theirs, and with others almost 
impossible. And yet all do it in exactly the 
same prescribed fashion. The nurses are well 
aware that this is how it always is. Today, a 
nurse new on the ward partners up with the very 
tidy nurse, the one who opts for working with 
equipment rather than with people whenever she 
can. The two seem to be competing, not only to 
see how fast each can go but to see how neatly 
they can work. When they get onto their third 
bed, they don't see that Sister (who is very bad 
at beds herself, and knows it) is now stood 
watching them, quite fascinated. The rest of us 
also stop doing what we are doing and watch, 
because it is impossible to take one's eyes off 
this brilliantly synchronised "first-time" 
performance. The two nurses finish their bed 
and then, of course, notice they have been the 
centre of attention. Sister smiles at them and 
walks off back to her office, while the two nurses 
look at each other and at the rest of us and laugh 
as does everybody now. Then, when we resume our 
bedmaking, we try a little harder and work a little 
faster, and only because we have seen how well what 
we are doing can be done.
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Being a Person Means Losing Oneself
In exploring what by my theoretical light seem to be one 
or two inadequacies on Sennett’s part, I have cleared the way 
for my making of the point (already made from possession’s 
point of view at the end of Chapter VII) that pure possessions 
exhaust "being" not only of those who would become enraptured 
by them but also of those who are so possessed, and this point 
J make to suggest that auto-rapture, which I shall deal with 
shortly, is an implicit, but only implicit, condition of the 
possessed person. His state of being nothing but his legible 
surface needs, as I have said, his full control, which would be 
gone if he went over to rapture at a possession that in this 
case just happens to be his own. But, implicitly, all of 
himself, of whom his possession is its clearest definition, is 
taken into his own possession just as it would be if he were 
enraptured by it, but with this difference, that it is taken 
into a form that it already knows, in which, usually, it 
cannot get lost unless it would wittingly or unwittingly confuse 
the possession. (Thus, if you do it yourself, you ^  it, and 
if someone else does it in front of you he does it and you do 
not have to do it yourself, and if you are the one doing it 
your "implicit" rapture is the loss of your being with no 
compensating bonus of discovery.) Sartre (1963) says much the 
same of Genet's and Wilde's absolute declaration for the 
surfaces of life:
If Genet feels in his heart that Beauty concerns 
him, the reason is that, like evil, it demands of 
him the most difficult conduct. It requires that 
he live according to its law, the law that Wilde,
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prince of aesthetes, calls style and Genet 
elegance. "In matters of great importance," 
says the former, "the vital element is not 
sincerity,but style." And the latter: "The 
only criterion of an act is its elegance." 
Elegance: the quality of conduct which 
transforms the greatest quantity of being into 
appearing. An act is the less elegant as it 
leaves a larger quantity of waste, of 
unassimilable residues, as it involves a greater 
degree of utilitarian conduct. Gratuitous and 
destructive, the act is all the more elegant as 
it transforms reality into appearance for a 
larger number of spectators.
Elegance, style, and possession, the more intense they 
are, are all the more concerned with audience, and are the 
truest manifestations of social man: that is the message of 
this thesis. Yet both Wilde and Genet, extreme stylists, 
the one with his cult of beauty, in which the contemplation 
of beauty was the only other excuse for life besides that of 
being beautiful oneself, and the other with his devotion to 
criminals (practised both by his passive homosexuality and 
his adorational prose), found that their creation of aesthetic 
words of performance was invariably the outcome of respective 
losses of self in rapturous abandonment. So the implicit 
rapture of clear possession may be a function of a person's 
capacity for direct rapture in an external possession, the 
greater this latter capacity the more his potential for 
effective self possession. This I think supports my argument 
that rapture and possession are very often found side by side, 
to the same degree, in the same person, as well as reciprocally 
between persons. Thus it would follow that, when persons 
interact, their biographies, for example, may have very little 
importance if the interaction is ritually alive, and if it is 
alive like this it may come about that any interactant may 
feel he is any other interactant. Interactants will then
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feel strange or familiar as they are possessed or enraptured, 
and sometimes, when a possession is perfect and the strange 
is as familiar as the familiar is strange, interaction - 
at its most interactive - will be a juggling of endlessly 
metamorphosing identities that hardly belong to the bodies 
without which (in not every case) they could not be there.
In everyday life one does not meet many moral aesthetes 
on the order of Wilde or Genet, but one is unlikely to meet 
another person who does not act, who does n̂ ot conjure a - 
realm, and who does not do this except to try to bring about 
in his audience a belief, which he would like to be a 
rapturous one, that by his performance he comes into his own 
as a person, just like them. A person then is someone who 
if you look at him is not there, because if he is there you 
cannot look at him, since then you must be him, who is not 
watched by your eyes but entered by these, and this "him" is 
constituted not by any confessional act of definition but by 
the quality of his playing with any material that comes to 
his hand, only being his and his only because of, if he has 
it, his unique style or "behavioural signature", as Goffman 
(1975, p 547) has said:
...when an individual appears in person before 
his familiars and joins with them in talk - 
surely the place where we ought to see him in 
the round, acting for himself, in his own name 
and in his own way - he frames himself from 
view. To say that he assumes a role and 
presents himself through it is already a bias 
in the direction of wholeness and authenticity.
What he does is to present a one-man show. He 
animates. That much is his own, his doing of 
the moment. But this capacity to present is 
largely used in the name of principals other 
than he-himself-at-the-moment. Certainly, 
beliefs, concerns, feelings, attitudes, are 
"expressed"; "inner states" are documented.
But these displays are not some privileged 
access to the biological innards of the speaker, 
for they are properly to be attributed to a
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figure animated, not the animator.
So a person is not someone who merely is a person before 
one's very eyes - such a person is only a creature, as he 
must be to those students of interaction who cannot or will 
not become enraptured (consider the above quotation and try 
to visualise the individual described, and immediately you 
realise that your refusal to be taken in by his performance 
makes him little more than a figure of fun). A person is 
someone who agitates his audience's imaginations, a being 
who is the pretext for a world of meanings, a sort of 
behavioural commotion that both he and his others with their 
gestures and their words seem to be groping through as if 
there is a way out of it into a world of clear, hard truth 
not a long way away but, if only one can find the right 
word at the right time, liable to open itself up at any 
instant. And occasionally a person does and says things 
in such a way that those around him fall in love with him, 
by which I mean they lose their sense of separation, becoming 
nothing but possessed consciousnesses wishing to further 
excite the being they are watching, but are no longer conscious 
of watching, into a form so true that it will be irrefutable.
A society without citizens who can relate in these ways, it 
must be said, is not much more than a crowd of strangers, a 
sort of limbo to a hell of inviolable solitudes, and is not a 
social place that will claim any loyalty from its denizens, 
nor have much use for sociology if sociology is the study of 
social life considered as being social. This asocial limbo, 
of course, exists for the major part of their time for the 
majority of people, in every city of the world.
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To close this section I invite the reader to ponder the 
following long excerpt from my theatre fieldnotes, which 
hints at what rapturous interaction might be. Then I follow 
that with an excerpt from a transcript of a university 
seminar which shows a singular lack of rapture between the 
two conversants who are in fact colleagues:
We shove our way into the club - it's like 
boarding a Northern Line tube in the rush 
hour at Leicester Square - and start struggling 
towards the bar. Already slightly drunk, 
after the post-performance drinks in the 
Griffin, no one notices their feet being 
trodden on or that they are treading on other 
people's feet and also on coats that have been 
brushed off the backs of chairs. I fancy 
that I am first to the bar but there ahead of 
me to my left is B, his eyes very bright, 
presumably because the pupils are dilated after 
his sniffing cocaine earlier on in the men's 
dressing room. He would also appear to have 
lost the capacity to blink. I wonder who he's 
going to be when he orders his pint of Guinness, 
the Lancashire lad made good, the gypsy, the 
forthright artesan, the gifted director,
McMurphy, the womaniser, the failure and 
alcoholic, the paranoid, the rustic thespian, 
or what. He tilts his head back very slightly 
and at the same time turns his head very slightly 
from side to side taking in not only me but 
the entire press of his fellow actors shoving 
towards the bar, each of them thrusting paper 
money at Tom and his assistant as they dash 
back and forth behind the counter, drawing the 
outstretched hands after them like tentacles.
Tom seems more hunched than usual, peering out from 
under his forehead as though expecting a hail of 
glasses and bottles, and then he sees B and 
notices the familiar look of calm belligerence, 
and comes to him straightaway. I've been so 
intent on watching B ride this rip-tide of 
outsize personalities that I have stopped hearing 
the noise. Then I come to and hear an 
undifferentiated roar, through which the juke-box 
- it's the Stranglers singing, "Whatever happened 
to Leon Trotsky?" - even at full volume can 
barely be heard. There's a sudden lull in the 
sound and it coincides with a brief pause in the 
music. B supplies the Stranglers' next line 
slightly ahead of them and in an undertone:
"He got an ice-pick." B buys me a pint along 
with his Guinness which means that he's decided
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to be Orson Welles, and I feel he wants me to 
say something arresting so as to justify to 
him his decision to make me privy to his life 
style. Without really thinking, I lean across 
and shout in his hear: "Alcohol, the great
ventriloquist." He smiles broadly. Then a 
voice in my ear - it belongs to Martini, but 
I can’t turn round to check because of the 
crush - says, with surprising clarity above 
the roar: "Glove puppets!" There's a lot of
laughter and spilled beer now, and the next 
thing I remember I am in a group sat round a 
circular table so full of glasses that there 
isn't space for a matchbox let alone a micro 
tape-recorder. Hands keep swooping into the 
collection of full and empty and half-empty 
glasses -and-sometimes it'-S-almost-surprising 
- they snatch up not glasses but lit cigarettes 
from the ashtray in the middle of them all.
I'm very aware of people's teeth and the red 
fingernails of women and the eyes glancing this 
way and that and voices almost polyphonic 
as if detached from faces and including my 
own as if detached from me. I keep looking 
at my watch - every time I do so I think 1 am 
looking at it too much - and each time it shows 
another thirty minutes as if some child under 
the table has moved on the minute hand for 
devilment. In the toilets I try to reconstruct 
who I am sitting with and what the conversation 
has been about, but B comes in and, as if I 
have prompted the remark, says conclusively:
"No more heroes." After a pause, he adds:
"The excellence of mediocrity." I just cannot 
remember what I said, but I do remember him 
chuckling with appreciation. The next day (now, 
as I am writing) I feel - through a headache 
like pounding smog - that I have been in a sort 
of giant concrete mixer and haven't yet reformed 
into a slightly different shape to the one I 
had before I chucked myself into the mixer. My 
only thought at this point - the point of 
giving up the reconstruction of persons and their 
statements, which I never carried on from where 
I began it in the toilets last night - is that 
people are afraid of self-propelled interaction 
not because the reasons for it may be wrong 
but because it can become the reason for every­
thing else which, when it is lacking, leaves 
one in social worlds that simply do not feel 
sufficiently social. Thus pubs, pub life, and 
the "problem" of alcoholism.
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X: So if you look at that work and I don’t
want to get into that stuff in detail because 
it’s - it’s all very complicated and - and 
um well worked out I mean it’s well worth 
while just going back to the thing. They’ve 
got - let me see - they’ve got - they 
identify eight threats to internal validity 
and another four to external validity, and 
they work out all sorts of elegant designs 
(pause in which speaker smiles pityingly 
and patronisingly) of - um - experimental 
treatments to meet these different threats. 
Um. , .
Y : Interesting...
(The door to this seminar room has swung into an
open position of its own accord.)
X: What? (Looks to door.) A non-person coming
in.
Y : Non-person coming in.
X: An invalid person.
(No laughter. Four seconds of silence.)
X: So, and then there’s all sorts of other -
sort of - discussions about validity, there’s 
all sorts of different definitions about 
validity - um - in the literature, about - 
um - face validity - about whether it looks 
right on the surface - at least to a 
reasonably discriminative observer does it 
look right. And there’s notions of convergent 
validity, which are the notions of using 
a set of different measures to sort of 
triangulate in on what we’re trying to 
measure...
Y : Sorry X - Can I? - I ’m in a muddle - I don’t
know when - how soon you want the discussion 
to start, because I don’t want to stop your 
- your development of the argument but there 
are already one or two queries I’ve got.
X: Aha.
Y: And they’re terminological. Are you talking
of validity of measures or the validity of 
evidence or the validity of conclusions? 
Because some of the things you’ve been saying 
are traditionally in the business of the 
validity of measures, like valid - like 
validity and reliability of measures - do they 
measure what they purport to measure. Um.
But some of the arguments might also be about 
the validity of conclusions which you come to
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on the basis of examining the evidence - 
X : Uhum.
Y: Is your evidence a valid sample or is the
conclusion you've drawn validly drawn. Which 
is it you’re talking about?
X: Yeah. That’s a confusion in my mind as well.
Man, therefore, does not live by himself alone. But some 
manage quite well, sometimes seemingly indifferent to the rest 
of the species, in a state, auto-rapture, whose definition is 
overdue.
Auto-Rapture
I started out by saying that a person cannot enrapture 
himself. This is not strictly true, but cases of auto-rapture, 
as one might call it, do depend on the strangeness of the self 
to the "same” self that regards it. Louis Bouilhet reported 
that his friend Gustave Flaubert could not help crying when he 
re-read Madame Bovary. Here an author is worked on by his own 
performance. Similarly a man might build his own physique into 
something wondrous to his eyes, as one of the heroes of Mishima’s 
Kyoko’s House (in Nathan, 1975) does:
What he now beheld was something he had 
created himself; moreover it was himself.
Mike Katz (Gaines & Butler, 1980) has similar experiences
Sometimes when you’re working out in the gym, 
and you’re so much more developed and, you 
know, unbelievable in comparison to anybody
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working out around you, you say to yourself, 
"Man, am I real? Is it possible that I 
really am this big?"
Freud (1978) says that women "especially if they grow up with 
good looks" love themselves as deeply as they are loved by men. 
Of these and other auto-rapturous beings he writes:
Such women have the greatest fascination for men, 
not only for aesthetic reasons, since as a rule 
they are the most beautiful, but also because of 
a combination of interesting psychological factors^
For it seems very evident that another person’s 
narcissism has a great attraction for those who 
have renounced part of their own narcissism and 
are in search of object love. The charm of a 
child lies to a great extent in his narcissism, 
his self-contentment and inaccessibility, just 
as does the charm of certain animals which seem 
not to concern themselves about us, such as cats 
and the large beasts of prey. Indeed, even great 
criminals and humorists as they are represented 
in literature, compel our interest by the 
narcissistic consistency with which they manage 
to keep away from their ego anything that would 
diminish it.
What Freud is saying here, of course, virtually rejects its own 
concept of narcissism, for there is no need to say any more 
than that the self enraptured in itself is only enraptured by 
what would enrapture any self, and that this is the simple 
reason why other selves come to be enraptured by auto-enraptured 
people. (And being enraptured in or possessed by one’s own 
possession of the moment must strengthen it so long as the auto­
rapture does not reduce the possession’s consciousness.)
But, as if going along with Freud’s idea that narcissism 
or auto-rapture is of itself attractive, many people assume that 
auto-rapturous persons would be relatively closed to possessions 
other than their own. I now advance the opposite view that a 
person is more likely to be able to achieve the state of auto-
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rapture if he can become relatively easily enraptured by 
other possessions first.
To appreciate this, it must be born in mind that rapture 
is not a state produced as it were involuntarily. A great 
performance might be resisted - Pontius Pilate was only "almost" 
persuaded - and a bad one might be used for absorptive purposes, 
as when people allow themselves to drift into the tune of an 
indifferent song. So persons can deliberately cultivate their 
interest and rapture in artefacts or performances they would be 
inclined to ignore. Thus Genet, as Sartre (1963) discloses:
He CGenetl uses gestures as instruments of 
prospecting. He has informed us of his method:
"I take gestures chosen from young men passing 
by. At times it’s a French soldier, an American, 
a hoodlum, a bartender. . . . They suddenly 
offer me a gesture which can only be Erik’s.
I shall take note of it. . . . I sometimes try 
to imitate the discovered gesture. I note the 
state that it makes me know." No doubt he is 
only momentarily a beggar, a fallen queen, a ship’s 
ensign. But there are only momentary souls. The 
one that remains longest or that recurs most often 
we call our soul, and we are surprised to find it
again after a long journey. Proust, too,
experienced the surprise that Genet cultivates 
and that Darling tries to ignore, and he often 
wondered how, "after deep slumber. . . . seeking 
one’s mind, one’s personality, as one seeks a 
lost object, one ends by finding one’s own self 
rather than any other."
In this way an oft-enraptured person can almost become a 
stranger to himself, or, to put it in the language of this 
thesis, can reawaken himself to the contingent nature of his own 
possession which then - just because it has been made strange - 
much more than the closed "narcissistic" self opens itself up
for the rapture that is auto-rapture. He who would readily
inhabit possessions, of others and of himself, then, will develop 
a finer consciousness of these than his opposite extreme, the 
man who "does not waste his time" on other people. In everyday
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life, one might go on to say, the "showing of an interest" 
that is the mark of an auto-rapturous person will inevitably 
facilitate more interesting displays, for resolute shows of 
"not being interested" will likely blight all but the hardiest 
ritual growths, because of the feedback process (noted in 
Chapter VIII) of ritual awareness fuelling ritual power.
However, auto-rapture may not be merely and only the 
personal pay-off for being interested in others or for being, 
as Ereud thought, interesting of oneself. A social function 
is performed by its negative, "shame". The ashamed person, or 
the person who fears to feel ashamed of himself, is brought into 
social line by no other internal process than that, when he 
contemplates, as if from outside it, his engrossing self, he, 
the contemplator, is suddenly "mortified" by what engrosses him. 
His rapture then does not cathartically precipitate a better 
self, but, abruptly negativized, spits out a grim consciousness 
bent on nothing more splendiferous than "living down" its 
socially unacceptable predecessor.
One would expect, therefore, that in interaction auto-rapture 
will probably alternate with possession, the fully auto-enraptured 
person not being social enough and the possessed person always to 
some degree - despite that I have said he is familiar with himself 
from the inside - identifying rapturously with his possession (as 
much as he is unfamiliar with it by his coming to it from other 
enrapturing possessions), and, in the same way, two persons, 
interacting, might be in a state, each of them, of alternating 
possession (of himself) and rapture (in the other) that is quite 
wrongly represented here as discontinuous events. Although I
298
shall stick to my analytic schema, I am indicating that this is 
all it is, and that, useful as it may be, it may not very 
accurately chart the actual reciprocations, one with another, 
of possession and rapture in interaction, about which, however, 
practically nothing is not open to revision. I now fill out 
these thoughts a little more.
Direct and Alternating Interaction
I have already said why i think Richard Sennett (1977) is 
unnecessarily alarmed by the capacities for rapture that persons 
show, and I have indicated that it might be a mistake to see 
rapture as exclusive of possession, as does Sennett when he says 
the intimacy of private life can only beget "refugee" personalities 
and "soft selves". Against the soft selves "in a hard world"
(p 260) Sennett advocates the development of masks, recommending 
a new animation of these false faces, which would require the 
practice of an all-but lost art of public performance between 
persons. Though I thoroughly agree with Sennett that rapture 
confronted with rapture involves a deterioration of human 
definition inimical to the production of rapture in the first 
place, I cannot go along with him in assuming that possession 
must only meet equal and opposite possession - though in "rounding" 
this in effect is what it does, but, I am saying, adamantly, with 
intervening rapture on both sides. I say this because it does not 
seem to me that it must follow that an enraptured person is not, 
straightaway after being enraptured, capable of assuming a 
commanding possession, any more than it must follow that a 
possessed person is not, straightaway after
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achieving a very high definition of self, capable of sinking 
completely into someone else’s equally defined performance.
Thus I am led to say that this process of possession becoming 
rapture in each and every person of an interacting group may 
be normal for all proper interactions, the oscillations perhaps 
being very rapid. Certainly it would seem that in the case of 
lovers there is likely to be incredibly quick oscillation, 
for both interactants, between losing the self in the other and 
feeling the other to be lost in the self, with additional 
contrapuntal oscillations between losing oneself in one's lost 
self in the other and finding oneself in the other's lost self 
in oneself.
A good question to ask now is, "How does a person recover 
himself from rapture?" I think that he does not so much tear 
himself out of someone else's possession as find that it is no 
longer enough to hold him, and he knows he is not being held 
by noting that he has "come to". Coming-to and "staying to" 
may lead to boredom with an interaction. Boredom, then, may be 
the absence of rapture through the persistent presence of an 
unenrapturing self. Solitary confinement perhaps would not be 
the punishment it is were this not the case.
Perhaps, also, the alternating current of self and not-self 
is what charges lovemaking with its feeling of being more 
creative than any other kind of social interaction, the biological 
creation sometimes consequent upon the activity being seized on 
as a convenient rhetoric of description by those, the majority, 
who so far lack sociological imagination as to mistake copulation 
for a celebration of biological relations when, as often as it 
may be that, it is also the process of biologies being used to
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effect very î^cial social bondings, which the Christian 
marriage service, for example, recognises in the phrase,
"With my body I thee worship." (The biological reduction 
translates that into, "With myself I worship thy body.")
Mutual engrossment of any sort might then require that both 
parties are able to be fascinating for each other at the 
exact same time that they can also lose themselves in each 
other without thereby relinquishing their separate fascinations 
Thus social interaction that is fully interactive enough to 
feel for the interactants like interaction might depend on 
these sorts of rapid oscillations of the self, it only being 
the case in stage performances that the division of labour is 
not made within each interactant but actually between 
interactants. The following passage from James Joyce’s (1948)
A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man I think does show that 
an enraptured person may not be lost to his surroundings even 
when only one aspect of these enraptures him:
His blood was in revolt. He wandered up and 
down the dark slimy streets peering into the 
gloom of lanes and doorways, listening eagerly 
for any sound. He moaned to himself like some 
baffled prowling beast. He wanted to sin with 
another of his kind, to force another being to 
sin with him and to exult with her in sin. He 
felt some dark presence moving irresistibly 
upon him from the darkness, a presence subtle 
and murmurous as a flood filling him wholly 
with itself. Its murmur besieged his ears like 
the murmur of some multitude in sleep; its 
subtle streams penetrated his being. His hands 
clenched convulsively and his teeth set together 
as he suffered the agony of its penetration.
He stretched out his arms in the street to hold 
fast the frail swooning' form that eluded him 
and incited him: and the cry that he had
strangled so long in his throat issued from his 
lips. It broke from him like a wail of despair 
from a hell of sufferers and died in a wail of 
furious entreaty, a cry for an iniquitous 
abandonment, a cry which was but the echo of an 
obscene scrawl which he had read on the oozing 
wall of a urinal.
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He had wandered into a maze of narrow and 
dirty streets. From the foul laneways he 
heard bursts of hoarse riot and wrangling 
and the drawling of drunken singers. He 
walked onward, undismayed, wondering whether 
he had strayed into the quarter of the jews.
Women and girls dressed in long vivid gowns 
traversed the street from house to house.
They were leisurely and perfumed. A trembling 
seized him and his eyes grew dim. The yellow 
gas flames arose before his troubled vision 
against the vapoury sky, burning as if before 
an altar. Before the doors and in the lighted 
halls groups were gathered arrayed as for some 
rite. He was in another world: he had
awakened from a slumber of centuries.
He stood still in the middle of the roadway, 
his heart clamouring against his bosom in a 
tumult. A young woman dressed in a long pink 
gown laid her hand on his arm to detain him 
and gazed into his face. She said gaily:
- Good night, Willie dear!
Her room was warm and lightsome. A huge doll 
sat with her legs apart in the copious easychair 
beside the bed. He tried to bid his tongue 
speak that he might seem at ease, watching her 
as she undid her gown, noting the proud 
conscious movements of her perfumed head.
As he stood silent in the middle of the room she 
came over to him and embraced him gaily and 
gravely. Her round arms held him firmly to her 
and he, seeing her face lifted to him in serious 
calm and feeling the warm calm rise and fall of 
her breast, all but burst into hysterical weeping
Goffman (1963) says that full engrossments (such as rapture) 
cannot occur in public without involvement rules being broken, 
and earlier I said that rapture is not seen outside of private 
places. But maybe, after all, rapture can exist in gatherings, 
hidden away in very thin slices of time.
Thus rules
of gatherings may not be broken even when a state is experienced 
that has no consciousness to spare for their observance. And, 
more than that, I do not think it is always the case that
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publicly enraptured persons are deemed out of order. My 
own entirely personal point of view here is that, very often, 
indulgent others can be a little enraptured themselves by 
shows of mutual engrossment, even when these are fist fights 
and slanging matches.
This concludes thé essential material of this chapter, 
but before ending it in so many words I shall add some 
reflections on Sartre to show that my rhetoric does not lack 
the corroboration of other rhetorics whose theoretical 
equipment moreover is vastly superior to mine and only not 
used in this thesis because it has been my concern to manage 
without its ontological and psychological "whirligigs" 
CJameson, 1976; Sartre, 1963).
Conclusion
Sennett, I have shown, deplores mutual rapture because
his analysis does not contain the possibility - which is
central to mine - of this only really being worth calling
rapture if it alternates with very precise possession. But
another fundamental disagreement with my thesis seems to come
from Jean-Paul Sartre (1963) in his book Saint Genet : Actor
and Martyr. Sartre, the exact reverse of Sennett, lauds
rapture and deplores possession, as in this passage which 
hisbegins by^asking why Jean Genet seeks to identify with 
Cenrapture himself in) others:
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Why does he demand disgust and rebuffs, the 
other's indifference, the tortures of jealousy 
and, in the end, the despair that comes from 
the certainty of not being loved? And yet he 
must have something to gain by this. What is 
behind it all? For Genet, the answer is clear : 
love is a magical ceremonial whereby the lover 
steals the beloved's being in order to 
incorporate it into himself. . . . Thus Divine 
says to Gabriel: "You're myself," and Gabriel,
decent chap that he is, smiles fatuously 
without realizing that his blood is being 
sucked from him . . .  To those who have a sense of 
belonging, to the just, to the honorable, this 
identification may seem a vain and absurd 
endeavor. But I would like to ask them whether _ 
they are quite sure of being themselves. How 
do I know that they have not obtained that inner 
peace of theirs by surrendering to a foreign 
protector who reigns in their stead? I know 
that the man whom I hear utter the words "We 
doctors..." is in bondage. This we doctors is 
his ego, a parasitical creature that sucks his 
blood. And even if he were only himself, there 
are a thousand ways of being delivered to oneself 
as to beasts, of feeding with one's own flesh an 
invisible and insatiable idol. For nobody may 
say the simple words: I am I. The best and
freest of men may say: I exist. Which is
already too much. For the others, I suggest that 
they use such formulae as: "I am Himself" or
"I am so-and-so in person." If they do not aim 
at changing their skin, it is because the force 
that governs them does not allow them the leisure 
to do so; above all, it is because society has 
long since recognised and consecrated this symbiosis 
by according glory or simply honorability to the 
couple formed by the sick man and his parasite: 
it is a legitimate hell.
For Sartre, what possesses a man, then, is a "parasite" and 
the man possessed is "sick", and whole arrangement is "hell". 
Sartre, in the name of reciprocity, or deep inter-subjectivity, 
as strongly resists the idea of possessions within interaction 
as Sennett resists the idea of undifferentiated symbiosis.
But I think Sartre confirms that things are as he describes 
them precisely by the depth of his disgust, and later on in 
Saint Genet, his theory of interaction does allow for both 
possession and rapture, when he calls possession "objectivity" 
and rapture "subjectivity".^^
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But even Sartre's terminology is purely cognitive, bereft 
of a word like rapture that gets one out of the trap of 
thinking interaction approximates to mutually imperfect 
cognition. The state of rapture is an emotional one, both 
of escape from identity and into new identification: rapture
is an emotion of metamorphosis. What this kind of emotion 
is, I do not know, but I suggest that rapture cannot exist 
without emotion, for if it did it would be an irremediable 
loss of self, the "lost self" no longer registering, through 
emotion, being new-found, in which case its reconstitution 
would not be catharsis but a takeover, the creation of a 
replica human, a zombie. Interaction, then, is about escape, 
and escape is emotionally toned. (When the escape is too 
effective, when a person is too lost, then his home self, his 
former prison, looms for him as a safe haven, into which from 
his spacious disorientation he will reversedly escape.) Why 
should this escape be emotional in its nature? Is it because 
persons are all the time much greater than they can cognitively 
appreciate, "ritual beings" as I have tried to capture this in 
words, who are mobilized even down in their biology when they 
are released from their limitations?
But the escape may be blocked. The disposition to rapture
might confront a human object that cuts down to a small size
its would-be inamorata. This human object not only may refuse
a person's rapture but also may disenrapture a person with
himself, because the object is a negativized possession, an
acted closing of a preferred ritual realm. Negative possession
draws comments like, "I hate the sight of him." (It is
perfectly appropriate to my analysis that it is the "sight"
of him that is hated more than is the "him".) And for he who
feels it, hate is the emotion that accompanies his annihilation
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of its objects, usually in imagination, to make room for
the blocked and thwarted ritual person. So hate, a central
12social emotion, is explained by rapture, though, of course, 
blocked rapture may vent itself into the possessions, often 
seemingly there for just this purpose, of artists and 
entertainers. (One would expect, then, that the most ardent 
fans, or, in the political sphere, the most fanatical followers 
of charismatic leaders, will be those who are most trodden 
down by their fellow men, and this seems to be the case.)
So, the imperative to be a person, as I have defined 
persons, seems very powerful, but one must ask why. Why the 
endless complaint, "I just want to be treated like a human 
being." Why do people want to be themselves, knowing 
themselves to be what they do not know, and not knowing this 
cognitively when cognitive life is not their life as it is 
lived?
Perhaps one way not to find out is to construct 
cognitive social analyses that ignore love and hate. And 
perhaps theories that assume the human is a cognitive actor 
must end up finding that people are stupid, just because 
people identify with others and also refuse identifications 
with others on the basis of what cannot be known in advance. 
Cognitive theories, moreover, will not understand people in 
as much as people are not seen as enrapturing, but people 
might well understand that many cognitive theories are 
unenrapturing (even when the theories themselves are not 
understood) and so refuse identifications with them, which, 
whether these theories are right or wrong by any imaginable 
criteria, will result in their social disregard, and so also 
result in their having no chance of becoming self-fulfilling.
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Notes
Barthes (1977), in his autobiography, says that his 
idea that wrestlers "unlock Justice" comes from a phrase 
of Baudelaire's - "the emphatic truth of gesture in the 
great circumstances of life." Barthes goes on: "Baudelaire 
called this excess of pose the numen (which is the silent 
gesture of the gods pronouncing on human fate). The 
numen is hysteria frozen, eternalised, trapped, since it 
is at last held motionless, pinioned by a long stare" (p 134)
Artists, if "originality of expression" defines art, 
are not ahead of their times, by this logic, so much as 
non-artists are behind the present. The "unacknowledged 
legislators of mankind" (Shelley) and the "antennae of the 
race" (T S Eliot) are "ahead" because they are more re­
sponsive to current fashions that non-artists do not yet 
see as fashions.
But there are special occasions, like the performances 
of plays in theatres, where an absence of rapture at pos­
session would be embarrassing, and, then, if it is gen­
uinely absent, it may well have to be feigned.
Norman Mailer (1970) describes hippies marching on the 
Pentagon in 1967 as a sort of vast troupe following the 
enrapturing Beatles of Sgt Pepper:
The hippies were there in great number, perambulating 
down the hill, many dressed like the legions of Sgt
Pepper's band, some were gotten up like Arab sheiks, or
in Park Avenue doormen's greatcoats, others like Rogers 
and Clark of the West, Wyatt Earp, Kit Carson, Daniel 
Boone in buckskin, some had grown mustaches to look like 
Have Gun, Will Travel - Paladin's surrogate was here! - 
and wild Indians with feathers, a hippie gotten up like 
Batman, another like Claude Rains in The Invisible Man - 
his face wrapped in a turban of bandages and he wore a
black satin top hat. A host of these troops wore capes,
beat-up khaki capes, slept on, used as blankets, towels, 
improvised duffel bags; or fine capes, orange linings, 
or luminous rose linings, the edges ragged, near a tatter, 
the threads ready to feather, but a musketeer's hat on 
the head. One hippie may have been dressed like Charles
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Chaplin; Buster Keaton and W C Fields could have come 
to the tall; there were Martians and Moon-men and a 
knight unhorsed who stalked about in the weight of real 
armor. There were to be seen a hundred soldiers in 
Confederate gray, and maybe there were two or three 
hundred hippies in officers' coats of Union dark-blue.
They had picked up their costumes where they could, 
in surplus stores, and Blow-your-mind shops. Digger 
free emporiums, and psychedelic caches of Hindu junk.
There were soldiers in Foreign Legion uniforms, and 
tropical bush jackets, San Quentin and Chino, California 
striped shirt and pants, British copies of Eisenhower 
jackets, hippies dressed like Turkish shepherds and 
Roman senators, gurus, and samurai in dirty smocks.
They were close to being assembled from all the inter­
sections between history and the comic books, between 
legend and television, the Biblical archetypes and 
the movies.
Waiting for Godot, the play in which "nothing happens, 
twice" is nonetheless a calculated misrepresentation. 
Audiences, not believing that the tramps really will go 
to the nowhere of which they speak, are dramatically sur­
prised when the tramps do actually end up there. This, 
because the face-value words must prove they are only face- 
value, in the theatre, just as often as they are proved 
not to be.
Societal short-circuits exist everywhere. All those who 
write about life, for example, try to make it seem in­
terpretable as it had not seemed in life - or else they do 
not make sense, though some forms of deliberate senselessness 
make the sense that nothing makes sense - and so sociologists 
too must be dramatists. There is no harm in this as long 
as sociologists do not start thinking that sociology is 
more important than life, for it goes without saying that 
it is only because life is important that sociological and 
other texts about life have their secondary importance. Of 
course, the sociological short-circuit will be ignored if the 
voltage is too small, and, to follow the metaphor, volts 
are dramatic human enactments.
William James said that people do not cry because they 
are sad but are sad because they cry. Eisenstein also
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writes (in Barna, 1973) of a member of an audience: " he 
must, by way of fantasy, give free rein to base promptings 
and criminal tendencies in his nature. . . through the 
play of the real emotions that go with his fantasy com­
plicity in the horrors perpetrated on stage."
8 Freud relieved his neurotic patients by collaboratively 
rewriting their inner psychodramas in such a way that the 
final denouement completed hitherto looping neuroses.
However, rapture will be its negative, shame, if on em­
erging from the Freudian possession the patient recognises 
it as more demeaning than his earlier representations of 
himself to himself, and catharsis will only "cure" if after 
rapture - usually some admixture of this with shame - the 
new possession of the enraptured person has been enriched 
during the loss of the old possession, by his disowning the 
shamed self and cleaving to his enrapturing possibilities.
9 People recognise both their need for sublime expression 
and their incapacity for it in locutions such as, "it was 
indescribable," or, "words fail me." These are second- 
best performances that at least point to things so en­
rapturing that their possession by words would not "do 
them justice."
10 But it is possible, contra the 1970 Sennett, to go from 
caring to not caring, from having an identity to not having 
one. This is what Goffman saw happening to many of the 
patients travelling dov/n betrayal funnels into the asylum 
wards he researched in the mid-fifties.
11 Sartre (1963) says that at one limit each person is an 
object (and is this only for a transcendental subject) and 
that at the opposite limit each person is a subject (this 
is only possible if objectivity completely liquidates it­
self). Between the two limits, persons are not homogeneous: 
"We are not quite objects and not quite subjects." Goffman's 
"embarrassment", for example, occurs when a person in his 
subjectivity experiences the object he is for another's
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subjectivity. Thus far Sartre has not said any more than 
that persons are never wholly enraptured and never wholly 
possessed, and that auto-rapture can be negativized when it 
suddenly sees the possession it is for someone else in the 
most unflattering moral light possible. Negative auto- • 
rapture, of course, is shame, a feeling of being wholly 
taken up by an unwanted image of a person who moreover is 
oneself, the perception of whose form having the effect on 
one’s moral outlook that sudden sobriety would have on a 
drunk. Negative rapture, by this line of argument, would 
be shame by proxy, felt for the person by whom^would be 
used to being enraptured. Children who disgrace their 
families, persons who commit acts so heinous that their 
spouses no longer dare "show their faces" in public, people 
who make their companions wish the floorboards would open 
up for them, all these and many other unstable surfriders 
of the breaking waves of social forms sink not only them­
selves when they crash into the "unnamable" (Beckett, 1958) 
but their loved ones too, whose negative rapture is a 
further argument for the existence of its positive counter­
part and for its nature as I have described it. Sartre 
goes on to note that solitude has less to do with the 
physical separation of beings than with the states of 
persons when the social relationship is "lived in despair," 
which is to say, is lived with no feeling that it is there 
or is being lived. Criminal societies (not all of them) 
like homosexual societies (not all of them) and like the 
society of females (in male-dominated worlds) tend to be 
peopled solitudes because their members cannot escape the 
shame that awaits them when they emerge their "relative" 
societies that are defined by the wider, shaming society, 
and expressions of ashamedness within these relative 
societies further intensify individual solitudes, occasioning 
even more negative rapture. Solitude then is a result of 
not being able to become enraptured in another person, and 
it may come about because everywhere the possessions that
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are seen trigger off negative,rapture or because when 
rapture is possible negative auto-rapture sets in. Whole 
communities may be experienced by their members as the 
social occasions for solitude, just because nowhere is any 
member worthy of becoming enraptured in and everywhere is 
every member fully conscious of this unworthiness, and it 
may be the case, I suggest, that calls for "community" 
reflect this perceived state of affairs, the call going 
unheeded when it reminds its hearers of this state of 
affairs that can only be reversed by a member or members 
finding ways to act shamelessly. In most societies, however, 
Sartre says, persons oscillate from being objects ("victorious 
conformists") or, in my terms, possessed people, to being 
subjects ("defeated opponents") or enraptured people, the 
words "conformist" and "opponent" serving Sartre as moral 
parameters of humanness.
12 Hate very often calls forth hate and this cycle can only 
be broken by forgiveness. A person who is forgiven for a 
ritual crime is reinstated by his victim and his victim's 
sympathizers as a ritual being who once again, in principle, 
can be enrapturing. Forgiveness, then, is a delicate ritual 
state because if it comes too quickly to a victim it can 
show that he lacks self-respect and if too slowly that, again, 
he has too little honour, since he is not "big enough" to 
readily overcome his fear of the ritual offender. So it 
might be expected that genuine forgiveness is rarer than 
the feigned kind, it being socially expedient to pretend 
that an offender no longer offends even though his offence 
still rankles. An exception here is Jesus Christ, whose 
quick forgiveness always redounded to his ritual credit, 
because his obvious lack of rancour showed him to be of a 
ritual order that it was impossible for others to offend. 
However, during his forgiveness, any sign whatsoever of his 
"being offended" would have destroyed his self-respect in 
others' eyes, for the forgiveness would then have been seen 
as meek submission to superior power or, at best, merely
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strategic situational politicking. Presenting a flaw­
lessly performed forgiveness, then, is one way to rise 
above offenders, since they will not believe such a state 
is only as it seems. It follows that the performance of 
forgiveness is greatly facilitated by its being felt, 
though, as I have indicated, its being performed may en­
courage its being felt. Here again a person's "going 
through the motions" might lead directly to his seeming 
to come from them alone, if, of course, the motions do 
not seem to he motions that are-being gone through. ~ ~
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS^
The strength and strangeness of art, and in particular 
of literature since its medium is the medium of daily 
human relationship, derive from our feeling that we 
both are and are not in the presence of another human 
being; there is a voice which we can hear but which 
cannot hear us, a presence that can be passionately felt 
to the point of an enobrling superstition, rather as 
Keats felt Shakespeare to be his "présider", but which 
does not need to be mystical. In the same way, any 
great work of literature which teaches and changes us 
is a presence and a présider. "Required both to be 
present and to not be present"; Coffman's core of 
embarrassment is a core of literature. "Because of 
possessing multiple selves the individual may find he 
is required both to be present and to not be present on 
certain occasions. Embarrassment ensues: the indiv­
idual finds himself being torn apart, however gently." 
Corresponding to the oscillation of his conduct is the 
oscillation of his self. Part of such oscillation is 
between the sense in which the role of the reader is 
truly passive (Wordsworth's "wise passiveness" is 
attuned to books as to nature) and the sense in which 
the role of a reader is truly active. Some people 
find this duality more than they can take, and are fret­
ful or embarrassed by not knowing what they are supposed 
to ^  as a reader; it is not just their attention to the 
book, but the book's attention to them, which discomposes 
and even threatens them.*
I began with the idea that people when they interact 
treat one another as ritual beings. This was taken from the 
theories of Erving Goffman, which show that interactions are 
moral situations whose analysis demands that people be regarded 
as sacred. Sacrality, however, is not an unvarying attribute 
and it may even be greatly dependent on acting ability. This 
assertion is really founded on a commonsense appreciation that
* Ricks, Christopher (1974) Keats and Embarrassment
Oxford, Clarendon Press
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in any interaction a person can be degraded or exalted either 
by himself or by others or, not infrequently, by others be­
cause of what he does to himself. I sought to further 
elucidate this last category by describing, in apposition to 
each other, two appearance-oriented groups, punks and nurses, 
and to make sense of their conduct I found it necessary to 
use the concept "ritual power". _ The major part of my thesis 
thereafter is developed around this concept in a rhetoric 
which would have it, for example, that total interaction is 
one person's "rapture" at another's perfect "possession" by 
an entity often called "self". But first, the merchants of 
filth and how they make power out of it.
Ritual Power of Punks and Nurses 
2Punks use their understanding of a societal pollution 
scheme (Douglas, 1966) in order to systematically contaminate 
themselves so that other people will rear back from them as 
if from "untouchables". By doing this the punks achieve a 
ritual power of an inverted kind, for they come to seem as 
hard to approach on equal terms as persons of very high status 
Furthermore, the very deliberation of the punks' self degrad­
ations gives them yet more ritual power, since they appear to 
be capable of rising above the opprobrium they excite - or 
else they surely would divest themselves of their punk appear­
ance - and thereby create for themselves the ritual power that
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can withstand contaminations that would désacralisé others.
All the ritual power of punks, arising from their conduct as 
it is seen and also from its evident election over alternat­
ive "life-styles", is won from appearances alone.
The specifically punk appearance, by being fashionable, 
provides would-be punks with a ready-made, unambiguous visual 
statement which also has the look of collectivity. Not only 
that but an individual punk is protected from being seen as 
a lone deviant because he is recognised as an instance of a 
widespread type, yet, all the while, his fashion, by being 
deviant itself, magnifies his "legitimate deviancy" because 
his person is a loud reminder of the society-wide presence of 
very many similar persons. But, like all fashions in the 
period before they become outmoded, punk seems to be of a 
different order to other fashions, being mistaken for a social 
movement whose members can feel that they are united against 
contrary styles of conduct. At all times the punk therefore 
is activated by a behavioural logic that runs like this:
"When you walk into a place where people can see you, you want 
to look as repulsive and repugnant as possible."^ The nurs­
ing fashion, on the other hand, guarantees for its wearers 
that they will be impervious to and lifted above whatever 
might contaminate them, and zealously it is kept pure because 
nurses, facing considerable contamination, believe that they 
are the better sealed against filth, intrinsic and symbolic, 
the more they look like nurses. Thus nurses, regardless of 
the tasks they must perform, try, before all else, to be
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immediately identifiable as nurses, which incidentally 
accounts for the world-wide uniformity of their appearances. 
Where punks play the behavioural trick of degrading their 
appearances so as to appear like people who beneath their 
appearances have such strong ritual power that nothing can 
pollute or defile them, nurses work the same trick the other 
way and sacralize themselves so as to visually testify to 
the fact that neither the defiling persons and substances 
(with which they are in contact) nor their dirty duties can 
penetrate them. So the nurse rises above contaminants 
because she is untouched by these, and the unchallengeable 
proof that she is unsullied lies in her looking exactly as 
a nurse should look, that is, like someone with an extraord­
inary ritual power that can withstand contaminations that 
would desacralize others. Nurses, like punks, then, acquire 
ritual power merely through their manipulation of appearances
"Ritual power" may now be defined as the amount of 
"ritualness" a person has within interaction, and as such it 
is something more than the ritualness that Goffman has said 
must be respected between persons. So ritual power can be 
won from interactional conduct alone and is not just a prop­
erty to be lost or, at best, after being lost, restored to a 
former level. It should be noted here, of course, that, 
since ritual power belongs primarily to interactions, it is 
not the same as status, which is a given societal quantity. 
Nevertheless it is quite sensible to say that a person with 
commensurate ritual power will "live up to" a particular role
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expectation, or, alternatively, if his ritual power is 
insufficient, fail to live up to it.
Punks and nurses, then, gain ritual power through their 
exploitation of pollution systems and their power lies mainly 
in their costumes and costume-associated conduct. However, 
ritual power is not only a function of systematic communic­
ations in the language of pollution codes.
Fashionable Ritual
Another kind of ritual power (besides that secured from 
organized orientations to pollution) can be brought into 
interactions by persons when variants of fashionable human 
exemplars effectively possess them.
This proposition is best understood if it is approached 
from the idea that conduct, being first and foremost ritual 
conduct, enjoys its highest esteem when it is fashionable 
conduct. This must be so, because unfashionable conduct, 
always inappropriate, is necessarily offensive, and, since 
fashions only relate to other fashions and only obey laws 
internal to themselves, the correct action has to be the 
fashionable one. (Of course, it is assumed here that all 
conduct is appearance, of which clothing is only its espec­
ially obvious facet, and that all appearances are governed by 
fashion, so that in the world of appearances, which in this 
thesis is the whole world, fashion holds sway.) But, where
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do people get their notions of fashionable conduct?
Perhaps the well-established fact that in Anglo-American 
culture most persons spend a lot of their time spectating 
dramatised conduct on television might be cited to support 
the hypothesis that models of proper interactional performance 
are increasingly to be found on television screens. Profess­
ional actors, then, may well have come to "embody the forms of 
intelligible conduct", and those actors who are seen most are 
those who are most as they "should" be, behaving in the height 
of contemporary fashion. Thus, conduct, from this perspect­
ive, begins to look like creative mimicry, judged right or 
wrong not for any intrinsic moral intention - insofar as this 
does not seem to satisfyingly express itself - but according 
to whether it is aesthetically apt.
The Balinese, as Clifford Geertz (1975) interprets them, 
are an apparently extreme example of persons whose predominant 
concern is to be effective aesthetically, and they repay con­
sideration at this point. Geertz says that the social life 
of the Balinese is both a solemn game and a studied drama in 
which etiquette, dance, and formal ritual are always melting 
into one another. The need of each Balinese person to please 
all his others creates a flexible mosaic of conduct held 
together by the surface tension of a pervasive Balinese stage- 
fright called "lek". (Lek is the fear that the forms might 
collapse back into the beings creating them, which in societal 
terms would cause fissures through which unnamable and un- 
classifiable and therefore terrifying social entities might
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be glimpsed.) Geertz, however, feels that the Balinese show 
one another too much respect by always trying to be the best 
selves that they can be for other best selves. It is as 
though the comparative lack of obviously gratuitous and grace­
ful behaviours in Anglo-American culture induces Geertz into 
appraising his own culture's conduct as not principally aes­
thetic. Here, I think, Geertz falls victim to his American 
culture's heroic materialism which is premised on a belief 
that if you work hard enough you will produce something more 
valuable than a simple picture of yourself working hard. But, 
and the kind of ethnocentricity Geertz reveals supports this 
contention, conduct in Anglo-American culture is most effective 
insofar as it is not seen to be performed in just those cases, 
therefore, in which performance is good enough to completely 
conceal both the performer and the idea of a performer; then 
performance is, whatever its performer's attitudes and beliefs 
about it, so aesthetic as to render parallel "inner" comment­
aries (psychology) redundant. For example, tact, whose prac­
tice permits tentative, new forms to burgeon without premature 
censure, shows by the unceasing need for it in all interactions 
that it is precisely during the play of aesthetic conduct that 
the ritual, moral self is most exposed, contrary to an Anglo- 
American myth that when the forms of conduct are all that are 
of concern between persons their ritual selves must be hidden.
A person's ritual presence, then, despite the Geertzian tend­
ency to separate morality from beauty, would appear to be 
congruent with his best enactment of himself. This moral
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enactment, furthermore, is in terms borrowed from profess­
ionalised stage interpretations of current conduct fashions, 
seemingly without a great deal of reference to the morality 
of acts as this may be measured against absolute values 
where these are considered either out of date or too modern, 
the morality being that an act be the "done thing to do", 
and the current fashion of doing being seen as anything, else 
except a fashion.
There is much resistance to such an idea, and, in the 
theatre, this has come most powerfully from Antonin Artaud, 
who advocated a method of acting that would cut directly 
through what he read as oppressively deceptive outer forms.
In everyday life, too, many would-be authentic people have 
echoed Artaud's call for persons to drop their masks so as 
to let their real selves emerge. But such calls ask human 
life to perform a contradiction: a person cannot show himself 
to be anything whatsoever - even if this would be Artaud's 
pure force of life - without this too being conduct of a kind, 
which, the more desperately it attempts to be unmediated by 
the human physiology, will the less make deep sense in any 
sophisticated code. Real selves, then, if considered to be 
damagingly masked by outer forms that in principle can be 
removed, in fact cannot emerge except as behavioural screams 
that will always lack the expressive subtlety - and force 
therefore - they could have if they said what they meant, 
for example, through performances of articulacy in a language 
of words. De-aestheticised or authentic man, in this pers­
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pective, is much less than a man, rather more closely resembl­
ing Samuel Beckett's (1958) Unnamable who "is nothing but a 
shapeless heap, without a face capable of reflecting the 
niceties of a torment", and, though the Unnamable certainly 
exists, and very frighteningly for the Balinese at least, such 
a being is bound to say for itself, through the medium of 
Samuel Beckett in this case, that "it has not yet been my good 
fortune to establish with any degree of accuracy what I am, 
where I am, whether I am words among words, or silence in the 
midst of silence", whereas Samuel Beckett, his author par 
excellence, by dint of his aesthetic concentration in words is 
exactly defined by them - and by them more than by any other 
aspect of his conduct - as precisely himself and no one else, 
the "real" Samuel Beckett.
So, to be taken seriously as a person it is necessary not 
only to have a relatively serious status but to play it with 
adequate panache. That persons are expected to restrict them­
selves to the playing of one self may be merely a societal 
expedient to prevent confusion, and the uniformities exacted 
by fashions of their adherents obviously further reduce com­
plexity by simplifying individuals into broad and easily 
legible social categories. (An unremitting social rule may 
be discerned here, that, whatever a person can be, he must 
not be senseless. So strong is this rule that many people 
become convinced that sense is built into the universe spec­
ifically for human comprehension - and so human beings, as it 
were, must be involuntarily intelligible to whatever "depth"
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the perceiver chooses to look. My own conviction, drawn 
from Popper (1977), has it the other way round, that acts of 
Kantian comprehension project the simplifications of sense 
into an overrich universe of indefinitely related signs so 
as to liberate persons from other humanly-imposed limitations 
on the human. Needless to add, that is only the beginning 
of comprehension, for in its wake come acts of comprehension 
about acts of comprehension, and so on, either creatively dev­
eloping the initial guesswork or traducing that into reified 
orthodoxies to ends either of absolute banality or wonderful 
illumination or, as in my case, a fitful show of intelligence 
that while it can be intelligent about itself nonetheless does 
not know with any certainty [if it does desire certainty) 
whether it is worthwhile or worthless, to itself or to others, 
or how much of either, though it could talk about that too, 
but only at the same level of unknowing. )
Thus it is that persons possess themselves with recog­
nisable and stable social identities in respect of a societal 
moral conduct scheme wherein self-possession itself is highly 
valued. By virtue of the quality of this possession, aside 
from its formal identity, persons may procure extra ritual 
power that in the theatre is known as "presence". Presence, 
as I use the word, is not some sort of peculiar emanation from 
a hidden real self so much as possession by a clearly visible 
outer self, whom the possessed person as it were operates with 
the capabilities of the possessing self. Artaud, I think, 
wanted actors to be possessed by life itself, but his project
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was bound to give audiences nothing save the spectacle of 
people behaving as if so possessed. Yet it is to the stage 
or to television that people turn when they wish to watch 
experiments with the ritual code, for stage conduct is not 
only unusually self-conscious and hyper-aestheticised but 
also safely framed from practical effects. Thus, "lifelike 
conduct in its most pure and heightened forms is dramatised 
conduct, that is, the ritually live conduct of knowing poss­
ession". It does need to be added, however, that though,on 
stage, professional actors are regularly alive with a ritual 
power surpassing by far the ritual power the majority of 
their audiences ever attain, off-stage they are not treated 
as ritually very serious persons. This may be because off­
stage they willingly, though sometimes with great difficulty, 
give up the character they were playing on stage. If, how­
ever, an actor chose to stay in his stage character, he would 
retain his ritual power (provided he could disarm the plenti­
ful disgusBsions he would certainly encounter). So persons with 
names like James Dean, Marilyn Monroe, John VTayne, and Humphrey 
Bogart, who have not given up their characters even years after 
their physical decay, are very alive in many social worlds 
where, volte face, their recorded performances are taken as 
excerpts from their mundane lives. (Perhaps, with varying 
degrees of intent, the reading of the filmed performance as 
an episode of an ongoing mythic existence is fostered by the 
person so filmed.) The power these persons exert, I suggest, 
comes of their having presence, which for the time being can
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be understood as an expertly controlled possession that seems 
at play within unstable moral ambiences, effective only so 
long as good and evil (fashionable against unfashionable 
conduct) come into sharp relief on the body and face of the 
"star", or in the voice, if it belongs to someone like Billie 
Holiday, or in the tenor saxophone, if Charlie Parker, or in 
the words , if Shakespeare. These people from the grave, 
through electronic circuitry or print, come closer to every 
one of their fans than any one of their fans' loved ones, be­
cause they look so hypnotically as if they have to be so prec­
isely what they are and what - in their absence of closure - 
they are not. But the role of actor, it might be countered, 
is so lightweight that it vitiates any enactment an actor might 
perform, just because he has been known to be an actor - for 
example, Ronald Reagan. This is true, I think, but only 
because actors want it that way, for what their audiences do 
not see is that actors' choices of the unserious actor self 
off-stage are serious choices to the precise degree that actors 
have acting talent. I myself take actors more seriously than 
any other type of person whom I meet,now that I understand that 
they play themselves unseriously in everyday life. Whether 
or not - to continue this digression - ritual power as a James 
Dean (an actor who never "comes off it") exercises it is a 
form of coercion, and whether, if it is, it is immoral, as 
Plato against his own inclinations decided poets must be, will 
have to remain questions unanswered here. But this is as 
good a place as any for me to reflect on the fact that I am 
writing this text one week after the attempted assass-
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ination of Ronald Reagan by an individual whom the FBI 
claims identified himself with the character Travis Bickle 
in Martin Scorsese's film Taxi Driver. Universally, the 
would-be assassin has been written off as insane on account 
of his "muddled identity", based, so the media put it, on a 
fictional character who himself was "muddled". Now last 
year I chose an epigraph for this thesis from the words of 
Travis Bickle in Taxi Driver, because I thought that that 
character was one of the truest I had seen in the sphere of 
entertainment in the last several years. Similarly, I think 
that Reagan's assailant is not a freak and that the very 
strength of the media effort to so stigmatize him is a panic 
reaction to this distressing truth. My argument must be that 
a good performance by Robert de Niro, who played Travis Bickle, 
evoked another that in its turn set off a world-wide media 
psychosis. The world watched John Warnock Hinckley fire his 
gun at the President of the United States of America, just as 
Hinckley watched Robert de Niro, and the really significant 
difference, in my view, between Hinckley and all the other 
people who have watched Robert de Niro is that de Niro's per­
formance was more real to Hinckley, for the reason that he 
seems not to have perspectivised it against any other competing 
performances, probably because he had no one dearer to him than 
the characters in Taxi Driver. (Thus the responsibility for 
the assassination attempt lies as much with the film as with 
Hinckley. The moral criticism of Hinckley is that he aspired 
above his ritual station: he could only challenge the President
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by using a real gun and dealing out real death, which of course 
is to choose to use terror rather than genuine ritual power.) 
When the ritual imperative is irresistible, in a world that 
Andy Warhol, another human target (of the feminist assassin 
Valerie Solanas), so perspicaciously has said would only be 
satisfactory if each citizen were world-famous for fifteen 
minutes, the pressure to be interesting cannot be dismissed as 
a pathological condition. Naturally, as soon as a new assass­
ination hits the headlines, Hinckley will be forgotten and, as 
soon as an actor walks out of his limelight to resume the 
possession called "actor", he loses his ritual power, which 
only goes to show, at the end of this long digression, that 
ritual power, as I have claimed, can be entirely interaction- 
dependent.
Thus am I proposing certain extensions to Erving Coffman's 
ritual rhetoric, for, although Coffman often refers to persons' 
competences in performing, he does not examine the consequences 
for interaction of these varying between interactants, and I 
suggest that ritual power - human worth in its most human sense 
- accrues to competence, Coffman, what is more, tends to slight 
the secrets of performers as being "petty" (Coffman, 1971), and 
I further suggest that this is not only because he separates 
the ritual frame from the dramaturgical frame but also because 
he ignores the fact that people can be very deeply moved by the
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good performances that are possessions in concentrated human 
form. Cless (19 79) says that possessions work best when the 
performer produces original conduct that is self-evidently 
right, and from this I conclude that ritual power indeed can be 
gained by acts that, while retaining full interpretability by 
being fashionable, are yet quite original, and that ritual 
power - even if Coffman's rules are not broken - is indeed 
lost when conduct does not include new forms and variants, in 
which latter case it can, by looking less than fully alive, 
also seem not lifelike enough to be fully human.
Though the concept "possession" is now current in my 
analysis, I do not wish to define it summarily, but to let it 
show its meaning through the uses to which I put it. Freud 
(1978) has given reasons for a similar refusal to define his 
concept "instinct", and these I think state the terms of my 
excuse :
...it is not possible to avoid applying certain abstract 
ideas to the material in hand, ideas derived from some­
where or other but certainly not from the new observa­
tions alone. Such ideas - which will later become the 
basic concepts of the science - are still more indis­
pensable as the material is further worked over. They 
must at first necessarily possess some degree of inde­
finiteness; there can be no question of any clear 
delimitation of their content. So long as they remain 
in this condition, we come to an understanding about their 
meaning by making repeated references to the material of 
observation from which they appear to have been derived, 
but upon which, in fact, they have been imposed. Thus, 
strictly speaking, they are in the nature of conventions 
- although everything depends on their not being arbi­
trarily chosen but determined by their having significant 
relations to the empirical material, relations that we 
seem to sense before we can clearly recognise and 
demonstrate them.
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The purest possession is likely to become the centre of 
attention in any gathering, and it is the case that, say, a 
seizure of epilepsy - perhaps the most captivating perfor­
mance a person can mount - has a long human history of being 
interpreted as the visitation of spirits more powerful than 
men. I have implicitly proposed in this thesis that inter­
actions should not be analysed for their rules so much as 
understood, however this can be done (and The Stalking Ground 
is only an experimental piping of ritual life into social 
science), as occasions of ritual manifestation. But to 
arrive at this conclusion it is first essential to reorient 
to the topic of human interaction by declining to make the,
I think, uninteresting assumption that what can be usefully 
said about, for example, a boring interaction, however that is 
defined, is all that can be said about another interaction in 
which persons are electrified, as though it is enough that both 
occasions comprise people paying attention to one another. It 
is the dimension of possession (one that is also indicated by 
"narratibility") that I believe creates a necessary distance 
from certain sociological worlds that I find, despite their 
powerful argumentation (I am thinking of ethnomethodology), too 
bland to be true. I shall now summarise what I have said 
about possession.
The Dimension of Possession
Performances, particularly of actors, are often rated
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along a scale from non-seizure to total possession, and in 
this light social variations of a person's conduct may look 
less those of a "constant" defined person who plays a 
succession of parts than like total changes of person whose 
single actor, the body, is not a person until it acts. 
Interaction now can be seen not as the making of moves in a 
formal game but as an essentially supernatural ritual in 
which flesh-and-blood persons are closer to mediums than to 
strategic players.
Life, as it may exist through the possessions of per­
sons in interaction, can only come, therefore, from a ritual 
realm which is created wittingly or unwittingly, as if it is 
somewhere they are coming from, by the visible conduct of 
persons. Thus a society belle strung with diamonds seems 
to be an envoy from some luxuriously resplendent amnion while 
the nurse in her carefully-shaped white hat displays her 
intimate spiritual affinity to the long-deceased Florence 
Nightingale. Such an appreciation as this of what can be 
going on in interactions is inevitably heightened among pro­
fessional actors, and it is for this reason that "camp" conduct 
(burlesquing the sacred) is so prevalent in the theatre world, 
for camp is a means by which persons can block one another's 
routine creation of ritual realms so as to make their inter­
actions less fraught with significance.
By describing conduct in these terms, one can easily see 
that the differences between the conduct of, for example, a 
great performer on stage and, say, subjects being studied in a
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laboratory or a workshop amount to a crucial dimension of 
interaction. If such a dimension is accepted it follows that 
interactions which have some of the feel of effective drama 
contain more of what is specifically interactive in human 
conduct than do those that are unclear to or of only super­
ficial interest to interactants, the uninteresting ones, of 
course, ceasing to qualify as interactions when the interest
of all its partiès finally dies.
Further, it seems to be a consequence of the super­
natural possibilities within interaction that persons are 
accredited what I have termed "narratibility", the sense- 
making and even interest-generating capacity to coherently 
perform themselves. This must be, since it is a condition 
of being dramatic that one dramatises intelligibly (i.e. through 
a narration of sorts) and it is a condition of being human that 
one is dramatic, so much so that, robbed of narratibility, 
persons feel disoriented, senseless, and worthless. Thus 
the writers Joan Didion and Charles Dickens both show how 
personal confusion or a sense of incoherent possession, which 
is the same thing, can be reorganized by recasting the self
as the hero of its own narration, thereby restoring the
ritual worth arising out of narratibility. (It follows that 
the inordinately intricate senselessness of life may be the 
powerful prompter of people's never-ending work of story­
telling and the reason for their non-stop activity of self- 
possessing.) The idea of narratibility, or imposition of 
historical pattern, now connects directly to the idea of
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control, for even the wildest possession takes up some form that 
can be seen as "wild possession".
The Control of Possession
Possession on its own is not enough to transform the human 
physiology into a person, for possession - to be seen as what it 
is - must always be controlled. The apparently universal prac­
tice of tact, for example, is evidence that control is always 
exercised in interaction, for the tactful person is his "better 
self", a human creation whose precise characterisation depends 
both on its sensitive appreciation of and accommodation to diffi­
cult situations (which may be all of them). Anglo-American cul­
ture, moreover, is one that will not allow that persons can be 
uncontrolled; thus psychopathic conduct, the most asocial that 
can be imagined, is attributed to a "psychopathic personality", 
which is held to be the more clearly indicated the more the 
conduct is uncontrolled. This type of nominalist magic, of 
course, shows that the desire to control the uncontrolled if 
not present in the subject will be met by him in his human 
objects.
What happens if "responsibility" (Hymes, 1975) for per­
formance, or control as I phrase it, is not assumed? Becker 
(1962) found that depressives consistently fail to present 
selves of a kind to which proper deference can be paid, and 
so, receiving insufficient deference, become further depressed 
until a point may be reached where the only means left to them 
of regaining control may be the refusal to control any self
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at all. Now just as loss of or abrogation of control in this 
way is a full social withdrawal so the maintenance of control 
might be all that allows a person to remain the social person 
he would be. Thus, Mishima's (19 79) Hagakure code - "the 
slightest flaw in word or deed causes the collapse of one's 
philosophy of life" - and Stanislavsky's theory of the sub­
text both explicitly state that all acts must be invested with 
"readable" thought. This strongly recommends the idea that a 
person is most himself when his possession by himself is in 
his fullest control.
The real person, then, is not to be encountered in 
unguarded moments or at times of distress, for on such occa­
sions he will tend to lose the particularity that made him 
what he was for others, and, instead, disintegrating now 
into loosely-organized and comparatively illegible human 
behaviours, his selves will unfocus. (That so many people 
are unoriginal in deed and word, yet at the same time live 
under the impress of a cultural myth that the differences 
between persons, not their similarities, allow them to be 
"individuals", would explain the assumption that a person's 
uniqueness must be out of sight. The perceived uniformi­
ties of conduct together with the belief that individuality 
is the mark of a "real" person may be impelling people to 
think that some blueprint or template or programme or inner 
composition that is theirs alone is hidden somewhere inside 
them. I have already shown that, if this be so, real selves
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are doomed to be forever unseen because they are "unemergable" 
except through codes that must destroy entities defined as 
essentially antipathetic to codes. Those enslaved to beliefs 
in hidden real selves therefore inhibit their creative genera­
tion of original communication - because they act as if their 
conduct cannot fully represent them - and must travel back­
wards from Other people, ever more deeply regressing towards 
total unintelligibility.) Furthermore, microanalysts such 
as Birdwhistell (1971) and Scheflen (1973) have conclusively
demonstrated that even the "unpossessed" conduct Hymes desig­
nates "behaviour pure and simple", which, on the face of it, 
would seem least capable of conveying self, is always minutely 
attuned to audience reaction exactly according to Hymes' defi­
nition of performance. In social life, then, people show 
themselves as what they are, and they are physiologies trying 
to communicate in languages that in every single case have to 
be learned from scratch. (Of course, people can choose to 
misrepresent themselves, and that, as spies or secret adul­
terers for example, they can do so over long periods of time 
and under very fine scrutiny proves the point that an enacted 
self until gainsaid by discrepant enactments is the only 
social self there is.)
It is as if the human judgement of conduct is too harsh
a measure of the man in much of contemporary Anglo-American 
culture, for everywhere its members try to assume that, in 
some unspecified place and using some unspecifiable language.
333
some other entity than that given conscious being by its forms 
of conduct alone (as they possess human raw material) pulls 
the puppet strings of a behaving person. Paradoxically, 
however, it might be the very cogency of possessions, in 
creating habitable ritual realms out of visible cues, that 
prompts other persons - or possessions - to go regressively 
searching in those realms - now possessed by them - as if 
realms were strong enough to exist apart from the acts that 
bring them into being. What happens to the man lost in 
someone else's possession (which, of course, comes to be his 
own) is that he foregoes his own separate ritual development. 
Confronted with worlds he would understand, he enters them 
as if he would find their origins and somehow deal with these 
direct, without the mediation of imaginative constructs.
In this sense, he is literally "taken in". Unless he can 
repossess himself, his articulations now will be those of a 
"mouthpiece" for another's realm. So those who, for fear of 
ridicule or for other reasons, will not produce performances 
of their own by properly responding to different performances, 
will sink into an ideology which - dumbly, because it does 
not like to speak - thinks that the way to find out about 
the self among other selves is by some different route than 
being a self for other selves who are also being themselves 
for others. A society of such "taken in" people, audiences 
to their own non-performances, will be a sort of amoebic 
stasis in which there will be an increasingly unthinking 
absorption in increasingly unabsorbing human material.
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Richard Sennett (1977) calls this psychosocial sump "the 
tyranny of intimacy," portraying it as a permanent and total 
encounter group in which there is no possibility of any 
encounters. But this is not to say that the practice of 
psychologising about interaction has not produced great per­
formances. The work of Freud and Jung, tracking back to 
"first causes" of Oedipus complex or archetypes may have been 
more illuminating than the writing of Samuel Beckett, but, 
like all psychology, it can only exist if its phenomena are 
discovered in the sociological realm of interaction and if 
its reporting takes place in the sociological medium of 
verbal language. Thus Jung does not discover his "internal 
society" (Rowan, 1978) until he has put it before himself 
in the form of words that he recognises as his various 
possessions; but, instead of then conceding that he has 
found a new way of seeing himself from the outside, he begins 
to think that all along this was how he must have been on the 
inside. (Obviously, there is complex matter "inside", but 
it is not comprehensible until repossessed outside.) I 
argue here no more than that he who would explore the mind 
must behave as though he has created it from its visible 
behaviour, as Ryle (1949) and Coulter (1979) insist. How­
ever, the idea of "inner men" deterministically manipulating 
persons is perfectly adjusted to the idea of a ritual realm, 
only failing to be logical by ignoring the fact that the 
ritual realm is definitionally absent until someone seems to 
be arriving from it.
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So much, then, for the pathetic fallacy that, beneath 
our second-hand gestures and borrowed phrases and copied 
attitudes, we are there, pristine little souls, treasure troves 
of authenticity, who only need the courtship of people who love 
us to be charmed out of the deep recesses of the psyche into 
which hostile environments have driven us. No, whatever we 
do belong to - if to anything, even if to others, the equally 
iinbélônging - it is hot to ourselves, for there is no one 
inside any one of us, and, worse yet, every time we do or say 
what someone else has said and done, we automate our conduct, 
becoming dummies then. So perhaps the only way out of the 
semiological scrapheap we spend a lifetime assiduously turning 
ourselves into is to "make it new" (Pound) in hopes that any 
one of us might voice some thought quite beyond the capacity 
of cellular matter, which furthermore might be heard by others, 
whom conceivably it might invigorate. "But what about 'being 
natural'? Don't we often relax and quite naturally let our 
normal selves show through these creative behavioural dances 
that surely are not our only warrant for thinking ourselves 
human?" Again, no: I am afraid the phrase "natural conduct"
is a contradiction in terms, as follows.
Natural Conduct and the Ritual Imperative
The form of controlled possession predominating as an 
ideal to be aimed at in Anglo-American culture is "natural 
conduct" which is the less seen as performance the more 
controlled it is. Unlike other forms of controlled 
possession that command interest within interactions, natural
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conduct tries to pass itself off as the next best thing to no 
conduct at all, as if a natural person were to be hermetically 
sealed from any suspicion that being a person is not wholly 
guaranteed by the human physiology. Natural conduct is thus 
required to look unforced and spontaneous as though it cannot 
help but be exactly as it is, having its unusual harmony with 
whatever interactional rules govern the contexts in which it 
is found by happy coincidence, quite "naturally". However, 
it can easily look too self-possessed, when what shows is not 
a natural self but a self that looks as if it is acting self- 
possession, and it can be successfully feigned for though, to 
quote Strindberg (1968), "It is not easy to be charming when 
one is mad with rage," it is nevertheless not impossible 
either. Not only that, but to be complimented for being 
natural is to be highly praised, which fact alone indicates 
that it is difficult to bring off the performance of natural­
ness. Being natural is, then, as Evreinoff (n.d.) says, "a 
science necessitating long years of training, experience, and 
education." This means, I think, that without a refined but 
far-reaching understanding of social situations, without 
physical adroitness, without delicate verbal care, without 
eyes that know exactly when to look and when not to look and 
what to look at when they are and are not looking, and without 
a skilled willingness to abide by the conventions, a man who 
would obey the self-directed social injunction to "be himself"
- which he should if the rhetoric of naturalness would be 
believed - would rage like a bull among the china sensibilities
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of whatever emporium of selves he is loosed into, and would be 
banished eventually from the company of his fellow men, just 
for his crime of "not knowing how to behave." On the other 
hand, the human chameleon who is nimble and svelte, who can 
juggle not only his own but the identities of others too in 
complex trajectories, while all the time seeming to have polite 
eyes only for what is shown to hiin, will be a social asset, 
feted for his vivacious ease, an artist to his fingertips, 
whose very presence is the breathtaking physiological trick 
of seeming to be an absence of all those human phenomena that 
are "not done", "not mentioned", and "unmentionable". Natural 
conduct, one must conclude, is the reverse of what it is 
believed to be, and so this analysis is on the edge of saying 
that there is nothing natural about natural conduct.
The social construction of naturalness - both as a
desirable mode of conduct and as conduct that poses as its
own opposite - may well function, as does the myth that real 
selves are inaccessible, to protect performers from a con­
sciousness that they can only be what they can seem to be,
which consciousness would surely make more taxing still the 
creation of natural selves in interaction, to such an extent 
that the continuity of social life would be threatened.
Maybe this threat of disruption, should people realize that 
their conduct, when imperfectly natural, signifies that they 
only have inadequate selves, has to be met by a myth which 
says the opposite, that selves are somehow traduced by any 
conduct.
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Obviously some people are better at seeming to be natural 
than others, and this fact leads me to repeat what I have 
already observed, that, although Goffman is always aware of 
people as ritual beings, he has never considered the conse­
quences for interaction of variations in acting ability 
between persons. (He could have done in the essay "Where 
the Action Is" when he writes about the "character contests" 
whose outcome is diminished ritual power for the loser and 
increased ritual power for the winner, but, instead of working 
the analytic promise of this discovery, he drives only to 
the conclusion that run-ins are socially disruptive.) One 
important interactional consequence for the person who is 
exceptionally good at acting himself, whether as a unique 
behavioural montage or as a natural self or as a mix of both, 
is, I now again suggest, that he will by his conduct alone 
gather ritual power. Thus the more interactants are bent 
on raising their ritual power - as indeed, obeying the 
dramatic imperative of everyday life, they must always be - 
the more interactions, which Goffman has already shown must 
be viewed as structured on the basis that people are ritual 
beings, will turn round exclusively ritual concerns. But 
unfortunately, despite his saying (Goffman, 1975) that often 
interactions are one-man shows, which perception, I am sug­
gesting, actually demands the ritual frame of analysis,
Goffman has only used his idea of persons' sacrality in a 
negative way as if sacrality is merely an attribute that 
only must not be offended rather than, as I propose here.
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one that not only can be generated and magnified by expert 
human enactments but should be, a state of affairs that cries 
out for more of Coffman's ritual sociology.
Now if ritual power even in the seemingly undramaturgical 
case of natural conduct can be dependent on acting ability, it 
would follow that there might exist institutions wherein 
persons can be so trained that their cultivated styles of 
conduct will come to command more than their fair share of 
deference. Public schools in England are one such institu­
tion, and so successful is the dramatic coaching of their 
clients - albeit taking place on rugby fields and in dining 
rooms and under other guises - that these persons can often 
be described as "well-bred", as if their peculiar behavioural 
inflexions were so "natural" to them that they must have been 
inherited. In fact, everywhere in society, persons develop 
their expertise at acting, and the periods of training are 
usually called "socialization" periods as though that term 
can mask their essentially dramaturgical function, this 
masking being itself a form of deference to the idea that 
humanness is so worthy - in whatever role it is discovered - 
as to be something that cannot be bought by fees for 
instruction in how to act it.
Of course, it is not only individuals who will be 
natural or unnatural. Interactions as a whole may be ex­
perienced as having this or that amount of naturalness, but 
only by their interactants and not necessarily equally for 
each of them. One test of a natural interaction might be
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the degree of ease with which an interactant can forget him­
self therein, the greater this is the more natural the inter­
action. So interactions which feel like interactions would 
be ipso facto unnatural, and always like this for he who 
would study them. The active student of interactions more­
over must fake sufficient naturalness, which might be an 
adequate performance of appearing to have forgotten himself, 
in order to prevent his exclusion from the interactions he 
would study, and he will never know whether or not his co­
interactants are similarly faking. Appearance is all in these 
matters, and the consciousness accompanying appearances - in 
the above examples as well as in several other situations my 
analysis turns up - need not be taken into consideration so 
long as it does not look like consciousness, which in the 
case of a natural appearance would transform this anyway into 
an unnatural one. Obviously, interactions are more likely 
to be natural when interactants are similarly trained, for 
then in order to be in harmony with one another they need 
make less of the effort that would awaken them to the inter­
actional side of interaction. From this it can be inferred 
that items of behaviour taken on their own are not in them­
selves natural or unnatural, so that the naturalistic 
rhetoric which would outlaw unnatural conduct as intrinsi­
cally unhuman misses the point that any conduct can be 
regarded as natural if only it makes sense in a shared 
interpretive scheme.
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Natural conduct, which will always be fashionable 
conduct, is good conduct because it is the exemplary 
opposite of what is taken to be least human of all, unnatural 
behaviour, but conduct in general will be the more moral - 
or, as is natural conduct, the more ritually effective - the 
more consummately it is performed, with little regard for the 
contents of the moral realm created by the performance. So 
a poor performer is a poor person, not just because he breaks 
an important rule of the stage - one which is no less impor­
tant in everyday life - that a person must always give him­
self to the best of his ability but more significantly 
because if he does not do this he cannot appear as much of 
a person. What is more, in appearing as less than himself, 
a person not only slights himself but also those he interacts 
with, who are made to feel they are only worthy of his half­
hearted self. So it is not surprising that the rule to 
perform well is entrenched in all forms of social life.
From this one might speculate that much of social life is 
not just about the protection of face, as Goffman has demon­
strated, but beyond that, is to do with the ritualization of 
persons. The principal social activity of persons might 
just be their individual and mutual attempts to generate 
sacrality for themselves. Sometimes they may do this with 
one another's assistance as appreciative audiences, and, at 
other times, persons may open a ritual gap beneath them by 
desacralizing others. A central human ambition, then.
342
might be as simple as the one to be something greater than 
flesh and blood, to be, for example, an immortal soul which 
can be won or lost by mortal conduct. Does this mean that 
good performers are necessarily good people? I think they 
are taken to be so, provided that their performances neither 
look like what they are nor are compromised by being too 
various or too skilled, which again would show them to be 
more like performances then genuine-seeming selves. An 
objection might be made here that a brilliant criminal, for 
example, is bad because he is bad, never mind his brilliance. 
But I suggest that, if this criminal gets away with his crime 
and if he sets a fashion whose adherents similarly get away 
with their crimes, then he will be considered good, and the 
more so as the fashion catches on. As it is, his badness - 
which will be the element of his acting that is "not done", 
such as injuring another person - will be redeemed with moral 
credit to spare if the crimes have been lucrative and daring 
and imaginative, which are very much elements of highly com­
petent performance. This has been the case for the Great 
Train Robbers at any rate.
So possession is always controlled and only sometimes 
by its being natural conduct, and life is about the rituali­
zation of self (which is almost to say, about the annihilation 
of the physical). Do people really spend their lives fighting 
for the limelight? I think they do, but I also think that 
they are safely boxed into frames and greatly constrained 
by their dramatic talent, as I now explain.
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Additional Controls of Possession
Natural conduct controls itself as a matter of course 
to conform slavishly to given rules of conduct but perfor­
mances require additional controls if they are not to over­
whelm interactions. These are supplied by framing devices 
which range from the physical separation of stages (in the 
case of ritualized ritual enactments in the theatre) to a 
continuous framing generated in his paracommunicative channels 
by the performer as he might, for example, relate a story in 
a small focused gathering. Safely framed, the performer can 
create worlds for his audience to enter, and it is to the 
performer as an envoy from a world that appreciation is shown 
and not to the performer as human physiology per se. The 
opposite of appreciation is the rudeness of breaking into a 
world without warning. Interrupting like this is in its 
own right a performance, but, unframed by requisite apolo­
gising, it discommodes its audience, and powerful sanctions 
are reserved for interruptions of all kinds, whether these be 
"contempt of court" in judicial places or "butting into" 
conversations. In this way social life is not only organized 
to protect people from performances but also to protect per­
formances from people, so much so that those who repeatedly 
disrespect performances - such persons as importunate 
children and lunatics - are regarded as less human than per­
formers. Thus, deliberated performance, as long as it looks 
reasonably natural or unperformed, despite the fashionable 
counter-rhetoric, is regarded as more human than undisciplined
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or free expression, and it is controlled or disciplined by 
its frames as soon as it appears.
As well as being controlled by its frame, performance 
is more comprehensively controlled by a person's dramatic 
ability. Throughout society this fact is recognized by the 
lengthy socialization periods individuals must undergo before 
they can feel at ease in new roles. Socialization, and 
indeed professionalization, is a rehearsal period, and even 
professional actors need a great deal of rehearsal time 
before they can feel comfortable in a new part. Actors 
who perform inadequately can destroy a playworld, of course, 
but other role-players in society may wobble institutions if 
they forget important lines, miss cues, or simply seem mis­
cast. It would only take, for example, one nurse going 
about in a filthy dress for a whole hospital and a calling 
to be brought into disrepute. (At first sight this seems 
unreasonable, because only one nurse is behaving "badly", 
but, if my point, that she is mostly an envoy from a ritual 
realm all other nurses also come from, is granted, it becomes 
obvious that a nurse who looks like a dirty slut is enough to 
make those around her, including her fellow nurses, see the 
possibility of similar transmogrifications in any nurse 
anywhere, just because something very evidently has gone 
wrong in the ritual realm of "nurseness".) One can appre­
ciate from the hard work it is even for professional actors 
to learn new parts that, as it is generally true that 
societal roles must be learnt in the same way as stage parts.
345
they are not easy to assume, and this is perhaps yet another 
reason why persons tend to only play one self. Control, then, 
is also exercised by the difficulty there is in mastering any 
performance, and this difficulty is partly a function of 
dramatic ability.
Unlike other persons, however, the professional actor 
needs to develop an unusual degree of behavioural self- 
consciousness. This, on top of the arduous and unique 
working conditions of his profession, separates the actor 
from the very people he must impersonate on stage. Yet, 
on stage or television, the more successfully the actor acts 
the more he succeeds in hiding from audiences what he very 
definitely is, an actor. This is an unexpected form of 
control of possession, that well-controlled possession always 
controls disclosure of the possible source of control, and it 
explains why persons in interaction, seeming to be in depth 
what I say they can only be on the surface, must initially 
seem resistant to the analysis I am advancing. So expres­
sions form and reform on the face, the body moves, the hands, 
arms, head, and trunk gesture and indicate, eyes glance, a 
vibrating column of air becomes a voice, and the whole is 
suddenly something unproblematic. But, when people are 
understood to be variously caught up in behaviourally cueing 
their audiences as to what they wish to be taken for, their 
conduct can be seen as a dance and a prayer, as antics and 
invocations seeking to create beings called persons, for 
whom a body and a mind are the bare minimum constituent
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parts that in consort must devote themselves to their trans­
formation into a person who is only a person when it becomes 
unthinkable that he need not be what and who he is in his 
present condition, when his ritual appearance fully controls 
into invisibility its appearance of being mere appearance.
In this "Summary and Conclusions" I have already used 
the concept "ritual realm" on several occasions. Now I shall 
come at it more directly through the following condensed 
remarks about "rounding", which is the term David Cole (1975) 
uses to describe how an actor creates presence by seeming to 
come from an "illud tempus" or land of spirits and dreams.
Ritual Power Absorbs People rather than Impresses Them
A controlled performance, I argue, is not a feat of 
conduct standing in interactional lieu of some other more 
real person, rather it is the person in toto, so that a 
tightly controlled person, for example, shows not that he 
is securely guarded but only his limited scope and stiff 
syntax. Thus, totally uncontrolled people are not people 
at all whereas people whose control excels - not by being 
tight but by being expert - can bring about the interactional 
phenomenon of "rounding", that is, of becoming present by 
flooding an interaction with a supernatural realm fellow 
interactants hunger to see more of in his person. A person 
who rounds, very much more so than one who fails to do so.
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creates, as it were, a human "black hole" into which an 
audience can disappear. Therefore it is misleading to say 
that interactionally powerful individuals "project" strong 
^impressions" of themselves. Much more accurately, one ‘ 
should say that brilliant performers open up larger worlds 
for other people to enter.
Among actors on stage, rounding can call forth rounding, 
and, when this happens, the staged conduct, in looking 
larger than life, looks fully alive. In everyday life, 
roundings may be uncommon but the entertainment ethic 
that dominates Anglo-American culture (Althiede & Snow, 1979) 
compels the presentation of events as dramatic conflicts, 
and the more these resemble (or become) actual roundings the 
more involving they must be for audiences. So it could be 
that a form of social life which was entirely lacking in 
occasions of rounding would never fully involve its members, 
seeming to them an arena wherein they are less than fully 
alive. And it would follow from this that the goal of 
quietly harminous relations - within an organisation, for 
example - would entail, if achieved, a fall-off of members' 
interest, niceness having been bought at the cost of humanness
On stage, however, where rounding is sought, not only 
by actors but, because they are watching, by the audience 
too, the ordeal an actor goes through, if he cannot properly 
control his possession, or the triumph he enjoys, if he does 
round, comes to an end with his curtain call, but in everyday
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life (if its interactions are lived, that is) the ordeals 
whose overcoming can give rise to triumph are never final­
ized. An actor, furthermore, is judged the better actor 
the more easily he dispossesses himself after a per­
formance, whereas other people, if they suddenly stop 
being the selves they had seemed to be, are for that seen 
as less than, not more than, any one of those selves. So 
continuity is one of the main differences between stage 
life and everyday life, and perhaps this is the stress 
against which people mythologize a real self that could 
only be itself by not performing. Unfortunately, only the 
sleeping self meets this criterion and though, as they say, 
it may be, in having "all its defences down," the realest 
of selves, it is of course a self that communicates no 
self, being no more absorbent of interest than the flesh 
constituting it.
Known ritual realms, moreover, I am implying, lose 
their ritualness by being known. I now give a possible 
reason for this, and some consequences arising from this 
reason.
Ritual Power as the Originality that Escapes Theory
Only its originality warrants that conduct is meant 
for its present audience, and, where a sleeping self, for 
example, is at the extreme of unoriginality, a thoroughly 
original self is the most alive kind of self. Thus, social
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life, which is lifelike to the degree that it seems, without 
loss of interpretability, spontaneous, unpredictable, and 
original, is not necessarily best analysed under the auspices 
of determinism, when it must be assumed that all conduct can 
be predicted, for original conduct like future knowledge 
(Popper, 1957) cannot be known in advance. In other words, 
because life at its liveliest tends to transcend itself in _ 
unexpected ways, any complete analysis must take care to seem 
incomplete. (A sociological realm, therefore, diminishes 
itself as it reduces the ritual realm to nothing.)
A person's pursuit of originality, I contend, is no 
more than his attempt to acquire ritual power in order to be 
a serious person who is taken seriously. However, truly 
charismatic individuals who unfailingly transport fellow 
interactants to transcendent realms are few and far between. 
But that does not mean that their opposites are not usually 
looked down on as "automatic" humans, too obviously taken 
over by possessions unworthy of human life. Stage actors 
falling into automatism are considered to have sold them­
selves, when, says Grotowski, they cannot bring about a real 
theatrical communion. It is this sort of "sold" bad acting, 
with its stereotyped movements and its parroted lines, that 
has given acting a bad name and helped to obscure the reality 
that when all conduct is acting the more human person is the 
better actor of himself.
As social life becomes ever more differentiated and
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therefore more dishonest (Luhmann, 19 79), so ritual power will 
accrue not just to original acts but also to any human truth, 
since this alone can cue its interpreters to a realm that does 
not destroy itself the instant it is imagined, as a lie must 
(its realm necessarily negating itself). It might be that it 
is societally convenient to frame such truth in theatres, there 
to institutionally preserve refreshing evidence that selves can 
be awesome. Conversely, when social selves are expected to be 
hyper-aware of the moral meanings of their conduct, as in 
Cromwell's England, theatres might appear to be untactful 
insinuations that the reverse is the case, and so be closed, 
as they were by Cromwell.
But ritual presence, always having to find new forms for 
itself, can quickly become automatic, whether in theatres or in 
life. Grotowski (19 76) says that the only way an actor can 
avoid this "death in life" is by giving himself to others with 
love, and Abrahams (19 72), of street performers in American 
ghettos, also says that the sharing of possession is an act of 
love. I think that what is meant by this is that presence must 
be realized for the audience of the moment, since, if it seems 
like something that has been manufactured for others, it also 
seems not to care especially for the present audience. If 
this is so, then loving someone is the constant recreation for 
the person in question of a self that is to be entered only by 
this person or by this person ahead of all others. When this 
is mutual in everyday life, universes will open for each other, 
but love that uses hackneyed speech and worn-out signs has the
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problem of appearing to be other than it is, as does any con­
duct not bearing an individual signature. So perhaps the 
desire to come across to other people as really-meaning- 
something-quite-genuinely is the greatest spur there is to 
creative expression, and perhaps talking to other people is 
the only chance for most people of receiving proofs that 
they can be listened to as people. The imperative here is 
to be a human being who can hold up his head in the eyes of 
others even if he cannot get others to bow their heads before 
him. Human beings must want to "walk tall" in this way 
because they want to be people, and they must want to be 
people because they are not, and they are not people because 
at every moment of every interaction they must begin again to 
be original with no guarantee that this is possible. Becoming 
a person, therefore, is an endless social construction process 
whose completion is ever in the future, in life and in analyses 
of life.
But people do manage to be people and sometimes they bring 
themselves off with such virtuosity that, when they exit their 
own performances, something - an aura? - lingers like a disem­
bodied ritual power. From the springboard of this thought I 
now leap to the further thought that people know enough about 
ritual power to arrange life around it.
Ritual Power Shapes Places, Audiences, and Occasions
Ritual realms may be entered when the person or persons
who created them are absent, and this is true not only of
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performances coded in words, music, or images, but also of 
territories of persons, which I term ritual spaces because 
I believe they are sacrosanct insofar as they are invested 
with ritual power belonging originally to people. So 
territory is less a chunk of demarcated real estate than it 
is ritual space, an other-worldly piece of the world, though 
of course the other world is not any sort of territory. This 
must be why churches, art galleries, and the like, containing 
as they do imagery that functions as the interface between the 
so-called real world and other ritual worlds, are treated of 
themselves with respect. Places that are treated with dis­
respect, on the other hand, by vandals for example, are like­
wise ritual spaces, but ones whose putative ritual owners are 
targets for contaminations designed to show the owners that 
their power is being challenged. (Citizens who urge stiff 
punishment for vandals, tit for tat degradation, as it were, 
reveal that they are highly receptive to this meaning of 
"mindless" spoliations.) Persons themselves, moreover, are 
necessarily self-propelled units of ritual space, and it is 
consistent with this conceptualization that they are respected 
not because, having two arms, two legs, a head, and a torso, 
they look like human beings but because humans look like 
beings who can open up realities that are more absorbing 
than the visible one.
But these ritual realities only occasionally reach the 
pitch of being completely absorbing and, when they do, it is 
because a person bringing them to life has "rounded". By
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rounding, an actor unleashes ritual danger and this common 
danger transforms a collection of individuals into the 
collective of an audience.^ Without the audience's ap­
preciation of his danger a performer could not round. He 
needs to feel that all eyes are locked on him before he can 
go on to create from his slightest acts realities that 
transcend the mundane, and only when a performer feels he 
is fully there for others can he begin to assume a character 
with which the audience can identify until in a sense it 
too becomes the character. Generally speaking, then, the 
audience fuels a performer's ritual power to the degree 
that he succeeds in awakening them to it. Thus a given 
frame can go on filling with ritual power through a feed­
back process, and this power might not vanish with the 
vanishing frame. This being so, gatherings may owe their 
shape to the ebb and flow of ritual power rather than to 
the rules of gatherings per se, and these rules in turn 
might exist mainly to help in the generation or preservation 
of ritual power.
It should be noted at this point that ritual power 
may not only gravitate to space but also to its other kinds 
of frames, so that the frames of occasions can come to possess 
independent ritual power. For example, the routines of 
theatres are deferred to in their own right, because they 
have borrowed presence from the productions they have framed.
Obviously, formal rituals can be full of ritual presence 
while empty rituals are precisely those from which it has
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gone, and, given the behavioural imperative to be fashionable, 
it would seem that ritual life will drift from the unfashionable 
rituals of life so that "proper" forms of conduct will tend 
always to lag behind contemporary experiences of ritual 
presence. So empty rituals will be encountered more often 
than full ones, and ritual life will seem to be the less 
definitely framed the more it is ritually alive.
It might also come about that a person whose ritual 
power is strongly associated with a certain heavily- 
ritualized frame will find it hard to maintain his power 
outside it. This is definitely true, as has been pointed 
out, of actors, who on stage can achieve ritual power quite 
beyond that of members of the audience and yet who are treated 
as lightweight persons off-stage. (It even happens that 
actors at the beginning of their performances may take from 
places and frames a power that was put into these by other 
actors.) In a sense, then, actors who are not acting on 
stage are dispossessed, as must be anybody who lacks the 
ability or opportunity to conjure gestures and words into an 
interpretable self. A person who cannot stage himself in 
interaction - so far as this analysis goes - cannot be a 
person. His dispossession is ritual death, some examples 
of which I now consider before briefly recapitulating my 
thoughts on "rapture", which is only not ritual death because 
the enraptured person is taken into another possession, 
whereas people who ritually die must enter into possessions 
that do not want them to be the people they either were or
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would wish to be.
Ritual Death
A person dies ritually when his habitual possession is 
destroyed by hostile forces outside his own control.
Thus :
A young woman is walking down a city street. . . .
She walks through a group of construction workers who 
are eating lunch in a line along the pavement. Her 
stomach tightens with terror and revulsion; her face 
becomes contorted into a grimace of self-control and 
fake unawareness; her walk and carriage become stiff 
and dehumanized. No matter what they say to her, it 
will be unbearable. . . . They will use her body with 
their eyes. They will evaluate her market price. They 
will comment on her defects, or compare them to those 
of other passers-by. They will make her a participant 
in their fantasies without asking if she is willing.
They will make her feel ridiculous, or grotesquely 
sexual, or hideously ugly. Above all, they will make 
her feel like a thing.
(Tax, 1972)
Here the young woman's ritual being cannot survive an inter­
actional atmosphere of pure biological appraisal, and yet 
(unlike some women) she cannot welcome the only possession 
available to her, of her own body. As a person, she dies, 
and what walks on past the construction workers is her body 
in which, desperately, amidst the death throes of the old 
possession, some new possession - such as the experience in 
its written form - is being born.
The ritual death of the young woman is possibly not 
visible, but it could have been, as it is in the case of this 
suspect when he realises he is not going to get away with 
murder :
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"I guess you know why we're here."
Hickock's mouth straightened - his posture, too.
"I guess you realize we wouldn't have come all the 
way to Nevada just to chat with a couple of two-bit 
cheque chisellers."
Nye had closed the notebook. He, too, stared at the 
prisoner, and observed that a cluster of veins had appeared 
in his left temple.
"Would we, Dick?"
"What?"
"Come this far to talk about a bunch of cheques."
"I can't think of any other reason."
Nye drew a dagger on the cover of his notebook. While 
doing so, he said; "Tell me, Diok. Have you ever heard 
of the Clutter murder case?" Whereupon, he later wrote 
in a formal report of the interview, "Suspect underwent 
an intense visible reaction. He turned grey. His eyes 
twitched."
(Capote, 1966)
Now that his secret murdering self is public, Hickock's 
"innocent" public self, turned into a ritually empty pos­
session, cannot survive and visibly dies. Exactly the same 
sort of death is narrated in finer detail by the hero, also 
a murderer, of Norman Mailer's (19 67) An American Dream:
I did not have any certainty at all that I could go on. 
No, they would question me and question me? they would 
tell me truths and they would tell me lies; they would 
be friendly, they would be unfriendly; and all the while 
I would keep breathing the air of this room with its 
cigarettes and cigars, its coffee which tasted of dirty 
urns, its distant hint of lavatories and laundries, of 
junk yards and morgues, I would see dark green walls 
and dirty white ceilings, I would listen to subterranean 
mutterings, I would open my eyes and close them under the 
blistering light of the electric bulbs, I would live in 
a subway, I would live for ten or twenty years in a 
subway, I would lie in a cell at night with nothing to 
do but walk a stone square floor. I would die through 
endless stupors and expired plans.
Or I would spend a year of appeals, spend a last year 
of my life in an iron cage and walk one morning into a 
room where ready for nothing, where nothing done, failed, 
miserable, frightened of what migrations were ready for 
me, I would go out smashing, jolting, screaming inside.
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out into the long vertigo of death which fell down 
endless stone walls.
It was then I came very close. I think I would have 
called Leznicki over and asked him for the name of a 
lawyer, and stuck my tongue out in some burlesque of 
him and me and our new contract, and rolled my eyes, and 
said, "You see, Leznicki, I'm raving mad." I think I 
really would have done it then, but I did not feel the 
strength to call across the room, I had a horror of 
appearing feeble before that young blonde girl, and 
so I sat back and waited for Leznicki to return, ex­
periencing what it was like to know the exhaustion and 
the apathy of those who are very old and very ill.
(Mailer, 1967)
But Rojack is not fully dispossessed, because his old 
possession, which is the narrator's too, is, feebly, holding 
itself together. However, ritual death might be experienced 
as an instantaneous shock. In the next example a young man 
suddenly senses his imminent exposure as a homosexual, which 
would divest him of the only possession he has:
At this instant something inside of me was torn in 
two with brutal force. It was as though a thunderbolt 
had fallen and cleaved asunder a living tree. I heard 
the structure, which I had been building up piece by 
piece with all my might up to now, collapse miserably 
to the ground. I felt as though I had witnessed the 
instant in which my existence had been turned into some 
sort of fearful nonbeing.
(Mishima, 1965)
An instantaneous ritual death may entail the destruction, 
along with that of the possession itself, of the whole world 
in which the possession had lived:
All men who have experienced prison know that its 
terrible grasp reaches out far beyond its physical 
walls. There is a moment when those whose lives it
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will crush suddenly grasp, with awful clarity, that 
all reality, all present time, all activity - everything 
real in their lives - is fading away, while before them 
opens a new road on to which they tread with the trembling 
step of fear. That icy moment is the moment of arrest.
(Serge, 1972) 
Solzhenitsyn describes the same experience:
Arrest I Need it be said that it is a breaking point 
in your life, a bolt of lightning which has scored a 
direct hit on you? That it is an unassimilable spiri­
tual earthquake not every person can cope with, as a 
result of which people often slip into insanity?
The Universe has as many different centres as there 
are living beings in it. Each of us is a centre of the 
Universe, and that Universe is shattered when they hiss 
at you: "You are under arrest."
If you are arrested, can anything else remain un­
shattered by this cataclysm?
But the darkened mind is incapable of embracing these 
displacements in our universe, and both the most soph­
isticated and the veriest simpleton among us, drawing 
on all life's experience, can gasp out only: "Me?
What for?"
And this is a question which, though repeated millions 
and millions of times before, has yet to receive an 
answer.
Arrest is an instantaneous, shattering thrust, ex­
pulsion, somersault from one state to another.
That's what arrest is: it's a blinding flash and a
blow which shifts the present instantly into the past 
and the impossible into omnipotent actuality.
(Solzhenitsyn, 1974)
In all these cases the self is annihilated while the 
body and a disoriented, possession-less consciousness live 
on. These forcibly dispossessed beings will have to learn 
new parts on stages not of their choosing, with nothing in 
their pasts to act as guides. Deaths like these are more 
profound than physical deaths because it is the person who
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dies, whereas, when the body dies, its possession, though 
obviously terminated, may not have been affected.
Who else but professional actors would know more than 
most about these involuntary dispossessions? There are few 
actors who cannot graphically describe what they call "dying" 
on stage, which happens, they say, when the performance fails 
in the eyes of the audience. Such "dyings" occur in every­
day life too, as when spouses kill trusting partners by 
telling them they do not love them any more, or bosses 
faithful retainers by firing them, and so on. But in every 
interaction each person is no more than a word or a gesture 
or a glance away from his ritual death, though the further he 
thinks he is from it the more of a death it would be were he 
to suffer it.
However, much more often that a person dies in inter­
action, he leaves himself behind and freely enters another's 
possession, which to some extent enraptures him. Now follows 
a short exposition of my provisional ideas on rapture, which, 
with its negative, shame (a partial ritual death), is the 
corollary of possession in interaction, if interaction is 
fully interactive.
Rapture
Possessions of full ritual power can be effortlessly 
entered by a willing audience who then inhabit the same 
ritual realm as the possessed persons and, in so doing, become
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enraptured through their release from their own possessions 
into realms not the least of whose enrapturing properties is 
that of seeming to be at once familiar in being strange and 
strange in being familiar.
Rapture in a mild form is interest, and interest in its 
turn can only be felt if its object makes sense, but making 
sense is not a guarantee of being interesting any more than 
being interesting guarantees rapture. So, just as the op­
posite of possession is dispossession, the opposite of rap­
ture is disinterest, with the median state, interest, ob­
viously being experienced more often than rapture. But 
everyday interactions are fully interactive only if one 
person at least is enraptured by some other possession; 
usually, however, interactants, each of them, oscillate, 
either between rapture and possession, or between interest 
and being interesting, or, if the interaction is minimally 
interactive, between seeing sense and making it.
The "rounding" which takes place when the ritual power 
of possession in interaction is at its height is not, be­
tween two persons, possession contra possession, but this 
with intervening rapture on both sides. The relationship 
between rounding persons is, of course, the most interactive 
there is, with every word, tone, expression, gesture, and 
appearance (of any sort) making sense that seems absolutely 
original and perfectly true at the same time. (Hollywood 
has chosen the gun-fight for the archetypal representation
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of the rounding encounter, but this degrades the ritual 
powers of rounding by involving physical death in the out­
come of ritual murder.) All interactions must fall short 
of this "ideal type", the rounding interaction, which is 
perhaps found most often between lovers, where it is least 
accessible for direct sociological observation.
Because rapture must dissolve social distance it en­
dangers formal status differences, which are therefore least 
likely to be found in charismatic groups where the leader 
enraptures his followers (and, conversely, when everybody 
hates the "system", the formality of ranks and duties will 
be the only resort for ritually unimpressive persons, as is 
the case in prisons, armies, hospitals, and some university 
departments, for example). But, politically, rapture need 
not necessarily be felt just for a human leader; it is my 
contention that bureaucracies themselves are charismatic 
organizations functioning most rationally when bureaucrats 
are enraptured by the idea of rational offices and pro­
cedures. Those political leaders, however, who set out to 
enrapture whole societies are obliged to use terror, when 
they fail, in order to command for their shows of possession 
suitably reciprocal shows of rapture that obviously must be 
in excess of the respect that could be evinced with fear in 
preference to terror. (Nations without political prisoners, 
one may say then, are likely to be fairly uninvolving per se 
to rulers and citizens both.) The charismatization of poli­
tical leaders (Sennett, 1977), even long after Weber and others
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have predicted their decline, may be accounted for by rapture: 
the socially secessionist enrapturing possibility one lover 
may hold out for another is intercepted by the friendly poli­
tical face on the TV screen, so that the very state that would 
take persons in pairs out of society is used in an attempt to 
take the whole of society out of its constituent pairs. Those 
political leaders, whether societal or organizational, who 
actively compete in this way with husbands and Wives for hus­
bands and wives, work their images as the "stars" of enter­
tainment do, but no longer framed in the safety frames of 
"entertainment" or "high culture".
Rapture, then, is a social state that may be seen as 
pivotal to any understanding of societal processes, but, of 
course, for that very reason, it is a central experience of 
the individual. Thus, persons capable of the enrapturing 
possessions that make them more like people than people, seam 
very used to becoming enraptured, and it seems to be a con­
dition of any possession that it be preceded by rapture, the 
new possession, if radically redefining and improving on the 
old, coming as a catharsis. What is more, people who have the 
talent and willingness to lose and find themselves in a variety 
of relationships with external human or other material would 
seem able to enrapture themselves with themselves. And auto­
rapture such as this enables shame, which is rapture at the 
self turned into its negative, by an emerging self's conscious­
ness that the old self or possession was ritually unworthy; 
and since shame is a social state - because it leads persons
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to try to live down or sheer off their shameful possessions 
and to cultivate those of their possessions that have enrap­
turing possibilities - it facilitates personal growth. (It 
is also the case that, when rapture for another person has 
existed, shame at his disgraces will be keenly felt, and this 
supports my view that not only in interactions, when these 
are truly interactive, are the boundaries of selves wrongly 
represented if persons are seen as their physical beings - 
insofar as these are not the cues for ritual meanings - but 
also in some more prolonged social relationships like marriage, 
in which it is less helpful to think of the pairing as an 
interacting dyad than to think of both individuals as being 
separate, complementary representatives of an essential unity.)
Rapture, of course, may be thwarted, perhaps more often 
than not, and the consequence for an individual is that he 
will feel hate when his ritual development through rapture is 
blocked, and he will feel it for the person or situation or 
thing that is in his way. Bettelheim (1970) , however, 
reports that in the German concentration camps many of the 
longest surviving prisoners identified with the SS guards, 
even wearing home-made jackboots in pathetic emulation. This 
indicates that, when hate for oppressors cannot translate into 
action or of itself clear them out of the way, it may yield to 
its opposite, so imperious is the human dramaturgical spirit 
which will be a person. But, outside concentration camps and 
prisons of all sorts, hate can be suspended by ritual re- 
routings into entertainment and culture; these offer short cuts
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for their audiences to the state of personness, when people are 
released from themselves so as to come into their own as truly 
human beings, whose essential nature may be that it is always 
beyond itself, drawing itself into itself.
Of course, in this rhetoric, hate or release or any
feeling is not something a person just feels. A feeling
happens when a person experiences himself as a person behaving
in a way that it has been culturally established designates
5certain ritual states. Thus a person is "moved" only when 
he has a defining consciousness that he is being moved, other­
wise he is simply taken in. Likewise he is shamed only when 
he sees the socially degrading state that is his is degrading, 
else, however shameful he may be to others, he can feel no 
shame, only the cultural epiphenomena in their unprocessed 
state as it were, before culture has redesigned them into signs 
and symbols. That feelings may be very painful or ecstatic, 
and everything in between, only shows the tremendous capacity 
for identification persons do have for other people. (Naturally 
I do not include here the feelings that are sensations or pre­
social biological experiences.)
This is definitely not to say that feelings are not deeply 
felt or that they are understood only through unfeeling under­
standings, and it is not to imply that if somehow feelings 
could be blown away from people's minds then people would be 
better able to be people. On the contrary, my view is that, 
for example, societal analyses operating with purely cognitive 
understandings of persons risk concluding that people are
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stupid, for this is an inevitable result of looking at people 
as if their ways of being conscious of one another are not 
those of empathy and identification. Now, since people who 
would empathize cannot be cognitive without ritually offending 
those about whom they are thinking in this mode, it is in fact 
stupid to aspire to a style of apprehension that carries on as 
if it were not human. Fruits of this sort of socially clumsy, 
cognitive understanding, furthermore, will only become in­
corporated in human life if there are persons who can in their 
turn be enraptured by the cognitive, and be so enraptured that 
they still cannot see that this is what they are (for if they 
did they would feel shame at having been enraptured).
Cognition, however, is in no way threatened by its use 
of rapture as a means of apprehension, because rapture is 
respect heightened to an inordinate pitch, and respect is the 
leaving alone of phenomena. Moreover, rapturous apprehension 
is only possible when it intimately relates the known to the 
unknown, whereas free-floating cognition when it is not of 
itself enrapturing may have very little human content. (It 
need hardly be said at this point that the anti-dramatic short 
circuits of experiential-style research workshops can only 
work when they stop being what they think they are.)
It should be clear by now that, throughout this very 
brief resume of my remarks on rapture (Chapter IX), I have 
assumed that a person cannot become enraptured by phenomena 
that are not interpretable to him. Interpretability is the 
conceptual link between the apparently subjective state of
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rapture and the society-wide appearances of fashion. The 
nature of this link has not been examined in this thesis 
much beyond the point of saying that a minimum necessary 
condition for enrapturing possession is interpretability.
But it is implicit in several passages that a close apprecia­
tion of originality in conduct, which is the sine qua non of 
ritually powerful forms, depends on a fine understanding of 
conduct fashions, for only he who is thoroughly conversant 
with already established forms will be able to confidently 
declare for true originality when he sees it. True origina­
lity consists in being beyond what has gone before while being 
perfectly comprehensible (and if the new comprehensibility is 
larger than the old it could be said that a civilization is 
becoming more intelligent). Such originality is perhaps 
impossible for most people most of their time, and this is 
precisely a reason for fashion, that it gives its followers a 
momentary advantage over those who lag behind its original 
forms, for the fashion follower can be highly original and 
also, just because he is in fashion, quite comprehensible in 
wide societal terms. Here is a return to my proposition that 
fashionable conduct is ritually strong conduct and that ritual 
conduct is good conduct. So it might now be said - to make 
one more connection between fashion and rapture - that those 
who are "interested" in fashion, although they may not know it, 
are interested in being alive with other persons. The tragedy 
of these people is beautifully stated by George Eliot (1957 )
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apropos of the young Gwendolen Harleth:
She rejoiced to feel herself exceptional; but her 
horizon was that of the genteel romance where the 
heroine's soul poured out in her journal is full of 
vague power, originality, and general rebellion, while 
her life moves strictly in the sphere of fashion; and 
if she wanders into a swamp, the pathos lies partly, 
so to speak, in her having on her satin shoes. Here 
is a restraint which nature and society have provided 
on the pursuit of striking adventure; so that a soul 
burnings with a sense of what the universe is not, and 
ready to take all existence as fuel, is nevertheless 
held captive by the ordinary wirework of social forms 
and does nothing particular.
Both punks and nurses, I have said, live for their 
ritual power (or enrapturing capabilities, according to 
whether those who see them would enter a realm defiant of 
normal society or one risen above it), and, because of this, 
also have ritual power to diminish or offend those who only 
see it as a self-serving insistence on empty ritual power that, 
however, by pushing down the audience, can still maintain the 
same differential between those seen and those seeing. But 
no punk and no nurse, insofar as he or she comes to perfectly 
exemplify the punk or the nurse, which is the whole point of 
being either, is a separate, unique possession. These fas­
hioned beings, just as they do not succeed in coming across 
as independently embodied persons, must look "taken over", 
like dummies or zombies. Cleverly, both groups adopt just 
such routinized conduct that looks as though it were not alive 
(in the sense of being a conscious separation from the social 
universe), and this zombifying of conduct - in the case of
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punks done by deliberately adopting moronic conduct appearances 
and in the case of the nurses by the ruthless extirpation of 
the personal in pursuit of utter selflessness - is too much. 
Confronted with it, audiences give in, because it is not 
natural, and therefore evidently is a product of human will.
So the will reveals itself, and at this meta level the dummy 
is humanized again, now being the more powerful the less 
personal he or she is. Soldiers, policemen, and all office 
holders, inasmuch as they totally sink themselves into their 
offices, in this way acquire the ritual power that, it can now 
be said, will always accrue to immolations of the self on the 
emptiness of roles, in exactly the same way that ritual power 
accrues to immolations of the role on the emptiness of selves. 
Yet, as George Eliot observes, this is "nothing particular".
It is simply conduct that looks towards its own time as a 
time to be preserved against every possible force of change, 
and its originality is nothing but its willed unoriginality. 
Persons so possessed by it abrogate their particular possi­
bilities, but, and this is the crux, only to a greater extent 
than all persons who allow themselves to be possessed. In 
any age and culture there simply may not be many viable 
possessions, and the sense of there being a variety between 
persons may only come from their individually different ways 
of failing to be properly possessed, and the failures will 
seem the same as the rare cases of genuinely original 
possession to those who themselves, knowing it or not, are 
improperly possessed. The dummies and the would-be dummies.
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then, whether they veneer themselves in acceptability or try 
to tear themselves to shreds, are out there, right now, a 
jostling throng, the human race, through which, who knows, 
may be shouldering someone who can see himself, and his others 
too, for what they are, and in a way that lets them see it. 
Saying this. I, myself, feel like one of the dummies, through 
whose mouth some ventriloquist who has no respect for me is 
articulating these words and sentences. But this social 
feeling, that the world is an ant heap and that being an ant 
is to move and speak at another's bidding, of course, can be 
escaped, if, and only if, rapture should supervene.
Conclusion
People, so-called, know themselves in one another's 
company when possessions spiral into being and travel to and 
fro between them, and sometimes separate possessions may 
become one larger possession into which fingers, hands, 
words, eyes, laughter, expressions, gestures, exclamations, 
faces, voices, and bodies too are drawn pell-mell. These 
mini-zeitgeists that only obey their own dynamic may also 
feed the societal Zeitgeist which sucks into itself the 
larger human material of lives entire, careers, businesses, 
artistic movements, money, and ideas until eventually blowing 
itself out and dropping the airborne harbingers of the future
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to the ground as period pieces and relics. Strindberg (19 64), 
who, in my opinion, is still airborne, understood this very 
well in 1888, when writing of the characters in his play 
Miss Julie:
Since they are modern characters, living in an age 
of transition more urgently hysterical at any rate than 
the age which preceded it, I have drawn my people as 
split and vacillating, a mixture of the old and the new. 
And I think it not improbable that modern ideas may, 
through the media of newspapers and conversation, have 
seeped down into the social stratum which exists below 
stairs.
My souls (or characters) are agglomerations of past 
and present cultures, scraps from books and newspapers, 
fragments of humanity, torn shreds of once-fine clothing 
that has become rags, in just the way that a human soul 
is patched together.
Individuals may only occasionally be aware of themselves 
like this, and perhaps less frequently still are they fully 
alive in interactions, as Normal Mailer (1970), about to be 
arrested outside the Pentagon on 20 October 196 7, describes 
the condition:
It was as if the air had changed, or light had altered; 
he felt immediately much more alive - yes, bathed in 
air - and yet disembodied from himself, as if indeed 
he were watching himself in a film where this action 
was taking place. He could feel the eyes of the people 
behind the rope watching him, could feel the intensity 
of their existence as spectators. And as he walked 
forward, he and the MP looked at one another with the 
naked stricken lucidity which comes when absolute 
strangers are for the moment absolutely locked together.
This interactional state is captured by Raymond Chandler (19 71)
The coffee-maker was almost ready to bubble. I turned 
the flame low and watched the water rise. It hung a
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little at the bottom of the glass tube. I turned the 
flame up just enough to get it over the hump and then 
turned it low again quickly. I stirred the coffee and 
covered it. I set my timer for three minutes. Very 
methodical guy, Marlowe. Nothing must interfere with 
his coffee technique. Not even a gun in the hand of a 
desperate character.
I poured him another slug. "Just sit there," I said. 
"Don't say a word. Just sit."
He handled the second slug with one hand. I did a 
fast wash-up in the bathroom and the bell of the timer 
went just as I got back. I cut the flame and set the 
coffee-maker on a straw mat on the table. Why do I go 
into such detail? Because the charged atmosphere made 
every little thing stand out as a performance, a move­
ment distinct and vastly important. It was one of those 
hypersensitive moments when all your automatic movements, 
however long established, however habitual, become 
separate acts of will. You are like a man learning to 
walk after polio. You take nothing for granted, ab­
solutely nothing at all.
Mailer and Marlowe, as fully as can be, actors of themselves, 
are, I contend, at the limit of self-possession, when being 
a person is totally a matter of acting in a distinctive, in­
telligible manner that, the sharper it is and the more of a 
style it is with prevailing fashions, will acquire ritual 
power, commanding attention, then, of itself for itself alone. 
This is the condition that all other impersonations of the 
self in interaction fall short of to various extents, and 
normally, of course, a person is less likely to become the 
centre of attention by consummate acting than by "making a 
scene".
But social life, it will be objected, is about real 
political situations, in which performances are powerless 
against economic and similar factors. This is probably so, 
except that these "real" factors do not exist for most 
people unless dramatized. For example, Jean-Luc Godard (1972)
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ref]ects on how to make a film about concentration camps,
^and desperately concludes that their reality is unintell­
igible unless conveyed obliquely through the reality of 
those to whom pain and death are administratively irrelevant:
Take concentration camps, for instance. The only real 
film to be made about them - which has never been 
made because it would be intolerable - would be if 
a camp were filmed from the point of view of the 
torturers and their daily routine. How to get a human 
body measuring two metres into a coffin measuring 
fifty centimetres? How to load ten tons of arms and 
legs on to a three-ton lorry? How to burn a hundred 
women with petrol enough for ten? One would also 
have secretaries making lists of everything on their 
typewriters. The really horrible thing about such 
scenes would not be their horror but their very 
ordinary everydayness.
Here the problem is laid bare, of how to make an audience 
see a "real" factor, like anti-semitism and genocide, in 
ways that do not dissipate into statistics, thereby 
dehumanizing the ritual sense of what it is to be human. 
Goerge Steiner, confronting the same issue, has concluded 
that tragedy itself is no lonaer possible against the scale 
of human exterminations in this century, but if this is so 
then humans will have stopped being ritual beings, which I 
do not think is everywhere the case, though I feel that the 
only contemporary tragedy is the political triviality of 
human tragedies.
Already, from within "high culture", literary works 
are being de-ritualized, notably by the French structuralists 
who refuse to see anything but words in a text. This only 
mirrors the wider social science practice of hehaviourizing
373
man by collapsing his ritual realm into the literal dimension 
of his conduct. I see both these approaches as being untrue 
to people's experience: that how they act, no more than the
two-dimensional representation of perspective in a painting, 
is not to be fully understood in terms that do not, as in the 
analogy of the painting, show a third dimension or ritual realm 
as I have called it.
Can I prove this? Only if the words with which I have 
indicated the ritual realm have seemed to open up a space that 
at the same time is not a space so much as a frame in which 
human acts can begin to be properly analysed as having such 
attributes as dignity, vileness, goodness, beauty, clumsiness, 
and so on, through the manner of their being acted.
I have declared "inner men" to be fabrications or at 
best misleading descriptors of possessions that are private, 
and I suggest that these non-sociological entities are 
mythologized into the culture so that society may be kept 
stable. In the situation where people's faces can so easily 
be blown this way or that in this or that ritual wind, life 
is brought under control when these faces are nailed to a 
variety of grinning skulls such as "IQ", "extraversion- 
introversion rating", "neuroticism score", "construct set", 
and so on.
Of course, already, many distinguished scientific 
careers (Birdwhistell, Garfinkel, Scheflen) have been poured 
into the proposition that a person is only his seeable self.
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but not even Goffman has seemed to want to make a case for 
the human capacity to enrich and refine performative con­
duct, especially by its sensitive responses to other per­
formances, and so these scientists miss perhaps a central 
social fact, that, if ritual power can be acquired in 
interaction by conduct alone, every other theory, of how 
power (of this sort) is acquired by a levelling down of one 
set of parties in order to elevate another, is riddled with 
as many holes as there are ritually powerful performances 
in the interactions it would pretend to explain. Of course, 
it is always easier to short-cut performance demands by 
politically consolidating a ritually powerful enactment 
with rules backed by force, and those who confront such 
political terror tactics - whether in their families or 
in the organizations where they work - may re-route thwarted 
appreciation (of "betters" who do not live up to their 
statuses) into figures from the realms of entertainment and 
high culture. Thus there arises a parallel society, more 
real, if reality be measured by engrossableness, than the 
one of cash and labour and gun, which, of late, Althiede &
Snow (19 79) have demonstrated, more and more models itself 
on this flimsier but ritually more powerful world.
My thesis has been a provisional affair, since it wished 
to begin five inseparable large projects rather than conclude 
a small one. These projects are:
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(1) The integration of a branch of interactional sociology 
with some society-wide conceptualizations.
(2) A re-orientation of a style of interactional sociology 
so that the life of everyday life becomes its central 
reference.
(3) The linking of an interaction theory to a wider theory 
of human comprehension (this in embryo is the rapture- 
possession relation).
(4) The development of a sociology whose methodology and 
practice are of a piece with its findings.
(5) To advance a theme of the thought of the only genius 
(known to me, at any rate) currently writing sociology
My judgement of this thesis is that I have indeed opened up 
each one of these projects as sociologically viable activi­
ties, and my reason for not having been clearer or more 
comprehensive than I have been is that the amount of work 
required to push any one of these projects to a conclusion 




1 Some of the conclusions are developed as the summary 
goes along.
2 I refer to punks in the present tense even though their 
fashion is now outmoded.
3 An Oakland Chapter Hell's Angel quoted in Thompson (1968).
4 Audiences may be a sociological category between groups 
and mobs, but, though most persons belong to them more 
frequently than they belong to groups or mobs, the category 
has not been well developed in sociology. A view of society 
as a collection of overlapping audiences has the merit of 
directing attention to what is most attended to by social 
people.
5 Scheflen (1973a) says that an emotional response "is merely 
cognitive experience for which the idea is not conscious"
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My theory, speculative and barely theoretical though 
it may be, predicts a trend in sociology toward more literary 
work, because literature is a dramatic ritual realm that meets 
both social life and language in full face, so to speak, 
generally avoiding outlooks, on the one hand, that take lan­
guage to be a mathetic code for things called facts and, on 
the other hand, that assume life to be best approached by 
the mind in its lowest gear, steering straight ahead, and 
throttled back to a purely measuring, quantitatively analytic 
mode. Once the premature sciaitism of sociology (and perhaps 
psychology too) is seen for what it is, perhaps a new genre 
of sociology-literature will replace it, blending ethno­
graphies and speculative analysis as good journalism, in a 
halting way, already does. The imagination may then be used 
to take the reader closer to the realities of life and not - 
as has happened in most of literature since the novel ceased 
being a popular verbal entertainment - further away as if it 
itself were a greater realm than society. Thus this appendix ■ 
"Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man" - is a short text 
written to show how a series of experiences lived on the level 
of cunning, physical performance awakens a protagonist to 
their ritual meanings. From a sociological point of view, 
the text feels incomplete, because everything is implicit.
But from the point of view of the text, of course, sociology 
seems incomplete, because nothing there is implicit.
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Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man
His pencil beam played over the statuette without 
sticking to the gold that, touched by light, seemed warm 
and reptilian and alive with a contempt for the man behind 
the beam. He switched his torch off and darkness, dissolving 
away his surface, exposed his tree of nerves to the seething, 
hyperactive silence, but, from this fear-infested non-being, 
his hand and arm, a trembling branch of nerves, reached out. 
The hand took the statuette and put it as gently as if it 
were a grenade into his pocket, then, not sensible that it 
had stolen what had been coveted, waited there while he, 
still rooted to the spot, braced himself against arresting 
hands that did not seize him this time.
He padded across the carpet to the door at which, 
appalled by the loudness of his footfalls following him, 
he paused, but he heard not the tiniest crack of any one 
of this building's bricks contracting in the huge cold 
night. He went through the door, and as he closed it the 
latch clicked to like a camera taking a portrait of his 
back. Motionless now, he peered between the landing ban­
isters into a black fog that stirred in none of its particles 
and only his heart thudded at the centre of this palace 
of refrigeration.
He glided along the landing, and then up a flight of 
marble stairs, three at a time, and up a second flight, 
and a third, and into what, from his sense of its walls 
and ceiling narrowing him in, he guessed to be corridor. 
Twenty paces down the corridor he stopped. In the icy 
wall to his right, there was the handle he wanted, which
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he turned to open the door of a small room he entered.
Presh air now penetrated the wool of his ski mask; it came 
from the high window he had struggled in through just two 
minutes ago.
He egressed the window backwards, pulling himself 
up by his hands which had hold of the guttering above, 
and, as he swung round the overhang of the gutter, he did 
not see down into space that far below ended in level, 
hard denial of braggadocio on high. His toes at last in 
the gutter, he stretched up and out in a star on the sloping 
roof, then crabwise inched right till he could drop onto 
a flat ledge.
There he took his bearings in a nightscape of lights 
cumulatively glowing yellow beneath a sky whose ragged 
muslin clouds took on tinges of blue as they tore across 
the moon.
It was bitter cold.
Five storeys below, the exhaust of a Rolls-Royce drifted 
through the hard light of a No Entry sign, euid/Rolls Royce's 
perfected drone disappeared street by street into the city's 
low roar that now and again was descanted by wind keening 
in some aerials overhead. To the left, a box with louvred 
vents housed the inflow of an air-conditioning system. 
Crouching next to it now, he heard a woman moaning, "Say 
you love me, please, or I'll die of shame." A man grunted 
and bedsprings twanged as if the man had jumped to his feet. 
Sounds of a scuffle filtered up through the vents, and 
horrified female gasps and female words, "Help me somebody 
please."
His ladder, at the far parapet to which he had crept, 
was still there, thank god. He placed it across the drop 
between this building and its neighbour, and on all fours 
crawled downwards into the sag - over a street as clear 
as a photograph but in his same medium of empty air - then 
crawled up to the other side, where he pulled the ladder 
in after him. Below this parapet, as he had left them, 
were the briefcase, western boots, and anorak. He ripped
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off his ski mask and gloves and training shoes, and stowed 
them in the briefcase on top of the statuette; then he 
put in the bleeper by which his look-out in the street 
had not needed to alert him.
A minute later, briefcase in hand, he was ready to go, 
but he stood listening intently to a roof so silent he 
suspected a trap. Trap or not, there was no other way 
down than the emergency stairs, which he did not make a 
move towards until the moon went behind a thick cloud.
less than thirty seconds later he was in the street 
walking away from the scene of his crime with the relaxed 
gait of a man of means.
Outside the pub where he had arranged to rendezvous 
with his lookout, he faltered, irrationally certain that 
the police were lying in wait behind the swing doors, yet 
in the Lounge Bar no one was watching his accomplice,' who 
seemed ready to plunge, a suicide, into the deep V neck 
of a barmaid whose two eyes were like Pernod clouding from 
within as she saw an admirer taken away from her.
At the rear of the pub the two men locked themselves 
into a single cubicle of the Gents.
The briefcase was exchanged, but words were not.
A minute later, with empty hands, the burglar passed 
through the pub’s back gate into a cul-de-sac lined with 
battered, lidless dustbins. For an instant of foreboding, 
he felt that the bins were waiting to fill with the goods 
his cash would consume, but he walked past them, and on, 
to the terrace house of his brother-in-law. Its door opened 
as if it were the entrance to a Victorian catacomb, barred, 
however, by his brother-in-law, whose face was like an 
identikit being jogged as it said, "Hello.”
In the lounge they disturbed a woman watching Startrek. 
She eyed her brother with an unnerving stare of greed and 
fear combined; then she went to the TV and decreased its 
volume to zero while her husband poured gins. She handed 
round the drinks, and, after omitting to toast one another, 
the three of them sipped cautiously.
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"What’s the time?" demanded the visitor.
"Ten forty-five," murmured his sister.
"And I ’ve been here since nine?" she was asked in the 
same tone of voice.
The woman searched her husband’s face for the face 
of the man she had married and he gazed back at her as if 
he thought she thought he was someone else, and, outside 
the continuing guessing game and feud of their marriage, 
the visitor laid five £10 notes next to his almost full 
glass on the low coffee table.
"Yes. You’ve been here since nine," the man estimated, 
"hasn’t he? hasn’t he, dear?"
"Yes. Nine."
The two men then drove in the brother-in-law’s van 
through Highbury to a block of flats in Islington. This 
was to maintain the alibi that had just been bought: it 
was understood that if its truth had to be sworn in court 
more money would change hands. By now the statuette had 
been fenced and the briefcase full of forensically incriminating 
gear had been loaded with a brick and dropped in the Thames, 
so only one link to the crime remained. That was the Security 
Officer. Probably he would confess to the police and maybe 
he was talking at that very moment, but he could only point 
the finger at a man who when bribing him to unplug the
alarms for that vital ten minutes had worn a blond wig,
sunglasses, and, to increase his height, cuban heels.
The brother-in-law parked the van and had to trot to 
keep up as they entered the block, crossed the hall, climbed 
twelve zig-zag flights of stairs, and went down a sixth- 
floor corridor.
They stopped and the man in front tapped on a door 
which, after a wait, opened slowly, revealing a woman with 
brilliant eyes. The thief turned from the eyes and said 
to his brother-in-law, "Goodnight."
"Oh yes, goodnight," was the reply from a figure who 
diminished down the corridor as if he were pushing a barrow
loaded with scrap. Prom the gloomy distance, this badly-
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dressed, furtive-looking man looked back and darkly called, 
"Be lucky."
The thief joined his wife in the bed she had risen 
from to answer the front door, and they lay side by side, 
not touching, she in one of her few nightdresses that he 
had not given her. He could no longer understand whom he 
had been in those days when he had always rushed into the
flat with nothing else in his mind but to go to work on
her like a pneumatic drill. After all her explosive orgasms, 
he wondered that she was still shaped like a woman, whom 
other men, at least, lusted after just as he had once.
"I’m going to leave you," she said.
He felt like retorting, "So leave me."
After a while, though, his life began to seem futile 
without her.
He rolled onto his side, facing her, and could see
the livid line of her profile against the dim wall, a wall
vague as if through it he might discern some consoling 
human sign. Her profile's lips, now parting and closing 
three times in saying, "I mean it," seemed to take in a 
shadowy hope that he felt was his.
"No!" she shouted, wrestling away from him, but in 
no time her body, whoever that was, welcomed him without 
reserve.
He began to spin round a tiny, living Venus that was 
gleaming lasciviously with gold. If he grabbed it, crushed 
it to nothing in his fist, would he absorb its strange 
erotic power? His hand moved to pluck the figure from 
its darkness but, when his fingertips brushed the gold, 
he lost his balance and toppled over and fell headlong 
into what felt like an endless hole. A window in the side 
he was falling past lit up and out of it popped the head 
of his wife, happy as he had never seen her in life. 
"Goodbye," she said. He laboured to find some words to 
say but another window lit up showing a teacher he remembered 
from Primary School. She was shaking her head. Below 
the teacher there glared the face of a lady magistrate.
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"Do you want to spend your whole life in prison?" she 
enquired. Following her, a detective pronounced, "You’ll 
do ten for this you bastard."
A long way below the detective a prison governor fixed 
him with sharp, inhuman eyes. "I might as well be addressing 
a brick wall," he sighed, and then he laughed an ugly laugh 
that followed its human object down the hole into even 
thicker blackness. No faces materialized for quite a time, 
until a grey-wigged judge suddenly shone forth. "You are 
an enemy of society. I am sentencing you to..." But the 
man in the dock was plummeting too fast to hear the length 
of his term, though it had to be life.
The bedroom door was being broken down.
Twisting round, he separated from his wife, and was 
blinded by the beam of a heavy-duty torch. Before he could 
react, the centre light switched on, bleakening four walls 
that, newly solid, closed off rescue or redemption. At the 
foot of the bed crouched two rigid detectives, like figures 
in a manual, each aiming a .38 revolver at his brain, and 
in the doorway behind them thronged uniformed policemen and 
women, gaping in. To stop the howling noise he shut his 
mouth, yet the howling continued. Thickly he understood 
that it came from his wife hidden under the white sheet 
she had .dragged over her head.
He put up his hands and got out of bed, and the police 
made way for him as nakedly he strolled into the lounge 
where a search warrant was waved under his nose.
"You’re coming with us," commanded a senior detective.
Two policewomen dashed into the bedroom and the wife 
quieted to the relief of everyone, though not a single 
face relaxed. A detective appeared with clothing in his 
arms, but he was still pointing a gun at his nude quarry, 
whom he allowed to dress before locking handcuffs onto his 
wrists. Even as their prisoner was being hustled out of 
the flat the uniformed police began tearing it apart.
Nobody spoke in the lift or in the front hall of the 
block or in the police car or in the police station all
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the way to an underground Interview Room, where the prisoner 
was left alone. He sat on one of two chairs at a battered 
table, and studied the grain lines that pencil points had 
deepened. Every single channel led indirectly or directly 
to one or other of the table's precipitous edges. He was 
trapped on the table top, unable to leap to freedom.
There were hours to go before dawn and this windowless 
room, despite an iron radiator that smelled of the nineteenth- 
century foundry it had been cast in, held no more warmth 
than a railway platform.
The prisoner's senses were so bared that he could 
hear a detective going up the steps to the side entrance 
of the police station, hear him walk down a hallway, enter 
an office, open a filing cabinet, pull out a dossier, shut 
the cabinet, exit the office, descend a flight of stone 
steps, walk down the corridor outside this room... The 
detective opened the door, sat down across the table, and 
began to read from the dossier;
"Taking away a car... Burglary... Resisting arrest... 
Conspiring to rob... Armed robbery... Etcetera..."
The detective then authored a swelling silence before 
closing the dossier as on a pressed flower he had reprieved 
from burning.
"You're a shit," he commented, "and I don't like you 
living in the area of ray jurisdiction."
"Hard luck," the prisoner said, his words outing before 
he had thought them.
More silence, signed only by the detective, who eventually
said :
"It's your hard luck actually. From now on I'm going 
to go after you day and night, night and day. You'll make 
a mistake sooner or later. And I'll catch you."
The detective stood up, and tucked his dossier under 
one arm and almost marched to the door which he opened but 
did not go through. He called to the policeman on guard 
outside, "Lock him up," and he looked back lingeringly at 
the prisoner, who was studying the fingernails of his right
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hand. Then the detective leaned into the corridor as if
it were an uphill slog all the way now to his pension.
The prisoner was escorted the other way down this corridor
to a narrow flight of concrete steps, and down these, then
along a darker corridor which smelled of unwashed bodies,
and into a dirty cell. The policeman took off the prisoner's
handcuffs before leaving the cell and turning a loud iron
key in its door. Locked away, the prisoner sat down on
the hard bed and looked up at the light, a glaucomatous
bulb covered by a bowl of reinforced glass, and he looked
at the hard walls which seemed to harden further as if
their solidity was extending to the boundaries of his
consciousness. So here he was again trapped in a lift stuck nearer hell^than heaven. , , .Three hours later, released as arbitrarily as he had
been confined, he walked home into the dawn breaking over 
the city that by day he regarded as asleep, swarming with 
people to whom he did not credit the emotion which in him 
night sharpened till it could cut through the bars he met 
everywhere.
At home, his wife, who had cleaned up the flat, made 
two cups of instant coffee which she set down on the kitchen 
table they sat either side of.
"What are you going to do today?" she asked.
He gave a start, for even in so brief a spell of custody
he had broken the habit of making plans.
"Go to the gym. Weight training."
She shut her eyes as if her burden, of neglect, was 
finally too great.
He thought of his muscles glistening with sweat and 
the swollen blue veins snaking beneath his skin, and an 
image came back to him from a glossy magazine, of a nude 
woman photographed upwards from a position between her 
knees. She was caught in the act of pulling a T-shirt 
over her head, her arms snared in the garment above her 
leaned-back body which was as inviting as runway to one 
longing for take-off into what?
He did have the phone numbers of a girl who for cash
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would willingly assume the stance of the woman in the magazine, 
so he would take it from there, because he had to try.
He knew already, though, that it would probably end up with 
his whipping the girl's buttocks until he shot himself 
into thin air. The distant premonition of those whip marks, 
that like thin red bars caged in his desire to love, paled 
as his wife's face came back into focus.
They finished their coffees in silence. He felt she 
understood him. She waited for him to say he would stay 
home after all. He got up and walked out of the kitchen, 
she following.
In the hall he donned his Crombie overcoat while his 
wife framed herself in the lounge doorway. On a row of 
cloakroom hooks to her right, their coats hung like dis­
continued personalities. She leaned against one jamb, 
folded her arms.
"Do you love me?" she asked.
He stopped buttoning his coat and met her eyes. She 
blinked and looked down. He buttoned the last two buttons.
"When you get back tonight. I'll be gone."
"You don't have to go."
In the doorway that over the years she had made her 
proscenium for the delivery of farewells, nothing changed 
but her eyes which began shedding tears.
He left, and she listened to him thumping down the 
corridor, listened to the lift, and, after a gap, to his 
car as he backed it out of the car-park behind the block.
She did not budge, though if it had been possible she would 
have lain open-legged in the path of his car, for she craved 
what he had become for her, a vicious machine, which, as 
it tortured also processed her emotions into reliable, 
calculating attitudes that protected her from men.
Eventually her tears dried. She laughed, and said 
aloud, "I'm leaving you today." Still laughing, she went 
into the kitchen. There she smashed the coffee grinder, 
the percolator, the electric kettle, the microwave oven, 
the freezer, the fridge, and the transistor radio. Still
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laughing - but all the while hearing herself with a mixture 
of affection and panic - she went from kitchen to lounge, 
where she smashed the hifi, the colour TV, the standard 
lamp, the bottles and glasses of the cocktail cabinet, 
the cabinet itself, the ashtrays, the mirrors, and the 
glass of the glass-topped tables. After that she stopped 
laughing and went to bed, and resolved not to move until 
she was absolutely certain what to do next.
In the gym, meanwhile, her husband on his back bench- 
pressed a seven-foot cadmium steel bar with 30 Kg on each 
end. At this moment, when the man of nerves was eclipsed 
by the man of muscles, he recited one of his poems to 
himself;




I live with the dead.
I am a spirit,
for ever and ever.
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